Tippins #342855 v. Washington et al
Filing
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OPINION; Order to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
JOHNNY TIPPINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 2:18-cv-69
Honorable Janet T. Neff
HEIDI WASHINGTON et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the
Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim against
Defendants Washington and Bauman. The Court will serve the complaint against Defendants
Immel, Scheam, Chamberlin, and Sprader.
Discussion
I.
Factual allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Alger Correctional Facility (LMF) in Munising, Alger County, Michigan. The
events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues MDOC Director Heidi
Washington, Warden Catherine Bauman, Deputy Warden Anthony Immel, Resident Unit Manager
G. Scheam, Prison Counselor K. Chamberlin, and Deputy Warden Scott Sprader.
Plaintiff alleges that prior to his transfer to LMF from the Chippewa Correctional
Facility (URF), he had sought protection at URF because the victim in Plaintiff’s criminal case
had family at URF and had put a hit out on Plaintiff. On February 28, 2018, he submitted a request
for protection to LMF Unit Supervisor Salo because his need for protection continued after his
placement at LMF. Plaintiff was placed in protective segregation.
Plaintiff met with Defendant Chamberlin on March 5, 2018. Defendant Chamberlin
asked Plaintiff about his need for protection, and Plaintiff stated that he wanted to be transferred
to a safe prison. Defendant Chamberlin stated that he was going to investigate. On March 9, 2018,
Corrections Officer Sabin ordered Plaintiff to pack up his property and move to Cedar Unit. After
Plaintiff refused, Defendant Sabin wrote Plaintiff a misconduct ticket for disobeying a direct order.
On March 15, 2018, Defendant Chamberlin gave Plaintiff a copy of the February 28, 2018
protection request report, which showed that Defendants Scheam, Immel, and Chamberlin
concluded, “No need for protection is required at this time per this investigation and the prisoner’s
own statements. Prisoner is willing to be housed in General Population Re-integration at LMF as
soon as bed space becomes available in full accordance with LMF OP 04.05.120-D.” Plaintiff
asserts that this statement is completely untrue. Plaintiff wrote grievances regarding this issue.
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Plaintiff continued to refuse to go to the general population and continued to receive misconduct
tickets as a result.
Plaintiff alleges that in June, he was seen by the Security Classification Committee
(SCC) and Defendant Sprader. Defendant Sprader advised Plaintiff that he was not going to
transfer him to another facility. Therefore, Plaintiff continued his placement in administrative
segregation because of the continued threat to his safety from other prisoners at LMF. Plaintiff
seeks damages and injunctive relief in the form of an immediate transfer.
II.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
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8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
Plaintiff fails to make specific factual allegations against Defendants Washington
and Bauman, other than his claim that they failed to conduct an investigation in response to his
grievances. Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their
subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676;
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d
484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009).
A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active
unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v.
Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can
supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310
F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may
not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act
based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300
(6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
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official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff
has failed to allege that Defendants Washington and Bauman engaged in any active
unconstitutional behavior. Accordingly, he fails to state a claim against them.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Immel, Scheam, Chamberlin, and Sprader all
refused to provide him with protective custody and punished Plaintiff for refusing to place himself
in danger in the general population by writing misconduct tickets on him. Plaintiff also states that
these individuals lied on the protection request report by stating that Plaintiff was willing to go to
the General Population and did not need protection. The Court concludes that these claims are not
clearly frivolous and may not be dismissed on initial review.
As noted above, Plaintiff requests injunctive relief in the form of an immediate
transfer. However, Plaintiff has failed to establish that he will suffer irreparable harm absent
injunctive relief. At the current time, Plaintiff is confined in administrative segregation and is not
in danger of being assaulted. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for immediate injunctive relief is
denied.
III.
Pending motions
Plaintiff filed a motion seeking a copy of his original complaint. Plaintiff’s request
for a copy of the complaint is unnecessary because Plaintiff will be provided with a copy as a
matter of course pursuant to the accompanying order for partial service. Therefore, Plaintiff’s
motion for a copy of his complaint (ECF No. 4) is DENIED. In addition, Plaintiff’s objection to
the order denying appointment of counsel (ECF No. 11) is DENIED for the reasons set forth in
the August 3, 2018, order denying counsel (ECF No. 10).
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Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Defendants Washington and Bauman will be dismissed for failure to state a
claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will
serve the complaint against Immel, Scheam, Chamberlin, and Sprader.
An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated:
September 25, 2018
/s/ Janet T. Neff
Janet T. Neff
United States District Judge
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