Reed #487837 v. Corizon et al
Filing
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OPINION ; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
DWAYNE REED,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 2:17-cv-156
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
CORIZON et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the
Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim against
Defendants Corizon and Michigan Department of Corrections Bureau of Health Care. The Court
will serve the complaint against Defendants Buchanan and Headley.
Discussion
I.
Factual allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the G. Robert Cotton Correctional Facility (JCF) in Jackson, Michigan. The events
about which he complains, however, occurred at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) in
Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan.
Plaintiff sues Corizon, Michigan Department of
Corrections Bureau of Health Care (MDOC-BHCS), Nurse Practitioner Brenda Buchanan, and
Nurse Unknown Headley.
Plaintiff alleges that on September 22, 2016, he fell while in quarantine, but was
not taken to the hospital. Plaintiff was already considered disabled and required a cane. Plaintiff
was issued a medical detail for a wheelchair when going any sort of distance. After this incident,
Plaintiff was transferred to URF.
On December 5, 2016, Defendant Buchanan cancelled Plaintiff’s wheelchair detail
because she did not believe that Plaintiff required it. Plaintiff states that Defendant Buchanan
spoke to him in a rude and demeaning manner. On December 30, 2016, Plaintiff was exiting the
dining room on the east side of URF when he slipped and fell on the sidewalk, which was covered
in ice. Plaintiff landed on his back and hip, and also struck the back of his head on the sidewalk.
Plaintiff lost consciousness and when he regained awareness, three officers were helping him into
Health Services.
Once inside Health Services, Defendant Headly began asking Plaintiff questions.
Plaintiff’s vision was blurred and he was unable to make out what Defendant Headley was saying.
At this point, Defendant Headley began yelling at Plaintiff in an angry tone. Defendant Headley
gave Plaintiff a hot water bottle and a package of Motrin, but then took the hot water bottle back
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after falsely asserting that Plaintiff already had one. Defendant Headley then screamed at Plaintiff
to “get out,” and sent Plaintiff across the ice covered sidewalk back to his cell without any
assistance, despite Plaintiff’s extreme dizziness. On December 31, 2016, Plaintiff filed a grievance
complaining that he was being denied necessary pain medications for his back, knee, and head
injury, and that he was still being denied a wheelchair.
Plaintiff claims that following his accident, he was in so much pain that he could
barely walk to the medication line or to meals and that on January 1, 2017, Plaintiff suffered from
chest pains. Plaintiff was taken to War Memorial Hospital, where he received an EKG and a chest
x-ray. The doctor told Plaintiff that he was suffering from a bruised chest due to the fall. Plaintiff
described his symptoms and the doctor wrote a prescription for Toradol for pain, Robaxin for rib
pain, and Antivert for dizziness. Once back at URF, Defendant Headley told Plaintiff that no
medications had been ordered. Plaintiff never received any medications.
On January 3, 2017, Plaintiff was seen by Defendant Buchanan, who asked Plaintiff
about the medications he was taking and the location of his pain. Plaintiff told Defendant
Buchanan that his back, neck, hip, knees, and arm were “messed up,” and that he had difficulty
understanding conversations since his head injury. Plaintiff also stated that he could only stand
for two to three minutes before his back pain became unbearable and that his hip hurt continuously.
Defendant requested a review of Plaintiff’s hip x-ray. On January 7, 2017, Defendant Buchanan
reissued Plaintiff’s wheelchair detail. Defendant Buchanan told Plaintiff that the fall had affected
blood flow to Plaintiff’s hip and that he would likely need a hip replacement.
On May 17, 2017, Plaintiff had hip replacement surgery at Bronson Hospital.
Plaintiff claims that surgery was required because of the delay in treatment after his fall on
December 30, 2016. Plaintiff states that he continues to suffer from pain and dizziness and that he
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is still being denied needed pain medication and the assistance of a wheelchair. Plaintiff seeks
compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
II.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not
‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
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by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the
Michigan Department of Corrections Bureau of Healthcare Services. Regardless of the form of
relief requested, the states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from
suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated
Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O=Hara v. Wigginton, 24
F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1993). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment
immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has
not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877
(6th Cir. 1986). In numerous unpublished opinions, the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the
MDOC is absolutely immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., McCoy v.
Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2010); Turnboe v. Stegall, No. 00-1182, 2000
WL1679478, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000). In addition, the State of Michigan (acting through the
Michigan Department of Corrections) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money
damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)).
Therefore, the Court dismisses the Michigan Department of
Corrections Bureau of Healthcare Services.
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The Court further notes that Defendant Corizon is not vicariously liable for the
actions of its employees and, therefore, “may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely
by its employees or agents.” Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). To impose liability against
Corizon, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered a violation of his federal rights “because of”
a Corizon policy or custom. See Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff
can demonstrate the existence of such a policy or custom in one of several ways: (1) prove the
existence of an illegal official policy; (2) establish that an official with final decision making
authority ratified illegal actions; (3) demonstrate that there existed a policy of inadequate training
or supervision; or (4) establish that there existed a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal
rights violations. Ibid. Plaintiff’s complaint contains no factual allegations that, even if accepted
as true, would satisfy any of these requirements. Therefore, Defendant Corizon is properly
dismissed.
Following a review of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court concludes that his Eighth
Amendment claims against Defendants Buchanan and Headley are not clearly frivolous and may
not be dismissed on initial review.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Defendants Corizon and Michigan Department of Corrections Bureau of
Health Care will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will serve the complaint against Buchanan and
Headley.
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An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated:
April 18, 2018
/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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