Lindsey #256676 v. Wertanen et al

Filing 83

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
__________________________

JAMES LINDSEY #256676,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 2:16-CV-30

RICK WERTANEN, et al.,

HON. GORDON J. QUIST

Defendants.
__________________________/

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiff, James Lindsey, who is currently on parole from the Michigan Department of
Corrections, has sued Defendants, Rick Wertanen, Ty Hyatt, and Jody Karppinen, alleging a claim
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment when
they unnecessarily and gratuitously inflicted pain on Lindsey while escorting him to a dental call
out. Lindsey also alleges state-law claims of assault and battery. Lindsey’s claims were tried to the
Court on August 15, 2018. The Court heard testimony from Lindsey, Defendants, and non-party
Corrections Officer Mike Waltanen and received exhibits from the parties.
The Court now issues its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The incident at issue occurred at Baraga Correctional Facility on June 12, 2014. On that
date, Lindsey was scheduled for a dental call out. At approximately 9:30 a.m., Defendants Rick
Wertanen and Ty Hyatt got Lindsey from his cell and escorted him to his dental call out. Lindsey
was secured in handcuffs and belly chains but was not wearing leg restraints. Defendant Hyatt was
holding the strap attached to the back of the belly chains.

Wertanen and Hyatt approached the door of the bubble with Lindsey and waited for bubble
officer Waltanen to open the door. As they waited, Defendant Karppinen walked out of the
commanding officer’s office. Seeing Karppinen, Lindsey lunged at her, stating, “I’m going to get
you now bitch,” or words of similar effect. Wertanen stepped between Lindsey and Karppinen, told
Lindsey “that’s it, you’re going back to your cell,” and attempted to get control of Lindsey, but
Lindsey kicked Wertanen in the groin. Hyatt pulled Lindsey back by the strap, and Hyatt and
Wertanen both ordered Lindsey to get on the ground and stop resisting. Wertanen again attempted
to gain control of Lindsey, but Lindsey kneed, or kneed at, Wertanen. At that point, Wertanen
pulled out his personal chemical agent spray and administered a short burst to Lindsey’s face. Hyatt
eventually took Lindsey to the ground, but Lindsey continued to resist by attempting to get off the
ground and attempting to bite Hyatt. Wertanen then administered a second burst of chemical agent
to get Lindsey under control. At that point, other officers responded and restrained Lindsey’s legs.
The officers then escorted Lindsey back to his cell.
Following the incident, prison healthcare treated Lindsey for the injuries he sustained in the
altercation. Wertanen and Hyatt were treated for their injuries at Baraga County Memorial Hospital.
Karppinen did not call Lindsey a “baby raper” prior to the altercation, nor did she or any other
Defendant say “let’s do it” or words of similar effect immediately prior to the altercation. Neither
Wertanen nor Hyatt kicked or punched Lindsey.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the infliction of “cruel
and unusual punishment” in the prison setting. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Regarding the use of force,
“only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 1084

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(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Regardless of the circumstances, whenever a prison
official is accused of using excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, “the core judicial
inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7, 112 S. Ct. 995,
999 (citing Whitley); see also Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that
although inmates may be expected to “endure relatively greater physical contact, the Eighth
Amendment is nonetheless violated if the ‘offending conduct reflects an unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain’” (quoting Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034, 1037 (6th Cir. 1993)).
An Eighth Amendment claim has both an objective and a subjective component. Cordell
v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014). “The objective component requires the pain
inflicted to be ‘sufficiently serious.’” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 298, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991). In assessing this component, a court must consider the
context in which the force was used, although “the extent of a prisoner’s injury . . . is not dispositive
of whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred.” Cordell, 759 F.3d at 580–81. “‘When
prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of
decency are always are violated . . . [w]hether or not significant injury is evident.’” Id. at 581
(quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, 112 S. Ct. at 1000). As for the subjective component, in assessing
whether a prison official had a culpable state of mind, courts should consider “such factors as the
need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was
used, [and] the extent of injury inflicted.’” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S. Ct. at 1085 (quoting
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2nd Cir. 1973)). Other factors include “the extent of the
threat to safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by officials on the basis of the facts
known to them, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id.
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Lindsey’s claim fails on the subjective component. As Defendants Wertanen and Hyatt were
escorting Lindsey, Lindsey lunged at Karppinen and threatened to harm her. The need for force was
immediately apparent—Lindsey expressed an intent to harm Karppinen, who was nearby, and
Lindsey realistically could have assaulted Karppinen even though he was in handcuffs and belly
chains. When Lindsey failed to comply with the officers’ orders and kicked Wertanen, Wertanen
reasonably used his chemical spray to subdue Lindsey. Wertanen’s second use of chemical spray
on Lindsey after Lindsey was on the ground was likewise reasonable because Lindsey continued to
resist and attempted to bite Hyatt. In short, Defendants applied force in a good-faith effort to
restrain Lindsey and restore order.
Finally, because Defendants applied force in a good-faith effort to restore order, Lindsey’s
state-law assault and battery claims fail as well.
CONCLUSION
In sum, Lindsey has failed to prove that Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by
“‘maliciously and sadistically [applying force] for the very purpose of causing harm.’” Whitley, 475
U.S. at 320–21, 106 S. Ct. at 1085 (quoting Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033).
An appropriate judgment will enter.

Dated: August 22, 2018

/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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