Lechner v. Marquette, County of et al

Filing 14

OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

JOHN FRANCIS LECHNER,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:15-cv-5

v.

Honorable Robert Holmes Bell

COUNTY OF MARQUETTE, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro
se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state
a claim.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff John Francis Lechner filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Marquette County, Marquette County Board of Commissioners,
Chairman Gerald O. Corkin, Vice Chair Bobbie Pelow, Steve Pence, Paul Arsenault, Bruce Heikkila,
Greg Seppanen, Marquette County Administrator Scott Erbisch, Marquette County Sheriff’s
Department, Marquette County Sheriff Michael H. Lovelace, Marquette County Undersheriff Jack
Schneider, Unknown Corrections Officers, and the United States Marshal Service.
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested on federal charges on
September 21, 2011. While Plaintiff was being held at the Marquette County Jail, prison officials
interfered with his mail. Plaintiff states that on October 23, 2011, Plaintiff was denied delivery of
a piece of mail sent by Lisa Honeycutt. Plaintiff only discovered this denial on July 17, 2012, when
he was transferred to the Chippewa County Jail and it was discovered by officials as his property was
being processed. On October 24, 2011, Plaintiff’s attorney, Charles W. Malette, mailed an envelope
containing Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) rules to Plaintiff, along with a description of the
planned trial strategy. Plaintiff states that this envelope was never delivered to him and the
whereabouts continue to be unknown. Plaintiff asserts that he suffered harm as a result because he
was less able to assist his attorney in his own defense.
On November 4, 2011, Audrey Plastino mailed Plaintiff an envelope containing ATF
rules to aid in his defense. Plaintiff did not discover this mail until he was transferred to the
Chippewa County Jail on July 17, 2012. On November 21, 2011, Attorney Malette mailed Plaintiff
legal documents describing planned trial strategy. Plaintiff never received this mail. On December
26, 2011, personal mail sent to Plaintiff by the Dooley family on December 22, 2011, was withheld
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from Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not discover this mail until he was transferred to the Chippewa County
Jail on July 17, 2012. On January 2, 2012, attorney Mallette mailed Plaintiff a large envelope
containing mail describing federal law, anticipated trial strategy, and a “plethora” of viable defenses
to be presented at Plaintiff’s trial. Plaintiff never received this envelope. On January 25, 2012,
Audrey Plastino sent Plaintiff an envelope containing personal correspondence, but Marquette
County Jail employees did not deliver it to Plaintiff and he did not discover this mail until he was
transferred to the Chippewa County Jail on July 17, 2012. On February 4, 2012, Ken Lechner mailed
Plaintiff correspondence, but Marquette County Jail personnel did not deliver it to Plaintiff. Plaintiff
did not discover this mail until he was transferred to the Chippewa County Jail on July 17, 2012.
On March 5, 2012, Ken Lechner sent Plaintiff correspondence which included
possible trial strategy based on various experts in criminal law. Marquette County Jail personnel did
not deliver this correspondence to Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not discover this mail until he was
transferred to the Chippewa County Jail on July 17, 2012. On March 12, 2012, Ken Lechner sent
Plaintiff an envelope which contained a check for $200.00. Marquette County Jail personnel did not
deliver this envelope to Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not discover this mail until he was transferred to the
Chippewa County Jail on July 17, 2012. On May 7, 2012, Ken Lechner sent Plaintiff an envelope
containing personal correspondence and stock quotes. Marquette County Jail personnel did not
deliver this correspondence to Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not discover this mail until he was transferred
to the Chippewa County Jail on July 17, 2012.
On May 25, 2012, Ken Lechner sent Plaintiff an envelope containing correspondence
and $15.00 in cash. Marquette County Jail personnel did not deliver this correspondence to Plaintiff.

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Plaintiff did not discover this mail until he was transferred to the Chippewa County Jail on July 17,
2012. In addition, when Plaintiff received the envelope, only $10.00 in cash remained.
Plaintiff states that the interference with his mail violated his rights under the First,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as under state law. Plaintiff seeks
compensatory, punitive and exemplary damages, as well as equitable relief.
Discussion
I.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
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v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Marquette County, Marquette County Board of
Commissioners, Chairman Gerald O. Corkin, Vice Chair Bobbie Pelow, Steve Pence, Paul
Arsenault, Bruce Heikkila, Greg Seppanen, Marquette County Administrator Scott Erbisch,
Marquette County Sheriff’s Department, Marquette County Sheriff Michael H. Lovelace, and
Marquette County Undersheriff Jack Schneider are liable for Plaintiff’s injuries because they failed
to adequately train and supervise the deputies. These Defendants cannot be liable for such conduct
under § 1983. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1264,
120 S. Ct. 2724 (2000).
Liability under Section 1983 must be based on more than merely the right to control
employees. Polk Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325-26 (1981); Monell v. New York City Department
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Thus, Section 1983 liability cannot be premised upon mere
allegations of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Polk, 454 U.S. at 325. A party cannot
be held liable under Section 1983 absent a showing that the party personally participated in, or
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otherwise authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in, the allegedly unconstitutional conduct.
See e.g. Leach v. Shelby Co. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932
(1990); Hays v. Jefferson, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833 (1982). See also
Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 845 (1984).
Supervisory officials can be held liable for the acts of their subordinates only if
plaintiff establishes that the supervisor failed to appropriately discharge his supervisory duties, and
that this failure resulted in a denial or deprivation of plaintiff’s federal rights. See e.g. Leach, 891
F.2d at 1246; Hayes v. Vessey, 777 F.2d 1149, 1154 (6th Cir. 1985). However, the failure of a
supervisor to supervise, control or train the offending employee is not actionable absent a showing
that the official implicitly encouraged, authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in, or in some
other way directly participated in, the offensive conduct. Leach, 891 F.2d at 1246. Such a claim
requires, at a minimum, that the official had knowledge of the offending employee’s conduct at a
time when the conduct could be prevented, or that such conduct was otherwise foreseeable or
predictable. See e.g. Gibson v. Foltz, 963 F.2d 851, 854 (6th Cir. 1992). In addition, plaintiff must
show that defendant had some duty or authority to act. See e.g. Birrell v. Brown, 867 F.2d 956, 959
(6th Cir. 1989) (lower level official not liable for shortcomings of building); Ghandi v. Police Dept.
of City of Detroit, 747 F.2d 338, 351 (6th Cir. 1984) (mere presence at the scene is insufficient
grounds to impose Section 1983 liability in the absence of a duty to act); accord Hall v. Shipley, 932
F.2d 1147 (6th Cir. 1991). In addition, merely bringing a problem to the attention of a supervisory
official is not sufficient to impose such liability. See Shelly v. Johnson, 684 F. Supp. 941, 946 (W.D.
Mich. 1987) (Hillman, C.J.), aff’d 849 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1988). Finally, supervisory liability claims

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cannot be based on simple negligence. Leach, 891 F.2d at 1246; Weaver v. Toombs, 756 F. Supp.
335, 337 (W.D. Mich. 1989), aff’d 915 F.2d 1574 (6th Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that Defendants Marquette County,
Marquette County Board of Commissioners, Chairman Gerald O. Corkin, Vice Chair Bobbie Pelow,
Steve Pence, Paul Arsenault, Bruce Heikkila, Greg Seppanen, Marquette County Administrator Scott
Erbisch, Marquette County Sheriff’s Department, Marquette County Sheriff Michael H. Lovelace,
Marquette County Undersheriff Jack Schneider were personally involved in the activity which forms
the basis of his claim. The only roles that Defendants Marquette County, Marquette County Board
of Commissioners, Chairman Gerald O. Corkin, Vice Chair Bobbie Pelow, Steve Pence, Paul
Arsenault, Bruce Heikkila, Greg Seppanen, Marquette County Administrator Scott Erbisch,
Marquette County Sheriff’s Department, Marquette County Sheriff Michael H. Lovelace, Marquette
County Undersheriff Jack Schneider had in this action involve the denial of administrative
grievances or the failure to act. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Marquette County, Marquette County Board of Commissioners, Chairman Gerald O.
Corkin, Vice Chair Bobbie Pelow, Steve Pence, Paul Arsenault, Bruce Heikkila, Greg Seppanen,
Marquette County Administrator Scott Erbisch, Marquette County Sheriff’s Department, Marquette
County Sheriff Michael H. Lovelace, Marquette County Undersheriff Jack Schneider are properly
dismissed for lack of personal involvement.
With regard to Plaintiff’s claims against the United States Marshal Service, the
allegations set forth by Plaintiff in his complaint fail to show any wrongdoing on the part of the
Marshal Service. Moreover, as noted by Defendant Marshal Service in their motion to dismiss, see
docket #12, Plaintiff may not maintain an action for alleged constitutional violations against a federal
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agency. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendant Marshal Service are properly dismissed.
With regard to Plaintiff’s claims against Unknown Corrections Officers, these claims
are properly dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to show that his constitutional rights were
violated. Plaintiff makes a conclusory statement that Defendants’ actions violated his rights under
the Fifth Amendment. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment precludes successive
state proceedings that are essentially criminal in nature. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 527-528
(1974). In Breed, the Court noted that criminal proceedings impose heavy pressures and burdens
on a person charged. Id. at 529-530. The purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to ensure that
a person not be subject to such a proceeding more than once for the same offense. Id. at 530.
The Fifth Amendment also protects a person’s right against self-incrimination.
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316 (1975). A prisoner may remain silent when charged with
a prison rule infraction, but his silence during a prison disciplinary hearing may be weighed against
him in determining his guilt. Id. at 316-319. Plaintiff in this case failed to allege any facts which
would implicate his rights under the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment
claim should be dismissed as frivolous.
Plaintiff also claims that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. The Sixth
Amendment protects a person’s right to counsel in all criminal proceedings. U.S. CONST. Amend.
VI. Plaintiff fails to allege that his right to counsel was violated. Therefore, his Sixth Amendment
claims are properly dismissed.
Plaintiff contends that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated. The Eighth
Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted
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of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards
of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). The Amendment, therefore,
prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”
Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346).
The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600-01 (6th Cir.
1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations of essential food, medical care,
or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348
(citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while
incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954.
In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that
he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with
“‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir.
2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (applying deliberate indifference
standard to medical claims); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying
deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims)). The Court concludes that
Plaintiff’s allegations fail to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment claim.
Plaintiff claims that the interference with his mail violated his First Amendment right
of access to the courts. In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), the Supreme Court recognized a
prisoner’s fundamental right of access to the courts. While the right of access to the courts does not
allow a State to prevent an inmate from bringing a grievance to court, it also does not require the
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State to enable a prisoner to discover grievances or litigate effectively. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343
(1996). Thus, Bounds did not create an abstract, free-standing right to a law library, litigation tools,
or legal assistance. Id. at 351 (1996). Further, the right may be limited by legitimate penological
goals, such as maintaining security and preventing fire or sanitation hazards. See Acord v. Brown,
No. 91-1865, 1992 WL 58975 (6th Cir. March 26, 1992); Hadix v. Johnson, No. 86-1701, 1988 WL
24204 (6th Cir. March 17, 1988); Wagner v. Rees, No. 85-5637, 1985 WL 14025 (6th Cir. Nov. 8,
1985).
To state a claim, an inmate must show that any shortcomings in the library, litigation
tools, or legal assistance caused actual injury in his pursuit of a legal claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351;
Talley-Bey, 168 F.3d at 886; Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996); Pilgrim v. Littlefield,
92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996); Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 932 (6th Cir. 1985). An inmate
must make a specific claim that he was adversely affected or that the litigation was prejudiced.
Vandiver v. Niemi, No. 94-1642, 1994 WL 677685, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 1994). Particularly, an
inmate cannot show injury when he still has access to his legal materials by request, Kensu, 87 F.3d
at 175, when he fails to state how he is unable to replicate the confiscated documents, Vandiver,
1994 WL 677685, at *1, or when he could have received the material by complying with the limits
on property, e.g., where he had the opportunity to select the items that he wanted to keep in his cell,
or when he had an opportunity to purchase a new footlocker that could hold the property. Carlton
v. Fassbender, No. 93-1116, 1993 WL 241459, at *2 (6th Cir. July 1, 1993).
In this case, Plaintiff was represented by an attorney in his criminal trial. The fact that
Plaintiff failed to receive some documents from his attorney which related to his defense at trial is
not sufficient to deprive him of his right of access to the courts. Moreover, Plaintiff’s claim that he
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was prejudiced at trial by his failure to received certain documents appears nonsensical given the fact
that Plaintiff pleaded guilty prior to any trial being conducted. See USA v. John Francis Lechner,
Case No. 2:11-cr-49, docket #33. Therefore, Plaintiff’s access to courts claim is properly denied.
Plaintiff also appears to be claiming that his right to free association was violated.
The court notes that the Sixth Circuit has not decided the degree to which prison inmates retain their
freedom of association. Long v. Norris, 929 F.2d 1111, 1118 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 863
(1991). However, other courts have held that an inmate’s right to mail letters to his family or friends
is not absolute, and that a prisoner has no more right to free postal service than does the ordinary
citizen. Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1972); Williams v. Ward, 404 F. Supp. 170,
172 (S.D. N.Y. 1975); Chiarello v. Bohlinger, 391 F. Supp. 1153, 1154 (S.D. N.Y. 1975), aff’d, 573
F.2d 1288 (1978). In addition, a court in the Eastern District of Michigan recently held that “no right
of freedom of association exists for prisoners.” Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 902 F. Supp. 765, 770 (E.D.
Mich. 1995), aff’d, 124 F.3d 774 (6th Cir. 1997), supp. by, 133 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 524 U.S. 953 (1998). The court concludes that any limited right of freedom of association
Plaintiff might retain while incarcerated was not violated by the alleged interference with Plaintiff’s
mail.
Plaintiff claims that his due process rights were violated by Corrections Officers when
they interfered with his mail. Plaintiff’s due process claim is barred by the doctrine of Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Under
Parratt, a person deprived of property by a “random and unauthorized act” of a state employee has
no federal due process claim unless the state fails to afford an adequate post-deprivation remedy.
If an adequate post-deprivation remedy exists, the deprivation, although real, is not “without due
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process of law.” Parratt, 451 U.S. at 537. This rule applies to both negligent and intentional
deprivation of property, as long as the deprivation was not done pursuant to an established state
procedure. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-36 (1984). Because Plaintiff’s claim is
premised upon allegedly unauthorized acts of a state official, he must plead and prove the inadequacy
of state post-deprivation remedies. See Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479-80 (6th Cir. 1995);
Gibbs v. Hopkins, 10 F.3d 373, 378 (6th Cir. 1993). Under settled Sixth Circuit authority, a
prisoner’s failure to sustain this burden requires dismissal of his § 1983 due-process action. See
Brooks v. Dutton, 751 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff has not sustained his burden in this case.
Plaintiff has not alleged that state post-deprivation remedies are inadequate. Therefore, this claim
is properly dismissed.
To the extent that Plaintiff is claiming his state law rights were violated, the Court
refuses to exercise pendent jurisdiction over such claims. Claims raising issues of state law are best
left to determination by the state courts, particularly in the area of prison administration. In addition,
pendent jurisdiction over state law claims cannot be exercised after all federal claims have been
dismissed. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-727, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 1139 (1966);
Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, et al., 465 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. Sep. 28, 2006); Smith v. Freland, 954
F.2d 343, 348 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 915, 112 S.Ct. 1954 (1992).
That power need not be exercised in every case in which it is found
to exist. It has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction
is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right. Its justification lies
in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to
litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to
exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even though bound to apply
state law to them, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct.
817, 82 L. Ed. 1188. Needless decisions of state law should be
avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between
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the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of
applicable law. Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before
trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state
claims should be dismissed as well. Similarly, if it appears that the
state issues substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof, of
the scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the
remedy sought, the state claims may be dismissed without prejudice
and left for resolution to state tribunals.
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-727, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 1139 (1966).
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: April 30, 2015

/s/ Robert Holmes Bell
ROBERT HOLMES BELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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