Brooks #153447 v. Stratton
Filing
15
OPINION ; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc)
Case 2:18-cv-00028-RJJ-TPG ECF No. 15 filed 09/24/18 PageID.149 Page 1 of 4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
TERRY DARCEL BROOKS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 2:18-cv-28
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT L. STRATTON, III,
Defendant.
____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the
Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The
Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court
will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
I.
Factual allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan.
The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Kinross Correctional Facility
Case 2:18-cv-00028-RJJ-TPG ECF No. 15 filed 09/24/18 PageID.150 Page 2 of 4
(KCF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues Chippewa County Prosecuting
Attorney Robert L. Stratton, III.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated his constitutional rights during his
prosecution of Plaintiff for prison riot and malicious destruction of a building in 2017 (ECF No.
3, PageID.3; ECF No. 3-1, PageID.68-71). Plaintiff seeks damages and equitable relief.
II.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not
‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
2
Case 2:18-cv-00028-RJJ-TPG ECF No. 15 filed 09/24/18 PageID.151 Page 3 of 4
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
Plaintiff contends that Defendant violated his rights when he pursued charges
against Plaintiff without sufficient evidence that Plaintiff was involved in the crimes. Defendant
is entitled to absolute immunity for his actions in prosecuting the criminal action against Plaintiff.
The Supreme Court embraces a functional approach to determining whether a prosecutor is entitled
to absolute immunity. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,
486 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988); accord Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d
459, 467 (6th Cir. 2010); Lomaz v. Hennosy, 151 F.3d 493, 497 (6th Cir. 1998). Under a functional
analysis, a prosecutor is absolutely immune when performing the traditional functions of an
advocate. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130; Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 797 (6th Cir. 2003);
Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1137 (6th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court has held that a
prosecutor is absolutely immune for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution. Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); Lomaz, 151 F.3d at 497. Acts which occur in the course of
the prosecutor’s role as advocate are entitled to protection of absolute immunity, in contrast to
investigatory or administrative functions that are normally performed by a detective or police
3
Case 2:18-cv-00028-RJJ-TPG ECF No. 15 filed 09/24/18 PageID.152 Page 4 of 4
officer. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 276-78 (1993); Grant, 870 F.2d at 1137. In
the Sixth Circuit, the focus of the inquiry is how closely related the prosecutor’s conduct is to his
role as an advocate intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Spurlock,
330 F.3d at 797; Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1443 (6th Cir. 1997). Obviously, the decision
to charge and pursue a criminal action is part of the prosecutor’s role as an advocate. Accordingly,
Defendant is entitled to immunity.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Defendant will be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated:
September 24, 2018
/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?