Peterson v. Strait et al
Filing
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OPINION ; signed by Judge R. Allan Edgar (Judge R. Allan Edgar, cam)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
JEFFREY PETERSON,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:15-cv-124
v.
Honorable R. Allan Edgar
SCOTT STRAIT, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro
se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state
a claim.
Discussion
I.
Factual allegations
Plaintiff Jeffrey Peterson, an inmate at the St. Joseph County Jail, filed this pro se
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Mackinaw County Sheriff Scott
Strait, Undersheriff Edward M. Wilk, Jail Administrator Timothy Ahlborn, and Supervisor of
Community Corrections Robert St. Louis. Plaintiff contends that Defendants retaliated against him
for his conduct in filing a lawsuit against jail officials, Peterson v. Strait, et al., No. 2:15-cv-42
(W.D. Mich.), on March 11, 2015.
Plaintiff alleges that in April of 2015, while he was confined in the Mackinaw County
Jail, he began volunteering in the inmate library, where he put away books and magazines and
attempted to organize the library. Plaintiff alleges that on May 22, 2015, he was approved for the
PA 511 Program and assigned to “inside the jail” work detail. The PA 511 Program affords county
jail inmates the opportunity to earn time off their sentences for good behavior through a work credit
that equals one day off for each seven hours worked. On June 17, 2015, in a brief meeting with
Defendant St. Louis, Plaintiff was told that he would be assigned to jobs such as washing cars,
cleaning the lobby and front offices, doing dishes, cleaning the kitchen, doing laundry, and painting.
However, Plaintiff was never assigned any job duties. Plaintiff asked Defendant Ahlborn if he could
earn credits for volunteering in the library and on June 18, 2015, Plaintiff began to receive credits
for his volunteer work.
On July 17, 2015, Plaintiff was exiting the conference room after using the Westlaw
terminal, when Defendant Ahlborn told Plaintiff to see Defendant St. Louis to report his hours,
despite the fact that he knew that Plaintiff had not been given any hours. Plaintiff believes that this
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statement was made in an effort to frustrate and humiliate him. On July 18, 2015, Plaintiff wrote
a letter to Defendants Strait, Wilk, Ahlborn, and St. Louis, complaining of the allegedly retaliatory
refusal to give him work assignments.
On July 25, 2015, Plaintiff received a few hours of work doing laundry. Plaintiff
believes that this was the result of his July 18, 2015, letter to Defendants. However, Plaintiff was
only asked to do laundry on nine other occasions during the remainder of his time at the Jail, and was
not given any other job assignments. Plaintiff states that he was only given jobs on weekends and
“averaged 2-5 work opportunities” a month during the last four months of his sentence. Plaintiff was
transferred to another facility on September 23, 2015. See ECF No. 4. Plaintiff contends that other
inmates received more work assignments and that this discrepancy proves that he was being
retaliated against for his litigious behavior. Plaintiff states that Defendants’ retaliatiory conduct has
affected the length of his sentence and seeks damages and equitable relief.
II.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
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inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
As noted above, Plaintiff asserts that he was not given the same amount of work
assignments as other inmates because Defendants sought to retaliate against him for his conduct in
filing a lawsuit against jail officials. Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her
constitutional rights violates the Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th
Cir. 1999) (en banc). In order to set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must
establish that: (1) he was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him
that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse
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action was motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff must be
able to prove that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the
defendant’s alleged retaliatory conduct. See Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001)
(citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
As noted above, Plaintiff filed Peterson v. Strait, et al., No. 2:15-cv-42 (W.D. Mich.)
on March 11, 2015. Plaintiff was subsequently approved for the PA 511 program on May 22, 2015,
but was not given any jobs until July 25, 2015. Plaintiff believes that this was because of a desire
to retaliate against him for his lawsuit. However, Plaintiff ignores the fact that Defendant Ahlborn
approved him to receive credits for his volunteer work in the library as early as June 18, 2015.
Moreover, Plaintiff did receive some job assignments pursuant to the PA 511 program. In addition,
although Plaintiff makes a conclusory assertion that he did not receive as many job assignments as
other inmates, he fails to allege any specific facts in support of this claim.
Temporal proximity “may be ‘significant enough to constitute indirect evidence of
a causal connection so as to create an inference of retaliatory motive.’” Muhammad v. Close, 379
F.3d 413, 417-18 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 422 (6th Cir. 2004)).
However, “[c]onclusory allegations of temporal proximity are not sufficient to show a retaliatory
motive.” Skinner v. Bolden, 89 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2004).
Moreover, Muhammad does not stand for the proposition that temporal proximity
alone is sufficient to create an issue of fact as to retaliatory motive.
In Muhammad the Sixth Circuit did not resolve the issue, but merely
observed that “temporal proximity alone may be ‘significant enough
to constitute indirect evidence of a causal connection so as to create
an inference of retaliatory motive.’” Id. at 418 (quoting DiCarlo v.
Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 422 (6th Cir.2004) (emphasis added). Even if
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temporal proximity may in some cases create an issue of fact as to
retaliatory motive, it would only be sufficient if the evidence was
“significant enough.” Plaintiff’s conclusory and ambiguous evidence
is not “significant enough” to create an issue of fact as to retaliatory
motive.
Brandon v. Bergh, 2010 WL 188731, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Mich., Jan. 16, 2010). The court concludes
that Plaintiff’s conclusory claims of retaliatory motive are insufficient to state a claim.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: 10/23/2015
/s/ R. Allan Edgar
R. ALLAN EDGAR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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