Freeman #752710 v. Headley et al
Filing
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OPINION ; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
DALE FREEMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 2:18-cv-68
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
JENNIFER HEADLEY et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the
Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim against
Defendants McLean and Spitters.
Discussion
I.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF) in Carson City, Montcalm County,
Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Chippewa Correctional
Facility (URF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan, and the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional
Facility, (LRF) in Muskegon Heights, Muskegon County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues Nurse Jennifer
Headley, Nurse Supervisor Bethany Staine, Nurse Tiffany Haske, Nurse Practitioner Brenda
Buchanan, Michael Brown, Nurse Theresa Merling, Physician Daniel Spitters, Physician
Bienvenido Canlas, Dr. Ricky Coleman, and Grievance Coordinator M. McLean.
Plaintiff alleges that he is a paraplegic who requires a special medical air mattress
to prevent decubitus pressure ulcers and urinary catheters to drain his bladder and prevent urinary
tract infections. On March 26, 2015, Plaintiff was transferred to LRF, where he was examined by
Defendant Spitters. Defendant Spitters ordered a special accommodation for Plaintiff to receive a
special air mattress. The accommodation was for the duration of one year, and was to expire on
May 13, 2016. Plaintiff states that Defendant Spitters failed to renew the accommodation, which
resulted in the mattress being confiscated as contraband.
On June 7, 2017, Plaintiff was transferred to URF, where Plaintiff received a
medical screening by LPN Cicco. Defendant Merling subsequently provided Plaintiff with an air
mattress and catheters, despite the fact that Plaintiff’s mattress detail had expired. Defendant
Canlas reviewed Plaintiff’s medical screening on June 9, 2017, but failed to renew Plaintiff’s
medical accommodation for an air mattress. Plaintiff spoke to Defendant Merling and asked her
to provide him with an accommodation for an air mattress and catheters. In early July of 2017,
Plaintiff submitted a kite, which was responded to by Defendant Haske. On July 4, 2017, Plaintiff
received a mattress exchange from Defendant Brown. On August 14, 2017, Plaintiff submitted a
kite for another mattress because his air mattress had a hole in it. Plaintiff received a replacement
mattress on August 18, 2017. At this time, Plaintiff was unaware of the fact that he did not have
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an accommodation for a special mattress. On September 11, 2017, while Plaintiff was in
segregation at URF, Defendant Headley confiscated Plaintiff’s mattress and catheters. Plaintiff
wrote a kite, stating that he needed the mattress and catheters in order to avoid bed sores and
urinary tract infections. Plaintiff also wrote a grievance on Defendant Headley.
On September 13, 2017, Plaintiff required treatment with an antibiotic for a urinary
tract infection. Plaintiff was referred to Defendant Canlas on September 14, 2017, who then
referred Plaintiff’s case to Defendant Coleman with regard to Plaintiff’s need for an air mattress.
Defendant Coleman deferred the request. On September 19, 2017, Plaintiff awoke with severe
pain in his left leg and discovered decubitus pressure ulcers. Plaintiff attempted to inform
Defendant Staine while she was making her medication rounds, to no avail. Plaintiff wrote a kite
and was seen by Defendant Brown, who told Plaintiff that the sores were no big deal and gave him
a bandaid. Plaintiff asked Defendant Brown to take pictures of the sores, but he refused.
On September 25, 2017, Plaintiff’s decubitus ulcers had gotten worse and he was
seen by Defendant Buchanan. Plaintiff was then sent to War Memorial Hospital and was given
intravenous antibiotics. Plaintiff remained in the hospital for three days. After being released
from the hospital, Plaintiff was seen by Defendant Buchanan on September 29, 2017. Plaintiff
explained that he was in pain, but Defendant Buchanan asserted that Plaintiff had purposely caused
the decubitus ulcers and ignored his complaints. On September 30, 2017, Plaintiff was readmitted
into the hospital due to a worsening of his bed sores. Plaintiff was given antibiotics and a
protective dressing for decubitus ulcers on his hip and knee. Plaintiff was instructed to change the
dressings daily. After returning to URF, Defendant Buchanan stated that Plaintiff only needed
dressing changes every other day for three to five days.
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Plaintiff’s decubitus ulcers continued to worsen and became infected.
On
October 16, 2017, Plaintiff’s sores produced such a bad odor that Defendants Staine, Headley, and
Haske had to run a fan during dressing changes in order to avoid gagging. On October 17, 2017,
Plaintiff requested extra showers because of the drainage from his decubitus ulcers. Defendant
Buchanan denied Plaintiff’s request. Plaintiff was readmitted to the hospital on October 19, 2017.
On October 20, Defendant Headley discovered that Plaintiff had a different type of infection based
on lab results from the October 19 hospitalization. Plaintiff suffered an extremely high fever and
was hospitalized again on October 30, 2017. At this point, Plaintiff’s infection required that he be
admitted to the infirmary for intravenous antibiotic treatment. Plaintiff was told by Dr. Tann that
if the infection in his left leg was untreated, he was at risk of requiring an amputation.
In December of 2017, Plaintiff was referred to a plastic surgeon for surgery on his
left hip and knee. On December 30, 2017, Plaintiff was admitted into the hospital with severe
fever. Plaintiff subsequently underwent surgery for the debridement of his left knee and shin bone
biopsy at Henry Ford Allegiance Hospital January 4, 2018. Plaintiff received ongoing antibiotic
therapy, but his wound reopened. On January 18, 2018, Plaintiff wrote several letters complaining
about the medical care he received, describing the grievances he had filed, and complaining of
Defendant McLean’s failure to investigate Plaintiff’s grievances.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ conduct violated his rights Eighth Amendment.
Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief.
II.
Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
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a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not
‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
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Plaintiff fails to make specific factual allegations against Defendant McLean, other
than his claim that he failed to conduct an investigation in response to his grievances. Government
officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory
of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. New York City Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A
claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v.
Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002).
The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the
mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d
881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a
supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in
a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead
that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendant
McLean engaged in any active unconstitutional behavior. Accordingly, he fails to state a claim
against him.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Spitters did not renew Plaintiff’s air mattress
accommodation, which ultimately resulted in Plaintiff’s air mattress being deemed contraband and
being confiscated. However, during the time that Plaintiff was at LRF under the treatment of
Defendant Spitters, he continued to have access to an air mattress and did not suffer any ill effects
as a result of Defendant Spitters’ failure to renew the accommodation. Therefore, Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Spitters is properly dismissed.
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The Court notes that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Headley, Staine, Haske,
Buchanan, Brown, Merling, Canlas, and Coleman are not clearly frivolous and may not be
dismissed on initial review.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Defendants McLean and Spitters will be dismissed for failure to state a
claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated:
October 24, 2018
/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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