Cromer #211902 v. Eagan et al
OPINION Denying Leave to Proceed IFP - Three Strikes; signed by Magistrate Judge Maarten Vermaat (cam)
Case 2:22-cv-00066-MV ECF No. 7, PageID.114 Filed 05/09/22 Page 1 of 7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
EDWARD JAMES CROMER,
Case No. 2:22-cv-66
Honorable Maarten Vermaat
MICHAEL EAGAN et al.,
OPINION DENYING LEAVE
TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS - THREE STRIKES
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) Because Plaintiff has filed at least three
lawsuits that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim, he is barred
from proceeding in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Where a plaintiff is ineligible for in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, “he
must make full payment of the filing fee before his action may proceed.” In re Alea, 286 F.3d 378,
380 (6th Cir. 2002). That means payment should precede preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c), which the Court is required to conduct prior to the service
of the complaint. See In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134
(6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the
complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s
relationship to the proceedings.
“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless
notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros. v.
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Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding
tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named
defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that
capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time
within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless
a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non
directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive
rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat.
1321 (1996) (PLRA), by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before
service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the
plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t, 212
F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that “[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court
screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of
the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all
proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF No. 4.) That statute provides that “[u]pon
the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all
proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the
named defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently
parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to enter an order denying Plaintiff
leave to proceed in forma pauperis and directing him to pay the $402.00 filing fee. See Neals v.
Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the
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defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to the action at the
time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1
The Court will order Plaintiff to pay the $402.00 civil action filing fees applicable to those
not permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.2 This fee must be paid within twenty-eight (28) days
of this opinion and accompanying order. If Plaintiff fails to pay the fee, the Court will order that
this case be dismissed without prejudice. Even if the case is dismissed, Plaintiff must pay the
$402.00 filing fees in accordance with In re Alea, 286 F.3d 378, 380–81 (6th Cir. 2002).
The PLRA, which was enacted on April 26, 1996, amended the procedural rules governing
a prisoner’s request for the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis. As the Sixth Circuit has
stated, the PLRA was “aimed at the skyrocketing numbers of claims filed by prisoners–many of
which are meritless–and the corresponding burden those filings have placed on the federal courts.”
Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997). For that reason, Congress created
economic incentives to prompt a prisoner to “stop and think” before filing a complaint. Id. For
But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a
United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the
United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a
screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c));
Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for
the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning
in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).
The filing fee for a civil action is $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The Clerk is also directed to
collect a miscellaneous administrative fee of $52.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(b);
miscellaneous administrative fee, however, “does not apply to applications for a writ of habeas
corpus or to persons granted in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”
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example, a prisoner is liable for the civil action filing fee, and if the prisoner qualifies to proceed
in forma pauperis, the prisoner may pay the fee through partial payments as outlined in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b). The constitutionality of the fee requirements of the PLRA has been upheld by the Sixth
Circuit. Id. at 1288.
In addition, another provision reinforces the “stop and think” aspect of the PLRA by
preventing a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis when the prisoner repeatedly files
meritless lawsuits. Known as the “three-strikes” rule, the provision states:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action
or proceeding under [the section governing proceedings in forma pauperis] if the
prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any
facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was
dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of
serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The statutory restriction “[i]n no event,” found in § 1915(g), is express and
unequivocal. The statute does allow an exception for a prisoner who is “under imminent danger of
serious physical injury.” The Sixth Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of the three-strikes rule
against arguments that it violates equal protection, the right of access to the courts, and due process,
and that it constitutes a bill of attainder and is ex post facto legislation. Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d
596, 604–06 (6th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff has been an active litigant in the federal courts in Michigan. In more than three of
Plaintiff’s lawsuits, the Court entered dismissals on the grounds that the cases were frivolous,
malicious, and/or failed to state a claim. See Op. & J., Cromer v. Snyder, No. 1:17-cv-94 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 27, 2017), (ECF Nos. 9, 10); Op. & J., Cromer v. Place, No. 2:16-cv-108 (W.D. Mich.
Sept. 30, 2016), (ECF Nos. 8, 9); Op. & J., Cromer v. United States of America, No. 2:16-cv-94
(W.D. Mich. June 29, 2016), (ECF Nos. 8, 9); Op. & J., Cromer v. Masker, No. 2:13-cv-15 (W.D.
Mich. Apr. 10, 2013), (ECF Nos. 5, 6). All of Plaintiff’s dismissals were entered after enactment
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of the PLRA on April 26, 1996. Additionally, Plaintiff has been denied leave to proceed in forma
pauperis because he has filed at least three such frivolous, malicious, or insufficient complaints.
See Op. & Order, Cromer v. Davids, No. 1:19-cv-883 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 5, 2019), (ECF Nos. 4,
5); Op. & Order, Cromer v. Stephan, No. 1:19-cv-150 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 11, 2019), (ECF Nos. 3,
4); Order, Smith et al. v. Washington, No. 1:17-cv-285 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 6, 2017), (ECF No. 4);
Op. & Order, Cromer v. Snyder, No. 1:17-cv-94 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2017), (ECF Nos. 4, 5).
Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations do not fall within the “imminent danger” exception to the
three-strikes rule. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Sixth Circuit set forth the following general
requirements for a claim of imminent danger:
In order to allege sufficiently imminent danger, we have held that “the threat
or prison condition must be real and proximate and the danger of serious physical
injury must exist at the time the complaint is filed.” Rittner v. Kinder, 290 F. App’x
796, 797 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus a prisoner’s
assertion that he or she faced danger in the past is insufficient to invoke the
exception.” Id. at 797–98; see also [Taylor v. First Med. Mgmt., 508 F. App’x 488,
492 (6th Cir. 2012)] (“Allegations of past dangers are insufficient to invoke the
exception.”); Percival v. Gerth, 443 F. App’x 944, 946 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Assertions
of past danger will not satisfy the ‘imminent danger’ exception.”); cf. [Pointer v.
Wilkinson, 502 F.3d 369, 371 n.1 (6th Cir. 2007)] (implying that past danger is
insufficient for the imminent-danger exception).
In addition to a temporal requirement, we have explained that the
allegations must be sufficient to allow a court to draw reasonable inferences that
the danger exists. To that end, “district courts may deny a prisoner leave to proceed
pursuant to § 1915(g) when the prisoner’s claims of imminent danger are
conclusory or ridiculous, or are clearly baseless (i.e. are fantastic or delusional and
rise to the level of irrational or wholly incredible).” Rittner, 290 F. App’x at 798
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Taylor, 508 F. App’x
at 492 (“Allegations that are conclusory, ridiculous, or clearly baseless are also
insufficient for purposes of the imminent-danger exception.”).
Vandiver v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 727 F.3d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 2013). A prisoner’s claim of
imminent danger is subject to the same notice pleading requirement as that which applies to
prisoner complaints. Id. Consequently, a prisoner must allege facts in the complaint from which
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the Court could reasonably conclude that the prisoner was under an existing danger at the time he
filed his complaint, but the prisoner need not affirmatively prove those allegations. Id.
Plaintiff’s claims largely stem from his complaints regarding the procedures of the
Michigan Parole Board. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 5, PageID.85–98; see Compl., ECF No. 1,
PageID.7–19.) Plaintiff contends that “on/about May 5, 2021[,] the Board attempted ‘a review of
lifer’s files’ by denying the decree of ‘an organic Constitution.’” (Am. Compl., ECF No. 5,
PageID.85; see Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) Plaintiff alleges that the “Parole Board contends
‘they owe no duty to disclose who entered a courthouse or the government on any level and
asserted a constitutional loss or injury entry.’” (Am. Compl., ECF No. 5, PageID.85 (emphasis
omitted).) Plaintiff also presents retaliation claims regarding his “5–6 [transfers] in 13 months for
writing grievances challenging ‘commitment papers’” and his placement on a “mental ward” in
June of 2020. (Id., PageID.103–04.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants are “using a facade of
‘mental health’ to keep [him] in ‘isolation/mental ward’ to exacerbate into psychotic depression
and decompensate until [he] loses insight on constitutional limitation.” (Id., PageID.104.) Plaintiff
also contends that Defendants are “killing [him] with stress devices and [a] ‘war of nerves’ to
protect their financial gain,” and that “[t]his is a true political assassination in order to hide what
could be a scam executed statewide by state officials giving themselves titles like warden,
attorney general, police [and] judges while circumventing the decree of an organic Constitution
and due process.” (Id.)
Although Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants are “killing [him] with stress devices and
[a] ‘war of nerves’ to protect their financial gain,” and that he is subject to “a true political
assassination in order to hide what could be a scam executed statewide by state officials” suggest
that Plaintiff may face some sort of danger (id.), a court “may deny a prisoner leave to proceed
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pursuant to § 1915(g) when,” as is the case here, “the prisoner’s claims of imminent danger are
conclusory or ridiculous, or are clearly baseless (i.e. are fantastic or delusional and rise to the level
of irrational or wholly incredible).” Vandiver, 727 F.3d at 585 (quoting Rittner, 290 F. App’x
at 798). Further, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of any imminent danger fall well short of
meeting the requisite notice pleading standard of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. The allegations of the complaint and amended complaint therefore are insufficient to allow the
Court to reasonably conclude that Plaintiff was in imminent danger at the time he initiated this
Therefore, § 1915(g) prohibits Plaintiff from proceeding in forma pauperis in this action.
Plaintiff has twenty-eight (28) days from the date of entry of this order to pay the civil action filing
fees, which total $402.00. When Plaintiff pays his filing fees, the Court will screen his complaint
as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). If Plaintiff does not pay the filing
fees within the 28-day period, this case will be dismissed without prejudice, but Plaintiff will
continue to be responsible for payment of the $402.00 filing fees.
United States Magistrate Judge
May 9, 2022
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