Stevenson #229119 v. Snyder

Filing 4

OPINION; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
JERMAINE STEVENSON,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:18-cv-83

v.

Honorable Gordon J. Quist

RICK SNYDER,
Defendant.

____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the
Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
I.

Factual allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan.
Plaintiff sues Michigan Governor Rick Snyder.

Following a jury trial in the Wayne County Circuit Court, Plaintiff was convicted
of first-degree murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b. On January 26, 1993, the court sentenced
Plaintiff to respective, consecutive terms of imprisonment of life and two years. Plaintiff appealed
his convictions and sentences to both the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme
Court. The court of appeals rejected all appellate grounds and affirmed the sentences and
convictions on November 10, 1995. The supreme court denied leave to appeal on July 29, 1996.
Plaintiff filed a motion for relief from judgment in the Wayne County Circuit Court
on April 12, 2014, raising eight grounds for relief. The court denied the motion on September 17,
2014. Plaintiff sought leave to appeal to both the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan
Supreme Court. Those courts denied leave to appeal on August 13, 2015, and July 26, 2017,
respectively. It also appears that Plaintiff has attempted to seek relief in the Michigan courts by
way of motions for superintending control and complaints for writ of habeas corpus. See Mich.
Ct. App. Electronic Case Search System, http://courts.mi.gov/opinions_orders/case_search/Pages/
default.aspx?SearchType=2&PartyName=Stevenson+Jermaine&CourtType_PartyName=3&Pag
eIndex=0&PartyOpenOnly=0 (last visited June 22, 2018) (reflecting that Plaintiff made nine
different attempts to seek relief in the Michigan appellate courts).
In his present civil rights action, Plaintiff alleges that he was 18 years old at the
time of the offenses for which he was committed, though he remained within the jurisdiction of
the probate court as an individual who had been placed in foster care and was transitioning to
independence. He alleges that, because the probate court had not yet relinquished jurisdiction over
him, he should be entitled to the protections of Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.25a, which was adopted
to implement the holding of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (barring the imposition of

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mandatory sentence of life without parole on a defendant who was a juvenile at the time of the
offense of conviction). Michigan Compiled Laws § 769.25a provides the procedures to be applied
in cases once the state supreme court has concluded that Miller v. Alabama retroactively applies
to a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the crime, Plaintiff contends that
Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.25a, which was signed by Defendant Snyder, arbitrarily and capriciously
excludes 18-year-old offenders who remain within the jurisdiction of the foster care system.
Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause.
II.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not
‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

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8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
Plaintiff effectively challenges the duration of his incarceration by the State of
Michigan, because he claims that the Equal Protection Clause requires that he be eligible for
consideration for parole under the procedures set forth in Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.25a, a claim
the state trial court has rejected. A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be
brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought
pursuant to § 1983. 1 See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (the essence of habeas
corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody and the traditional
function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody). Therefore, to the extent that
Plaintiff’s complaint challenges the fact or duration of his incarceration, it must be dismissed. See
Adams v. Morris, 90 F. App’x 856, 858 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissal is appropriate where § 1983
action seeks equitable relief and challenges fact or duration of confinement); see also Moore v.
Pemberton, 110 F.3d 22, 23-24 (7th Cir. 1997) (reasons for not construing a § 1983 action as one

1

The Court notes that Plaintiff currently has an amended habeas petition pending in this Court, in which he raises
the issue. Stevenson v. Woods, No. 2:16-cv-90 (W.D. Mich.).

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seeking habeas relief include (1) potential application of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),
(2) differing defendants, (3) differing standards of § 1915(a)(3) and § 2253(c), (4) differing fee
requirements, (5) potential application of second or successive petition doctrine or three-strikes
rules of § 1915(g)).
To the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief for alleged
violations of Constitutional rights, his claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 48687 (1994), which held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction
or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has
been [overturned].” See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997) (emphasis in original). In
Heck, the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner cannot make a cognizable claim under § 1983
for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid” unless a prisoner shows that the conviction or
sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). The holding in Heck has
been extended to actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 64648 (declaratory relief); Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1998) (claim for injunctive
relief intertwined with request for damages); Wilson v. Kinkela, No. 97-4035, 1998 WL 246401,
at *1 (6th Cir. May 5, 1998) (injunctive relief). Plaintiff’s allegations clearly call into question the
validity of his sentence. Therefore, his action is barred under Heck until his sentence has been
invalidated.

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A court’s dismissal of a claim on the basis that it is barred by Heck v. Humphrey is
properly considered a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) because it fails to state a claim on
which relief can be granted. See Hunt v. Michigan, 482 F. App’x 20, 22 (6th Cir. 2012) (a claim
barred by Heck is properly dismissed for failure to state a claim); Morris v. Cason, 102 F. App’x
902, 903 (6th Cir. 2004) (same).
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: June 28, 2018

/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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