Williams #214952 v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al

Filing 8

OPINION ; signed by Judge R. Allan Edgar (Judge R. Allan Edgar, cam)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

CARLOS WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:15-cv-39

v.

Honorable R. Allan Edgar

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro
se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed based on
immunity and for failure to state a claim.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff presently is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility although the events about which he
complains took place while he was housed at the Chippewa Correctional Facility. Plaintiff sues the
MDOC, Director Patricia Caruso and Director Daniel Heyns.
Plaintiff alleges that on September 3, 2010, he was found guilty of fighting. In
connection with that guilty finding, Plaintiff was sanctioned with 30 days of detention and ordered
to pay restitution in the amount of $1,584.54 to cover the medical co-payment fees of the prisoner
Plaintiff had injured while fighting. Plaintiff alleges that immediately after he was ordered to pay
restitution the MDOC took all of the funds in his prisoner trust account. Thereafter, the MDOC has
taken 50% of the funds deposited into Plaintiff’s prisoner trust account. Plaintiff has thus far paid
$347.05 in restitution. Plaintiff alleges that prison policy allows the imposition of restitution only
for property damage and only if the offending prisoner is found guilty of assault. Therefore, Plaintiff
alleges, Defendants are wrongfully taking his money. Moreover, even if restitution were the
appropriate sanction, the MDOC collects only $5.00 in medical co-payments so Plaintiff should not
be required to pay $1,584.54.
Plaintiff alleges violations of his Eight Amendment and due process rights. As relief,
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief.
Discussion
I.

Immunity

Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the Michigan Department of
Corrections. Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their departments are immune
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under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity
or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782
(1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1993). Congress has not expressly
abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979),
and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan,
803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous unpublished opinions, the Sixth Circuit has
specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
See, e.g., McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2010); Turnboe v. Stegall, No. 001182, 2000 WL1679478, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000). In addition, the State of Michigan (acting
through the Michigan Department of Corrections) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983
for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)). Therefore, the Court dismisses the MDOC.
II.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
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plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
A.

Defendants Heyns and Caruso

It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular
defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must
make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). Where a person is named
as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even
under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92
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F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any
named defendant was involved in the violation of his rights); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762,
764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree
of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each
alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir.
Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal involvement against each defendant); Rodriguez
v. Jabe, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against
those individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to
them which would suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries”). Because
Plaintiff’s claims fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (requiring
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”), his complaint
must be dismissed against Defendants Caruso and Heyns.
Even if Plaintiff had made specific factual allegations against Defendants Heyns and
Caruso, his due process and Eighth Amendment claims would be dismissed.
B.

Due Process

Plaintiff contends that the Defendants, in violation of prison policy, withdrew money
from his prison trust account to pay restitution. Claims under § 1983 may not be based upon alleged
violations of state law, nor may federal courts order state officials to comply with their own law. See
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984). Plaintiff does not enjoy
any federally protected liberty or property interest in state procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461
U.S. 238, 250 (1983); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1164 (6th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff alleges only

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that Defendants failed to follow prison policy when they ordered him to pay restitution. Such a
claim is not cognizable under § 1983.
Moreover, it is clear that Plaintiff received due process of law. In all cases where a
person stands to be deprived of his life, liberty or property, he is entitled to due process of law. This
due process of law gives the person the opportunity to convince an unbiased decision maker that, for
example, he has been wrongly or falsely accused or that the evidence against him is false. The Due
Process Clause does not guarantee that the procedure will produce a correct decision. “It must be
remembered that even if a state decision does deprive an individual of life, [liberty], or property, and
even if that decision is erroneous, it does not necessarily follow that the decision violated that
individual’s right to due process.” Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, n.9 (1980). “[T]he
deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in ‘life, liberty or property’ is not
in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due
process of law.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (emphasis in original). Further, an
inmate has no right to counsel in disciplinary proceedings. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
569-70 (1974); Franklin v. Aycock, 795 F.2d 1253, 1263 (6th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff states that a
hearing was conducted by an MDOC hearing officer on September 3, 2010, at which time the
restitution was ordered. He does not allege that the hearing was infirm in anyway. Merely because
Plaintiff does not like the outcome of the hearing, does not mean that Defendants violated his due
process rights. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. 125.

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C.

Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants inflicted cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth Amendment when they began withdrawing funds from his prisoner trust account to pay
the medical co-payment of the prisoner Plaintiff injured while fighting, when Defendants are only
allowed to collect a medical co-payment of $5.00. These allegations merit little discussion.
The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states
to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene
society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). The
Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596,
600-01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations of essential
food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes,
452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might
endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954.
Even if merely withdrawing funds to pay a restitution debt could ever rise to the level
of an Eighth Amendment violation, Plaintiff makes clear that Defendants only withdraw funds from
his prisoner trust account when the amount in the account exceeds $50.00 and then, Defendants
withdraw only half of the amount in excess of $50.00. The clear import being that Defendants

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withdraw funds to pay off Plaintiff’s restitution debt while allowing him to maintain sufficient funds
for necessities. Plaintiff entirely fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed based on immunity and for failure to state a claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: 3/20/2015

/s/ R. Allan Edgar
R. ALLAN EDGAR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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