Weatherspoon #471817 v. Williams et al

Filing 4

OPINION; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
MORRIS WEATHERSPOON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 2:17-cv-40
Honorable Gordon J. Quist

CAROL WILLIAMS et al.,
Defendants.

____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

The Court must read

Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and
accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint against Defendants Jessica Knack, Christine L. Henson, Matthew R. Luttrell, Susan
Wilson, Perri A. Cooper, Marie L. Drouin, Cynthia M. Jenkins, Sharon Starr, Marie Bennett, Dawn
R. Eicher, Matthew Sizer, Shelly A. Ronquist, Lori L. Davis, Duncan MacLaren, Jim Armstrong,
L. Berlinger, Mike Curley, Unknown Parties, and S. Farley for failure to state a claim. The Court

will order service on Defendants Carol Williams, L. Schwesinger, M. Dicken, B. Johnson, B.
Mastaw, Robert Beaudion, Unknown Raffaele, Marquita Marlette, K. Olson, Charles Simons,
Kimberly Franckowlak, and Penny Rogers.
Discussion
I.

Factual allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at Baraga Correctional Facility (AMF) in Baraga, Baraga County, Michigan. The events
about which he complains, however, occurred at the Kinross Correctional Facility (KCF) in
Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues Medical Service Providers Carol Williams,
Jessica Knack, Christine L. Henson, Matthew R. Luttrell, Susan Wilson, Perri A. Cooper, Marie
L. Drouin, Cynthia M. Jenkins, Sharon Starr, Marie Bennett, Dawn R. Eicher, Matthew Sizer,
Shelly A. Ronquist, and Lori L. Davis. Plaintiff also sues Assistant Resident Unit Manager
Marquita Marlette, Deputy Warden K. Olson, Warden Duncan MacLaren, Grievance Coordinators
Jim Armstrong, L. Berlinger, and Mike Curley, Dentist Charles Simons, Dental Hygienist
Kimberly Franckowlak, Nurse Practitioner Penny Rogers, Sergeant L. Schwesinger, Assistant
Resident Unit Manager M. Dicken, Sergeant B. Johnson, Corrections Officer B. Mastaw,
Corrections Officer Robert Beaudion, Captain Unknown Raffaele, Unknown Parties Medical
Service Provider or Prison Officials, and Hearing Investigator S. Farley.
Plaintiff alleges that on October 15, 2012, Defendant Simons failed to provide
Plaintiff with needed dental care. On October 26, 2012, Defendant Franckowlak failed to provide
Plaintiff with needed dental care. On December 8, 2012, Defendant Schwesinger had Plaintiff
placed in administrative segregation under false pretenses and ignored Plaintiff’s complaints of
harassment by prison officers.

Defendant Schwesinger also collaborated with Defendants

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Williams, Henson, Bennett, Mastaw, Beaudion, Raffaele, and Johnson to deprive Plaintiff of pain
medication and dental care. Plaintiff claims that Defendants Beaudion and Mastaw set him up for
false misconduct tickets. On December 10, 2012, Defendants Dicken, Olson, and Marlette
falsified the record of Plaintiff’s SCC (Security Classification Committee) review by stating that
Plaintiff was in fear of his safety from staff due to racial issues, but that there was no proof that
Plaintiff had been threatened. Plaintiff states that he had actually requested protection because he
was afraid that he would be attacked by other inmates.
Following the SCC interview, Defendant Beaudion set Plaintiff up on a gambling
misconduct. On December 11, 2012, Defendant Johnson reviewed Plaintiff on the misconduct
ticket. Defendant Farley authored a hearing investigation report shortly thereafter, which did not
reflect Plaintiff’s comments to Defendant Johnson. On December 13, 2012, Defendant Raffaele
ignored Plaintiff’s complaints regarding the inaccuracies in the ticket written by Defendant
Beaudion. Plaintiff claims that his confinement in administrative segregation prevented him from
seeking treatment for serious medical conditions. When Plaintiff asked Defendant Raffaele to
destroy the misconduct report, Defendant Raffaele became threatening and caused Plaintiff to fear
for his life. Plaintiff was unable to sleep for two days.
Plaintiff alleges that between December 8, 2012, and January 3, 2013, Defendants
Williams, Knack, Henson, Luttrell, Wilson, Cooper, Drouin, Jenkins, Starr, Bennett, Eicher, Sizer,
Ronquist, Davis, Rogers, and Unknown Parties denied Plaintiff prescribed pain medication, as
well as other treatment for a tumor in Plaintiff’s femur and for his dental problems. Plaintiff also
claims that in September of 2012, Defendants McLean, Curley, Armstrong, Berlinger, and
MacLaren were responsible for Plaintiff being placed on modified access to the grievance
procedure. Finally, Plaintiff claims that in November of 2013, he had “encounters” with Defendant

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Olson on two occasions, during which Plaintiff complained of harassment, retaliatory cell
searches, and threats of misconduct reports.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his rights under the First, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
II.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not
‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
State statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to determine the timeliness
of claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1985). For
civil rights suits filed in Michigan under ' 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See MICH.
COMP. LAWS ' 600.5805(10); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam);
Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). Accrual of the
claim for relief, however, is a question of federal law. Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th
Cir. 1996); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984). The statute of limitations begins
to run when the aggrieved party knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his
action. Collyer, 98 F.3d at 220. 1
Plaintiff=s complaint is untimely. He asserts claims arising in September of 2012
through January of 2013. Plaintiff had reason to know of the Aharms@ done to him at the time they
occurred. Hence, his claims accrued no later than January of 2013. However, the Court did not
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28 U.S.C. ' 1658 created a Acatch-all@ limitations period of four years for civil actions
arising under federal statutes enacted after December 1, 1990. The Supreme Court=s decision in
Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004), which applied this federal four-year
limitations period to a suit alleging racial discrimination under ' 1981 does not apply to prisoner
claims under 28 U.S.C. ' 1983 because, while ' 1983 was amended in 1996, prisoner civil rights
actions under ' 1983 were not Amade possible@ by the amended statute. Id. at 382.

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receive Plaintiff’s complaint for filing until March 2, 2017. In addition, Plaintiff did not sign his
complaint until February 20, 2017, well past Michigan=s three-year limit. Moreover, Michigan
law no longer tolls the running of the statute of limitations when a plaintiff is incarcerated. See
Mich. Comp. Laws ' 600.5851(9). Further, it is well established that ignorance of the law does
not warrant equitable tolling of a statute of limitations. See Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335
(6th Cir. 1991); Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 1991); Mason v. Dep=t
of Justice, No. 01-5701, 2002 WL 1334756, at *2 (6th Cir. June 17, 2002).
The statute of limitations is tolled for the period during which a plaintiff’s available
state remedies were being exhausted. See Brown v. Morgan, 209 F.3d 595, 596-97 (6th Cir. 2000).
In this case, Plaintiff claims that he attempted to file grievances, but that they were improperly
rejected because Plaintiff was on modified access to the grievance procedure. Plaintiff states that
he was thus thwarted from exhausting his administrative remedies. Therefore, the statute of
limitations was not tolled.
A complaint is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous if it is
time barred by the appropriate statute of limitations. See Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d
508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001). The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that when a meritorious affirmative
defense based upon the applicable statute of limitations is obvious from the face of the complaint,
sua sponte dismissal of the complaint is appropriate. See Dellis, 257 F.3d at 511; Beach v. Ohio,
No. 03-3187, 2003 WL 22416912, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 21, 2003); Castillo v. Grogan, No. 02-5294,
2002 WL 31780936, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 2002); Duff v. Yount, No. 02-5250, 2002 WL
31388756, at *1-2 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 2002); Paige v. Pandya, No. 00-1325, 2000 WL 1828653 (6th
Cir. Dec. 5, 2000). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Knack, Henson, Luttrell,

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Wilson, Cooper, Drouin, Jenkins, Starr, Bennett, Eicher, Sizer, Ronquist, Davis, MacLaren,
Armstrong, Berlinger, Curley, Unknown Parties, and Farley must be dismissed as frivolous.
With regard to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Williams, Schwesinger,
Dicken, Johnson, Mastaw, Beaudion, Raffaele, Marlette, Olson, Simons, Franckowlak, and
Rogers, the Court notes that Plaintiff initially raised those claims in Case No. 2:14-cv-108 (W.D.
Mich.), and that those claims were dismissed from that action without prejudice on February 4,
2016, on the grounds of misjoinder. See 2:14-cv-108, PageID.238-240. In the report and
recommendation for dismissal, the magistrate judge noted that the dismissal would not prejudice
Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals because “Michigan law tolls the limitation period while
an earlier action was pending which was later dismissed without prejudice.” Id. at PageID.220.
As a result, the statute of limitations governing Plaintiff’s 2012 and 2013 claims against
Defendants Williams, Schwesinger, Dicken, Johnson, Mastaw, Beaudion, Raffaele, Marlette,
Olson, Simons, Franckowlak, and Rogers were tolled from May 15, 2014, when the prior action
was filed, until February 4, 2016, when the claims were dismissed without prejudice. With the
benefit of tolling during this 20-month period, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Williams,
Schwesinger, Dicken, Johnson, Mastaw, Beaudion, Raffaele, Marlette, Olson, Simons,
Franckowlak, and Rogers are not time barred.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Defendants Jessica Knack, Christine L. Henson, Matthew R. Luttrell, Susan
Wilson, Perri A. Cooper, Marie L. Drouin, Cynthia M. Jenkins, Sharon Starr, Marie Bennett, Dawn
R. Eicher, Matthew Sizer, Shelly A. Ronquist, Lori L. Davis, Duncan MacLaren, Jim Armstrong,
L. Berlinger, Mike Curley, Unknown Parties, and S. Farley will be dismissed for failure to state a

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claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court
will serve the complaint against Defendants Carol Williams, L. Schwesinger, M. Dicken, B.
Johnson, B. Mastaw, Robert Beaudion, Unknown Raffaele, Marquita Marlette, K. Olson, Charles
Simons, Kimberly Franckowlak, and Penny Rogers.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: October 19, 2017

/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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