Jackson #282320 v. Bahrman
Filing
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OPINION; signed by District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Judge Paul L. Maloney, cmc)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
CURTIS O. JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:16-cv-144
v.
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
KAREN A. BAHRMAN,
Defendant.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action
brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A. The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff’s due process and equal protection claims on the grounds that Defendant is immune from suit for
damages for her actions taken to prosecute Plaintiff, and Plaintiff’s demand for an injunction on these claims
is barred by Heck v. Humphrey. The Court will serve Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against Defendant
Bahrman.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Curtis O. Jackson presently is incarcerated at the Marquette Branch Prison, where
he is continuing to serve multiple sentences imposed in 1999, 2001 and 2008. He sues Alger County
Prosecutor Karen A. Bahrman.
Plaintiff alleges that, in March 2015, apparently while Plaintiff was on parole, Defendant
Bahrman authorized criminal charges against Plaintiff for the crime of aggravated stalking. Plaintiff claims
that he did not have notice of the personal protection order (PPO), so he could not be guilty of aggravated
stalking. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Bahrman was aware that Plaintiff did not qualify for the offense,
did not have notice, and did not have a hearing to contest the PPO. He therefore asserts that Defendant
Bahrman, by authorizing charges, violated his rights to both procedural and substantive due process.
Plaintiff also contends that Defendant Bahrman’s conduct violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because Bahrman discriminated against him on the basis of his
custodial status as a state prisoner. He alleges that other unspecified individuals were treated differently
and were provided PPO hearings before being charged with aggravated stalking.
In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bahrman violated his rights to free speech and
expression since December 2014, because she had Plaintiff’s outgoing mail addressed to law schools and
organizations censored or destroyed, allegedly because the mail contained criticism of Bahrman and
accused her of engaging in prosecutorial misconduct.
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief barring Bahrman from maliciously prosecuting Plaintiff. He
also seeks compensatory and punitive damages and declaratory relief.
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Discussion
I.
Prosecutorial Immunity
Defendant Bahrman is entitled to absolute immunity from damages for her actions in
prosecuting the Plaintiff for aggravated stalking. The Supreme Court embraces a functional approach to
determining whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127
(1997); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988);
accord Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2010); Lomaz v. Hennosy, 151 F.3d 493,
497 (6th Cir. 1998). Under a functional analysis, a prosecutor is absolutely immune when performing the
traditional functions of an advocate. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130; Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791,
797 (6th Cir. 2003); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1137 (6th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court
has held that a prosecutor is absolutely immune for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution.
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); Lomaz, 151 F.3d at 497. Acts which occur in the
course of the prosecutor’s role as advocate are entitled to protection of absolute immunity, in contrast to
investigatory or administrative functions that are normally performed by a detective or police officer.
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 276-78 (1993); Grant, 870 F.2d at 1137. In the Sixth
Circuit, the focus of the inquiry is how closely related the prosecutor’s conduct is to his role as an advocate
intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Spurlock, 330 F.3d at 797; Ireland
v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1443 (6th Cir. 1997). Obviously, authorizing charges and pursing criminal
prosecution is part of the prosecutor’s role as an advocate. Accordingly, Defendant Bahrman is entitled
to absolute immunity from damages for her actions taken to prosecute Plaintiff. The Court will address
Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief infra.
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In contrast, Defendant Bahrman is not immune from damages for her actions taken to
interfere with Plaintiff’s outgoing mail. Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Bahrman interfered either to
protect her personal reputation or to further investigate Plaintiff. Such actions would not fall within the
prosecutor’s role as an advocate. See Buckley, 509 U.S. 276-78 (distinguishing investigatory actions from
actions taken in role as an advocate).
II.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not
contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must
determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability
requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not
‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2));
see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal
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plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr. Med.
Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not
a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific
constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
To the
extent that Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief barring Defendant Bahrman from prosecuting him for aggravated
stalking, the Court must abstain from addressing the claim under the principles enunciated in Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger, the Supreme Court has held that absent extraordinary
circumstances, federal equity jurisdiction may not be used to enjoin pending state prosecutions. The
Younger abstention doctrine is based on the principle that the states have a special interest in enforcing their
own laws in their own courts. (Id. at 44.) The rule is “designed to permit state courts to try state cases
free from interference by federal courts, particularly where the party to the federal case may fully litigate
his claim before the state court.” Zalman v. Armstrong, 802 F.2d 199, 205 (6th Cir. 1986) (internal
quotations omitted). Abstention in favor of state court proceedings is proper where there exists: (1) an
ongoing state proceeding; (2) an important state interest; and (3) an adequate opportunity in the state
judicial proceedings to raise constitutional challenges. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State
Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, (1982); Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 744 (6th Cir. 1996).
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The three factors that support Younger abstention are present in this case. First, Plaintiff
expressly alleges in his complaint that there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding against him. Second,
state criminal proceedings involve important state interests. See, e.g., Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937,
954 (6th Cir. 2000). Third, the state court proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise
constitutional challenges. Nothing prevents Plaintiff from presenting his federal claims in the pending statecourt proceedings. If he does so, and the trial court denies or otherwise fails to consider his constitutional
claims, he may exercise his right to an appeal under Michigan law.
Abstention is therefore appropriate in the absence of one of three exceptions to the
Younger abstention doctrine in which: (1) “the state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or is
conducted in bad faith,” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975); (2) “the challenged statute
is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions,” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,
424 (1979) (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 611); or, (3) there is “an extraordinarily pressing need for
immediate federal equitable relief.” Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 125 (1975). These exceptions have
been interpreted narrowly. Zalman v. Armstrong, 802 F.2d 199, 205 (6th Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff fails even to allege the existence of any of the three exceptions. According to
Plaintiff’s complaint, his prosecution for aggravated stalking is ongoing. While Plaintiff implies that the
prosecution is conducted in bad faith, he alleges no facts supporting that suggestion. He simply argues that
he lacked sufficient notice of the PPO and therefore did not commit aggravated stalking, an issue he may,
and undoubtedly will, raise in his state-court proceedings. Moreover, Plaintiff does not challenge any
statute, much less a patently unconstitutional one. Finally, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate an extraordinarily
pressing need for federal equitable relief. In fact, it appears that Plaintiff, in the interim, has been returned
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to prison for parole violations. Relief from prosecution in the new case therefore will not automatically
trigger his liberty.
For all these reasons, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s due process and equal protection
claims based on his prosecution by Defendant Bahrman.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Bahrman violated his First Amendment rights over a
period of months by censoring or destroying his outgoing mail. Upon initial review, the Court concludes
that the allegations are sufficient to warrant service of the complaint.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s claims based on his prosecution for aggravated stalking will be dismissed under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) on grounds of immunity and failure
to state a claim. The Court will serve the First Amendment claim against Defendant Bahrman.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: July 20, 2016
/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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