Shields v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
18
OPINION and ORDER that decision of ALJ is reversed and case is remanded; signed by Magistrate Judge Timothy P. Greeley (Magistrate Judge Timothy P. Greeley, pjc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
WALTER SHIELDS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:14-cv-226
HON. TIMOTHY P. GREELEY
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER
On March 9, 2012, the Commissioner notified Plaintiff (a child) that she had been
overpaid supplemental security income (SSI) benefits from September, 2009, to February, 2012,
in the amount of $17,858.96. See Transcript of Administrative Hearing at page 11, 38-42, 82
(hereinafter Tr. at ___). The overpayment was identified by the Social Security Administration
(SSA) after discovering a money market account that precluded Plaintiff from being eligible for
SSI benefits. Tr. at 11. Plaintiff’s father (Walter Shields, conservator of the account) requested
reconsideration of the matter, but the overpayment determination was affirmed on March 18,
2012. Tr. at 11, 38, 84-86, 89-90. Mr. Shields filed a request for an administrative hearing on
June 7, 2012. Tr. at 11, 91. On February 1, 2013, a hearing was held by video before an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Tr .at 11. Plaintiff was represented by Mr. Shields at the
hearing, as her conservator, and Mr. Shields was represented by counsel. Tr. at 11, 140. In a
decision issued February 21, 2013, the ALJ affirmed that Plaintiff had, in fact, been overpaid
benefits in the amount of $17,858.96. Tr. at 13, 78. Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council,
which denied her request for review on September 9, 2014. Tr. at 3-5. Plaintiff then filed this
action on October 30, 2014.1 ECF No. 1.
In 1998, Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and became disabled.
Tr. at 36, 125, 141. The injuries she incurred from the accident resulted in a settlement payment
of $29,671.54, which was approved by the probate court. Tr. at 123-24. These funds were to be
held in a conservatorship account that Plaintiff could access when she turned eighteen. Tr. at 17,
125. Mr. Shields was appointed conservator of the account. Tr. at 17-18, 123. In 2000, Judge
Ulrich signed a court order limiting access to the conservatorship account in the following
manner:
[A]ny and all funds shall be preserved in a bank savings account or
in certificates of deposit at a financial institution and shall not be
withdrawn without written permission of the Chippewa County
Probate Court until such time as Minor obtain[s] [the] age of
majority. A verification of funds shall be filed with the Court.
Tr. at 17-18, 123. The funds were left untouched until 2003 when Plaintiff’s home burned down.
Tr. at 124. Thereafter, Mr. Shields petitioned the probate court for access to Plaintiff’s account
in order to buy her replacement clothes, and Judge Ulrich granted the request ($2,500.08). Tr. at
124, 126. Two years later, Mr. Shields petitioned the court for money to buy Plaintiff more
clothes since she had outgrown her last batch. Id. The request was granted ($2,364.29). Id.
Then, sometime between 2007 and 2008, Mr. Shields petitioned the court again in an attempt to
access Plaintiff’s funds to buy her a computer for school. Tr. at 124, 126-27. The request was
granted ($624.34). Id. In April of 2010, Mr. Shields requested money for a replacement
computer, and again the request was granted ($836.33). Tr. at 19, 125, 127. Finally, around
1
Both parties consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge on January 29, 2015. ECF No. 11.
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2011 to 2012, Mr. Shields made another petition to the court to access Plaintiff’s funds so that he
could pay for Plaintiff’s driver’s education classes. Tr. at 125, 127. The request was granted
($293.76). Id. As of February 2012, there remained $29,343.58 in the account. Tr. at 127.
Since Plaintiff was disabled after the accident, Mr. Shields applied for and was
granted SSI benefits for Plaintiff approximately a year and a half after the settlement was
approved. Tr. at 146. Mr. Shields testified before the ALJ that he disclosed the conservatorship
account to the local social security representative when he applied for SSI on behalf of Plaintiff.
Tr. at 146-47.
Plaintiff filed an initial brief to this Court on February 19, 2015. ECF No. 13.
Defendant Commissioner of Social Security filed a response on March 31, 2015. ECF No. 16.
Plaintiff replied on April 22, 2015. ECF No. 17. The matter is now ready for a decision. The
sole issue before this Court is whether Plaintiff’s conservatorship account rendered her ineligible
to receive SSI benefits from September 2009 to February 2012.
“Our review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to whether the ALJ applied the
correct legal standards and whether the findings of the ALJ are supported by substantial
evidence.” Winslow v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 566 Fed. App’x 418, 420 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The findings of the ALJ are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). Substantial evidence is defined as more than a mere scintilla of evidence but “such
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Jones v. Sec’y, Health & Human Servs., 945 F.2d 1365, 1369 (6th Cir. 1991). This Court is not
permitted to try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in the evidence and cannot decide
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questions of credibility. Brainard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th
Cir. 1989); see Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 475 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting the
ALJ’s decision cannot be overturned if sufficient evidence supports the decision regardless of
whether evidence also supports a contradictory conclusion). This Court is required to examine
the administrative record as a whole and affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by
substantial evidence, even if this Court would have decided the matter differently. See Kinsella
v. Schwikers, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983); see also Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545
(6th Cir. 1986) (holding that the court must affirm a Commissioner even if substantial evidence
would support the opposite conclusion).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in deciding Plaintiff was not eligible to receive
SSI benefits during the period in question since her conservatorship account was an excludable
resource. ECF No. 13. Under 20 C.F.R § 416.1205, a disabled individual “is eligible for benefits
under title XVI of the Act if his or her nonexcludable resources” do not exceed $2,000. 20
C.F.R § 416.1205(a). A “resource” includes “cash or other liquid assets . . . that an individual
owns and could convert to cash to be used for his or her support and maintenance.” 20 C.F.R. §
416.1201(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1208(a) (same); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201(b) (noting liquid
resources includes funds contained in a financial institution account, such as a checking or
savings account, for example). An individual “owns” the account if he or she “can withdraw
funds and use them for his or her support and maintenance.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.1208(b). An
account qualifies as one used for “support and maintenance” if money from the account may be
used for food or shelter. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1104, 416.1157(b). Plaintiff specifically argues
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that the funds in her conservatorship account were not used for her support and maintenance, and
thus the account was an excludable resource.
In his decision, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was ineligible for SSI benefits
because her conservatorship account was a nonexcludable resource that contained over $2,000 at
all relevant times, and the account was accessible to Plaintiff despite needing court permission
before a withdrawal occurred:
The record shows that the account in question was established in the
name of “the estate of Elizabeth Shields, a Minor” (the claimant),
funded by a settlement arising from a motor vehicle accident. The
record further shows that over $29,000.00 has been in the account at
all times here material–an amount which would preclude the
claimant’s eligibility for benefits.
It has basically been contended on the part of the claimant that the
account in question was purposely established under court
supervision as a conservatorship account for the claimant, to which
she would have no immediate or direct access (as any withdrawal
would require court approval). Therefore, the account should not be
considered an available and countable resource.
However, as explained on the part of the Administration in Exhibit
6, the singular fact that the conservatorship account was established
under court supervision is not the essential element for determining
whether the account represents a countable resource. Rather, in
keeping with the above-referenced section of the Regulations [20
C.F.R. § 416.1208], actual access is the key; if funds can be
withdrawn (albeit with court approval) in order to provide for
ordinary support and maintenance of the claimant, the account is
considered available and countable.
Here, it has been admitted on the part of the claimant that access for
appropriate expenses has remained possible, if court permission is
secured. Also in that regard, a letter concerning the account was
submitted on January 16, 2013 by Lowell R. Ulrich, a retired Probate
Judge (for Chippewa County, Michigan) who previously supervised
the account. While the letter was apparently secured for the purpose
of demonstrating that court permission has been required for account
withdrawals, the letter nevertheless describes four specific instances
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in which that permission was given for withdrawals to cover
necessary expenses–for clothing and school-related computer costs.
Thus, irrespective of the need for court permission, funds have indeed
been withdrawn, as necessary, to provide for items of support and
maintenance for the claimant.
Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the conservatorship account
in question has at all times here material represented a countable
resource precluding eligibility. Consequently, the claimant was
overpaid, as previously determined [in the amount of $17,858.96].
Tr. at 12 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The ALJ’s decision focuses entirely on
whether Plaintiff had access to the funds within the conservatorship account. Id. Interestingly
though, the ALJ did not discuss whether the funds in Plaintiff’s account were used for her
“support and maintenance.” Instead, the ALJ assumed that the funds in the account were used
for her “support and maintenance” since money from the account was spent on clothes,
computers, and a driver’s education class. Notably, however, there is no evidence in the record
to support the ALJ’s assumption that such items constitute “support and maintenance.” See
Garland v. Sec’y of Health & Human Services, 528 F. Supp. 415, 417 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (citing
Wilson v. Califano, 617 F.2d 1050, 1054 (4th Cir. 1980) (“[I]t is manifestly unfair for the ALJ to
rely on assumptions and ‘facts’ which the claimant cannot, without reading the ALJ’s mind, test
or rebut.”)). Therefore, the question of whether the conservatorship account could be (or was)
used for Plaintiff’s support and maintenance remains unanswered.
Because the ALJ’s assumption that Plaintiff’s funds were used for her support and
maintenance is not supported by substantial evidence, the Court must remand the case to the ALJ
to resolve this question. Jones, 945 F.2d at 1369 (noting an ALJ’s decision must be supported by
more than a mere scintilla of evidence); see also Brainard, 889 F.2d at 681 (noting this Court
may not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in the evidence). This Court has the “authority
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to remand a case for further administrative proceedings [under] § 405(g).” Allen v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec’y, No. 09-cv-13503, 2010 WL 3905983, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Mich. June 2, 2010) (citing
Hollon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec’y, 447 F.3d 477, 482-83 (6th Cir. 2006)). For example, under
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), it states:
The court shall have the power to enter, upon pleadings and transcript
of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without
remanding the cause for a rehearing.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Accordingly, the decision of the ALJ is reversed and the case is remanded
to the ALJ for further consideration of the unresolved issue.
Dated: December 17, 2015
/s/ TIMOTHY P. GREELEY
HON. TIMOTHY P. GREELEY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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