Gray #670289 v. Brown et al

Filing 8

OPINION; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

TAUREAN JAMES-HENRY GRAY,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:16-cv-132

v.

Honorable Gordon J. Quist

M. BROWN, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s
pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure
to state a claim against Defendants Hubbard and Hough. The Court will serve the complaint against
Defendants Brown, Bigger, Dunton, and Isard.
Discussion
I.

Factual allegations

Plaintiff Taurean James-Henry Gray, a state prisoner currently confined at the G.
Robert Cotton Correctional Facility, filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Defendants Corrections Officers M. Brown and Unknown Bigger, Assistant Resident Unit
Manager Kenneth Dunton, Inspector P. Hubbard, Inspector L. Hough, and Deputy Warden D. Isard.
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on January 14, 2014, while he was confined
at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF), Defendants Brown and Bigger placed Plaintiff in a
non-handicap accessible cell in segregation, despite the fact that they were aware that Plaintiff was
confined to a wheelchair. This placement resulted in Plaintiff having to sleep in his wheelchair. On
January 25, 2014, Plaintiff asked Nurse Haske about being placed in a handicap accessible cell.
Nurse Haske stated that she would look into it.
On January 26, 2014, Plaintiff was seated at his desk when Officer Queen came to
pick up his food trays. When moving back to his wheelchair, Plaintiff fell. Plaintiff was taken to
War Memorial Hospital and was diagnosed as having a contusion on his head and an aggravation
of a previous back injury. On January 27, 2014, Plaintiff spoke with Nurse Supervisor Filain and
Defendant Dunton. Defendant Dunton told Plaintiff to “file a grievance.” On January 28, 2014,
Plaintiff filed a grievance and on January 29, 2014, Nurse Filain told Plaintiff that he was to be
placed in a handicap accessible cell. Nurse Filain then stated that she emailed Defendants Hough
and Hubbard. Later that day, Officer Rose Balm spoke with Defendant Isard about releasing
Plaintiff from segregation, but Defendant Isard stated that he was not ready to release Plaintiff.
Plaintiff continued to be held in the same non-handicap accessible cell. Plaintiff seeks damages
against the named Defendants.
II.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
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than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(I)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
The Court notes that Plaintiff’s only allegations against Defendants Hubbard and
Hough are that Nurse Filain emailed them regarding Plaintiff’s placement in a non-handicap
accessible cell. A party cannot be held liable under Section 1983 absent a showing that the party
personally participated in, or otherwise authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in, the
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allegedly unconstitutional conduct. See e.g. Leach v. Shelby Co. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990); Hays v. Jefferson, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 833 (1982). See also Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.), cert. denied
469 U.S. 845 (1984). Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that Defendants Hubbard and
Hough were personally involved in the activity which forms the basis of his claim. Accordingly,
the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Hubbard and Hough are properly
dismissed for lack of personal involvement.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Defendants Hubbard and Hough will be dismissed for failure to state a claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will serve
the complaint against Defendants Brown, Bigger, Dunton, and Isard.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: August 10, 2016

/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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