Taylor #377991 v. Smith et al

Filing 175

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 172 re 163 : Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 163 is GRANTED; case closed; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

TERRENCE LEE TAYLOR #377991,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:14-CV-175
v.
HON. GORDON J. QUIST
SCOTT SMITH, et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Terrence Lee Taylor, a prisoner incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several Defendants, alleging the
following claims: (1) violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right of access to the courts; (2)
retaliation against Plaintiff for his exercise of his First Amendment rights; (3) violation of Plaintiff’s
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights; and (4) violation of Plaintiff’s equal protection rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Following dismissal of Defendants Woods, Norton, and Ross
based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative grievance remedies (ECF No. 53), the case
proceeded against Defendants Smith and Clark. On October 27, 2016, Judge Bell dismissed
Plaintiff’s access-to-the-courts claim, concluding that Plaintiff failed to show an actual injury. (ECF
No. 100 at PageID.543.) Judge Bell also dismissed Plaintiff’s due process claim, but allowed
Plaintiff’s retaliation and equal protection claims to proceed against both Smith and Clark. (Id. at
PageID.546–48.) On December 14, 2016, Magistrate Judge Greeley denied Plaintiff’s motion to
amend his complaint to add allegations regarding his dismissed access-to-the-courts claim. (ECF
No. 107.)

On June 15, 2017, this Court held a jury trial on Plaintiff’s retaliation and equal protection
claims. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found for Defendants on both claims. (ECF No. 134.)
Plaintiff appealed the judgment to the Sixth Circuit. On August 30, 2018, the Sixth Circuit issued
an order denying Plaintiff’s appeal as to the trial-related issues but sustaining the appeal as to
Plaintiff’s argument that he should have been allowed to amend his complaint to shore up his accessto-the-courts claim. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that Plaintiff’s amendment sufficiently alleged an
actual injury because Plaintiff alleged that he could not effectively present his claims to the state
court absent his trial transcripts, which Defendants had confiscated. (ECF No. 154 at PageID.845.)
Following remand, Defendants moved for summary judgment on the access-to-the-courts
claim. On July 29, 2019, Magistrate Judge Maarten Vermaat issued a Report and Recommendation
(R & R) recommending that the Court grant Defendants’ motion because Plaintiff cannot establish
prejudice and Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 172 at PageID.1080.) The
magistrate judge noted that Plaintiff obtained a copy of his trial transcripts and filed a motion for
relief from judgment pursuant to M.C.R. 6.502 on October 6, 2016, in which he raised eight
issues—two more than he claimed he included in his 2013 motion that Plaintiff alleges Defendants
prevented him from filing. (Id. at 1082–83, 1085–86, 1092.) The magistrate judge also noted that
the state court considered and denied every claim on the merits that Plaintiff raised in his 2016
motion. Given these facts, the magistrate judge concluded that Plaintiff “has not shown that he was
denied the ability to present any claim due to the alleged delay in bringing his motion for relief from
judgment under MCR 6.502.” (Id. at PageID. 1091.) Finally, the magistrate judge concluded that
Plaintiff’s allegation that three claims he could have made at the time his transcripts were
confiscated—failure to swear in the jury; newly discovered evidence that cast doubt on a witness’s
trial testimony six years earlier; and a resentencing issue under People v. Lockridge, 488 Mich. 358,
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870 N.W.2d 502 (2015)—were foreclosed when Plaintiff eventually filed his motion for relief from
judgment is without merit, as Plaintiff included such claims in his 2016 motion and the state court
considered them on the merits. (Id. at 1092.)
Plaintiff has filed an objection to the R & R, arguing that the magistrate judge erroneously
concluded that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), upon
receiving an objection to a report and recommendation, the district judge “shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to
which objection is made.” After conducting a de novo review of the R & R, Plaintiff’s objection,
and the pertinent portions of the record, the Court concludes that the R & R should be adopted.
Plaintiff does not argue that the magistrate judge erred in concluding that Plaintiff fails to
show that the lack of a transcript prevented him from presenting or developing one or more of his
claims. Instead, he argues that the magistrate judge erred by “not mak[ing] an independent
determination as to whether the underlying claims were frivolous as required by Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 354 (1996).” (ECF No. 173 at PageID.1095.) Regardless of whether Plaintiff’s claims
were frivolous or had some arguable merit, the magistrate judge correctly concluded that Plaintiff
failed to demonstrate prejudice because he was not prevented from presenting a claim to the state
court. Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge should have conducted his own independent
analysis of Plaintiff’s claims because, according to Plaintiff, the state court either applied the
incorrect standard or erred in applying the correct standard. Plaintiff miscomprehends the
magistrate judge’s analysis and the scope of relief available an access-to-the-courts claim under §
1983. The R & R does not recommend that the Court grant summary judgment on the underlying
claims in Plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment. The state court already ruled on these claims.
Instead, the R & R recommends granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s access-to-the-courts
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claim asserted in this federal court. This Court has no authority in this § 1983 action to review
Plaintiff’s state-court claims. “[L]ower federal courts possess no power to sit in direct review of
state court decisions.” Atl. Coast Line R.R Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 296, 90
S. Ct. 1739, 1748 (1970); see also Collins v. Collins, 597 F. Supp. 33, 39 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (“Federal
courts are not in the business of hearing attacks on state court judgments where the judgment is not
on its face violative of the Constitution and where the state has provided an opportunity for appellate
review to satisfy the requirements of due process.”). As Plaintiff implicitly recognizes, the proper
vehicle for seeking relief as to the state-court’s rulings—to the extent they present a federal
constitutional issue—is a petition for habeas corpus, which Plaintiff has already filed in the Eastern
District of Michigan. (ECF No. 173 at PageID.1097–98 (stating as to sufficiency of the evidence
claim: “The fact that the state court denied relief is not relevant to the district court’s determination
as to whether the underlined [sic] claim was ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable.’ It is very much possible
that the Eastern District of Michigan where the claim is presently pending within a habeas corpus
petition (case no. 2:18-cv-11711) may grant relief on the issue.”).) See Lee v. Willard, No. 14-2605,
2015 WL 3404085, at *8 (E.D. La. May 26, 2015) (“The cornerstone of adequate court access . . .
is the ability to present a claim, not the right to obtain a ruling of one’s liking. Save his opportunity
to pursue his allegations on habeas corpus grounds, . . . Lee may not seek review of those state
courts’ decisions by casting a complaint in the form of a civil rights action.”); Jelks v. White, No.
07-00127 ACK-LEK, 2007 WL 879243, at *3 (D. Haw. Mar. 20, 2007) (observing that the
plaintiff’s access-to-the-courts claim asserted in a habeas corpus petition, “if brought under this
court’s original jurisdiction and not as a review of the state court’s ruling, must be brought as a civil
rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983") (italics added).
Therefore,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the July 29, 2019, Report and Recommendation (ECF No.
172) is ADOPTED as the Opinion of this Court. Plaintiff’s Objection (ECF No. 173) is
OVERRULED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
163) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
A separate judgment will enter.
This case is concluded.

Dated: August 21, 2019

/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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