Diabo #415102 v. Unknown Part(y)(ies)
OPINION; signed by District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Judge Paul L. Maloney, cmc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
RANDOLPH SCOTT DIABO,
Case No. 2:17-cv-00100
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the
Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendants Unknown Parties named
as Twenty Unknown Defendants for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The
events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in
Marquette, Marquette County, Michigan, as well as prior to his incarceration. Plaintiff sues
Unknown Parties, named as Twenty Unknown Defendants.
Plaintiff alleges that on June 25, 2009, he was sentenced to 4 years probation
pursuant to a plea agreement. Plaintiff states that 60 days prior to the expiration of his probation,
his agent gave him verbal notice that it was to be extended. While on probation, Plaintiff was
arrested on 6 felony charges and was resentenced to 1 to 15 years imprisonment in the MDOC.
Plaintiff was subsequently transferred to the Benzie County District Court, where he was sentenced
to 14 months to 2 years imprisonment, to run concurrent to his existing sentence. In addition,
Plaintiff was also ordered to pay restitution of $5,000.00 plus $60.00 pursuant to the Crime
Victim’s Rights Act.
Plaintiff was transferred to MBP, where he was wrongfully diagnosed with an
unspecified medical problem. Plaintiff claims that his diagnosis was improperly released to the
State Administrator, which defamed his character.
Plaintiff claims that the wrongful diagnosis constituted defamation of character in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff further claims that the Benzie and
Marquette Municipal Courts “assessed . . . cases [against him] and prosecuted Plaintiff
maliciously.” Plaintiff contends that the extension of his probation / parole was unjust. Finally,
Plaintiff states that the lack of medical care provided to him during his incarceration violated the
Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory
and injunctive relief.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not
‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s complaint consists of conclusory assertions
of wrongdoing, and fails to include specific allegations in support of those assertions. In fact,
Plaintiff fails to even specify the names of the defendants in this case. While a complaint need not
contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and
conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The court must determine
whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The court need not accept “threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements . . . .” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged B but it has not ‘show[n]’ B that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Moreover, Plaintiff’s individual claims lack merit under even the most generous
standard of review. Plaintiff claims that he was denied medical care in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Plaintiff fails to specify the nature of his medical problem in the body of his
complaint. According to attachments to Plaintiff’s complaint, he kited health care complaining of
collar bone / shoulder problems, and claiming that his collar bone slides out of place. Plaintiff
requested a shoulder brace. See ECF No. 1-1, PageID.16-PageID.19. On April 28, 2016, Plaintiff
kited that he had a dislocated shoulder and needed a shoulder brace. Plaintiff stated in the kite that
his shoulder had been x-rayed, but that he did not have a follow up visit with the doctor. Jerry C.
Ritz, RN stated that Plaintiff would receive a chart review. Id. at PageID.17. Plaintiff kited again
on April 30, 2016, and was told that he would be scheduled to see a health care provider. Id. at
On May 31, 2016, Plaintiff kited that he had a dislocated shoulder and was told to
kite Health Care three weeks from his last visit. Based on Plaintiff’s kite, it is clear that he was
seen by health care around May 10, 2016. Meredith J. Hammond, RN responded to Plaintiff’s
The visit stated you didn’t have a dislocated shoulder. It stated to
do stretching exercises provided for three weeks and to kite back if
there was no improvement. Have you been doing the stretching? Is
there any improvement[?] Also have you tried OTC pain
medications from the store[?]
Id. at PageID.19.
On February 5, 2017, Plaintiff kited that his collar bone was “out of place” and that
the x-ray did not show the problem. Plaintiff demanded an MRI. Elizabeth M. Berg, RN
responded to Plaintiff’s kite:
You will be reevaluated. The x-ray from 4/16 shows no dislocation
and no damage to collar bone. Which you were told. The results
were given to you in a kite response. There is no need for follow
up. But because it has been longer than 6 months and you want to
be reevaluated a new appointment will be made not a follow up
Id. at PageID.18.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment
against those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment obligates
prison authorities to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such
care would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
102, 103-04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately
indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Id. at 104-05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273
F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001).
A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a
subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective
component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In
other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial
risk of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied
“[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner’s need[ ] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.”
Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004). If the plaintiff’s claim,
however, is based on “the prison’s failure to treat a condition adequately, or where the prisoner’s
affliction is seemingly minor or non-obvious,” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 898
(6th Cir. 2004), the plaintiff must “place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the
detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment,” Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 742
(6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a
sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863,
867 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Deliberate indifference “entails something
more than mere negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but can be “satisfied by something less than
acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.”
Id. Under Farmer, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at
Not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment
states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. As the Supreme Court
[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be
said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to
be repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Thus, a complaint that
a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical
condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under
the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In
order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs.
Id. at 105-06 (quotations omitted). Thus, differences in judgment between an inmate and prison
medical personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnoses or treatment are not enough to state
a deliberate indifference claim. Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151, 154-55 (6th Cir. 1995); Ward
v. Smith, No. 95-6666, 1996 WL 627724, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1996). This is so even if the
misdiagnosis results in an inadequate course of treatment and considerable suffering. Gabehart v.
Chapleau, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL 160322, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 1997).
The Sixth Circuit distinguishes “between cases where the complaint alleges a
complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received
inadequate medical treatment.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). If “a
prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment,
federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize
claims which sound in state tort law.” Id.; see also Rouster v. Saginaw Cnty., 749 F.3d 437, 448
(6th Cir. 2014); Perez v. Oakland County, 466 F.3d 416, 434 (6th Cir. 2006); Kellerman v.
Simpson, 258 F. App’x 720, 727 (6th Cir. 2007); McFarland v. Austin, 196 F. App’x 410 (6th Cir.
2006); Edmonds v. Horton, 113 F. App’x 62, 65 (6th Cir. 2004); Brock v. Crall, 8 F. App’x 439,
440 (6th Cir. 2001); Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1998). “Where the claimant
received treatment for his condition, as here, he must show that his treatment was ‘so woefully
inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.’” Mitchell v. Hininger, 553 F. App’x 602, 605 (6th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011)). As noted above,
Plaintiff was seen on multiple occasions for his injury and received an x-ray. Plaintiff’s complaint
is regarding the adequacy of his treatment, which does not constitute an Eighth Amendment
Plaintiff also claims that he was mistakenly diagnosed with an unspecified
condition. “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical
condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.”
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106. Finally, the disclosure of unspecified information to the State
Administrator of the Marquette County Court does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation. The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims are entirely lacking in
merit and are properly dismissed.
Nor does Plaintiff’s claim regarding the disclosure of personal information violate
the Fourteenth Amendment. In J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981), the Sixth Circuit
reviewed the Supreme Court’s opinions regarding the right to privacy, including Whalen, Nixon,
and Paul, and concluded that “the Constitution does not encompass a general right to nondisclosure
of private information.” Id. at 1087-90. The court declined to “recognize a general constitutional
right to have disclosure of private information measured against the need for disclosure,” reasoning
that “[t]he Framers . . . cannot have intended that the federal courts become involved in an inquiry
nearly as broad balancing almost every act of government . . . against its intrusion on a concept so
vague, undefinable, and all-encompassing as individual privacy.” Id. at 1089-90. Consequently,
the Sixth Circuit restricts the constitutional right to informational privacy to “those personal rights
that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Id. at 1090
(citations omitted). “Only after a fundamental right is identified should the court proceed to the
next step of the analysis B the balancing of the government=s interest in disseminating the
information against the individual=s interest in keeping the information private.” Lambert, 517
F.3d at 440.1
Applying these standards, the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly rejected claims asserting
a constitutional right to nondisclosure of personal information. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Columbus,
636 F.3d 245, 261 (6th Cir. 2011) (city’s requirement that employees returning from sick leave
disclose the nature of their illness to their immediate supervisors does not implicate a fundamental
In contrast to the Sixth Circuit, other circuits hold that the disclosure of some kinds of personal information
requires the court to balance the government=s interests in disclosure against the individual’s interest in avoiding
disclosure. See, e.g., Barry v. New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983); Fraternal Order of Police v.
Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1987); Woodland v. Houston, 940 F.2d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam);
In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1999). Although the Supreme Court recently contrasted the holding in
DeSanti with the approach taken in the foregoing opinions, the Court declined to clarify the scope of a constitutional
right to informational privacy. See NASA v. Nelson, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 746, 755-57 & n.9 (2011) (assuming,
without deciding, that such a right existed in that case).
right); Summe v. Kenton Cnty. Clerk=s Office, 604 F.3d 257, 270-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (county’s
release of medical record of deputy county clerk to citizen pursuant to open records request did
not implicate a right fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty so as to violate
constitutional right to privacy); Jenkins v. Rock Hill Local Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 580, 591 (6th Cir.
2008) (school’s disclosure of information to Children Services not a violation of plaintiff’s
constitutional rights); Barber v. Overton, 496 F.3d 449, 455-57 (6th Cir. 2007) (release of guards’
birth dates and social security numbers did not rise to constitutional level); Coleman v. Martin, 63
F. App’x 791, 793 (6th Cir. 2003) (dissemination of prisoner’s mental health records to parole
board was not a constitutional violation); Jarvis v. Wellman, 52 F.3d 125, 126 (6th Cir. 1995)
(disclosure of rape victim’s medical records to an inmate did not violate her constitutional privacy
rights); DeSanti, 653 F.2d at 1091 (constitutional rights not violated by dissemination of juvenile
delinquents’ social histories to various state agencies). Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has recognized an
“informational-privacy interest of constitutional dimension” in only two instances: (1) where the
release of personal information could lead to bodily harm, see Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136
F.3d 1055, 1061 (6th Cir. 1998) (dissemination of undercover officers personnel file to members
of violent street gang some of whom officers testified against at trial); and (2) where the
information released was of a “sexual, personal, and humiliating nature,” see Bloch v. Ribar, 156
F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 1998) (nonconsensual disclosure at press conference of details of plaintiff=s
As noted above, Plaintiff fails to specify any details regarding the information
released, other than the fact that it was an incorrect medical diagnosis. The Court notes that the
Sixth Circuit has previously determined that the disclosure of an inmate’s HIV-positive status to
prison guards did not violate the inmate’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Doe v.
Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the plaintiff’s claim “is foreclosed by
the letter and reasoning” of DeSanti ). But see Moore v. Prevo, 379 F. App’x 425, 428 (6th Cir.
2010) (distinguishing Wigginton and holding that an inmate has a constitutionally-protected
interest in avoiding disclosure of his HIV-positive status to other inmates, subject to legitimate
The logic of DeSanti, Wigginton and Lee forecloses Plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment claim because the disclosure alleged by Plaintiff does not implicate a fundamental
interest. There is no relevant distinction between the disclosure of an inmate’s diagnosis to prison
guards, which the Sixth Circuit has held does not implicate a fundamental interest, Wigginton, 21
F.3d at 740, and the disclosure to state court officials as Plaintiff alleges here. See, e.g. Coleman
v. Martin, 63 Fed. App’x. 791, 792 (6th Cir. 2003) (dissemination of prisoner’s mental health
records to parole board does not state a claim for relief under § 1983); Holden v. Mich. Dep’t of
Corr., 2012 WL 2317538, at *5 (W.D. Mich. June 18, 2012) (no Fourteenth Amendment violation
where plaintiff alleged that prison employee disclosed his HIV status to other prison officials and
inmates); Reeves v. Engelsgjerd, 2005 WL 3534096, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 23, 2005) (doctor did
not violate prisoner’s constitutional rights by discussing his medical condition with non-medical
staff and in front of other inmates).
To the extent that Moore favors a different result, that decision is neither binding
nor persuasive in light of other published Sixth Circuit authority both predating Moore
(Wigginton), and post-dating Moore (Lee). Moore does not employ the fundamental-interest
analysis required by DeSanti, Lambert, Bloch, and Lee, nor does it cite any Sixth Circuit opinion
in support of its holding. Instead, it expressly adopts the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Doe v.
Delie, 257 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 2001). See Moore, 379 F. App’x at 427 (“‘It is beyond question that
information about one’s HIV-positive status is information of the most personal kind and that an
individual has an interest in protecting against the dissemination of such information.’”) (quoting
Delie, 257 F.3d at 317). As the court in Delie recognized, however, the Sixth Circuit’s decisions
in Wigginton and DeSanti conflicted with its own. Delie, 257 F.3d at 319 n.7; see Moore, 379 F.
App’x at 429 (Kethledge, J., dissenting). Even if the Court accepts the finding in Moore and Delie
that a prisoner has an “interest” in protecting against disclosure of his HIV status to other inmates,
it does not necessarily follow that such an interest is one of “constitutional dimension.” See
Lambert, 517 F.3d at 440.
In accordance with DeSanti, Wigginton and Lee, Plaintiff does not state a
Fourteenth Amendment claim because the disclosure of his unspecified diagnosis as alleged here
does not implicate a fundamental interest protected by the right to privacy under the Fourteenth
Plaintiff claims that his parole / probation was improperly extended, but fails to
allege any specific facts in support of this assertion. To establish a procedural due process
violation, a plaintiff must prove that (1) he was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest,
and (2) such deprivation occurred without the requisite due process of law. Club Italia Soccer &
Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, 470 F.3d 286, 296 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Swihart v.
Wilkinson, 209 F. App’x 456, 458 (6th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff fails to raise a claim of constitutional
magnitude because he has no liberty interest in being released on parole. There is no constitutional
or inherent right to be conditionally released before the expiration of a prison sentence. Greenholtz
v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Although a state may establish
a parole system, it has no duty to do so; thus, the presence of a parole system by itself does not
give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole release. Id. at 7, 11; Bd. of Pardons
v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). Rather, a liberty interest is present only if state law entitles an
inmate to release on parole. Inmates of Orient Corr. Inst. v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 929
F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1991).
In Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1164-65 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Sixth
Circuit, noting “the broad powers of the Michigan authorities to deny parole,” held that the
Michigan system does not create a liberty interest in parole. The Sixth Circuit reiterated the
continuing validity of Sweeton in Crump v. Lafler, 657 F.3d 393, 404 (6th Cir. 2011). In Crump,
the court held that the adoption of specific parole guidelines since Sweeton does not lead to the
conclusion that parole release is mandated upon reaching a high probability of parole. See id.; see
also Carnes v. Engler, 76 F. App’x 79, 80 (6th Cir. 2003). In addition, the Sixth Circuit has
rejected the argument that the Due Process Clause is implicated when changes to parole procedures
and practices have resulted in incarcerations that exceed the subjective expectation of the
sentencing judge. See Foster v. Booker, 595 F.3d 353, 369 (6th Cir. 2010). Finally, the Michigan
Supreme Court has recognized that there exists no liberty interest in parole under the Michigan
system. Glover v. Mich. Parole Bd., 596 N.W.2d 598, 603-04 (Mich. 1999).
Therefore, until Plaintiff has served his maximum sentence, he has no reasonable
expectation of liberty. The discretionary parole system in Michigan holds out “no more than a
mere hope that the benefit will be obtained.” Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11. The Michigan Parole
Board’s decision to extend Plaintiff’s term of parole, therefore, implicates no federal right. In the
absence of a liberty interest, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for a violation of his procedural due
Plaintiff also claims that his state court convictions and / or sentences were unjust.
The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and Plaintiff has the burden of proving the
Court’s jurisdiction. United States v. Horizon Healthcare, 160 F.3d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 1998).
Even where subject matter jurisdiction is not raised by the parties, the Court must consider the
issue sua sponte. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511 (1973); Norris v. Schotten, 146
F.3d 314, 324 (6th Cir. 1998); Mickler v. Nimishillen & Tuscarawas Ry. Co., 13 F.3d 184, 189
(6th Cir. 1993).
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.
district court has no authority to review final judgments of state-court judicial proceedings.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415B16 (1923). A loser in the state court may not be heard in the federal
district court on complaints of injuries by a state-court judgment rendered before the federal
proceeding commenced. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283-84
(2005). “The pertinent question in determining whether a federal district court is precluded under
the RookerBFeldman doctrine from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim is whether
the ‘source of the injury’ upon which plaintiff bases his federal claim is the state court judgment.”
In re Cook, 551 F.3d at 548.
To the extent that Plaintiff is asserting violations of state law, these claims are
properly dismissed. Claims under § 1983 can only be brought for “deprivation of rights secured
by the constitution and laws of the United States.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
924 (1982). Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law. Pyles v. Raisor,
60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants violated state law therefore fails to state a claim under § 1983.
Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to invoke this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction over a
state-law claim, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction. In determining whether to retain
supplemental jurisdiction, “[a] district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and
the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding
state law issues.” Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993).
Ordinarily, where a district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue
of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will
dismiss the remaining state-law claims. Id. Dismissal, however, remains “purely discretionary.”
Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)); Orton
v. Johnny’s Lunch Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012). Here, the balance of the
relevant considerations weighs against the continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.
Accordingly, Plaintiff=s state-law claim will be dismissed without prejudice to his ability to pursue
those claims in state court.
Finally, in light of the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff’s pending
motions to change venue and for dismissal (ECF Nos. 6 and 8) are denied as moot.
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
December 4, 2017
/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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