Peoples #479867 v. Bauman et al

Filing 118

OPINION and Order ; signed by Judge R. Allan Edgar (Judge R. Allan Edgar, cmb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
EDISON PEOPLES,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:14-CV-106
Honorable R. Allan Edgar

v.
CATHERINE BAUMAN, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Edison Peoples, an inmate currently confined by the Michigan
Department of Corrections (MDOC), filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. ECF No. 1, 10. Plaintiff sues the following
Defendants: Sergeant Terry Kienitz, Corrections Officer (CO) Michael Sadak, CO David
Tennyson, CO Robert Wickstrom, and CO Steven McDonald. ECF No. 10, 45. Plaintiff is
seeking declaratory relief and punitive damages.
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on October 24, 2014, alleging several claims
against Defendants. ECF No. 10; PageID.186-189. However, after this Court’s order from
August 3, 2015 (ECF No. 45), only the following claims remain:
I. Defendants Kienitz, Sadak, Tennyson, Wickstrom, and McDonald
violated Plaintiff’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
when they left Plaintiff in restraints for a prolonged period of time.
II. Defendants Kienitz, Sadak, Tennyson, Wickstrom, and McDonald
violated Plaintiff’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
when they refused to let Plaintiff wash chemical agents off of his
body.
PageID.473. In addition, Plaintiff raised the following claims in his deposition for the first time:
Defendants denied Plaintiff due process of law under the 6th and
Fourteenth Amendments when they deliberately failed to obtain
proper approval for the restraints through the administrative process

and had him placed in restraints for an extended period where he
never posed a threat to himself, others or state property, thereby,
arbitrarily denying him of his liberty interest.
PageID.701-72, 940. While Plaintiff classifies these new claims as Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims, they appear to fall within the scope of Plaintiff’s aforementioned Eighth
Amendment claims. As such, the Court will consider these new claims to be part of Plaintiff’s
original Eighth Amendments claims.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on February 9, 2016, raising
qualified immunity. ECF No. 97. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment on April 12, 2016. ECF No. 116. Defendants did not file a reply. The
matter is now ready for a decision.
The following are the events in question viewed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff. Muhammad v. Close, 379 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Adams v. Metiva, 31
F.3d 375, 382 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting any direct evidence offered by Plaintiff in response to a
summary judgment motion are accepted as true)). On August 8, 2011, Plaintiff was informed that
he had to move cells, and that if he did not cooperate, a “move team” would come to move him.
PageID.693. Plaintiff did not want to move cells, so he covered his cell window with paper,
placed his mattress in front of the door, and “prepar[ed] for combat.” PageID.171, 693-694.
Shortly thereafter, the “move team” (consisting of Defendants Kienitz, Tennyson, Wickstrom,
Sadak, and McDonald), came to Plaintiff’s cell door. PageID.171. Defendant Sadak ordered
Plaintiff to remove the items from the door, but Plaintiff refused. PageID.171, 694. Defendants
Kienitz, Tennyson, Wickstrom, Sadak, and McDonald then sprayed mace into Plaintiff’s cell
through the food slot for eight to ten seconds. PageID.171-172, 694. Plaintiff was standing three
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feet from the food slot when this occurred, and the mace struck him in the face, chest, and body.
PageID.172, 694. As a result, Plaintiff’s eyes, lungs, sinuses, face, and body began to burn, and
he had a hard time breathing. PageID.172.
Within a minute after the mace was sprayed, Plaintiff removed the paper and
mattress from the cell door. PageID.171, 694-695. Defendant Sadak ordered Plaintiff to remove
his clothes so that Defendant Sadak could conduct a visual cavity search of Plaintiff. PageID.172.
Plaintiff was then provided his clothes and ordered to dress himself. PageID.172.
Once dressed, Defendant Sadak placed soft restraints on Plaintiff’s hands and
ankles, which were connected to a belly chain. PageID.172, 696-697. Plaintiff contends that these
restraints made it impossible for him to touch his face or lower his pants below his waist.
PageID.174.
Plaintiff’s door was then opened and two officers grabbed hold of Plaintiff’s arms,
forcing him to walk backwards outside of the housing unit. PageID.173. A nurse subsequently
checked his vitals and placed eye drops in both of Plaintiff’s eyes, but Plaintiff claims this did
not help the pain. PageID.173, 696-697. Plaintiff told Defendants Kienitz, Sadak, Tennyson,
Wickstrom, and McDonald that his body was burning because his clothes were saturated in
chemicals, and that he wanted to take a shower. PageID.173. The nurse advised Defendants that
Plaintiff could be returned to his cell. PageID.173. Defendants then shortened the length of the
chain connecting Plaintiff’s stomach to his legs, and took Plaintiff to a new cell with his
restraints still on. PageID.173, 698. Plaintiff asked Defendants to take a shower again, but
Defendant Kienitz told Plaintiff to shower in his cell. PageID.173, 698.
Due to his limited range of motion from the restraints, Plaintiff could not lie down
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or stand for much time without experiencing pain. PageID.174. In addition, Plaintiff urinated
and defecated on himself because he could not pull his pants down. PageID.174. Plaintiff’s
restraints were removed on August 11, 2011. PageID.177, 698. During the days in which
Plaintiff remained in restraints, COs (including Defendants Tennyson, Kienitz, and Wickstrom)
would check on him approximately every fifteen minutes and someone from healthcare checked
on him twice daily. PageID.699-700, 705-723.
After Plaintiff’s restraints were taken off, he used his clothes to wipe off a large
portion of the chemicals that were left on his body from the mace administered on August 8,
2011. PageID.700. Plaintiff was given a change of clothes on August 13, 2011. PageID.177. On
August 18, 2011, Plaintiff was given his personal items (including soap) and then took a shower.
PageID.177, 700.
Based on these occurrences, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his
constitutional rights. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff seeks legal redress before this Court for these alleged
violations.
I.
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party establishes that
there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). If the
movant carries the burden of showing there is an absence of evidence to support a claim or
defense, then the party opposing the motion must demonstrate by affidavits, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
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Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25. The nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings but must present
“specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). Thus, any direct evidence offered
by the plaintiff in response to a summary judgment motion must be accepted as true.
Muhammad, 379 F.3d at 416 (citing Adams, 31 F.3d at 382). However, a mere scintilla of
evidence in support of the nonmovant’s position will be insufficient. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 25152. Notably, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court could not adopt
that version of the facts for the purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Ultimately, the court must determine whether there is
sufficient “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 252; see also Leahy v. Trans Jones, Inc., 996 F.2d 136, 139 (6th Cir. 1993) (single
affidavit, in presence of other evidence to the contrary, failed to present genuine issue of fact); cf.
Moore, Owen, Thomas & Co. v. Coffey, 992 F.2d 1439, 1448 (6th Cir. 1993) (single affidavit
concerning state of mind created factual issue).
II.
Both of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants fall under the Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment against those
convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment’s protections are limited
to “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation [or] other conditions intolerable for
prison confinement.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981). “Not every unpleasant
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experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir.
1987). Restrictions and even harsh conditions of confinement are not necessarily cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. 347.
For a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, the prisoner must
exemplify that “he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant
official acted with “‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Evans v. Capello, No.
2:12-CV-135, 2012 WL 1611227, at *4 (W.D. Mich. May 8, 2012) (quoting Mingus v. Butler,
591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010)).
A. Restraints
Plaintiff’s first Eighth Amendment claim against all five Defendants states that his
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated when Defendants kept him in
restraints from August 8 through August 11, 2011. PageID.172, 177. While in restraints,
Plaintiff indicates that he “was not able to lie down or stand in any position for any period of
time without experiencing extremely painful aches and spasms in his back, legs, arms and
Achilles tendons,” and that after several hours he was “forced to urinate and defecate on
himself.” PageID.174. Plaintiff claims that it was cruel to leave him in restraints so long because
during the time he was in restraints, he “did not display any threatening behavior, did not
threaten, attempt or engage in resistance, was not at risk to cause self-injury, was not a physical
threat to the [MDOC] staff or to the institutional security of [MDOC] itself, and did not threaten,
attempt, or engage in destruction or misuse of state property.” PageID.177.
Eighth Amendment claims contain objective and subjective components. Wilson
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v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). “The objective component requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate that he has been subjected to specific deprivations that are so serious that they deny
him ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Carson v. Harrington, 12 Fed. App’x
299, 301 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). In claims of excessive force, such as
this, “the subjective component requires the plaintiff to show that the defendants acted
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm, rather than in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted); see also Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992) (noting the core judicial inquiry is “whether force was applied
in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm.”); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
In determining whether the use of restraints was done maliciously or sadistically
under the subjective component, the court should evaluate the need for the application of force,
the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat “reasonably perceived
by the responsible officials,” and any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response.
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321); accord Griffin v. Hardrick, 604 F.3d
949, 953-54 (6th Cir. 2010); McHenry v. Chadwick, 896 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1990). Notably,
Physical restraints are constitutionally permissible where there is penological justification for
their use. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346; Jones v. Toombs, No. 95-1395, 1996 WL 67750, at *1 (6th
Cir. Feb. 15, 1996).
Plaintiff’s claim fails for several reasons. First, it is clear from the evidence
presented that there was a penological justification for the use of restraints from August 8
through August 11, 2011—meaning the restraints were constitutionally permissible. For
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example, Plaintiff was placed in full body restraints by Defendant Sadak on August 8, 2011, due
to his admittedly non-cooperative transfer (by all five Defendants) to another cell. PageID.172,
693-694 (noting that when he was told he needed to transfer to another cell, he placed paper in
his window and pushed his mattress up against the door to “prepare[] for combat” with
Defendants). Under the circumstances, the use of restraints was justified in order to gain control
of the situation, and the restraints were not more force than was necessary to restrain Plaintiff.
See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
Second, the medical records show that Plaintiff did not suffer any injuries as a
result of being in restraints for a few days, and that Plaintiff was able to move, walk, eat, and use
the bathroom without difficulty, contrary to Plaintiff’s allegations. PageID.705-723 (noting that
from August 8 through August 11, 2011, Plaintiff was evaluated twice daily by medical staff, and
they noted that Plaintiff had normal movement and coloring in his hands and feet, there was no
swelling, and that Plaintiff said he was “doing OK).
Third, even though Plaintiff alleges that he did not attempt to destroy property,
escape, or hurt himself or anyone else from the time he was placed in restraints (August 8, 2011)
until the time he was taken out of the restraints (August 11, 2011) (PageID.177), restraints may
still be justified even when the disruptive behavior had been discontinued. See e.g., Payette v.
Rondeau, No. 2:10-CV-204, 2011 WL 3156270, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Jul. 26, 2011) (noting it
plaintiff’s placement in restraints for seventy-two hours after his outbursts had stopped was
permissible); Rivers v. Pitcher, No. 95-1167, 1995 WL 603313, at *2 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting topof-bed restraints were appropriate even after inmate discontinued his earlier abusive, disruptive,
and threatening behavior).
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Finally, Plaintiff admitted that he knew Defendants did not have the authority to
take him out of the restraints, even if they wanted to do so. PageID.702. As such, Plaintiff has
not presented any evidence that Defendants acted maliciously or sadistically for the sole purpose
of causing him harm. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot
show, under the facts he has alleged, that there was a constitutional violation by his placement in
restraints during the days in question. Therefore, his first Eighth Amendment claim against
Defendant fails.
B. Chemical Agents
In Plaintiff’s second Eighth Amendment claim, he alleges that all five Defendants
were deliberately indifferent to his need for medical attention or need to take a shower after being
sprayed with chemicals on August 8, 2011. PageID.187-188, 939. Specifically, he claims that
because Defendants refused to allow him to shower “after his person and his clothing had been
doused with a chemical agent,” Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the medical harm he
faced by continuing to have mace on him. PageID.187-188. Plaintiff indicated that he was
sprayed with mace on August 8, and he did not have the opportunity to shower until August 18,
2011. PageID.700. As a result, he claims to have suffered “severe difficulty breathing, intense
burning of the eyes, lungs, sinuses, genitals and buttocks, and an overwhelming fear of death for
a period of approximately five days following the date that the chemical agent was
administered.” PageID.174. Based on this reading of Plaintiff’s claim, it is clear that he does not
allege that the use of mace violated his rights; but rather, that Defendants’ delay in allowing him
to shower or otherwise be treated for ten days violated his Eighth Amendment rights.
The Eighth Amendment obligates prison authorities to provide medical care to
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incarcerated people, and a failure to provide such care would be inconsistent with contemporary
standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is
violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a
prisoner. Id. at 104-05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001).
A claim, such as this one, for a delay in treatment has an objective and subjective
component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component,
the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words,
the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm. Id.; Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Where the
seriousness of a prisoner’s need[] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.”). If,
however, the need involves “minor maladies or non-obvious complaints of a serious need for
medical care,” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898, the inmate must “place verifying medical evidence in
the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment.” Napier v.
Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a
sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863,
867 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Deliberate indifference “entails something
more than mere negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but can be “satisfied by something less
than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will
result.” Id. Under Farmer, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Id. at 837.
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With regard to the objective component, Plaintiff has failed to show that his
medical need was sufficiently serious. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Plaintiff’s alleged injuries
appear to be “no more than the normal aftereffects of being exposed to gas and/or chemical
agents.” Censke v. Ekdahl, No. 2:08-CV-283, 2009 WL 1393320, at *6 (W.D. Mich. May 18,
2009). Given that Plaintiff suffered only “minor maladies or non-obvious complaints of a serious
need for medical care,” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898, Plaintiff would have to produce “verifying
medical evidence. . . to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment,”
Napier, 238 F.3d at 742. However, the medical evidence provided (by Defendants, not Plaintiff)
shows that his reaction to the mace was “normal,” and that he did not complain to medical staff
(during his twice daily check-ups) about any negative reactions to the mace. PageID.705-706
(Medical Reports dated 8/8/2011) (stating “Pt is normal risk for chemical agent use,” and that
“chem[ical] agent was used on pt. Pt eyes rinsed out with eye wash per pt request . . . . no
complaints voiced.”); PageID.710-716 (Medical Reports dated 8/9/2011) (stating “nurse washed
his eyes out,” and otherwise appears normal and no complaints relating to chemical agent);
PageID.717-721 (Medical Reports dated 8/10/2011) (stating Plaintiff told medical that he was
“doing OK” throughout the day).1 Based on this medical evidence, it is clear that Plaintiff did not
suffer any detrimental effects by his alleged ten day delay in taking a shower or otherwise being
treated after the mace was administered. Therefore, he has not satisfied the objective component
of his Eighth Amendment claim.
Even if Plaintiff had satisfied the objective component of this deliberate
indifference claim, he has failed to satisfy the subjective component (that Defendants had a
1

No medical reports were provided beyond August 11, 2011. PageID.721-723.

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sufficiently culpable state of mind when they delayed his medical treatment and shower for ten
days). Upon review of the limited medical evidence of record, it is clear that Plaintiff was seen by
medical staff twice a day from August 8 through August 11, 2011 (meaning Defendants did not
“delay” his ability to be seen by medical staff during the dates in question). PageID.705-723.
Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff claims his delay in taking a shower was due to Defendants’
deliberate indifference, this assertion also fails. Plaintiff had a shower in his cell, and he could
have used water to rinse off his body if he so chose. PageID.698 (noting that when Plaintiff asked
Defendant Kienitz for a shower, Defendant Kienitz said Plaintiff could shower in his cell).
Notably, however, in his deposition, Plaintiff stated that water “reactivated” the chemicals on his
body and made his pain worse, so it is unclear why he believes taking a shower was his best form
of relief. PageID.700. Regardless, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that any of the five Defendants
acted with a culpable state of mind in delaying his medical treatment or ability to shower after
the mace was administered. Therefore, his second Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants
fails.
C. State Law Claims
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff raised the following state law claims against
Defendants:
I. The actions of Defendants Kienitz, Sadak, Tennyson, Wickstrom,
[and] McDonnald [sic] . . . in applying physical restraints on the
Plaintiff in a manner that was excessive and unreasonable constituted
the tort of battery under the law of the State of Michigan.
II. The actions of Defendants Kienitz, Sadak, Tennyson, Wickstrom,
[and] McDonnald [sic] . . . in applying physical restraints on the
Plaintiff in a reckless manner constituted the tort of gross negligence
under the law of the State of Michigan.
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III. The manner in which Defendants Kienitz, Sadak, Tennyson,
Wickstrom, [and] McDonnald [sic] . . . applied physical restraints on
the Plaintiff constituted the tort of negligence under the law of the
State of Michigan.
IV. The actions of Defendants Kienitz, Sadak, Tennyson, Wickstrom,
[and] McDonnald [sic] . . . in recklessly refusing to permit or ensure
that Plaintiff was provided a reasonable opportunity to decontaminate
after his person and his clothing had been doused with a chemical
agent constituted the tort of gross negligence under the law of the
State of Michigan.
V. The actions of Defendants Kienitz, Sadak, Tennyson, Wickstrom,
[and] McDonnald [sic] . . . in refusing to permit or ensure that the
Plaintiff was provided a reasonable opportunity to decontaminate
after his person and his clothing had been doused with a chemical
agent constituted the tort of negligence under the law of the State of
Michigan.
PageID.187-189. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court may decline supplemental jurisdiction
if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Defendants
requested that this Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if this Court dismissed
Plaintiff’s federal claims. PageID.687. Because this Court has dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims
for which this Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over his state law claims. As a result, Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendants
are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
III.
Overall, despite the Court’s obligation to construe handwritten pro se documents
liberally, Plaintiff’s § 1983 fails. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (stating that pro se complaints are held to less stringent
standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys, and will only be dismissed if the claim

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undoubtedly contains no facts to support its request for relief). Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment is appropriate.
In light of the foregoing, this Court concludes that Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 97) is GRANTED and this case will be dismissed with prejudice
in its entirety. To the extent that Plaintiff raised state law claims, these claims are dismissed
without prejudice. PageID.187-189. An Order and Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be
entered. In addition, Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to file a response to Defendants’
motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 109) is denied as moot.
SO ORDERED.
_/s/ R. Allan Edgar____________________
R. ALLAN EDGAR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated:_5/20/2016____

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