Hurick #480810 v. Woods

Filing 33

ORDER APPROVING AND ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 27 , denying Petitioner's motion for summary judgment 18 , denying as moot Petitioner's second motion to amend/correct 28 ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

DALE ALLEN HURICK,
Petitioner,
Case No. 2:14-cv-81
v.
HON. ROBERT HOLMES BELL
JEFFREY WOODS,
Respondent.
/
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Dale Allen Hurick filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner has also filed a motion for summary
judgment.1 (ECF No. 18.) On January 21, 2016, United States Magistrate Judge Timothy P.
Greeley issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (ECF No. 27), recommending that
the petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed and that the motion for summary
judgment be denied. The R&R also recommended that a certificate of appealability be
denied. The matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s objections to the R&R. (ECF No. 30.)
The Court is required to make a de novo determination of those portions of the R&R
to which specific objection has been made, and may accept, reject, or modify any or all of

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The magistrate judge noted that the motion for summary judgment raises the same issues and requests the same
relief as the petition for writ of habeas corpus and considered the two motions together. Petitioner did not object to
this.

the magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b). “[A] general objection to a magistrate’s report, which fails to specify the issues of
contention, does not satisfy the requirement that an objection be filed. The objections must
be clear enough to enable the district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and
contentious.” Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995).
I.
Petitioner was found guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 750.316(a)(1), on November 2, 2009. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied his appeal
as of right, People v. Hurick, No. 295533, 2011 WL 521189 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2011),
and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, People v. Hurick, 800 N.W.2d 588
(Mich. 2011) (memorandum opinion). On April 9, 2014, Petitioner filed his petition for writ
of habeas corpus in this Court, raising several challenges to his conviction. The magistrate
judge recommended dismissing each claim. Petitioner has raised nine objections to the R&R.
The Court will address each in turn.
A. Objection One
Petitioner first argues that he was denied due process when the state trial court denied
his request to adjourn the trial so that independent forensic evaluations could be conducted.
By the end of January 2009, the state court judge had granted Petitioner’s requests for
forensic examinations of Petitioner’s competency to stand trial, competency to waive
Miranda rights, and criminal responsibility. (1/28/2009 Hr’g Tr. 3-4, ECF No. 12-3.) On

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April 16, 2009, the forensic center sent a report indicating that Petitioner was competent to
stand trial. (7/6/2009 Hr’g Tr. 4, ECF No. 12-7.) The trial court judge stated that “I’ll sign
the order that he’s competent to stand trial and find as a matter of law if he’s competent to
stand trial, he’s competent as well to waive Miranda because the Forensic Center has found
no organic mental problem or not organic mental problem [sic]. And I’ll sign that order. And
the motion to adjourn the trial is denied.” (Id.) On October 16, 2009, Petitioner again sought
to adjourn the trial solely to allow for an independent evaluation on Petitioner’s competency
to waive his Miranda rights. The trial court agreed to refer Petitioner for a Miranda
competency evaluation, but upon hearing the evaluation would take 60 days, refused to
further adjourn the trial. (10/21/2009 Hr’g Tr. 4, ECF No. 12-10.)
The Michigan Court of Appeals noted that “review of the record reveals a glaring
deficiency in the area of good cause warranting any adjournment of defendant’s trial for the
purpose of securing independent psychiatric evaluations,” and found that, “[i]n light of
[Petitioner’s] failure to present any evidence suggesting that he labored under a mental defect
or disease that could affect his culpability or capacity to stand trial or waive Miranda, he has
not demonstrated any good cause to justify independent psychiatric evaluations of his
competency to stand trial, competency to waive his Miranda rights, or criminal
responsibility.” Hurick, 2011 WL 5211189, at *2. The R&R noted that the petition did not
“show[] a need for an independent psychiatric examination or that such an examination
would have changed the result of the case.” (R&R 8, ECF No. 27.) The Court agrees, and

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Petitioner’s objections again fail to present any evidence suggesting that an independent
psychiatric examination was necessary or would have affected the outcome of this case.
Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is meritless. See Gover v. Perry, 698 F.3d 295, 299 (6th Cir.
2012) (“Generally, habeas petitioners are not entitled to relief based on a constitutional error
at trial unless ‘they can establish that it resulted in actual prejudice.’”) (quoting Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).
B. Objections Two and Seven
Petitioner’s second objection argues that he was “denied due process when the trial
court denied his motion to adjourn in order to conduct an evidentiary hearing to test whether
his inculpatory statement to police was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” (Objections 5,
ECF No. 30.) Petitioner contends he was denied a hearing outside of the presence of a jury,
contrary to the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Walker, 132 N.W.2d 87
(Mich. 1965). Petitioner’s seventh objection argues that his inculpatory statements must be
suppressed because they were made in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights, made under
threat, duress, and coercion, and made by the Petitioner when he was not competent to waive
his Miranda rights. Petitioner now contends that he was deprived food, medication, an
attorney, and an appropriate holding cell, and that he had been awake for 48 hours before
giving his statement. The Court will address these two objections together, as they both relate
to the voluntariness of Petitioner’s inculpatory statements.

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“Walker holds that a trial court presented with a pretrial objection to the voluntariness
of a confession must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the issue of voluntariness.”
Brown v. McKee, 231 F. App’x 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2007); see also People v. Leonard, 264
N.W.2d 130, 132 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a Walker hearing must be held if the
defendant moves for it before trial). “If the defense moves for a Walker hearing during trial,
despite failing to do so prior to trial, the trial court may in its discretion hold an evidentiary
hearing.” Brown, 231 F. App’x at 474 (citing People v. Soltis, 304 N.W.2d 811, 812 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1981)).
The Michigan Court of Appeals found that, “[c]ontrary to defendant’s appellate
characterization of the record, his trial counsel never specifically asked the trial court to hold
a Walker hearing to investigate whether his statements to the police in December 2008
qualified as voluntary, knowing and intelligent.” Hurick, 2011 WL 521189, at *2. “The sole
mention of a potential Walker hearing occurred before trial on May 14, 2009; after defense
counsel apprised the court she did not yet have an evaluation of defendant’s competency to
waive Miranda, the trial court raised the subject of a potential Walker hearing when
scheduling the July 6 trial date: ‘Well, then we’ll have to make sure to schedule a Walker
hearing and have the reports available.’” Id. at *2 n.6.
The Court agrees. Although Petitioner’s trial counsel requested an adjournment to
conduct an independent forensic examination, counsel did not request a Walker hearing. (Jury
Trial Tr. I at 3, ECF No. 12-11.) And at trial, the “[d]efense at no point raised a challenge to

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the admissibility of the statements defendant made to the police.” Thus, the trial court was
not required to conduct a Walker hearing that Petitioner did not request prior to trial. Brown,
231 F. App’x at 474.
Further, even if a Walker hearing had been conducted, Petitioner has failed to
demonstrate that a different result would have occurred. To be valid, a waiver of Miranda
rights must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573
(1987). “A confession is involuntary only if there is (1) police coercion or overreaching
which (2) overbore the accused’s will and (3) caused the confession.” Hill v. Anderson, 300
F.3d 679, 682 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165-66 (1986)).
Connelly held that “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a
confession is not voluntary.” 479 U.S. at 167.
The Michigan Court of Appeals stated:
The available record gives rise to no suggestion of police coercion. The police
arrested defendant on December 15, 2008, and a deceased police officer
attempted to interview defendant on December 16, 2008. The sergeant who
testified at trial recounted that he briefly and unsuccessfully interviewed
defendant at some point on December 17, 2008, and that he later returned to
discuss the victim’s murder with defendant at defendant’s request. The
December 17, 2008, interviews encompassed approximately 90 minutes, and
the sergeant denied noticing any signs that defendant had offered his
statements unwillingly.
Hurick, 2011 WL 521189, at *2. Petitioner did not object when a video recording of the
interviews was offered into evidence. (Jury Trial Tr. IV at 37, ECF No. 12-14.) The Court
of Appeals also correctly noted that the trial record was “entirely devoid of any medical

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records, testimony, affidavits or any offer of proof tending to substantiate that defendant
suffered from a mental illness or infirmity.” Hurick, 2011 WL 521189, at *2. The court stated
that “[t]he parties do not dispute that the only forensic psychiatric evaluation in the record
concluded that defendant had the capacity to waive his Miranda rights at the time he made
his statements, and defendant presented no evidence tending to substantiate that he labored
under any mental or emotional infirmity that might have placed in doubt the voluntary,
knowing and intelligent nature of his statement.” Id.
The Court has reviewed the record as well as Petitioner’s objections, and finds that
Petitioner has not rebutted the state court’s finding that there was no suggestion of police
coercion with clear and convincing evidence. McKinney v. Ludwick, 649 F.3d 484, 488 (6th
Cir. 2011). This factual determination was not objectively unreasonable in light of the
evidence presented at trial. Petitioner has also failed to rebut the forensic examination report
of Krissie Fernandez, Ph.D., which concluded that “there appeared to be nothing to suggest
mental retardation or mental illness during the time in question [December 2008].”
Put simply, because Petitioner has failed to point to any evidence in the record
showing coercive police activity or mental illness, “there was no legal basis to exclude
Petitioner’s statement . . . [and] Petitioner has . . . failed to show that his rights were violated
by the trial court’s failure to conduct a Walker hearing.” O’Bryan v. Palmer, No. 2:14-cv11793, 2016 WL 520943, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 10, 2016). The Michigan Court of Appeals’
finding that Petitioner’s “argument that the waiver of his Miranda rights was not voluntary

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must fail” was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court, and did not result in a decision that was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court
proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
C. Objection Three
Petitioner’s third objection argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him
of first-degree premeditated murder. When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim in
a habeas matter, “the relevant question is, whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979) (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972)). To be found guilty of firstdegree, premeditated murder, the state must prove that “defendant intentionally killed the
victim and that the act of killing was premeditated and deliberate.” People v. Ortiz, 642
N.W.2d 417, 420 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001). “The elements of premeditation and deliberation
may be inferred from circumstances surrounding the killing. Minimal circumstantial evidence
is sufficient to prove an actor’s state of mind.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
The Michigan Court of Appeals described in detail the evidence that, viewed in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, would allow a rational trier of fact to find that the
essential elements of first-degree, premeditated murder were established. See Hurick, 2011

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WL 521189, at *3-6. Francisco Saadedra testified that on the night the victim was killed,
Petitioner and the victim left a house together, and Petitioner had “something on him that
looked like the handle or a grip of some kind of tool like a hammer or screwdriver or
something.” (Jury Trial Tr. II at 88, ECF No. 12-12.) When Petitioner returned to the house
10 to 15 minutes later, without the victim, Saadedra did not notice the tool. Saadedra further
testified that when Petitioner returned to the house, he immediately went upstairs to wash his
hands and face. (Id. at 89.) “His hands looked red. It looked like there was something on his
hands.” (Id. at 89-90.) His shoes looked like they had “blood or something red” on them. (Id.
at 90.)
Richard Bowles also testified that 20-30 minutes after Petitioner and the victim left
together, he saw Petitioner running out of an alley without the victim. (Jury Trial Tr. III at
58, ECF No. 12-13.) Petitioner went upstairs to change his clothes. Petitioner told Bowles
that “I fucked [the victim] up pretty good.” (Id. at 60.) Bowles observed what appeared to
be spots of blood on Petitioner’s sleeves, and told him “you got to take this shit out of my
house. I don’t want it here . . . I don’t want no trail.” (Id. at 61.) Petitioner later told Bowles
that he hit the victim with “like a stone or a brick or something like that.” (Id. at 65.)
Further, on December 17, 2008, Petitioner authored a handwritten statement. In this
statement, Petitioner admitted to hitting the victim twice with a hammer, and throwing the
hammer in an industrial dumpster. (Jury Trial Tr. IV at 23, ECF No. 12-14.) Petitioner stated,
“I noticed [the victim] still breathing because blood was bubbling out of his nose. And then

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Richard [Bowles] found a huge rock and slammed it on [the victim’s] face.” (Id. at 24.) The
forensic examiner noted blunt force trauma to the victim’s head.
The Court finds no error in the Michigan Court of Appeals’ statement that “[t]he
reasonable inferences from these facts, together with defendant’s admissions to Bowles and
his properly admitted inculpatory statements to Sergeant Mackie, sufficiently proved beyond
a reasonable doubt defendant’s identity as the victim’s killer. And substantial other
circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences established beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant intentionally killed the victim with deliberation and premeditation.” Hurick, 2011
WL 521189, at *5. While Petitioner’s objections attempt to poke holes in some of this
evidence, the Court cannot say that, while viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, no reasonable juror could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 307.
D. Objection Four
Petitioner’s fourth objection argues that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair
trial by a non-biased and impartial trial court “where the trial court made numerous decisions
and comments which were adverse to Petitioner’s ability to properly defend himself, thereby
rendering the result of the trial unreliable.” (Objections 11.) Petitioner does not allege how
the magistrate judge erred. Rather, he simply restates arguments previously made before the
magistrate judge. Petitioner essentially argues that the trial court was biased and impartial,
as shown through its denials of an adjournment and evidentiary hearing. The Court has

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already found no error warranting relief in the trial court’s decision to deny to an
adjournment and evidentiary hearing, and the Court agrees with the magistrate judge that
Petitioner has not established judicial bias solely by alleging that the trial judge made rulings
that were unfavorable to him. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)
(“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
motion.”).
E. Objection Five
Petitioner next argues he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront his
accuser when Richard Bowles refused to testify at trial, and Petitioner was not able to crossexamine Bowles in front of the jury. (Objections 15.) At a preliminary examination, Bowles
testified and was subject to cross-examination and recross-examination. (Preliminary
Examination Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 12-2.) At Petitioner’s trial, Bowles refused to testify. The
trial court found that Bowles was unavailable, and allowed for Bowles’ preliminary
examination testimony to be read into trial.
“[T]he Supreme Court has recognized in the past that on certain facts, the opportunity
to cross-examine a witness at a preliminary hearing is sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation
Clause.” Weissert v. Palmer, No. 1:10-cv-851, 2015 WL 5680149, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Sept.
25, 2015) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70 (1980); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
165 (1970)). Given the cross-examination that took place at the preliminary examination,
which the jury heard, and the fact that Supreme Court has never determined exactly how

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much cross-examination is required before preliminary-examination testimony is admissible
at trial, the Court does not find that the state court’s decision resulted in either “a decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “a decision that was based
upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Bauman, 759 F.3d 630, 635 (6th Cir.
2014) (rejecting similar claim because the petitioner “has failed to identify any Supreme
Court precedent supporting his contention that his opportunity to cross-examine [the witness]
at his own preliminary hearing was inadequate to satisfy the rigors of the Confrontation
Clause”).
Petitioner also notes that, “at the very least the trial court had a duty to instruct the jury
with a ‘missing witness’ instruction before deliberation.” Petitioner cites no authority for this
statement, and has not met his “especially heavy” burden of proving that an omitted jury
instruction prejudiced him to the extent that “the ailing instruction by itself so infected the
entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S.
145, 155 (1977); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973).
F. Objection Six
Petitioner’s sixth objection argues that he “was denied his Fourth Amendment right
where there was no probable cause determination made prior to the issuance of the invalid

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complaint and subsequent arrest warrant, mandating a suppression of the evidence obtained
therein.” (Objections 16.)
As the magistrate judge noted, the United States Supreme Court has held that “where
the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment
claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that
evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). When applying Stone, district courts must make two
“distinct inquiries.” Riley v. Gray, 674 F.2d 522, 526 (6th Cir. 1982). First, the court must
determine “whether the state procedural mechanism, in the abstract, presents the opportunity
to raise a fourth amendment claim.” Id. Second, the court must determine whether
“presentation of the claim was in fact frustrated because of a failure of that mechanism.” Id.
The “Powell ‘opportunity for full and fair consideration’ means an available avenue for the
prisoner to present his claim to the state courts, not an inquiry into the adequacy of the
procedure actually used to resolve that particular claim.” Good v. Berghuis, 729 F.3d 636,
638-40 (6th Cir. 2013).
Michigan courts have a procedural mechanism—the motion to suppress—which
presents an adequate opportunity for criminal defendants to raise Fourth Amendment claims.
Lovely v. Jackson, 337 F. Supp. 2d 969, 976 (E.D. Mich. 2004). Petitioner has not shown or
argued that a failure of this mechanism prevented him from litigating his Fourth Amendment
claim. Moreover, Petitioner did in fact present his claim to the state court. Petitioner’s claim

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was denied in his motion for relief from judgment. (Mot. for Relief from J. 3-5, ECF No. 1221.) This “post-conviction motion” made clear that “the Michigan courts were cognizant of
Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim and that he received all the process he was due.
Accordingly, any claim concerning the validity of Petitioner’s arrest is not cognizable on
habeas review pursuant to Stone v. Powell.” Lovely, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 976.
G. Objection Eight
Petitioner’s eighth objection argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel as a result of his trial counsels’ errors. (Objections 20.)
Petitioner argues that his attorney at the preliminary examination, Lillian Diallo, was
ineffective for: failing to cross-examine Richard Bowles; failing to have Petitioner’s
competency evaluated to determine criminal responsibility, stand trial, and waive Miranda;
and failing to challenge the voluntariness of Petitioner’s inculpatory statement to the police.
Petitioner claims that Larry Polk, who represented him at two pre-trial hearings, provided
ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to challenge Petitioner’s competency or the
voluntariness of Petitioner’s statements. Petitioner contends that Steven Bullock provided
ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to object to the admission of Richard
Bowles’ preliminary examination testimony at trial, and when he failed to request a “missing
witness” jury instruction.
The magistrate judge found that Petitioner procedurally defaulted his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner has failed to address this ruling in his objections,

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and for the reasons stated in the R&R, the Court agrees.
Moreover, even if Petitioner had not procedurally defaulted this claim, it would still
be meritless. Petitioner’s argument that Diallo failed to properly cross-examine Richard
Bowles fails because the record demonstrates Diallo conducted extensive cross-examination
at the preliminary examination. (Preliminary Examination Hr’g Tr. 26-51.) Petitioner’s
argument that Diallo and Polk provided ineffective assistance of counsel when they failed
to have Petitioner’s competency evaluated and failed to object to the voluntariness of
Petitioner’s statements also fails. As stated above, Petitioner was subject to a forensic
examination by a psychologist, who determined that “there appeared to be nothing to suggest
mental retardation or mental illness during the time in question [December 2008].” Petitioner
has failed to show that if Diallo or Polk had obtained another, independent examination, the
result of the examination would have been different. Thus, Petitioner has failed to show that
but for counsels’ deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
Petitioner has also failed to show that objections should have been made as to the
voluntariness of Petitioner’s statements to the police or the admission of Bowles’ preliminary
examination testimony. “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly
deferential . . . [A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be

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considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101
(1955)). A lawyer does not perform deficiently or prejudice his or her client by failing to
raise frivolous objections. See Harris v. United States, 204 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2000). As
the Michigan Court of Appeals noted, and as stated above, the record evidence indicates that
the statements were made voluntarily. Further, the trial court’s admission of Bowles’
testimony was proper because Bowles was an unavailable witness. Thus, counsel’s failure
to raise objections to these matters was not constitutionally ineffective. Harris, 204 F.3d at
683.
Lastly, the Court cannot discern, and Petitioner has failed to argue, how the request
of a “missing witness” instruction would have led to a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Thus, counsel was not constitutionally
ineffective for failing to raise this issue. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
H. Objection Nine
Lastly, Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for
failing to raise many of these issues on direct appeal. As the Court has found that none of
Petitioner’s claims have merit, the Court disagrees. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536
(“[W]innowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on those more likely to prevail,
far from being evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy.”)
(citation omitted). Further, while Petitioner’s objections reference newly discovered evidence

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that counsel failed to introduce, he does not mention what that evidence is, and his claim is
therefore meritless.
II.
Petitioner also file a second motion for leave to amend or correct his petition. The
Court reviewed the attached amendments, and the amendments do not affect the Court’s
decision in this matter. Thus, Petitioner’s motion will be denied as moot.
III.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of
appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a
“substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To satisfy
this standard, the petitioner must show that “reasonable jurists could debate whether...the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
483 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Sixth Circuit has disapproved the
issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466
(6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the district court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each
claim” to determine whether a certificate is warranted. Id. at 467. Upon review, the Court
finds that reasonable jurists could not find that a dismissal of each of Petitioner’s claims was
debatable or wrong.

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IV.
For the reasons stated above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s January 21, 2016 Report
and Recommendation (ECF No. 27) is APPROVED and ADOPTED as the Opinion of this
Court. Petitioner’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s objections to the R&R (ECF No. 30)
are OVERRULED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment (ECF
No. 18) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s second motion to amend/correct
(ECF No. 28) is DENIED AS MOOT.
Judgment will enter in accordance with this opinion and order.

Dated: March 23, 2016

/s/ Robert Holmes Bell
ROBERT HOLMES BELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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