Alexander #731077 v. Isard et al

Filing 5

OPINION; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

DANDRE ALEXANDER,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:16-cv-65

v.

Honorable Gordon J. Quist

DAVID ISARD, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/

OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s
pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure
to state a claim against Defendants Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) and the State of
Michigan. The Court will also dismiss Plaintiff’s equal protection claims against all of the named
Defendants. The Court will serve the complaint against Defendants Isard, LaLonde, Woods, and
McLeod with regard to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims, and against
Defendants Isard, LaLonde, and McLeod with regard to Plaintiff’s retaliation claims.

Discussion
I.

Factual allegations

Plaintiff Dandre Alexander, a state prisoner currently confined at the Chippewa
Correctional Facility, filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Defendants Deputy Warden David Isard, the State of Michigan, the Michigan Department of
Corrections, David LaLonde, Kyle Woods, and Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Gary McLeod.
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on December 22, 2013, while he was confined at the
Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF), he was involved in a fight. Plaintiff was subsequently
informed that there was a hit out on him for being involved in the fight. On January 1, 2014,
Plaintiff informed Defendant Woods of the threat. Defendant Woods refused to inform anyone
about the hit on Plaintiff.
On February 28, 2014, Plaintiff told Defendants Isard and LaLonde that there was
a hit out on him and requested protection. Defendant Isard replied:
I know you. I’m not doing you any favors and you need to back off
healthcare. [Referring to a complaint that Plaintiff had pending
against healthcare.] I’m going to make sure you stay in the Upper
Peninsula. Stop complaining and maybe things will change.
See ECF No. 1, PageID.7. Defendant LaLonde agreed with Defendant Isard. Plaintiff stated that
if he was released to the general population, he would be assaulted. Defendant Isard told him that
he would be fine as long as he minded his own business. Defendant Isard also stated that he would
send Plaintiff to C or D wing to ensure his safety, since Plaintiff had originally been confined on A
wing. Plaintiff insisted that he would not be safe anywhere at URF. On March 10, 2014, Plaintiff
executed an affidavit notarized by Defendant McLeod, which asserted that Defendants Isard and
LaLonde were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety needs.
On March 12, 2014, Plaintiff was forced to move to Round Unit in the general
population. Plaintiff states that on March 13, 2014, his cell mate asked if Plaintiff was the one who
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had fought “the homie Cathead.” Plaintiff did not respond, but heard a shout from the hallway
stating, “You better hurry up and handle that or give back that tobacco.” Plaintiff’s cell mate then
attacked him and knocked him to the floor, where he beat and stomped on Plaintiff for at least five
minutes. Plaintiff was subsequently placed back in segregation. The attachments to Plaintiff’s
complaint show that he received a misconduct for fighting on March 13, 2014, and was found guilty
of the misconduct on March 19, 2014. See ECF No. 1-1, PageID.18 - PageID.19.
On March 20, 2014, Defendants Isard and LaLonde changed Plaintiff’s security level
from a IV to a V. Plaintiff states that on April 15, 2014, Defendant McLeod increased Plaintiff’s
assault risk to very high in response to the misconduct ticket that Plaintiff received in relation to the
March 13, 2014, assault. When Plaintiff complained that he was the victim of the assault, Defendant
McLeod stated, “If you drop all the legal stuff, I’ll make all this level stuff go away. Plaintiff told
him that he would think about it. On April 18, 2014, Defendant McLeod asked Plaintiff if he had
an answer for him, and Plaintiff stated that he did not know yet. Resident Unit Manager Dunton,
who was also present, interjected, “We can get you closer to your family. Just stop pursuing our
staff and we’ll make that happen.” Plaintiff did not respond. Defendant McLeod then stated that
Plaintiff had had his chance and would be transferred to Marquette. On April 21, 2014, Plaintiff was
transferred to Marquette Branch Prison.
Plaintiff states that Defendants violated his rights under the First and Eighth
Amendments, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff seeks
compensatory and punitive damages, as well as equitable relief.
II.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
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a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(I)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Initially, the court notes that Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the
Michigan Department of Corrections or the State of Michigan. Regardless of the form of relief
requested, the states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit
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in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated
Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d
823, 826 (6th Cir. 1993). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity
by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented
to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In
numerous unpublished opinions, the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely
immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x
646, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2010); Turnboe v. Stegall, No. 00-1182, 2000 WL1679478, at *2 (6th Cir.
Nov. 1, 2000). In addition, the State of Michigan (acting through the Michigan Department of
Corrections) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v.
Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)).
Therefore, the Court dismisses the Michigan Department of Corrections and the State of Michigan.
Plaintiff makes a conclusory assertion that Defendants’ conduct violated his equal
protection rights. The Equal Protection Clause commands that no state shall “deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A state
practice generally will not require strict scrutiny unless it interferes with a fundamental right or
discriminates against a suspect class of individuals. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312
(1976). Plaintiff does not suggest that he is a member of a suspect class, and “prisoners are not
considered a suspect class for purposes of equal protection litigation.” Jackson v. Jamrog, 411 F.3d
615, 619 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604 (6th Cir.1998).
Plaintiff does not identify the theory for his equal protection claim. As discussed,
prisoners are not considered a suspect class. Jackson, 411 F.3d at 619. As a consequence,
Defendants’ conduct need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. See
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United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir.
1997). To prove his equal protection claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate “intentional and arbitrary
discrimination” by the state . . . and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that he was treated differently from all other
prisoners, he fails to state a claim under the “class-of-one” model. To prove his class-of-one claim,
Plaintiff must demonstrate “intentional and arbitrary discrimination” by the state; that is, he must
demonstrate that he “has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that
there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.
562, 564 (2000).
Plaintiff’s allegation of discriminatory treatment is wholly conclusory. Conclusory
allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under
§ 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting
that he was intentionally treated differently than any similarly situated person, nor has he identified
such person. Therefore, Plaintiff’s equal protection claim is properly dismissed.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Isard, LaLonde, Woods, and McLeod failed to take
appropriate action to protect him from other prisoners in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Plaintiff also claims that Defendants Isard, LaLonde, and McLeod were motivated by a desire to
retaliate against Plaintiff for filing complaints against prison officials. After carefully reviewing
Plaintiff’s allegations in this case, the court concludes that his Eighth Amendment and retaliation
claims are non-frivolous and may not be dismissed on initial review.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Defendants Michigan Department of Corrections and State of Michigan will be
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dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will also dismiss Plaintiff’s equal protection claims against all of the
named Defendants. The Court will serve the complaint against Defendants Isard, LaLonde, Woods,
and McLeod with regard to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims, and against
Defendants Isard, LaLonde, and McLeod with regard to Plaintiff’s retaliation claims.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: May 6, 2016

/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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