Spivey #211446 v. Wilson et al
Filing
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OPINION; signed by District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Judge Paul L. Maloney, cmc)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
MENTWELL SPIVEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 2:17-cv-56
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
THOMAS WILSON et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must read
Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and
accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint against Defendants Thomas Wilson, Unknown Wilson, Jerard M. Jarzynka, Unknown
Jarzynka, Robert J. Colombo, Unknown Colombo, Kym L. Worthy, and Unknown Worthy for
failure to state a claim.
Discussion
I.
Factual allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan.
The events about which he complains, however, appear to have occurred prior to his incarceration.
Plaintiff sues Judge Thomas Wilson, his spouse Unknown Wilson, Prosecutor Jerard M. Jarzynka,
his spouse Unknown Jarzynka, Judge Robert J. Colombo, his spouse Unknown Colombo,
Prosecutor Kym L. Worthy, and her spouse Unknown Worthy.
Plaintiff alleges that he served Defendants with a “Criminal Complaint & Affidavit
of Obligation” via a third party. This complaint asserted criminal acts and human rights violations
committed by Defendants in the Jackson County 4th Judicial Circuit Court in Case Number 9053735-FC. Plaintiff attaches a copy of his Judgment of Sentence for Case No. 90 53735 FC to his
complaint, which shows that Plaintiff received two sentences of 15 to 22 years imprisonment for
breaking and entering, a sentence of 50 to 75 years imprisonment for armed robbery, and a sentence
of 50 to 75 years imprisonment for first-degree criminal sexual conduct. See ECF No. 1-3.
Plaintiff states that Defendants failed to respond to his complaint. Plaintiff now seeks an order
entering a default judgment against Defendants, which would require them to pay Plaintiff
damages.
II.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
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more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not
‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
Plaintiff’s “Criminal Complaint & Affidavit of Obligation” is clearly an attempt to
indirectly challenge his state court criminal convictions. Therefore, the instant lawsuit, in which
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Plaintiff seeks to enforce his “Criminal Complaint,” is also an attempt to challenge those
convictions. The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and Plaintiff has the burden of
proving the Court=s jurisdiction. United States v. Horizon Healthcare, 160 F.3d 326, 329 (6th Cir.
1998). Even where subject matter jurisdiction is not raised by the parties, the Court must consider
the issue sua sponte. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511 (1973); Norris v. Schotten,
146 F.3d 314, 324 (6th Cir. 1998); Mickler v. Nimishillen & Tuscarawas Ry. Co., 13 F.3d 184,
189 (6th Cir. 1993).
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff=s claims.
A federal
district court has no authority to review final judgments of state-court judicial proceedings.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415B16 (1923). A loser in the state court may not be heard in the federal
district court on complaints of injuries by a state-court judgment rendered before the federal
proceeding commenced. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283-84
(2005). AThe pertinent question in determining whether a federal district court is precluded under
the RookerBFeldman doctrine from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim is whether
the >source of the injury= upon which plaintiff bases his federal claim is the state court judgment.@
In re Cook, 551 F.3d at 548. In this case, the source of Plaintiff’s injury is his state court
convictions. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims are barred.
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary relief for alleged violations of
Constitutional rights that occurred during his state criminal trial, his claim is barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), which held that Ain order to recover damages for
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a ' 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
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conviction or sentence has been [overturned].@ See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997)
(emphasis in original). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner cannot make a
cognizable claim under ' 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for Aharm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid@ unless a prisoner shows
that the conviction or sentence has been Areversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question
by a federal court=s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.@ Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). The
holding in Heck has been extended to actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. See
Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646-48 (declaratory relief); Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189-90 (5th Cir.
1998) (claim for injunctive relief intertwined with request for damages); Wilson v. Kinkela, No.
97-4035, 1998 WL 246401, at *1 (6th Cir. May 5, 1998) (injunctive relief). Plaintiff=s allegations
clearly call into question the validity of his conviction. Therefore, his action is barred under Heck
until his criminal conviction has been invalidated.
In addition, Defendants Thomas Wilson and Robert J. Columbo are state court
judges. Generally, a judge is absolutely immune from a suit for monetary damages. Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (A[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper
administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be
free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.@)
(internal quotations omitted); Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 254 (6th Cir. 1997); Barnes v.
Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). Absolute judicial immunity may be overcome in
only two instances. First, a judge is not immune from liability for non-judicial actions, i.e., actions
not taken in the judge=s judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; see Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.
219, 229 (1988) (noting that immunity is grounded in Athe nature of the function performed, not
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the identity of the actor who performed it@). Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though
judicial in nature, taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Id. at 12.
Plaintiff=s allegations do not appear to implicate either of the exceptions to judicial
immunity. Actions taken during the trial and sentencing of a criminal defendant are a judicial act.
Accordingly, Judges Wilson and Colombo are absolutely immune from liability. Consequently,
Plaintiff may not maintain an action for monetary damages against them.
28 U.S.C.
' 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
Finally, Prosecutors Jerard M. Jarzynka and Kym L. Worthy are also entitled to
absolute immunity for their actions in prosecuting the criminal action against Plaintiff. The
Supreme Court embraces a functional approach to determining whether a prosecutor is entitled to
absolute immunity. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,
486 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988); accord Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d
459, 467 (6th Cir. 2010); Lomaz v. Hennosy, 151 F.3d 493, 497 (6th Cir. 1998). Under a functional
analysis, a prosecutor is absolutely immune when performing the traditional functions of an
advocate. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130; Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 797 (6th Cir. 2003);
Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1137 (6th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court has held that a
prosecutor is absolutely immune for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution. Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); Lomaz, 151 F.3d at 497. Acts which occur in the course of
the prosecutor=s role as advocate are entitled to protection of absolute immunity, in contrast to
investigatory or administrative functions that are normally performed by a detective or police
officer. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 276-78 (1993); Grant, 870 F.2d at 1137. In
the Sixth Circuit, the focus of the inquiry is how closely related the prosecutor=s conduct is to his
role as an advocate intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Spurlock,
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330 F.3d at 797; Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1443 (6th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff has failed to
allege any specific facts regarding the actions of Defendants Jerard M. Jarzynka and Kym L.
Worthy taken outside their roles as advocates in the judicial phase of the criminal process.
Therefore, they are entitled to immunity from damages.
Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Unknown
Wilson, Unknown Jarzynka, Unknown Colombo, and Unknown Worthy are based solely on the
fact that they are married to the other named Defendants. Where a person is named as a defendant
without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the
liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App=x
188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any named
defendant was involved in the violation of his rights); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App=x 762, 764
(6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff=s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree
of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each
alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th
Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal involvement against each defendant);
Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990) (APlaintiff=s claims
against those individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations
as to them which would suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries@).
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Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Defendants Thomas Wilson, Unknown Wilson, Jerard M. Jarzynka,
Unknown Jarzynka, Robert J. Colombo, Unknown Colombo, Kym L. Worthy, and Unknown
Worthy will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: September 25, 2017
/s/ Paul L. Maloney_______
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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