Belser #352904 v. Woods et al

Filing 12

OPINION; signed by District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Judge Paul L. Maloney, cmc)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

MARVIN BELSER,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:16-cv-134
HON. PAUL L. MALONEY

v.
JEFF WOODS, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________/
OPINION

Plaintiff Marvin Belser, an inmate currently confined by the Michigan Department
of Corrections (MDOC), filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Defendants Jeff Woods, C. Horton, D. Isard, Reid Goldberg, Bienvenido B. Canias, Malissa Laplunt,
Mike Brown, Penny L. Filion, Marci L. Hatfield, S. Baldino, and M. McLean. ECF No. 1. Under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required
to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se
complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Woods, Horton, Isard, Goldberg, Baldino, and McLean. The Court will order service of
the complaint on Defendants Canias, Laplunt, Brown, Filion, and Hatfield.

DISCUSSION
I. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff arrived to prison in his personal electric wheelchair on July 28, 2006.
PageID.10. A few weeks later, Plaintiff was taken to the hospital for chest pain and difficulty
breathing. PageID.10. When Plaintiff returned to the prison, the nurse told Plaintiff that another
inmate who had been discharged from prison mistakenly took Plaintiff’s personal electric
wheelchair. PageID.10. Some of Plaintiff’s other property was missing too, such as a cushion.
PageID.10. These items were never returned.
In addition, Plaintiff has a Child Protective Services case that is documented in the
Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) computer system, which includes his name and his
children’s names. PageID.5. Plaintiff contends that he did not consent to this case being available
through the law library or MDOC computer system. PageID.5. Plaintiff has asked the law library
supervisor (Defendant Goldberg) over twenty times to take his case off of the MDOC computers,
but he has not done so. PageID.5. Plaintiff believes that having his, as well as his children’s, personal
information on the MDOC computers has placed himself and his children in danger. PageID.5. For
instance, Plaintiff indicated that he was attacked by inmates, thrown from his wheelchair, hit in the
head from behind, harassed by prison staff, and denied medical attention by Defendants Canias,
Laplunt, Filion, Hatfield, and Brown. PageiD.5.
Moreover, Defendants Canias, Laplunt, Filion, Hatfield, and Brown would laugh at
Plaintiff and tell him that he had nothing wrong with him despite Plaintiff’s several kites and
requests for medical attention. PageID.5. Plaintiff stated that he requires “nitrotapps, incontinate [sic]
garments, transfer board, shower chair, replacement velcro shoes, air mattress, singal [sic] cell detail,
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P.T. on aide to assist detail and to be transferred to a medically assistant [sic] living facility because
[he] cant [sic] stand or walk,” for example, but is not receiving them. PageID.5.
On March 1, 2014, while housed at Chippewa Correctional Facility, Plaintiff was
attacked by three inmates. PageID.5-6. After this incident, when Plaintiff had returned back to his
cell, he was attacked again by three more inmates. PageID.6. These attacks resulted in Plaintiff being
unable to stand, walk, move his left side, open his left eye, or speak clearly, and he also had pain in
his spine, neck, and right foot. PageID.6. As a result of this incident, Plaintiff requested that he be
placed in protective custody. PageID.6.
From March 1, 2014, through March 20, 2016, Plaintiff was told by doctors at
Chippewa that he needed a wheelchair. PageID.7. So, Plaintiff was provided a non-electric
wheelchair and special details. PageID.7. However, Plaintiff states that while at Chippewa
Correctional Facility, Plaintiff’s wheelchair, medical equipment, and medical details were taken
away from him. PageID.6. From March 29 through April 1, 2014, Plaintiff was at the War Memorial
hospital because he was having chest pains and difficulty breathing. PageID.6. Plaintiff stated that
the physician at the hospital had made arrangements for Plaintiff to be sent to a medically assisted
living facility, for which the Chippewa medical staff agreed to make arrangements, but never did.
PageID.6.
Plaintiff was discharged from the hospital on April 1, 2014. PageID.6. Two officers
came to the hospital to pick up Plaintiff and transfer him back to the Chippewa facility. PageID.6.
While at the hospital, the two officers ordered that Plaintiff stand and dress himself before they left.
PageID.6. Plaintiff told them that he could not do that without help, but the officers refused to help
Plaintiff. PageID.6. Sergeant Ormsbee eventually told the two officers to not worry about Plaintiff
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putting his clothes on, and to put Plaintiff in full restraints. PageID.6. The officers then helped
Plaintiff off of the hospital bed and put him into a wheelchair. PageID.7. The officers took Plaintiff
outside to the transport van, at which time Sergeant Ormsbee told Plaintiff to get out of the
wheelchair and enter the van, or else he would be tased pursuant to orders from Defendant Woods.
PageID.7. Sergeant Ormsbee tased Plaintiff in the chest twice, which caused Plaintiff to pass out.
PageID.7. When he woke up, Plaintiff was naked and being pulled out of the transport van by two
officers and placed in a wheelchair. PageID.7.
On May 6, 2014, Plaintiff was transferred to Baraga Maximum Facility. PageID.7.
There, he was forced to “crawl on the floor and ground to move around” his cell and the facility.
PageID.7. On May 25, 2016, Plaintiff was transferred back to the Chippewa Correctional Facility.
PageID.7. When he arrived back to Chippewa, he asked Officer Smith to place him in protective
custody, but she said that Sergeant Ormsbee needed to approve this type of request. PageID.7.
Sergeant Ormsbee denied Plaintiff’s request to be placed in protective custody. PageID.7. Instead,
Plaintiff was placed back in the same unit where he was attacked in March of 2014. PageID.7.
However, officers told Plaintiff that Defendants Woods, Horton, and Isard stated that Plaintiff should
speak up if he is having problems there. PageID.8.
In addition, after his transfer back to the Chippewa facility, Plaintiff requested a single
cell due to his wheelchair needs and incontinence issues. PageID.8. However, Plaintiff’s request was
denied. PageID.8. On May 5, 2016, Plaintiff was assigned a “bunky.” PageID.8. Plaintiff caught his
bunky stealing Plaintiff’s personal property; however, the bunky stated that he would physically
harm Plaintiff if Plaintiff told the staff about his stealing. PageID.8. The bunky harassed Plaintiff and
made fun of his medical issues, too. PageID.8. Plaintiff fears for his life. PageID.8.
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On May 6, 2016, Plaintiff requested that he be placed in protective custody again.
PageID.8. After this request, Plaintiff was placed in segregation while his request was pending.
PageID.8. That same day, Plaintiff was interviewed by the Security Classification Committee to
determine whether he should be placed in protective custody. PageID.8. The committee concluded
that Plaintiff should return to the cell he was originally assigned to, and that if he did not return there,
he would be issued a Class I misconduct ticket for disobeying a direct order. PageID.8. In response
to this order, Plaintiff told the hearing officer (Mr. Theut) that he was in fear for his life, and that he
could not defend himself. PageID.8. Plaintiff was then issued a misconduct ticket, for which he was
later found guilty and sanctioned to five days in segregation. PageID.8. Similarly, on May 21, 2016,
Plaintiff received another misconduct ticket for disobeying a direct order. PageID.8. Plaintiff asserts
that this denial of protective custody constitutes a claim for failure to protect under the Eighth
Amendment. PageID.8.
Moreover, for three years, Plaintiff has not been able to brush his teeth because his
long-handled toothbrush was taken by MDOC staff while he was housed at Marquette Branch
Prison. PageID.9. Defendant Baldino has refused to renew Plaintiff’s detail for a long-handled
toothbrush. PageID.9. Plaintiff has tried to use a standard toothbrush, but he cannot use it well
because he lost the feeling in his right hand. PageID.9.
In addition, after Plaintiff was transferred back to Chippewa prison, his personal
property was lost. PageID.9. Plaintiff has asked several officers and written many grievances
regarding this issue, but he has not received any sort of positive responses. PageID.9. In addition,
Plaintiff could not exhaust his administrative remedies relating to some other issues because
Defendant McLean (the grievance coordinator) did not provide some of Plaintiff’s grievances
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identifier numbers or did not reply to or send a Step II responses for certain grievances. PageID.9-10.
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Goldberg has improperly told the law
librarians not to respond to any of Plaintiff’s kites. PageID.10. Based on all of these occurrences,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights.
II. Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not ‘show[n]’ - that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(I)).

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A. Supervisory Liability
Plaintiff asserts that Sergeant Orsmbee improperly tased Plaintiff at the orders of
Defendant Woods on April 1, 2014, when Plaintiff was being transferred from the hospital back to
prison. PageID.6. However, Plaintiff did not state that Defendant Woods was present when the
tasing occurred, or that Defendant Woods even knew what was going on at the time Plaintiff was
tased. Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their
subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676;
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th
Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior.
Gritner v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th
Cir. 2002); Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendant Woods
was present or knew that Sergeant Ormsbee was going to tase him, Plaintiff’s claim against
Defendant Woods fails.
B. Eighth Amendment - Failure to Protect
Next, Plaintiff makes two Eighth Amendment claims for failure to protect: (1) that
Defendants Woods, Horton, and Isard failed to protect Plaintiff when they did not place him in
protective custody on May 25, 2016, and (2) that Defendant Goldberg failed to protect Plaintiff when
he did not remove Plaintiff’s child custody case from the MDOC computers, which Plaintiff believes

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is the reason why he was assaulted by other prisoners in March of 2014.1
Under the Eighth Amendment, a prison official has a duty to protect an inmate from
violence caused by other prisoners. Wilson v. Sieter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991); Nelson v. Overberg,
999 F.2d 162, 165 (6th Cir. 1993); Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1453 (6th Cir. 1990). “A prison
official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the
Eighth Amendment.”

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (citations omitted).

Recognizing that a prison official has an obligation to protect an inmate from assault by another
inmate, the Supreme Court defined deliberate indifference as requiring a showing that the prison
official consciously disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiff. Id. at 839. The court
stated:
We hold instead that a prison official cannot be found liable under the
Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of
confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. . . . But an
official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have
perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot
under our cases be condemned as infliction of punishment.
Id. at 837. Thus, in order to support a claim that a prison official failed to protect plaintiff, two
conditions must be satisfied: (1) the inmate must show that a substantial risk of harm was present
and (2) that the defendants, having knowledge of that risk, possessed a culpable state of mind. Id.
In showing that these two conditions are met, the plaintiff must show “more than a lack of ordinary
due care, inadvertence, or error; the conduct must instead be ‘obdurate’ or ‘wanton’--exhibiting

1

While it appears that Plaintiff makes a failure to protect claim against Mr. Theut for denying Plaintiff’s
request for protective custody on May 6, 2016, Plaintiff did not name Mr. Theut as a defendant in this case.
Accordingly, this claim is dismissed.

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recklessness or callous neglect.” Id. at 165; see Gibson v. Foltz, 963 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1992);
McGhee v. Foltz, 852 F.2d 876, 881 (6th Cir. 1988); see also Jeffers v. Heavrin, 10 F.3d 380, 381
(6th Cir. 1993) (errors of judgment are shielded by qualified immunity).
i. Defendants Woods, Horton, and Isard
Plaintiff claims that on May 25, 2016 (after being transferred back to Chippewa
Correctional Facility from the Baraga Maximum Facility), Sergeant Ormsbee improperly denied
Plaintiff’s request to be placed in protective custody, and that when Plaintiff was taken to his cell,
Defendants Woods, Horton, and Isard did not help Plaintiff be placed in protective custody. In an
attempt to satisfy the first condition of his failure to protect claim (that a substantial risk of harm was
present), Plaintiff indicates that he feared being attacked again by prisoners at the Chippewa Facility
since he was attacked there two years ago. Plaintiff does not indicate that the same violent prisoners
were present at the facility that attacked him in 2014, or that there were any other reasons for him
to fear physical harm in 2016. Based on this information, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that a
substantial risk of harm was present when he was not placed in protective custody by Defendants on
May 25, 2016. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendants Woods, Horton, and
Isard were the people involved in making the decision to deny Plaintiff’s request to be placed in
protective custody in 2016 (rather, he says Sergeant Ormsbee was the person with authority to grant
or deny protective custody requests). As a result, Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim against
Defendants Woods, Horton, and Isard is dismissed.
ii. Defendant Goldberg
Next, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Goldberg failed to protect Plaintiff from
prisoner attacks when Defendant refused to remove Plaintiff’s child custody case from the MDOC
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computer system in 2014. With regard to the first condition of a failure to protect claim, Plaintiff has
sufficiently alleged that he was subjected to serious harm because he was attacked by six prisoners
in March of 2014. However, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the second condition of his Eighth
Amendment claim—that Defendant Goldberg had a culpable state of mind when he refused to
remove Plaintiff’s custody case from the computer system. Rather, Plaintiff merely states that
Defendant Goldberg did not remove the case from the computers when Plaintiff asked him to do so.
This does not overcome the possibility that Defendant Goldberg acted in error, meaning Plaintiff has
not satisfied the second condition of his failure to protect claim. See Gibson, 963 F.2d at 853 (noting
errors do not demonstrate a sufficiently culpable state of mind for purposes of the second condition
of a failure to protect claim); see also Jeffers, 10 F.3d at 381 (stating errors of judgment are shielded
by qualified immunity). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Goldberg is denied.
C. Eighth Amendment - Medical Deliberate Indifference
Plaintiff raises two Eighth Amendment claims of medical deliberate indifference: (1)
that Defendants Canias, Laplunt, Brown, Filion, and Hatfield were deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s medical needs from the time he arrived at the Chippewa Facility until the time this action
was filed, and (2) that Defendant Baldino was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s dental needs
when she would not reinstate Plaintiff’s medical detail for a long-handled toothbrush.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment
against those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment obligates
prison authorities to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such
care would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
102, 103-04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately
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indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Id. at 104-05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d
693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001).
A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective
component. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege
that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the inmate must show that
he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The objective
component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner’s
need[ ] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d
890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004). If the plaintiff’s claim, however, is based on “the prison’s failure to treat
a condition adequately, or where the prisoner’s affliction is seemingly minor or non-obvious,”
Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898, the plaintiff must “place verifying medical evidence in the record to
establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment,” Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d
739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a
sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867
(6th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Deliberate indifference “entails something more
than mere negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but can be “satisfied by something less than acts
or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id.
Under Farmer, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
i. Defendants Canias, Laplunt, Brown, Filion, and Hatfield
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Canias, Laplunt, Brown, Filion, and Hatfield were
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deliberately indifferent to his medical needs when Plaintiff arrived at Chippewa until the time he
filed this case. Plaintiff asserts that he needs a wheelchair and other medical equipment, such as
“nitrotapps, incontinate [sic] garments, transfer board, shower chair, replacement velcro shoes, air
mattress, [and a ] singal [sic] cell detail,” but Defendants have denied him these items, laughed at
his requests, and told Plaintiff that nothing is wrong with him. PageID.5. In addition, Plaintiff
asserts that he should have been transferred to a medically assisted living facility since a doctor at
the War Memorial Hospital said Plaintiff should be in one, but Defendants failed to transfer Plaintiff.
PageID.5. The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to warrant service of his
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim on Defendants Canias, Laplunt, Brown, Filion, and
Hatfield.
ii. Defendant Baldino
Plaintiff’s second deliberate indifference claim is that Defendant Baldino improperly
refused to reinstate Plaintiff’s medical detail for a long-handled toothbrush for three years when she
knew that Plaintiff needed one. Plaintiff claims that he needs a long-handled toothbrush because the
standard toothbrushes are too small for him given that he lost the feeling in his right hand.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the objective component of his Eighth
Amendment claim—that it would be obvious, even to a lay person, that Plaintiff’s need for a longhandled toothbrush was obvious. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Since Plaintiff’s claim is based on a
“minor or non-obvious” medical need, Plaintiff must “place verifying medical evidence in the record
to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment.” Napier, 238 F.3d at 742
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898. Plaintiff did not provide
any medical evidence to support his minor or non-obvious medical need that requires him to use a
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long-handled toothbrush. Accordingly, his claim against Defendant Baldino is dismissed.
D. First Amendment - Access to Courts
Plaintiff asserts that he was denied access to the courts. Specifically, he claims that
(1) Defendant Goldberg denied him access to the courts when told the law librarians not to respond
to any of Plaintiff’s kites, and (2) Defendant McLean denied him access to the courts when he did
not afford an identification number to Plaintiff’s grievances, or respond to Plaintiff’s grievances,
thereby prohibiting Plaintiff from exhausting his administrative remedies for potential civil rights
claims.
It is clearly established that prisoners have a constitutionally protected right of access
to the courts under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354
(1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
Prison officials have a two-fold duty to protect a prisoner’s right of access to the courts. McFarland
v. Luttrell, No. 94-6231, 1995 WL 150511, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 5, 1995). First, they must provide
affirmative assistance in the preparation of legal papers in cases involving constitutional rights, in
particular criminal and habeas corpus cases, as well as other civil rights actions relating to the
prisoner’s incarceration. Id. (citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at 824-28). Second, the right of access to the
courts prohibits prison officials from erecting any barriers that may impede the inmate’s accessibility
to the courts. Id. (citing Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1009 (6th Cir. 1992)); see also Bounds, 430
U.S. at 822 (citing Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941)). In order to state a viable claim for
interference with his access to the courts, a plaintiff must show actual injury to pending or
contemplated litigation. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349, 351 (noting to state a claim, an inmate must
show that any shortcomings in the library or legal assistance caused actual injury in his pursuit of
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a legal claim); Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001); Talley-Bey v. Knebl,
168 F.3d 884, 886 (6th Cir. 1999); Knop, 977 F.2d at 1000; see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536
U.S. 403, 416 (2002) (“Like any other element of an access claim, the underlying cause of action and
its lost remedy must be addressed by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give fair notice to a
defendant.”). Actual injury could be, for example, “having a case dismissed, being unable to file a
complaint, and missing a court-imposed deadline.” Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 578 (6th Cir.
2005) (citing Jackson v. Gill, 92 Fed. App’x 171, 173 (6th Cir. 2004)).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that he suffered an “actual injury” to any pending or
contemplated litigation. Plaintiff did not indicate that he cannot file a complaint or that any
outstanding cases were dismissed as a result of Defendants’ actions. As a result, Plaintiff’s claims
against these two Defendants are dismissed.
E. Conclusory Allegations
Plaintiff raises several claims of lost or stolen property; however, he does not name
anyone that is responsible for this misconduct or violation of Plaintiff’s rights. In addition, he raises
a claim that Sergeant Ormsbee used excessive force against him when the Sergeant tased him, but
Plaintiff did not name Sergeant Ormsbee as a defendant in this case. Conclusory allegations of
unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As a result, Plaintiff’s claims against
unknown parties for lost or stolen property are dismissed. Moreover, any claim Plaintiff is attempting
to assert against Sergeant Ormsbee is improper because the Sergeant is not a named defendant in this
action.

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III. Conclusion
Having conducted the review by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Woods, Horton, Isard, Goldberg, Baldino, and
McLean fail to state a claim, and will therefore be dismissed. The Court will serve Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment claims for medical deliberate indifference against Defendants Canias, Laplunt, Brown,
Filion, and Hatfield.
Accordingly, the Court will order the complaint served upon Defendants Canias,
Laplunt, Brown, Filion, and Hatfield.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Date: August 4, 2016

/s/ Paul L. Maloney
HON. PAUL L. MALONEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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