Anderson #734230 v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al

Filing 9

OPINION; Judgment to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
DEANDRE M. ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:17-cv-183

v.

Honorable Janet T. Neff

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.

____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is
required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The
Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
I.

Factual allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Gus Harrison Correctional Facility (ARF) in Adrian, Lenawee County, Michigan. The
events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in

Marquette, Marquette County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the Michigan Department of Corrections, the
Marquette Branch Prison, Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Unknown Govern, Psychologist Robin
J. Bailey-Webb, Corrections Officer Robert White, Corrections Officer Unknown Vrabal, and
Corrections Officer Unknown Speckerman.
Plaintiff’s complaint and his attached exhibits indicate that he is contesting an August
25, 2017 class I misconduct conviction for fighting. Plaintiff claims that prior to the incident, he had
complained to Defendants Bailey-Webb, Govern, and White of sexual harassment by Defendants
Vrabal and Speckerman, as well as by prisoners Pauli and Hall. Plaintiff claims that because
Defendants Bailey-Webb, Govern, and White failed to follow PREA [Prison Rape Elimination Act of
2003] standards, he was permitted to remain in an unsafe environment. Plaintiff asserts that these facts
should have prevented him from being found guilty of the misconduct. Plaintiff seeks damages and
equitable relief.
II.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a
complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than
labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility
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standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner
cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of
Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not
a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific
constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
III.

Eleventh Amendment immunity

Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the
Michigan Department of Corrections. Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their
departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the
state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by
statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); Alabama v.
Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1993). Congress
has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick
v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous unpublished opinions, the Sixth Circuit
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has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
See, e.g., McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2010); Turnboe v. Stegall, No. 001182, 2000 WL1679478, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000). In addition, the State of Michigan (acting
through the Michigan Department of Corrections) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for
money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)). Therefore, the Court dismisses the Michigan Department of
Corrections.
Plaintiff’s complaint seeks damages from the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP). An
express requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is that the defendant be a “person.” See Monell v. Dep’t of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). MBP is an administrative unit of the Michigan Department of
Corrections. Neither a prison nor a state corrections department is a “person” within the meaning of
section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s
claim against this Defendant is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Alabama, 438 U.S. at 782. As
noted above, that amendment prohibits suits in federal court against the state or any of its agencies or
departments. Pennhurst State School & Hosp, 465 U.S. at 100. MBP is therefore not subject to a
§ 1983 action.
IV.

Due process

Plaintiff appears to be claiming that his misconduct conviction violated his due process
rights. A prisoner’s ability to challenge a prison misconduct conviction depends on whether the
convictions implicated any liberty interest. In the seminal case in this area, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974), the Court prescribed certain minimal procedural safeguards that prison officials must
follow before depriving a prisoner of good-time credits on account of alleged misbehavior. The Wolff
Court did not create a free-floating right to process that attaches to all prison disciplinary proceedings;
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rather, the right to process arises only when the prisoner faces a loss of liberty, in the form of a longer
prison sentence caused by forfeiture of good-time credits:
It is true that the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory
behavior while in prison. But here the State itself has not only provided a statutory
right to good time but also specifies that it is to be forfeited only for serious
misbehavior. Nebraska may have the authority to create, or not, a right to a shortened
prison sentence through the accumulation of credits for good behavior, and it is true
that the Due Process Clause does not require a hearing “in every conceivable case of
government impairment of private interest.” But the State having created the right to
good time and itself recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major
misconduct, the prisoner’s interest has real substance and is sufficiently embraced
within Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” to entitle him to those minimum procedures
appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure
that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff does not allege that his major misconduct convictions resulted in any loss of
good-time credits, nor could he. The Sixth Circuit has examined Michigan statutory law, as it relates
to the creation and forfeiture of disciplinary credits1 for prisoners convicted of crimes occurring after
April 1, 1987. In Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2007), the court determined that loss of
disciplinary credits does not necessarily affect the duration of a prisoner’s sentence. Rather, it merely
affects parole eligibility, which remains discretionary with the parole board. Id. at 440. Building on
this ruling, in Nali v. Ekman, 355 F. App’x 909 (6th Cir. 2009), the court held that a misconduct citation
in the Michigan prison system does not affect a prisoner’s constitutionally protected liberty interests,
because it does not necessarily affect the length of confinement. 355 F. App’x at 912; accord, Taylor
v. Lantagne, 418 F. App’x 408, 412 (6th Cir. 2011); Wilson v. Rapelje, No. 09-13030, 2010 WL
5491196, at * 4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2010) (Report & Recommendation) (holding that “plaintiff’s

1

For crimes committed after April 1, 1987, Michigan prisoners earn “disciplinary credits” under a statute that abolished the
former good-time system. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 800.33(5).

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disciplinary hearing and major misconduct sanction does not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause”), adopted as judgment of court, 2011 WL 5491196 (Jan. 4, 2011). Absent a
demonstrated liberty interest, Plaintiff has no due process claim based on the loss of disciplinary
credits. See Bell v. Anderson, 301 F. App’x 459, 461-62 (6th Cir. 2008).
Even absent a protectible liberty interest in disciplinary credits, a prisoner may be able
to raise a due process challenge to prison misconduct convictions that result in a significant, atypical
deprivation. See Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Plaintiff has not identified any significant
deprivation arising from his convictions. Plaintiff received 21 days loss of privileges as a result of his
conviction. See ECF No. 1-1, PageID.15. The Wolff court described loss of privileges as a “lesser
penalt[y]” that would not warrant “the procedures required by today’s decision . . . .” Wolff, 418 U.S.
at 571 n. 19; see also Ingram v. Jewell, 94 F. App’x 271, 273 (6th Cir. 2004) (14-day loss of privileges
is not atypical and significant); Dixon v. Morrrison, No. 1:13-cv-1078, 2013 WL 6512981 at *7 (W.D.
Mich. December 12, 2013) (15-day loss of privileges is not atypical and significant). The sanction of
lost privileges here is not sufficiently significant or atypical to warrant due process protection. Unless
a prison misconduct conviction results in an extension of the duration of a prisoner’s sentence or some
other atypical hardship, a due process claim fails. Ingram v. Jewell, 94 F. App’x 271, 273 (6th Cir.
2004).
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Defendants Michigan Department of Corrections, the Marquette Branch Prison,
Govern, Bailey-Webb, White, Vrabal, and Speckerman will be dismissed for failure to state a claim,
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good6

faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $505.00
appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred
from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, then
he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated:

July 19, 2018

/s/ Janet T. Neff
Janet T. Neff
United States District Judge

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