Meeks #176401 v. Woods et al
Filing
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OPINION; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
ANTHONY MEEKS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 2:16-cv-174
Honorable Gordon J. Quist
JEFFREY WOODS et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s
pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state
a claim.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Anthony Meeks presently is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Macomb Correctional Facility (MRF). Plaintiff’s complaint, however,
alleges constitutional violations that occurred at three other MDOC facilities:
Chippewa
Correctional Facility (URF); Alger Correctional Facility (LMF); and Kinross Correctional Facility
(KCF). He sues URF Warden Jeffrey Woods; URF Inspector Pete Hubbard; URF Resident Unit
Managers (RUMs) G. McLead and D. Lalonde; URF Property Room Officer R. Hansen; LMF
Warden Catherine Bauman; LMF RUMs (unknown) Schrame and D. Benman; LMF Property Room
Officer (unknown) Staseroich; KCF Warden Duncan MacLaren; KCF Correctional Officers
Unknown Party #1, Unknown Party #2, and Unknown Party #3; and Property Transfer Officers
Unknown Part(y)(ies) #4.
On February 23, 2015, Plaintiff transferred from the Thumb Correctional Facility to
URF. When he arrived at URF, he was placed in observation for one day before being placed in
general population. Once Plaintiff had been moved to general population, Defendant Hansen called
him to get his property. However, Hansen did not give Plaintiff his property at that time. On
February 26, 2015, Hansen called Plaintiff again to get his property. When Plaintiff arrived, his
property was laid out on a table and Defendants Hubbard and Hansen were in the room. Hansen had
two screwdrivers in his hand. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hansen pretended to go through
Plaintiff’s property with him. Hansen picked up Plaintiff’s radio and pretended to unscrew the back,
although the radio already appeared to have been pried open and cracked. Hansen purportedly found
contraband in the radio, and Defendants Hansen and Hubbard escorted Plaintiff to segregation.
Sometime in March, Plaintiff received a contraband removal notice and a misconduct report dated
February 26, 2015, which reported the removal of Plaintiff’s “G.E. Super radio II, 1 footlocker,
1 Smith Corona typewriter, 2 Ribbons, 1 pair of bread [sic] trimmer with a battery pack, 1 green
sweat pant, 1 Hoppy Craft Clock, 1 Panasonic tape player, 1 tape case and 31 cassette tapes.”
(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.10.) On March 23, 2015, Defendant McLead came to Plaintiff’s
segregation cell and conducted an administrative hearing. McLead allegedly refused to investigate
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Plaintiff’s claims. McLead indicated that another prisoner’s number was on the footlocker and
sweatpants, but McLead could not answer Plaintiff’s question about whose number was on the
items. McLead took all of Plaintiff’s property, except the 31 tapes, telling Plaintiff that he could
keep 24 of the tapes if he ordered a new tape player. Plaintiff asked to have the rest of the property
sent home.
On April 7, 2015, Plaintiff was told by an unknown officer that he was being
transferred. The officer brought Plaintiff his property and told Plaintiff that anything that did not
fit in his footlocker would be thrown away. While his property was being itemized for transfer,
Plaintiff noticed that some hobby-craft pens, glue, and store goods were missing.
Plaintiff was transferred to Level IV at LMF on April 8, 2015. An unknown
Assistant Deputy Warden informed Plaintiff that he would be at Level IV for at least ninety days.
Defendant Staseroich called Plaintiff to the property room. Staseroich began itemizing Plaintiff’s
property with Plaintiff. Staseroich took two pairs of sweatshirts and sweatpants, three large towels,
three middle-size towels, three big dry towels and two bags of sugars, informing Plaintiff that he
could not have the items. Plaintiff responded that he wanted the items held, in accordance with
policy, until he was transferred back to Level II. Defendant Staseroich told Plaintiff that he did not
have the room to store the items. Staseroich told Plaintiff to put away his other property and go to
lunch, but to return after lunch. Plaintiff, however, could not get back to the property room, so he
sent his block representative. The block representative told Plaintiff that he saw some of Plaintiff’s
property in the trash. Staseroich told the representative that he could pull it out of the trash if he
wanted to, but the representative refused.
While Plaintiff was housed in the Level IV unit at LMF, he showed Defendant
Benman his Administrative Hearing Report from URF, telling her that he had to order a new tape
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player in order to get his 31 cassette tapes from URF. Benman gave Plaintiff a disbursement form,
and he ordered a tape player and a beard trimmer. Benman also told Plaintiff that she would call
URF to have Plaintiff’s tapes transferred. In July 2015, Defendant Benman called Plaintiff down
to her office, where she had his new tape player and beard trimmer, as well as his 31 cassette tapes.
Benman held an administrative hearing on the tapes, after which she gave Plaintiff 24 of the
cassettes. She had Plaintiff complete a disbursement form to send the other 6 cassettes home. Later
in July, an unknown officer told Plaintiff that he was being transferred and then itemized Plaintiff’s
property for transfer.
Plaintiff was transferred to KCF sometime in July 2015. When he arrived, an
unknown officer itemized and unpacked Plaintiff’s property. The officer took Plaintiff’s cable cord,
saying that Plaintiff would not need the cord, as the cells had cable cords in the walls. The officer
told Plaintiff that he would get the cord back when he transferred out of KCF. Within one and onehalf weeks, Plaintiff was again placed on observation in segregation, where he remained until
October 2015. While he was in segregation, his disbursement authorization form was returned to
him because there were insufficient funds in his prisoner trust account to mail the tapes home. As
a consequence, the tapes were not sent home. About a week later, on October 16, 2015, Plaintiff
was informed by an unknown officer that he was again being transferred. The officer put Plaintiff
in the day room for about an hour. Two unknown officers subsequently walked Plaintiff to the
control center to await transfer.
Plaintiff was transferred back to URF shortly thereafter. When he arrived, he was
placed on observation in the segregation unit. Plaintiff did not know if his property had been
transferred with him. He was let out of segregation on December 9, 2015. Defendant LaLonde
came to Plaintiff’s new cell with a contraband removal form and a misconduct report. The
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documents had been prepared months earlier, but Plaintiff had not seen them before. The
contraband removal form stated that Plaintiff’s television had been damaged and his footlocker,
headphones, and 24 cassette had been taken. That same date, Defendant LaLonde held a hearing
on the misconduct about the property. Plaintiff asked about the rest of his property, and LaLonde
responded that it was in another building and would be sent over later to be packed up for transfer.
LaLonde admitted that Defendant Hansen had broken the television. Plaintiff complained to
LaLonde about a variety of things, including a complaint that Hansen should not have unpacked
Plaintiff’s property while Plaintiff was in segregation and that Defendant McLead had told Plaintiff
that he would get the tapes back. Defendant LaLonde allegedly failed to investigate, so Plaintiff
asked to have the property sent home. Plaintiff waited for the rest of his property, expecting to
itemize it with an officer. He was then told that his property had already been packed without him.
Plaintiff arrived at MRF on December 10, 2015. Officer Hightower called Plaintiff
to itemize and receive his property. Plaintiff saw that his new tape player had been broken and that
some of his legal and religious property was missing. Officer Hightower advised Plaintiff that he
would call URF about the missing property. Plaintiff also spoke with Counselors Moses and
Williams about the missing property. They told Plaintiff that they had called and emailed Defendant
LaLonde about the missing property, but they had not received a response. On January 27, 2016,
Counselor Williams held a hearing with Plaintiff on certain legal material that came from URF.
Plaintiff advised Williams that the material did not comprise all of his legal and religious property.
Williams again advised that she would contact URF.
Plaintiff complains that the described actions violated MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., Policy
Directive 04.07.112 ¶¶ B, S, U, V, WW, and LL. He also alleges that the issuance and review of
his misconduct tickets violated MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., Policy Directive 03.03.105 ¶¶ YY, AAA,
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BBB, and WWW. Further, he alleges that he was deprived of an appropriate process under MICH.
DEP’T OF CORR., Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶¶ F(2) and G(3).
Plaintiff contends that he has rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
freedom of expression on matters of public concern and to seek redress of grievances. He also
alleges that he has a right not to be subjected to retaliation for the exercise of his right to freedom
of expression. Plaintiff contends that he has been deprived of his right to property without due
process of law. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
Discussion
I.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
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pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(I)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v.
Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
A.
Due Process
Plaintiff’s due process claim is barred by the doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Under Parratt, a person
deprived of property by a “random and unauthorized act” of a state employee has no federal
due process claim unless the state fails to afford an adequate post-deprivation remedy. If an
adequate post-deprivation remedy exists, the deprivation, although real, is not “without due process
of law.” Parratt, 451 U.S. at 537. This rule applies to both negligent and intentional deprivation
of property, as long as the deprivation was not done pursuant to an established state procedure. See
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-36 (1984). Because Plaintiff’s claim is premised upon
allegedly unauthorized acts of a state official, he must plead and prove the inadequacy of state postdeprivation remedies. See Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479-80 (6th Cir. 1995); Gibbs v.
Hopkins, 10 F.3d 373, 378 (6th Cir. 1993). Under settled Sixth Circuit authority, a prisoner’s failure
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to sustain this burden requires dismissal of his § 1983 due-process action. See Brooks v. Dutton, 751
F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1985).
Plaintiff has not sustained his burden in this case. Although he recites the Parratt
rule in his complaint, he utterly fails to allege that post-deprivation remedies were inadequate.
Numerous state post-deprivation remedies are available to Plaintiff. First, a prisoner who incurs a
loss through no fault of his own may petition the institution’s Prisoner Benefit Fund for
compensation. MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., Policy Directive 04.07.112, ¶ B (effective Dec. 12, 2013).
Aggrieved prisoners may also submit claims for property loss of less than $1,000 to the State
Administrative Board. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6419; MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.131
(effective Oct. 21, 2013). Alternatively, Michigan law authorizes actions in the Court of Claims
asserting tort or contract claims “against the state and any of its departments, commissions, boards,
institutions, arms, or agencies.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6419(1)(a). The Sixth Circuit
specifically has held that Michigan provides adequate post-deprivation remedies for deprivation of
property. See Copeland, 57 F.3d at 480. Plaintiff does not allege any reason why a state-court
action would not afford him complete relief for the deprivation, either negligent or intentional, of
his personal property. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s due process claims will be dismissed.
B.
First Amendment
Plaintiff broadly asserts that he has a right under the First Amendment to freely speak
on matters of public importance. He also alleges that he has a right to petition government and to
be free from retaliation. Finally, he contends that he has a right to be free from retaliation for filing
grievances and the instant lawsuit about the destruction and taking of his property.
Plaintiff’s allegations concerning his rights are wholly unsupported by factual
allegations that any Defendant actually violated his First Amendment rights. Indeed, Plaintiff
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alleges no conduct by any Defendant that prevented him from speaking, prevented him from
petitioning government or retaliated against him. Plaintiff’s entire complaint revolves around
Defendants’ repeated interference with his property, and he alleges no injuries caused by or arising
out of his exercise of First Amendment rights. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff utterly fails to
allege a violation of the First Amendment.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: October 19, 2016
/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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