Ashford #255100 v. Flatt et al

Filing 5

OPINION ; signed by Judge R. Allan Edgar (Judge R. Allan Edgar, cam)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

JOHN DANIE ASHFORD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:16-cv-82

v.

Honorable R. Allan Edgar

J. FLATT, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro
se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state
a claim.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff John Danie Ashford, a prisoner currently confined at the Kinross
Correctional Facility (KCF), filed his pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Defendants Corrections Officer J. Flatt, Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor T. Parline, Prison
Counselor Richard McBryde, Resident Unit Manager L. Olson, Warden Mitch Perry, Grievance
Specialist Sean Lockhart, and Richard D. Russell.
In Plaintiff’s complaint, he alleges that he received a major misconduct ticket on
October 30, 2013. In violation of MDOC policy, Plaintiff was terminated from his job on October
31, 2013, by Defendant T. Parline, despite the fact that he had not yet had a hearing on the
misconduct ticket. Plaintiff was informed of this fact by Defendant Flatt. On November 14, 2013,
Plaintiff was found not guilty of the misconduct ticket. On November 27, 2013, Plaintiff asked
Defendant Flatt for back pay for the month of November. Defendant Flatt replied that Plaintiff had
been terminated as of the end of October and his job had been given to another inmate.
Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the loss of his job, requesting reinstatement and
backpay. On December 6, 2013, Defendant McBryde responded to the grievance, stating:
Prisoner was laid in pending termination for misconducts incurred on
10/30/13. He was found not guilty on 11/14/13. PD 05.01.100
paragraph DD states in part, “if the prisoner is not found guilty at the
initial hearing, s/he shall be paid for any time s/he was removed from
the assignment pending the hearing. The prisoner may be returned to
the same assignment or considered for reclassification in accordance
with this policy, as determined by the Classification Director. The
prisoner shall not be returned to the same assignment if the
Classification Director determines it to be a threat to the safety or
security of the facility.” Prisoner was told he would be the next
prisoner hired for that position since it had since been filled, and that
he is entitled to the back pay only for the time leading up to the
hearing per policy, which is 15 days at a daily rate of $.84/day for a
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total of $9.24. Prisoner was not satisfied with this resolution and
wishes to proceed to Step II.
(ECF No. 1-1, PageID.23.)
Plaintiff’s appeal was denied at step II by Defendant Perry, and at step III by
Defendant Russell. Plaintiff claims that he was without prison employment for three and a half
months, which caused him to go without basic hygiene items. Plaintiff claims that the termination
from his job violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and that Defendants
McBryde, Olson, Perry, Lockhart, and Russell all conspired to cover up the underlying misconduct
in their handling of Plaintiff’s grievances. Plaintiff seeks compensatory, punitive, and nominal
damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
Discussion
I.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although

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the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of his constitutional right of due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that the conduct of Defendants Flatt and Parline
violated MDOC policy and resulted in the termination of Plaintiff’s job assignment. Even assuming
that what Plaintiff says is true, Plaintiff has not stated a viable due process claim.
Procedural due process claims require resolution of two questions:
[T]he first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest
which has been interfered with by the State, Board of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); the second examines
whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were
constitutionally sufficient. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 472.
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Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 1908 (1989).
Generally speaking, a protected interest exists if the individual has a legitimate claim
of entitlement to it. Id. at 460. The interest here at issue is whether Plaintiff, a prisoner, had an
entitlement to continued prison employment in the absence of just cause for discharge. Plaintiff has
no inherent constitutional right to rehabilitation, education, job assignments, or other programming.
See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2400 (1981); Moody v. Daggett, 429
U.S. 78, 88 n.9, 97 S. Ct. 274, 279 n.9 (1976); Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 374-75 (6th Cir.
1989); Canterino v. Wilson, 869 F.2d 948, 952-54 (6th Cir. 1989); Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955
(6th Cir. 1987); Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir. 1980).
Nor does state law create such an entitlement. Michigan’s statutes and regulations
give prison authorities complete discretion regarding programming assignments of prisoners.
Michigan does not have statutes or administrative rules restricting the discretion of its prison
administrators concerning such decisions. Under Michigan Department of Corrections regulations,
prison authorities retain broad discretion regarding the assignment of prisoners to rehabilitative
programs and work assignments. See MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., Policy Directives 05.01.100 and
05.02.112.
Accordingly, since Plaintiff had no entitlement to or liberty interest in his job
assignment, the Due Process Clause was not implicated by Plaintiff’s termination, with or without
cause.
Because the conduct of Defendants Flatt and Parline did not violate the Constitution,
the denial of Plaintiff’s grievances regarding his job termination by Defendants McBryde, Olson,
Perry, Lockhart, and Russell could not have violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Moreover,
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government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates
under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. New
York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir.
2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior.
Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th
Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based
upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis,
368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Section 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a
supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in
a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that
each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants Defendants
McBryde, Olson, Perry, Lockhart, and Russell engaged in any active unconstitutional behavior.
Accordingly, he fails to state a claim against them.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
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$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: 5/31/2016

/s/ R. Allan Edgar
R. ALLAN EDGAR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE