Reed #151290 v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al

Filing 14

OPINION ; signed by Judge R. Allan Edgar (Judge R. Allan Edgar, cam)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

MARK ANTHONY REED,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:14-cv-211

v.

Honorable R. Allan Edgar

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro
se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state
a claim.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Mark Anthony Reed, a state prisoner currently confined at the Chippewa
Correctional Facility (URF), filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Defendants Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) and the Keefe Company. In Plaintiff’s
complaint, he asserts that in November of 2010, the MDOC changed Policy Directive 03.03.105, and
classified misconduct tickets into three classes: I, II, and III. Plaintiff states that prison staff have
been given the authority to review class II misconducts, despite the fact that staff are the ones writing
the tickets. Plaintiff states that the procedure for handling these misconducts is unfair because the
review of the class II misconducts is done by officers who work alongside the officers who write the
misconduct. The reason for the change was that the Michigan Parole Board would not review class
II misconducts. Plaintiff states that the problem with this reasoning is that class II misconducts can
cause an increase in a prisoner’s security level. In addition, some class II misconducts are subject
to the loss of disciplinary credits, which has an effect on parole eligibility.
Plaintiff also asserts that the MDOC violated the Sherman Antitrust Act and the
Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act when it contracted with Defendant Keefe Company to
stock the prisoner store. Plaintiff further alleges that the MDOC has lowered the nutritional
standards in the prisons to the point where they are not healthy for prisoners as a whole and do not
meet the minimum daily caloric requirements for adult men. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the
MDOC does not provide adequate clothing for its prisoners.
Plaintiff purports to represent all similarly situated prisoners and does not specify the
exact relief being sought.

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Discussion
I.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
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a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Plaintiff has entitled his complaint as a class action, which the Court construes as a
request for class certification. For a case to proceed as a class action, the court must be satisfied on
a number of grounds, including the adequacy of class representation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
It is well established that pro se litigants are inappropriate representatives of the interests of others.
See Garrison v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 333 F. App’x 914, 919 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Oxendine v.
Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975)); see also Dodson v. Wilkinson, 304 F. App’x 434,
438 (6th Cir. 2008); Ziegler v. Michigan, 59 F. App’x 622, 624 (6th Cir. 2003); Palasty v. Hawk,
15 F. App’x 197, 200 (6th Cir. 2001); Howard v. Dougan, No. 99-2232, 2000 WL 876770, at *1 (6th
Cir. June 23, 2000). Because Plaintiff is an incarcerated pro se litigant, the Court finds that he is not
an appropriate representative of a class. Therefore, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s request for class
certification.
In addition, the court notes that Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the
Michigan Department of Corrections. Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their
departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the
state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by
statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); Alabama v.
Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1993). Congress
has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
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332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court.
Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous unpublished opinions, the Sixth
Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e.g., McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2010); Turnboe v.
Stegall, No. 00-1182, 2000 WL1679478, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000). In addition, the State of
Michigan (acting through the Michigan Department of Corrections) is not a “person” who may be
sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (citing
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)). Therefore, the Court dismisses the
Michigan Department of Corrections as a Defendant in this case.
Finally, Plaintiff claims that the arrangement between the MDOC and Defendant
Keefe Company violates United States antitrust laws. However, to prevail on a Section 1983 claim,
a plaintiff must establish that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a right secured
by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th
Cir. 1994). To establish standing to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a prospective plaintiff
must demonstrate an “injury in fact” that it is both “concrete and particularized” and is “actual or
imminent.” Barden Detroit Casino, L.L.C. v. City of Detroit, 230 F.3d 848, 854 (6th Cir.2000).
Plaintiff states that Defendant Keefe Company has raised prices in the prisoner store to a point where
it is difficult for inmates to afford to buy products. However, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts
showing that this arrangement has personally harmed him or that it has resulted in a violation of
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Keefe Company is
properly dismissed.

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Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: 1/23/2015

/s/ R. Allan Edgar
R. ALLAN EDGAR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE