Lewis #659963 v. Reisener et al
Filing
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OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
TONY DOIRELLE LEWIS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:13-cv-327
v.
Honorable Robert Holmes Bell
DALE REISENER,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO . 104-134, 110 STAT . 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro
se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure
to state a claim against Defendants Hough, McLean, and Swift. The Court will serve the complaint
against Reisener, Brown, Anderson, and Taylor with regard to Plaintiff’s equal protection claims,
and against Defendants Reisener, Brown, Anderson, Taylor, Dilday, and Bailey with regard to
Plaintiff’s retaliation claims.
Discussion
I.
Factual allegations
Plaintiff Tony Doirelle Lewis, a state prisoner currently confined at the West
Shoreline Correctional Facility in Muskegon, Michigan, filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint, Plaintiff names Dale Reisener, Unknown Bailey, Unknown
Brown, L. Hough, Unknown McLean, T. Swift, Unknown Anderson, Unknown Dilday, and
Unknown Taylor. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that while he was confined at the Chippewa
Correctional Facility (URF), he was subjected to sexual harassment, racial intimidation /
discrimination, and a violation of his due process rights.
Plaintiff contends that Defendant Reisener, a Corrections Officer, has a reputation
for playing the “slip game,” which involves an exchange of homosexual jokes and innuendo
designed to insult and emasculate inmates. Plaintiff alleges that on his first day in C-Unit, Defendant
Reisener responded to a question about where to turn in phone disbursements by stating, “Bend over
and I’ll show you.” Plaintiff told Defendant Reisener that he did not like to “play like that,” which
seemed to encourage Defendant Reisener even more. Defendant Reisener then began to make
sexually inappropriate comments to Plaintiff almost every time that he saw him, which made
Plaintiff feel uncomfortable and ashamed.
Plaintiff spoke to Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Haglee and asked for assistance
with the situation, to no avail. On December 8, 2011, Defendant Reisener intentionally rubbed
Plaintiff’s penis and made sexually explicit remarks during a routine pat down search. When
Plaintiff asked Defendant Reisener not to touch his penis anymore, Defendant Reisener stated, “Next
time I’ll put you in front of the camera and grab your nuts.” Plaintiff began to fear that Defendant
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Reisener was actually a homosexual predator. Later that day, Plaintiff filed a grievance on
Defendant Reisener. Defendant Reisener denied any misconduct and the grievance respondent lied
and stated that Plaintiff had failed to present any supporting evidence, despite the fact that Plaintiff
had requested two prisoner witnesses be interviewed. Plaintiff subsequently received a misconduct
for insolence for telling Defendant Reisener “you don’t need to be touching my groin area.”
On December 20, 2011, Plaintiff was moved to another unit, away from Defendant
Reisener. However, on Plaintiff’s first day in the unit, Defendant Reisener came over and sat down
next to Defendant Taylor, stating “That nigger Lewis is my bitch, so don’t you be trying to fuck
him.” Defendant Taylor then stated to Plaintiff, “Nigger when I get back we are going to get to know
one another.” Defendant Taylor also stated that Plaintiff was not going to like him very much.
Plaintiff filed a grievance asserting that Defendant Reisener was stalking him.
On January 16, 2012, Defendant Reisener passed Plaintiff and stated, “I’m going to
get you nigger.” Plaintiff states that Defendant Reisener was now calling him “nigger” on a regular
basis. Plaintiff filed a grievance, which was denied by Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor M. Cope:
I interviewed [Resident Unit Officer] Rysner (sic) and he stated at no
time did he ever make that statement to prisoner Lewis. Lewis has a
history of filling [sic] grievances accusing staff of racial statements.
There has been no proof of prisoner Lewis being harassed by MDOC
staff.
Plaintiff’s grievance was denied at levels I, II and III.
On March 22, 2012, Plaintiff was transferred to the Newberry Correctional Facility
(NCF). Plaintiff assumed that he was being transferred so that he could get away from Defendant
Reisener. However, Plaintiff later discovered that he had been transferred as part of a routine trade
for bed space. After about six months, Plaintiff was returned to URF. Plaintiff filed a grievance,
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asserting that he was in danger of further harassment by Defendant Reisener. Less than a month
later, Plaintiff was moved back into the same unit where Defendant Reisener continued to work as
a housing unit officer. Plaintiff spoke to Defendant Brown about his difficulties with Defendant
Riesener. Defendant Brown responded by stating that Plaintiff’s accusations were disrespectful
toward staff and that she was not going to move him anywhere. Defendant Brown told Plaintiff that
he would have to “deal with it.”
On January 9, 2013, Plaintiff filed a grievance asserting that he had been moved to
Defendant Reisener’s unit in retaliation for the December 13, 2012, grievance and that Defendant
Brown had failed to take corrective action to protect Plaintiff from Defendant Reisener. Defendant
Bailey responded to Plaintiff’s grievance noted that Defendant Reisener had denied Plaintiff’s
allegations and that Plaintiff had failed to offer any examples or evidence to support his claims.
Plaintiff asserts that this was a lie because he had set forth numerous examples of Defendant
Reisener’s misconduct in support of his grievance. Plaintiff kited Defendant Bailey and asked to be
moved. Defendant Bailey told Plaintiff that he did not have a right to pick the facility where he
wished to reside and that Plaintiff would end up back in Level IV because of his accusations.
On January 10, 2013, Plaintiff filed a grievance on Defendant Bailey. Defendant
Swift denied the grievance, stating that there were no case notes indicating any past issues with
Defendant Reisener. On January 11, 2013, after Defendant Reisener learned that Plaintiff had
complained to Defendant Brown, Defendant Reisener stated, “nigger you are going to pay.” Plaintiff
filed a grievance regarding Defendant Reisener’s comment, as well as the fact that Defendants
Brown and Bailey were unwilling to help Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s grievance was denied at all three
steps. On January 28, 2013, Plaintiff asked Defendant Reisener to sign his pass so that the could go
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to the Law Library. Defendant Reisener stated, “bend over nigger.” Plaintiff filed a grievance
reporting this incident. When interviewed, Defendant Riesener stated that when Plaintiff asked him
to sign his law library pass, he told Plaintiff to wait until he was done making his round. Plaintiff’s
grievance was denied.
On May 30, 2013, Plaintiff asked Defendant Dilday for a pass to health care, but
Defendant Reisener interrupted, stating, “would you rather see me?” Plaintiff ignored Defendant
Reisener and Defendant Dilday told Plaintiff to come back in thirty minutes. When Plaintiff
returned, Defendant Dilday laughed and told Plaintiff to get his pass from Defendant Reisener.
Defendant Reisener asked Plaintiff, “who’s your favorite officer?” Plaintiff looked at Defendant
Dilday, but Defendant Reisener instructed Defendant Dilday not to give Plaintiff a pass because
Plaintiff would not talk to him. Plaintiff filed a grievance, but Defendants Reisener and Dilday lied
and said that when Plaintiff was told to come back in thirty minutes, he never returned. Plaintiff
claims that Defendants McLean and Hough hindered his attempts to grieve staff misconduct by
ignoring his grievances, forcing Plaintiff to re-file grievances.
On June 13, 2013, Plaintiff was standing in his doorway when Defendant Anderson
approached and pushed Plaintiff backwards, telling Plaintiff to “get the fuck out of my way you lying
nigger.” Plaintiff filed a grievance, which was denied. In responding to the grievance, Defendant
Anderson denied any recollection of Plaintiff or of the assault. Plaintiff later received a misconduct
ticket for lying about staff and was found guilty.
On June 28, 2013, Defendant Reisener wrote Plaintiff a misconduct ticket for having
an unmade bed and a book and earplugs on his TV shelf. Plaintiff claims that the rule regarding an
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unmade bed was not strictly enforced and that it was only enforced against Plaintiff because he was
black and refused to engage in homosexual banter with Reisener.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief.
II.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
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standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. The
Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those
convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving
standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). The Amendment,
therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S.
at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600-01 (6th Cir.
1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations of essential food, medical care,
or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348
(citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while
incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954.
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In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that
he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with
“‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir.
2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (applying deliberate indifference
standard to medical claims); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying
deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims)).
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Reisener violated his Eighth Amendment rights by
subjecting him to sexual harassment. “[B]ecause the sexual harassment or abuse of an inmate by a
corrections officer can never serve a legitimate penological purpose and may well result in severe
physical and psychological harm, such abuse can, in certain circumstances, constitute the
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Freitas v. Ault,
109 F.3d 1335, 1338 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoted cases omitted).
Circuit courts consistently have held that sexual harassment, absent contact or
touching, does not satisfy the objective requirement because such conduct does not constitute the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. See Morales v. Mackalm, 278 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir.
2002) (allegations that prison guard asked prisoner to have sex with her and to masturbate in front
of her and other female staffers did not rise to level of Eighth Amendment violation); Barney v.
Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1311 n.11 (10th Cir. 1998) (allegations that county jailer subjected female
prisoners to severe verbal sexual harassment and intimidation was not sufficient to state a claim
under the Eighth Amendment); Howard v. Everett, No. 99-1277EA, 2000 WL 268493, at *1 (8th
Cir. March 10, 2000) (sexual comments and gestures by prison guards did not constitute unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain); cf. Seltzer-Bey v. Delo, 66 F.3d 961, 962-63 (8th Cir. 1995)
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(allegations that prison guard conducted daily strip searches, made sexual comments about prisoner’s
penis and buttocks, and rubbed prisoner’s buttocks with nightstick were sufficient to withstand
motion for summary judgment); Zander v. McGinnis, No. 97-1484, 1998 WL 384625, at *2 (6th Cir.
June 19, 1998) (verbal abuse of mouthing “pet names” at prisoner for ten months failed to state an
Eighth Amendment claim); Murray v. United States Bureau of Prisons, No. 95-5204, 1997 WL
34677, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 1997) (magistrate judge correctly held that verbal abuse in the form
of offensive remarks regarding a transsexual prisoner’s bodily appearance, transsexualism, and
presumed sexual preference cannot state an Eighth Amendment claim). Some courts have held that
even minor, isolated incidents of sexual touching coupled with offensive sexual remarks do not rise
to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See, e.g., Solomon v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 478 F.
App’x 318, 320-21 (6th Cir. 2012) (two “brief” incidents of physical contact during pat-down
searches, including touching and squeezing the prisoner’s penis, coupled with sexual remarks, do
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation); Jackson v. Madery, 158 F. App’x 656, 661 (6th
Cir. 2005) (correction officer’s conduct in allegedly rubbing and grabbing prisoner’s buttocks in
degrading manner was “isolated, brief, and not severe” and so failed to meet Eighth Amendment
standards); Johnson v. Ward, No. 99-1596, 2000 WL 659354, at *1 (6th Cir. May 11, 2000) (male
prisoner’s claim that a male officer placed his hand on the prisoner’s buttock in a sexual manner and
made an offensive sexual remark did not meet the objective component of the Eighth Amendment);
Berryhill v. Schriro, 137 F.3d 1073, 1075 (8th Cir. 1998) (where inmate failed to assert that he
feared sexual abuse, two brief touches to his buttocks could not be construed as sexual assault);
accord Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1111 (11th Cir. 2006); Boddie v. Schneider, 105 F.3d 857,
859-61 (2d Cir. 1997) (court dismissed as inadequate prisoner’s claim that female corrections officer
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made a pass at him, squeezed his hand, touched his penis, called him a “sexy black devil,” pressed
her breasts against his chest, and pressed against his private parts).
If true, Officer Reisener’s conduct toward Plaintiff was reprehensible, but it does not
rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Reisener made
sexually inappropriate comments toward him, such as telling him to “bend over,” threatening to
“grab [Plaintiff’s] nuts,” and telling another officer that Plaintiff was his “bitch” in Plaintiff’s
presence. Plaintiff also alleges that on one occasion Defendant Reisener intentionally rubbed his
penis and made sexually explicit remarks during a routine pat down search. As noted above, claims
of isolated touching of a prisoner’s buttocks and / or penis do not rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment violation, even when coupled with sexually suggestive comments. Therefore, Plaintiff’s
allegation fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Reisener.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Taylor, Brown, and Bailey violated his Eighth
Amendment rights by failing to protect him from being sexually harassed by Defendant Reisener.
In order to establish liability for such a claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendants Taylor,
Brown, and Bailey were deliberately indifferent “to a substantial risk of serious harm” to Plaintiff.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 828. To demonstrate deliberate indifference, an inmate must present
evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude “that the official was subjectively aware of the
risk” and “disregard [ed] that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 829, 847.
The only issue before this court is whether Plaintiff stated sufficient allegations to support a finding
that the above Defendants were aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. However,
as noted above, Defendant Reisener’s conduct, while worthy of condemnation, did not rise to the
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level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Therefore, the failure to protect Plaintiff from this conduct
could not constitute a constitutional violation.
Plaintiff also claims that Defendants Reisener, Taylor, Brown, and Anderson called
him “nigger” on numerous occasions. An allegation that a prison official used racial slurs, although
unprofessional and reprehensible, does not rise to constitutional dimensions. See Ivey v. Wilson,
832 F.2d 950, 954-55 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Jones Bey v. Johnson, 248 F. App’x 675, 677-78
(6th Cir. 2007) (prison guard’s use of racial slurs and other derogatory language against state
prisoner did not rise to level of a violation of the Eighth Amendment) (citing Torres v. County of
Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 152 (6th Cir.1985)); Williams v. Gobles, No. 99-1701, 2000 WL 571936,
at *1 (6th Cir. May 1, 2000) (occasional or sporadic use of racial slurs does not rise to a level of
constitutional magnitude; Bell-Bey v. Mayer, No. 98-1425, 1999 WL 1021859, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov.
3, 1999) (same); Thaddeus-X v. Langley, No. 96-1282, 1997 WL 205604, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 24,
1997) (verbal harassment is insufficient to state a claim); Brown v. Toombs, No. 92-1756, 1993 WL
11882 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 1993) (“Brown’s allegation that a corrections officer used derogatory
language and insulting racial epithets is insufficient to support his claim under the Eighth
Amendment.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims regarding the use of racial slurs
lack merit.
However, the Sixth Circuit has held that a pattern of racial harassment involving
racial slurs may violate the Equal Protection Clause. Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1013-14 (6th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 973 (1993). Plaintiff claims that Defendants Reisener, Taylor,
Brown, and Anderson subjected him to such racial harassment. Therefore, Plaintiff’s equal
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protection claims against Defendants Reisener, Taylor, Brown, and Anderson may not be dismissed
on initial review.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Anderson violated his Eighth Amendment rights when
he pushed Plaintiff backwards, telling Plaintiff to “get the fuck out of my way you lying nigger.”
Only those deprivations denying “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” are sufficiently
grave for an Eighth Amendment claim. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992). As noted by
the Supreme Court, “[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace
of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Id. at 9. Therefore, “[f]ederal
courts have routinely held that a single push, shove, punch, or blow by a prison guard does not rise
to the level of a constitutional violation. The same holds true even when the push or shove appears
to be unnecessary.” Stanley v. Smith, 2008 WL 4534434, at *6 (W.D. Mich., Sept. 29, 2008) (citing
Hampton v. Alexander, No. 95–3457, 1996 WL 40237 (6th Cir. Jan.31, 1996)). Plaintiff’s claim that
Defendant Anderson pushed him backward one time is clearly the type of de minimis use of force
which Hudson makes clear does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See De Walt v.
Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 620 (7th Cir.2000); Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir.1997);
Show v. Patterson, 955 F.Supp. 182, 193 (S.D.N.Y.1997). Therefore, Plaintiff’s excessive force
claim against Defendant Anderson is properly dismissed.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Dilday, Bailey, Swift, McLean, and Hough interfered
with his ability to seek redress through the prison grievance system by lying in response to his
grievances or by ignoring his grievances altogether. Plaintiff has no due process right to file a prison
grievance. The Sixth Circuit and other circuit courts have held that there is no constitutionally
protected due process right to an effective prison grievance procedure. Walker v. Mich. Dep’t of
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Corr., 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir.
2003); Young v. Gundy, 30 F. App’x 568, 569-70 (6th Cir. 2002); Carpenter v. Wilkinson, No. 993562, 2000 WL 190054, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422,
1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). Michigan law does not create
a liberty interest in the grievance procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983);
Keenan v. Marker, 23 F. App’x 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2001); Wynn v. Wolf, No. 93-2411, 1994 WL
105907, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 1994). Because Plaintiff has no liberty interest in the grievance
process, Defendants’ conduct did not deprive him of due process.
Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Reisener, Taylor, Brown, Bailey, Dilday, and
Anderson retaliated against him for his use of the grievance procedure. The court concludes that
Plaintiff’s retaliation claims are non-frivolous and may not be dismissed on initial screening.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s due process and Eighth Amendment claims against all Defendants will
be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Therefore, Defendants Hough, McLean, and Swift are dismissed from this
action.
The Court will serve the complaint against Defendants Reisener, Brown, Anderson,
and Taylor with regard to his equal protection claims, and against Defendants Reisener, Brown,
Anderson, Taylor, Dilday, and Bailey with regard to his retaliation claims.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: September 3, 2014
/s/ Robert Holmes Bell
ROBERT HOLMES BELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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