Greene #251997 v. Miller et al

Filing 4

OPINION (Screening) ; signed by Judge R. Allan Edgar (Judge R. Allan Edgar, cmb)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL GREENE,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:16-cv-44

v.

Honorable R. Allan Edgar

R. MILLER, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro
se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure
to state a claim against Defendant Woods. The Court will serve the complaint against Defendants
Butler and Miller with regard to Plaintiff’s retaliation and equal protection claims, but will dismiss
Plaintiff’s due process claims against these Defendants.

Discussion
I.

Factual allegations

Plaintiff Michael Greene, a state prisoner currently confined at the Ojibway
Correctional Facility (OCF), filed this pro se civil rights action against Defendants Corrections
Officer R. Miller, Prison Counselor B. Butler, and Warden Jeffrey Woods, who were employed at
the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) during the pertinent time period.
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on March 18, 2014, he arrived at URF. On
March 19, 2014, Plaintiff was moved from Chippewa West to Chippewa East. After he was placed
in Chippewa East, he was sent to the property room to receive his property. At this point, Defendant
Miller told Plaintiff that his KTV televison, Behringer guitar amp, and Harbinger weight lifting
gloves would be stored in the Property Room until a contraband hearing could be held. Plaintiff
explained that the property had been legally purchased and was not contraband. Defendant Miller
replied that if that was the case, his things would be stored because URF East did not have a music
program. Plaintiff was told that he would have to work things out with Defendant Butler. Plaintiff
was given a contraband removal record.
On March 20, 2014, Plaintiff asked Defendant Butler about a vendor to repair his
broken television. Defendant Butler responded that he did not know anything about that and to
contact the property room. On April 1, 2014, Plaintiff sent an inquiry to the property room regarding
his property, but received no response. Plaintiff wrote to the property room again on April 9, 2014,
but received no response.
On April 15, 2014, Plaintiff asked Defendant Butler about his property. Defendant
Butler responded that he had not received any paperwork on it, so nothing could be done. Plaintiff
-2-

expressed concern that it had been almost 30 days and that his property might be destroyed if
unclaimed. Defendant Butler stated that Plaintiff had better figure something out. Plaintiff asked
if he would get better results if he filed a grievanc. Defendant Butler told Plaintiff that would not
be a good idea because “people tend to take those things personally around here.” Plaintiff asked
about his alternatives and Defendant Butler reiterated, “like I said, figure it out.” Plaintiff wrote a
grievance regarding his property.
On April 24, 2014, Sergeant A. Ormsbee interviewed Defendant Miller regarding
Plaintiff’s property. Defendant Miller remembered Plaintiff and issued a Notice of Intent to conduct
an administrative hearing regarding Plaintiff’s property. On April 28, 2014, Plaintiff wrote to the
URF Administrative Assistant Robert Beaulieu complaining that policy was being violated. Plaintiff
did not receive a response. On May 5, 2014, Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Woods, but did not receive
a response.
On May 9, 2014, Plaintiff was called into Defendant Butler’s office and was asked
where he wanted to have his property sent. Plaintiff realized that this was intended to be the hearing
on his Notice of Intent and stated that Policy Directive 04.07.112 mandates that his property be
returned to him and that if it was really contraband, it would be destroyed, rather than sent out.
Plaintiff continued that he should not be forced to send anything out. Defendant Butler responded
that Plaintiff should have thought of that before he filed a grievance. When Plaintiff continued to
refuse to have his property sent out, Defendant Butler indicated that it would be destroyed. Plaintiff
then said he would like to send his television out for repair, but Defendant Butler indicated that they
did not have a vendor for that. When Plaintiff stated that URF did have a vendor and that he could
show Defendant Butler the information, Defendant Butler stated, “what I mean is we don’t do that
-3-

anymore.” Plaintiff argued that the information was recently posted in the day room and that another
inmate named Harper had just sent a television out for repair. Defendant Butler said, “well you’re
not him are you?” When Plaintiff asked what the difference was between himself and Harper,
Defendant Butler told him to look in the mirror. Defendant Butler also stated, “didn’t they tell you
when you got here that URF stands for you are fucked?” Plaintiff subsequently filed a grievance and
sent a complaint regarding Defendant Butler’s conduct to Defendant Woods. Plaintiff states that he
is African American and inmate Harper is Caucasian.
Plaintiff states that Defendants violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
II.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
-4-

550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Initially, the court notes that a plaintiff bringing an action pursuant to § 1983 cannot
premise liability upon a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Street v. Corr. Corp. of
Am., 102 F.3d 810, 818 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978)). Plaintiff must establish that Woods was personally involved, or that he otherwise
encouraged or condoned the action of the offending employees. Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476,
481 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-76 (1976) and Bellamy v. Bradley, 729
F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)). There must be more than merely a right to control employees, as
plaintiff must show that Woods at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced
in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending employees. Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d
1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993); Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989).
-5-

Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that show Woods encouraged or condoned the conduct of the
officers, or that Woods authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the conduct. Because
Plaintiff’s § 1983 action is premised on nothing more than respondeat superior liability, his action
fails to state a claim. Copeland, 57 F.3d at 481.
In addition, Plaintiff’s due process claim is barred by the doctrine of Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Under
Parratt, a person deprived of property by a “random and unauthorized act” of a state employee has
no federal due process claim unless the state fails to afford an adequate post-deprivation remedy.
If an adequate post-deprivation remedy exists, the deprivation, although real, is not “without due
process of law.” Parratt, 451 U.S. at 537. This rule applies to both negligent and intentional
deprivation of property, as long as the deprivation was not done pursuant to an established state
procedure. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-36 (1984). Because Plaintiff’s claim is
premised upon allegedly unauthorized acts of a state official, he must plead and prove the inadequacy
of state post-deprivation remedies. See Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479-80 (6th Cir. 1995);
Gibbs v. Hopkins, 10 F.3d 373, 378 (6th Cir. 1993). Under settled Sixth Circuit authority, a
prisoner’s failure to sustain this burden requires dismissal of his § 1983 due process action. See
Brooks v. Dutton, 751 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1985).
Plaintiff has not sustained his burden in this case. Plaintiff has not alleged that state
post-deprivation remedies are inadequate. Moreover, numerous state post-deprivation remedies are
available to him. First, a prisoner who incurs a loss through no fault of his own may petition the
institution’s Prisoner Benefit Fund for compensation. MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., Policy Directive
04.07.112, ¶ B (effective Dec. 12, 2013). Aggrieved prisoners may also submit claims for property
-6-

loss of less than $1,000 to the State Administrative Board. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6419; MDOC
Policy Directive 03.02.131 (effective Oct. 21, 2013). Alternatively, Michigan law authorizes actions
in the Court of Claims asserting tort or contract claims “against the state and any of its departments,
commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or agencies.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6419(1)(a). The
Sixth Circuit specifically has held that Michigan provides adequate post-deprivation remedies for
deprivation of property. See Copeland, 57 F.3d at 480. Plaintiff does not allege any reason why a
state-court action would not afford him complete relief for the deprivation, either negligent or
intentional, of his personal property. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s due process claims will be dismissed.
Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s equal protection and retaliation claims against
Defendants Miller and Butler are nonfrivolous and may not be dismissed on initial review.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Defendant Woods will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c), as will Plaintiff’s due process claims against
Defendants Miller and Butler. The Court will serve the complaint against Defendants Miller and
Butler with regard to Plaintiff’s retaliation and equal protection claims.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated:

4/1/2016

/s/ R. Allan Edgar
R. Allan Edgar
United States District Judge

-7-