Wilson #364916 v. Heyns et al
Filing
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OPINION; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL WILSON,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:14-CV-68
v.
Honorable Gordon J. Quist
DANIEL HEYNS,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis without payment of an initial
partial filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO . 104-134, 110 STAT . 1321
(1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the
complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Christopher Michael Wilson, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the
Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF), filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against Defendants MDOC Director Daniel Heyns, Warden Jeffrey Woods, and Dr. Unknown
Brostoski. In Plaintiff’s complaint, he alleges that on June 26, 2013, he became dizzy and fell due
to inadequate ventilation. Plaintiff states that “AC13-4143 requires that: at least 15 cubic feet of
outside or re-circulated filtered air per minute per occupant for cells as documented by an
independent, qualified source.” See docket #1, p. 2 of 7. Plaintiff alleges that after he returned from
the hospital and was seen by Defendant Brostoski, he was told that Policy Directive 03.04.100
prevented him from receiving any medication stronger than Tylenol or Motrin. Plaintiff asserts that
he is continuing to suffer from the effects of inadequate ventilation in the form of dizziness and
headaches.
Plaintiff states that Defendants’ conduct has violated his rights under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive
relief.
Discussion
I.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
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do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v.
Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment.
In extreme circumstances, courts have found that inadequate ventilation may result in a sufficiently
serious risk to prisoner safety under the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., White v. Monohan, 326 F.
App'x 385, 387–88 (7th Cir. 2009) (reversing district court dismissal of claim alleging that
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inadequate ventilation permitted temperatures to reach 110 degrees during the summer months);
Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 339–40 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that the Eighth Amendment was
violated by a ventilation system that allowed summer temperatures to average in the 90s, unless
prison officials took measures to ameliorate the heat by providing fans, ice water and daily showers);
Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir.1996) (allowing a prisoner’s claim that his cell was
“[s]aturated with the [f]umes of [f]eces (thrown by some inmates), the smell of urine and vomit as
well as other stale body odors” to proceed). However, absent such extreme conditions raising
serious risks to prisoner health, courts routinely have determined that claims concerning ventilation
were insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Frank, 290 F. App'x
927, 929 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that ventilation that allegedly caused dizziness, migraines, nasal
congestion, nose bleeds and difficulty breathing did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation); Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1297–98 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing cases and
concluding that a ventilation system that allowed summer temperatures to average eighty-five or
eighty-six degrees during the day and eighty degrees at night was not sufficiently extreme to violate
the Eighth Amendment, where such temperatures were expected and tolerated by the general public
in Florida); Ingram v. Jewell, 94 F. App’x 271, 273 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding the dismissal of a
prisoner’s claim that the confiscation of his extension cord, which was needed to operate a fan,
deprived him of constitutionally adequate ventilation); Bourrage v. McFarland, No. 99-60923, 2001
WL 185034, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2001) (upholding dismissal of a prisoner’s claim that inadequate
ventilation had led to his prescription for an Albuterol Inhaler); Jasman v. Schmidt, 4 F. App’x 233,
235-36 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of a claim that the weatherstripping on the doors of the
cells at a Michigan prison prevented air circulation and resulted in inadequate ventilation); Davis
v. Crowley, No. 00-1475, 2000 WL 1871891, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 12, 2000) (concluding that a
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plaintiff’s allegations that a ventilation system smelled strongly of gas did not allege a sufficiently
serious harm where, despite his allegations that the fumes caused him to experience shortness of
breath and watery eyes, the plaintiff failed to allege a substantial risk of serious harm); Thompson
v. Cnty. of Medina, 29 F.3d 238, 244 (6th Cir.1994) (upholding a dismissal of pretrial detainees’
claim that a jail had inadequate ventilation); King v. Berghuis, No.1:10-cv-57, 2010 WL 565373,
at *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2010) (dismissing prisoners’ claim alleging that ventilation system
moves less than 10 cubic feet of air and caused headaches).
In the instant case, Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendants have subjected him to an
objectively serious deprivation. As the Supreme Court has observed, “extreme deprivations are
required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. Plaintiff’s
allegations about inadequate ventilation are wholly conclusory. Plaintiff fails to allege any specific
facts regarding the ventilation, such as the presence of fumes, a smell of gas, or any other facts
supporting a conclusion that there was a problem with ventilation. In addition, although Plaintiff
claims that he fell as a result of poor ventilation, this claim appears to be entirely speculative.
Plaintiff fails to allege that he suffered symptoms prior to fall which would evidence a lack of proper
ventilation. Nor does he allege a specific diagnosis showing that his injury was due to lack of
ventilation. See Jasman, 4 F. App’x at 236 (rejecting prisoner complaint about poor ventilation
where plaintiff failed to allege harm caused by the ventilation). Consequently, Plaintiff’s allegations
create no inference of a serious risk to his health or safety.
Moreover, Plaintiff fails to allege that any of the named Defendants were aware of
any problem with ventilation in the unit or that they failed to correct any such problem. In order for
a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that he faced a sufficiently
serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with “‘deliberate
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indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010)
(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (applying deliberate indifference standard to
medical claims)); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying deliberate
indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims)). Because Plaintiff fails to allege that
any of the named Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a known problem with the ventilation
which resulted in his injury, his Eighth Amendment claim regarding ventilation is properly
dismissed.
In addition, after Plaintiff’s fall, he was taken to the hospital for treatment. Following
Plaintiff’s return to the prison, he was instructed to use Tylenol or Motrin as treatment for his
headaches. The Eighth Amendment obligates prison authorities to provide medical care to
incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would be inconsistent with contemporary
standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 102, 103-04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is
violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner.
Id. at 104-05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001).
A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a
subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective
component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In
other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk
of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here
the seriousness of a prisoner’s need[ ] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore
v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004). If, however the need involves “minor
maladies or non-obvious complaints of a serious need for medical care,” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at
898, the inmate must “place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental
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effect of the delay in medical treatment.” Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir.
2001).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a
sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867
(6th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Deliberate indifference “entails something more
than mere negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but can be “satisfied by something less than acts
or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id.
Under Farmer, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
Not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment
states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. As the Supreme Court
explained:
[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be
said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to
be repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Thus, a complaint that
a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical
condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under
the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In
order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs.
Id. at 105-06 (quotations omitted). Thus, differences in judgment between an inmate and prison
medical personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnoses or treatment are not enough to state
a deliberate indifference claim. Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151, 154-55 (6th Cir. 1995); Ward
v. Smith, No. 95-6666, 1996 WL 627724, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1996). This is so even if the
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misdiagnosis results in an inadequate course of treatment and considerable suffering. Gabehart v.
Chapleau, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL 160322, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 1997).
The Sixth Circuit distinguishes “between cases where the complaint alleges a
complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received
inadequate medical treatment.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). If “a
prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment,
federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize
claims which sound in state tort law.” Id.; see also Rouster v. Saginaw Cnty., 749 F.3d 437, 448 (6th
Cir. 2014); Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d 416, 434 (6th Cir. 2006); Kellerman v. Simpson, 258
F. App’x 720, 727 (6th Cir. 2007); McFarland v. Austin, 196 F. App’x 410 (6th Cir. 2006);
Edmonds v. Horton, 113 F. App’x 62, 65 (6th Cir. 2004); Brock v. Crall, 8 F. App’x 439, 440 (6th
Cir. 2001); Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1998). “Where the claimant received
treatment for his condition, as here, he must show that his treatment was ‘so woefully inadequate
as to amount to no treatment at all.’” Mitchell v. Hininger, 553 F. App’x 602, 604–05 (6th Cir.
2013) (quoting Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011)).
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that he fell and was taken to the hospital. In addition,
Plaintiff states that upon his return he was seen by Defendant Brostoski, who advised him to use
Tylenol or Motrin for his headaches. Plaintiff fails to allege any facts demonstrating that this
treatment was inadequate to meet his needs. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims are
properly dismissed.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his due process rights by failing to follow
MDOC policy and procedure. Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law.
Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir.
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1994). Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants violated state law therefore fails to state a claim under
§ 1983. Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to invoke this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction
over a state-law claim, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction. In determining whether to retain
supplemental jurisdiction, “[a] district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and
the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding
state law issues.” Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993).
Ordinarily, where a district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue
of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss
the remaining state-law claims. Id. Dismissal, however, remains “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad
Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)); Orton v.
Johnny’s Lunch Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012). Here, the balance of the
relevant considerations weighs against the continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state-law claim will be dismissed without prejudice to his ability to pursue
relief in state court.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
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Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: September 5, 2014
/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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