Jones #260563 v. Niemi
Filing
19
OPINION and ORDER denying Motion to Dismiss ; signed by Judge R. Allan Edgar (Judge R. Allan Edgar, cmb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
JESSE JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 2:13-CV-204
HON. R. ALLAN EDGAR
STEVEN NIEMI
Defendant.
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OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
violations of his rights under the First and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
In his pro se complaint, submitted on June 21, 2013 (Docket # 1), Plaintiff sues Corrections
Officer (CO) Steven Niemi for declaratory and punitive damages. Presently before this Court is
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss based on qualified immunity. Docket # 15.
Plaintiff is confined in the Michigan Department of corrections. On November
15, 2012, Plaintiff claims to have filed grievance number 12-11-3521-15a (15a). Following the
filing, Plaintiff stated that Defendant Niemi interviewed Plaintiff regarding this grievance.
Docket # 1 at 3. During the interview, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Niemi threatened to file a
misconduct ticket against Plaintiff and tell the inmates he was a snitch if Plaintiff did not sign-off
on the grievance. Id. Plaintiff indicated that he did not sign-off on the grievance. Id. Plaintiff
claims that Defendant Niemi then issued a misconduct report against Plaintiff for possession of
forged documents, and told the other prisoners that Plaintiff was a snitch. Id. Plaintiff states that
the misconduct ticket was dismissed by the hearing officer. Docket # 18 at 4. Since this alleged
incident, Plaintiff claims that he is in constant fear for his life because he receives threats that he
will be stabbed or killed by other inmates for being a snitch. Docket # 1 at 3. Upon reading the
complaint, it appears that Plaintiff sets forth the following claims for relief:
I. That Defendant Niemi violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right
to be protected from harm when he told the other inmates that
Plaintiff was a snitch.
II. That Defendant Niemi violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment right
to file grievances when Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff by
fabricating a misconduct ticket against Plaintiff and telling the other
prisoners that Plaintiff was a snitch after he did not sign-off on
grievance 15a.
Docket # 1. Presently before this Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), based on qualified immunity. Docket # 15. Plaintiff has filed a response
(Docket # 18), and the matter is now ready for a decision.
I.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the pleading,
requiring the court to determine whether the plaintiff would be entitled to relief if everything
alleged in the complaint is true. Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993). "[A]
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle [the plaintiff] to
relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see McGregor v. Indus. Excess Landfill,
Inc., 856 F.2d 39, 42-43 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that plaintiff’s complaint was denied when it
failed to set forth events, occurrences, and circumstances for which his claim was based). The
court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 236 (1974). A judge may not dismiss the complaint simply because he disbelieves the
complaint's factual allegations. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
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II.
Defendant Niemi claims that his motion to dismiss should be granted entirely on
the basis of qualified immunity because Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant violated
one of Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights. Qualified immunity “is an affirmative
defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815
(1982) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980)). Government officials, performing
discretionary functions, are generally shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir.
1999); Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1997). An “objective reasonableness” test is
used to determine whether the official could reasonably have believed his conduct was lawful.
Dietrich, 167 F.3d at 1012; Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). “Qualified
immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when
they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction,
and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
231 (2009).
Since this case has already been screened, this Court has determined that
Plaintiff’s claims do, in fact, allege violations of his federal constitutional rights. Docket # 5; see
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232; see also Moore v. Lowe, No. 1:13-CV-1136, 2014 WL 905840, at *5
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 7, 2014) (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (“Because §
1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first
step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly
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infringed.”)). As such, the only question before the Court on this motion to dismiss based on
qualified immunity is whether the constitutional violations Plaintiff alleges were clearly
established at the time of Defendant’s actions.
When determining whether a right is clearly established, this Court must look first
to decisions of the United States Supreme Court, then to decisions of the Sixth Circuit and to
other courts within this Circuit, and finally to decisions of other circuits. Dietrich, 167 F.3d at
1012. “A Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the
challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable
official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2078 (2011), (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640).
A. Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect Claim
Plaintiff raises an Eighth Amendment claim that Defendant Niemi failed to
protect him from harm when Defendant told the other prisoners that Plaintiff was a snitch,
thereby subjecting Plaintiff to physical harm. Assuming the facts as Plaintiff outlines them are
true, Plaintiff has alleged a clearly established constitutional right as of the date of this incident
(on or about November 15, 2012). Docket # 1 at 3; Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236 (noting the court
must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff); see Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (stating inmates have a constitutional right to personal safety under the
Eighth Amendment); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984) (noting prison staff are
obliged “to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates”); Catanzaro v. Mich.
De’t. of Corrs., No. 08-11173, 2011 WL 768115, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 10, 2011) (citing
Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that being labeled a snitch
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could satisfy the Farmer standard for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s safety)); Jones v.
Bergh, No. 2:08-CV-128, 2010 WL 3885363, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2010) (noting that
labeling an inmate a snitch could place an inmate in danger, supporting an Eighth Amendment
claim). Thus, “in drawing all permissible inferences in Plaintiff[’s] favor,” this Court concludes
that Plaintiff has established that his right to be protected from harm while in prison was clearly
established as of November 2012. As such, Defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim based on
qualified immunity is denied. See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236.
B. First Amendment Retaliation Claim
Plaintiff’s next constitutional claim is that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s First
Amendment right to file grievances when Defendant allegedly retaliated against Plaintiff by
filing a false misconduct ticket against him and by labeling Plaintiff a snitch after Plaintiff filed
grievance 15a. Docket # 1 at 3. As of November 2012, it was clearly established that retaliating
against an inmate for engaging in protected conduct was a violation of an inmate’s First
Amendment rights. See Scott v. Churchill, No. 97-2061, 2000 WL 519148, at *2 (6th Cir. 2000)
(“A prisoner has a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials.”); see Smith
v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (filing prison grievances is constitutionally
protected conduct for which a prisoner cannot be subjected to retaliation); Hall v. Nusholtz, No.
99-2442, 2000 WL 1679458, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000) (same); Burton v. Rowley, No. 001144, 2000 WL 1679463, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000) (same). Consequently, Defendant’s
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim based on qualified immunity fails because
Plaintiff’s right to file grievances without being subjected to retaliation was clearly established as
of November 2012.
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III.
Overall, in construing Plaintiff’s handwritten pro se documents liberally, this
Court concludes that Plaintiff has stated claims for which relief may be granted under § 1983.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (stating that pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than
pleadings drafted by attorneys, and will only be dismissed if the claim undoubtedly contains no
facts to support its request for relief). Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket #
15) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
____/s/ R. Allan Edgar_________________
R. ALLAN EDGAR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated:____9/18/2015_______
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