Longacre #626648 v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al
Filing
9
OPINION; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
KYLE JOSEPH LONGACRE,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:14-cv-10
v.
Honorable Gordon J. Quist
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis without payment of an initial
partial filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO . 104-134, 110 STAT . 1321
(1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the
complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Kyle Joseph Longacre, a prisoner currently confined at the Baraga
Maximum Correctional Facility (AMF), filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Defendants Michigan Department of Corrections Central Time and Computation
Center, Department Analysts D. Feller, J. Engstrom, and M. Fisette, and the Michigan Parole Board.
Plaintiff alleges that on March 30, 2012, he was sentenced to a one-year “flat
determinate term” in the MDOC, and that his sentence was to begin the same day. Plaintiff states
that MDOC Cental Time and Computation Center employees improperly treated this sentence as
an indeterminate sentence, so that the Michigan Parole Board obtained jurisdiction over Plaintiff
with regard to this sentence. After the Parole Board denied Plaintiff parole, he informed the Board
that the Central Time and Computation Center had miscalculated the maximum term of his sentence.
The Michigan Parole Board affirmed the calculation as being correct.
According to a memo from Defendant Fisette, dated January 29, 2013, Plaintiff’s
current maximum out date for all controlling sentences is January 31, 2016 (docket #1-1). The
memo states that Plaintiff’s March 30, 2012 sentence was ordered as a consecutive sentence, so it
essentially adds one year to his prior sentences. Plaintiff has filed a motion for injunctive relief
(docket #3), asserting that his true maximum out date for both sentences is January 31, 2015, and
that he should be released as of that date. In addition, Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $500
per day for each day that Plaintiff is forced to serve beyond January 31, 2015.
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Discussion
I.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v.
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Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
As noted above, Plaintiff is claiming that the manner in which his sentence has been
calculated will keep him in prison past the date that he should be released. A challenge to the fact
or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper
subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
484 (1973) (the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody and the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody). Therefore,
to the extent that Plaintiff’s complaint challenges the fact or duration of his incarceration, it must
be dismissed. See Barnes v. Lewis, No. 93-5698, 1993 WL 515483, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 1993)
(dismissal is appropriate where § 1983 action seeks equitable relief and challenges fact or duration
of confinement); see also Moore v. Pemberton, 110 F.3d 22, 23-24 (7th Cir. 1997) (reasons for not
construing a § 1983 action as one seeking habeas relief include (1) potential application of Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), (2) differing defendants, (3) differing standards of § 1915(a)(3)
and § 2253(c), (4) differing fee requirements, (5) potential application of second or successive
petition doctrine or three-strikes rules of § 1915(g)).
To the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief for alleged violations of Constitutional
rights, his claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), which held that “in
order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been [overturned].”
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See Edwards v.
Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997) (emphasis in original). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a
state prisoner cannot make a cognizable claim under § 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid” unless a prisoner shows that the conviction or sentence has been “reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make
such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”
Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). The holding in Heck has been extended to actions seeking
injunctive or declaratory relief. See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646-48 (declaratory relief); Clarke v.
Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1998) (claim for injunctive relief intertwined with request
for damages); Wilson v. Kinkela, No. 97-4035, 1998 WL 246401, at *1 (6th Cir. May 5, 1998)
(injunctive relief). Plaintiff’s allegations clearly call into question the validity of his sentence.
Therefore, his action is barred under Heck until his criminal conviction has been invalidated.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
In addition, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s pending motion for a preliminary
injunction (docket #3) as moot.
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
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Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: August 13, 2014
/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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