Hamilton #941610 v. Perry et al

Filing 13

OPINION; signed by District Judge Jane M. Beckering (lep)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
TONY HAMILTON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 2:23-cv-244
Honorable Jane M. Beckering

UNKNOWN PERRY et al.,
Defendants.

____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a prior
Order, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 5.) Under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is
required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The
Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim against Defendants Schulz and Hoult. The
Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, the following claims against remaining
Defendants Watson, Perry, Johnson, Lakanen, Zonza, Nichols, Balini, Voeks, Kelly, and
Schroeder: (i) First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Perry, Johnson, Lakanen,
Zonza, Nichols, Balini, Voeks, Kelly, and Schroeder; (ii) any intended Eighth Amendment claims

premised on verbal harassment; (iii) Eighth Amendment medical care claims against Defendants
Watson, Johnson, Lakanen, Zonza, Nichols, Balini, and Voeks; and (iv) any intended Fourteenth
Amendment due process claims. The following claims remain in the case: (i) First Amendment
retaliation claim against Defendant Watson; (ii) Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against
Defendants Watson, Perry, Johnson, Lakanen, Zonza, Nichols, Balini, and Voeks; and (iii) Eighth
Amendment medical care claims against Defendants Perry, Kelly, and Schroeder. Plaintiff’s
request for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 1, PageID.20) will be denied without prejudice.
Discussion
I.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections at the

Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in Marquette, Marquette County, Michigan. The events about
which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues the following MBP personnel: Sergeant
Unknown Perry; Correctional Officers Unknown Lakanen, Unknown Johnson, Unknown Zonza,
Unknown Nichols, Unknown Balini, Unknown Voeks, Unknown Watson, and Unknown Schulz;
Registered Nurse Unknown Kelly; Warden Sarah Schoeder; and Deputy Warden Jerry Hoult.
(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1–5.)
In Plaintiff’s complaint, he alleges that on October 5, 2023, he was to be escorted to the
shower by Defendants Watson and Johnson. (Id., PageID.5.) Prior to being escorted to the shower,
Plaintiff “had words” with Defendant Watson because Plaintiff had previously filed a grievance
against Watson “for degrading [Plaintiff] and harassing [Plaintiff by] calling [Plaintiff] racial
names and threatening . . . to hurt [Plaintiff].” (Id.) In response, Defendants Watson and Johnson
said “if your Black ass don’t like your escort[]s you can go to hell for all we care.” (Id.) Plaintiff
said that he would be filing another grievance “on him” because Watson was “around [Plaintiff].”
(Id.) Plaintiff then “let” Defendants Watson and Johnson “put handcuffs [and] chains around
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[Plaintiff’s] waist.” (Id., PageID.6) When Plaintiff turned around, he saw “many more correctional
officers [and a] sergeant[,] such as” Defendants Perry, Zonza, Nichols, Balini, and Voeks at
Plaintiff’s cell door. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Watson had “called on his walkie talkie,”
stating that they were going to “have a problem escorting this stinking trash to the shower.” (Id.)
As Plaintiff was going to the shower, “all of the correctional officers [and] sergeant” were
“behind [him,] such as” Defendants Watson, Perry, Johnson, Lakanen, Zonza, Nichols, Balini, and
Voeks. (Id., PageID.7.) “[Defendant] Watson tripped [Plaintiff] and said [Plaintiff] made a move
of resist[a]nce[].” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that it is “protocol to have a camera if a[n] inmate pose[s]
a threat at any time out of his cell,” but that Defendants did not have a camcorder. (Id.) Plaintiff
alleges that “in the process of all of this going on . . . they all took [him] to the ground in a very
forceful way[,] such as” Defendants Perry, Watson, Johnson, Balini, Zonza, Nichols, Voeks, and
Lakanen. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that “all of these individuals beg[a]n to punch, slap, [and] bang
[Plaintiff’s] head on [the] solid concret[e] floor” for “like about 20 minutes.” (Id., PageID.7–8.)
At some point, Defendant Watson “put his knees in the back of [Plaintiff’s] neck to where [Plaintiff
could not] move [his] head or neck.” (Id., PageID.8.) Plaintiff was also “bleeding from [his] mouth
[and] . . . going in and out of blacking out.” (Id.) Thereafter, while being escorted back to his cell,
Plaintiff states that “the correctional officers [and] sergeant [were] constantly [y]anking [his] body
in many different[] directions on purpose like they didn’t know which way to go,” and “as they
[we]re putting [Plaintiff] back in [his] cell[,] they thr[e]w [Plaintiff] in [his] cell to the floor and
[Plaintiff] bust [sic] [his] face on the ground hard cracking [his] teeth.” (Id., PageID.9.) Plaintiff
then turned around to “face them before they shut [his] cell door,” and he “end[ed] up spitting out
blood,” but Defendant Perry “end[ed] up shutting [the] cell door in a hurry thinking [Plaintiff] was
spitting at them.” (Id.) It was also at this point that Defendant Perry told Defendant Lakanen to get

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the camera “so they recorded that [Plaintiff] was being assaultive and resistance [sic] towards
them.” (Id.) Plaintiff requested medical attention from “many other correctional officers . . . as
well as from [Defendant] Perry,” but was denied. (Id., PageID.12.) Plaintiff states that he was then
left in his cell with handcuffs and belly chains from 2:50 p.m. to 11:50 p.m. (Id., PageID.10.)
At around 3:30 p.m., Defendant Kelly conducted a medical round in Plaintiff’s unit, and
Plaintiff “yelled out to get her attention.” (Id., PageID.12.) Defendant Kelly told Plaintiff she was
“not able to do nothing [sic] for you[;] you brought this on yourself ‘right.’” (Id. (emphasis
omitted).) Defendant Perry was escorting Defendant Kelly around the unit, and they both “walked
off from [Plaintiff’s] cell smiling at [Plaintiff] and saying what a piece of work.” (Id.) Plaintiff
alleges that he did not receive “the proper medical attention [he] needed.” (Id., PageID.12–13.)
The next day, October 6, 2023, Plaintiff was escorted to the medical department by
Defendants Schulz, Schroeder, and Hoult. (Id., PageID.14.) Defendants Schroeder and Schulz
“made the comment ‘wow’ looks like you had a long night how many rounds you lasted in the
fight.” (Id. (emphasis omitted).) At the medical department, Defendant Schroeder “told all of the
nurses . . . don’t document shit period[;] give him a couple of band-aids and send his ass on his
way.” (Id.) Plaintiff states “that is exactly what happened,” explaining that the nurses “prolonged
the time like they was [sic] tending to [Plaintiff’s] injuries but didn’t treat [the] injuries at all.”
(Id.)
Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff avers that Defendants violated his rights under
the First Amendment by retaliating against him; the Eighth Amendment by verbally harassing him,
using excessive force against him, and denying him adequate medical care; and the Fourteenth
Amendment. (Id., PageID.15.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as
compensatory and punitive damages. (Id., PageID.20–21.)

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II.

Request for a Preliminary Injunction
In Plaintiff’s complaint, when setting forth the relief that he seeks in this suit, Plaintiff

states that he seeks a preliminary injunction. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.20.) Preliminary
injunctions and temporary restraining orders are some of “the most drastic tools in the arsenal of
judicial remedies.” Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 808 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hanson Trust
PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir. 1986)). The issuance of preliminary
injunctive relief is committed to the discretion of the district court. See Ne. Ohio Coal. v. Blackwell,
467 F.3d 999, 1009 (6th Cir. 2006); Nader v. Blackwell, 230 F.3d 833, 834 (6th Cir. 2000). In
exercising that discretion, a court must consider whether plaintiff has established the following
elements: (1) a strong or substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the likelihood of
irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction does not issue; (3) the absence of harm to other
parties; and (4) the protection of the public interest by issuance of the injunction. Nader, 230 F.3d
at 834. These factors are not prerequisites to the grant or denial of injunctive relief, but factors that
must be “carefully balanced” by the district court in exercising its equitable powers. Frisch’s Rest.,
Inc. v. Shoney’s, Inc., 759 F.2d 1261, 1263 (6th Cir. 1985); see also S. Glazer’s Distribs. of Ohio,
LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2017); Nat’l Viatical, Inc. v.
Universal Settlements Int’l, Inc., 716 F.3d 952, 956 (6th Cir. 2013) (same); Ne. Ohio Coal., 467
F.3d at 1009 (same); Nader, 230 F.3d at 834 (same).
Under controlling Sixth Circuit authority, Plaintiff’s “initial burden” in demonstrating
entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief is a showing of a strong or substantial likelihood of
success on the merits of his § 1983 action. NAACP v. Mansfield, 866 F.2d 162, 167 (6th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff has not made such a showing. Although the Court makes no final determination on this
issue, it is not at all clear from Plaintiff’s pro se complaint that Plaintiff has a substantial likelihood
of success on his claims.
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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 1, PageID.20) will
be denied without prejudice.
III.

Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant

fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
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federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
A.

First Amendment Retaliation Claims

Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against
him. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.15.)
Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates the
Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In order to
set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) he was
engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a
person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was
motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff must be able to show
that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s
alleged retaliatory conduct. See Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
1.

Defendant Watson

At this stage of the proceedings, the Court must take Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true
and in the light most favorable to him. In this action, Plaintiff references filing a grievance about
Defendant Watson prior to October 5, 2023, and he alleges that on October 5, 2023, he advised
Defendant Watson that he would be filing another grievance because Watson was “around
[Plaintiff].” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff alleges that while
Defendant Watson was escorting Plaintiff to the shower, Defendant Watson “tripped [Plaintiff]
and said [Plaintiff] made a move of resist[a]nce[].” (Id., PageID.7.) Although Plaintiff has by no
means proven his First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Watson, and there is some
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question as to whether Plaintiff’s grievance about Watson being “around [Plaintiff]” would
constitute a non-frivolous grievance, at this stage of the proceedings, the Court will not dismiss
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Defendant Watson.
2.

Defendants Perry, Johnson, Lakanen, Zonza, Nichols, Balini, Voeks,
Kelly, Schulz, Schroeder, and Hoult

As to all of the other named Defendants, although Plaintiff indicates that he is bringing
First Amendment retaliation claims against them (see id., PageID.15), Plaintiff fails to allege any
facts to suggest that the other named Defendants retaliated against him. Instead, Plaintiff merely
alleges the ultimate fact of retaliation; however, he alleges no facts from which to reasonably infer
that the other Defendants were motivated by any protected conduct. Under these circumstances, a
vague suggestion of temporal proximity alone is insufficient to show a retaliatory motive. Murphy
v. Lane, 833 F.2d 106, 108 (7th Cir. 1987). Furthermore, such “conclusory allegations of
retaliatory motive ‘unsupported by material facts’” do not state a claim under § 1983. Harbin-Bey
v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see Murray v. Unknown Evert, 84
F. App’x 553, 556 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that in complaints screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, “[c]onclusory allegations of retaliatory motive with no concrete and relevant particulars
fail to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lewis v. Jarvie,
20 F. App’x 457, 459 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[B]are allegations of malice on the defendants’ parts are
not enough to establish retaliation claims [that will survive § 1915A screening].” (citing CrawfordEl v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998))).
Accordingly, for these reasons, Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims against
Defendants Perry, Johnson, Lakanen, Zonza, Nichols, Balini, Voeks, Kelly, Schulz, Schroeder,
and Hoult will be dismissed.

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B.

Eighth Amendment Claims
1.

Verbal Harassment

The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise Eighth Amendment claims regarding
verbal harassment by Defendants. (See e.g., Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.5 (alleging that Defendant
Watson used “degrading” and “harassing” language, including “racial names” and threats).)
The Court does not minimize Plaintiff’s experience; however, although unprofessional,
allegations of verbal harassment or taunts by prison officials toward an inmate do not constitute
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955 (6th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam). Allegations of verbal harassment also do not rise to the level of
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. See id.; see
Johnson v. Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539, 546 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that harassment and verbal abuse
do not constitute the type of infliction of pain that the Eighth Amendment prohibits).
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim premised on verbal
harassment.
2.

Excessive Force

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Watson, Perry, Johnson, Lakanen, Zonza, Nichols, Balini,
and Voeks used excessive force against him. (See, e.g., Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.7–8.)
As relevant to excessive force claims, the Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of
confinement which, although not physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those that are
“totally without penological justification.” Id. However, not every shove or restraint gives rise to
a constitutional violation. Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Hudson
v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “On occasion, ‘[t]he maintenance of prison security and
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discipline may require that inmates be subjected to physical contact actionable as assault under
common law.’” Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Combs v.
Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2002)). Prison officials nonetheless violate the Eighth
Amendment when their “offending conduct reflects an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”
Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034,
1037 (6th Cir. 1995)); Bailey v. Golladay, 421 F. App’x 579, 582 (6th Cir. 2011).
There is an objective component and a subjective component to this type of Eighth
Amendment claim. Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Comstock v.
McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001)). First, “[t]he subjective component focuses on the
state of mind of the prison officials.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383. Courts ask “whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Second, “[t]he objective component requires the pain inflicted
to be ‘sufficiently serious.’” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
298 (1991)). “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments
necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided
that the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Hudson, 503 U.S.
at 9–10 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). The objective component requires
a “contextual” investigation that is “responsive to ‘contemporary standards of decency.’” Id. at 8
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). Although the extent of a prisoner’s injury
may help determine the amount of force used by the prison official, it is not dispositive of whether
an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). “When
prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of

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decency always are violated . . . [w]hether or not significant injury is evident.” Hudson, 503 U.S.
at 9.
Here, Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that while he was being escorted to the shower
on October 5, 2023, Defendant Watson “tripped [Plaintiff] and said [Plaintiff] made a move of
resist[a]nce[].” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) Plaintiff alleges that “in the process of all of this
going on . . . they all took [him] to the ground in a very forceful way[,] such as” Defendants Perry,
Watson, Johnson, Balini, Zonza, Nichols, Voeks, and Lakanen. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that “all of
these individuals beg[a]n to punch, slap, [and] bang [Plaintiff’s] head on [the] solid concret[e]
floor” for “like about 20 minutes.” (Id., PageID.7–8.)
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court must take Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true
and in the light most favorable to him. Although Plaintiff’s allegations lack specificity as to what
each Defendant individually did, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
excessive force claims against Defendants Watson, Perry, Johnson, Lakanen, Zonza, Nichols,
Balini, and Voeks on initial review.
3.

Medical Care

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by interfering
with his receipt of adequate medical care. (See id., PageID.7.)
“The Supreme Court has long recognized that the government has a constitutional
obligation to provide medical care to those whom it detains.” Griffith v. Franklin Cnty., 975 F.3d
554, 566 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Rhinehart v. Scutt,
894 F.3d 721, 736–37 (6th Cir. 2018); Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir.
2004)). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the
serious medical needs of a prisoner. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d
693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001). Deliberate indifference may be manifested by a medical professional’s
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failure to respond to the medical needs of a prisoner, or by “prison guards in intentionally denying
or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.
Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states
a cause of action under § 1983.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05.
A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective
component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component,
the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words,
the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the
seriousness of a prisoner’s need[] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore,
390 F.3d at 899; see Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2008). Obviousness,
however, is not strictly limited to what is detectable to the eye. Even if the layman cannot see the
medical need, a condition may be obviously medically serious where a layman, if informed of the
true medical situation, would deem the need for medical attention clear. See, e.g., Rouster v.
Saginaw Cnty., 749 F.3d 437, 446–51 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that a prisoner who died from a
perforated duodenum exhibited an “objectively serious need for medical treatment,” even though
his symptoms appeared to the medical staff at the time to be consistent with alcohol withdrawal);
Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that prisoner’s severed tendon was
a “quite obvious” medical need, since “any lay person would realize to be serious,” even though
the condition was not visually obvious).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a
sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying medical care. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867
(6th Cir. 2000). Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but can

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be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with
knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “[T]he official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
a.

Objective Component

Plaintiff alleges that he had “black eyes, [a] split[] chin, busted nose, and cracked teeth,”
and that at one point he was “bleeding from [his] mouth [and] . . . going in and out of blacking
out.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.8, 15.) At this stage of the proceedings, the Court assumes,
without deciding, that Plaintiff has adequately alleged the objective component of the relevant
two-prong test.
b.

Subjective Component

Plaintiff alleges that after the October 5, 2023, incident with Defendants Watson, Perry,
Johnson, Lakanen, Zonza, Nichols, Balini, and Voeks, Plaintiff requested medical attention from
“many other correctional officers . . . as well as from [Defendant] Perry,” but was denied. (Id.,
PageID.12.) Plaintiff further alleges that at around 3:30 p.m., Defendant Kelly conducted a medical
round in Plaintiff’s unit, and Plaintiff “yelled out to get her attention.” (Id.) Defendant Kelly told
Plaintiff she was “not able to do nothing [sic] for [him;] you brought this on yourself ‘right.’” (Id.)
Defendant Perry was escorting Defendant Kelly around the unit, and they both “walked off from
[Plaintiff’s] cell smiling at [Plaintiff] and saying what a piece of work.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that
he did not receive “the proper medical attention [he] needed.” (Id., PageID.12–13.) The next day,
October 6, 2023, Plaintiff was escorted to the medical department by Defendants Schulz,
Schroeder, and Hoult. (Id., PageID.14.) At the medical department, Defendant Schroeder “told all
of the nurses . . . don’t document shit period[;] give him a couple of band-aids and send his ass on
his way.” (Id.)
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1.

Defendants Watson, Johnson, Lakanen, Zonza, Nichols,
Balini, and Voeks

As to Defendants Watson, Johnson, Lakanen, Zonza, Nichols, Balini, and Voeks, Plaintiff
alleges no facts showing that these Defendants were personally involved in the alleged denial of
his receipt of medical care. Although Plaintiff alleges that he requested medical attention from
“many other correctional officers,” “[s]ummary reference to a single, five-headed ‘Defendants’
[or staff] does not support a reasonable inference that each Defendant is liable . . . .” Boxill v.
O’Grady, 935 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch., 655 F.3d
556, 564 (6th Cir. 2011)) (“This Court has consistently held that damage claims against
government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with
particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional
right.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, any intended Eighth Amendment medical care claims
against Defendants Watson, Johnson, Lakanen, Zonza, Nichols, Balini, and Voeks will be
dismissed.
2.

Defendants Schulz and Hoult

With respect to Defendants Schulz and Hoult, Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants, along
with Defendant Schroeder, escorted Plaintiff to the medical department on October 6, 2024.
(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.14.) Besides escorting Plaintiff to the medical department, Plaintiff
does not allege that Defendants Schulz and Hoult had any involvement in his receipt of medical
care once Plaintiff reached the medical department. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff fails to
show that Defendants Schulz and Hoult engaged in any active unconstitutional conduct, let alone
that they were involved in the denial of Plaintiff’s receipt of medical care. Therefore, Plaintiff fails
to state a claim against Defendants Schulz and Hoult. See Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575–

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76 (6th Cir. 2008) (discussing that a claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active
unconstitutional behavior); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002).
3.

Defendants Perry, Kelly, and Schroeder

As to Defendants Perry, Kelly, and Schroeder, Plaintiff alleges that each of these
Defendants had some personal involvement in his alleged denial of medical care or his receipt of
inadequate medical care. Therefore, at this stage of the proceedings, the Court will not dismiss
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment medical care claims against Defendants Perry, Kelly, and
Schroeder.
C.

Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff references the Fourteenth Amendment when discussing the claims that he brings
in this suit. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.15 (referencing trying to use the grievance system
and setting forth the harm that resulted from Defendants’ actions).) The Court construes Plaintiff’s
complaint to raise a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim regarding his use of the
grievance procedure, as well as a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim.
1.

Procedural Due Process Claim

The elements of a procedural due process claim are (1) a life, liberty, or property interest
requiring protection under the Due Process Clause, and (2) a deprivation of that interest (3) without
adequate process. Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006).
“Without a protected liberty or property interest, there can be no federal procedural due process
claim.” Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris, 503 F.3d 514, 519 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Bd. of
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 579 (1972)).
The courts repeatedly have held that there exists no constitutionally protected due process
right to an effective prison grievance procedure. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983);
Walker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F.
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App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003); Young v. Gundy, 30 F. App’x 568, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2002); see
also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th
Cir. 1994) (collecting cases). And, Michigan law does not create a liberty interest in the grievance
procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); Keenan v. Marker, 23 F. App’x
405, 407 (6th Cir. 2001); Wynn v. Wolf, No. 93-2411, 1994 WL 105907, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 28,
1994). Therefore, any intended procedural due process claim regarding Plaintiff’s use of the
grievance procedure will be dismissed.
2.

Substantive Due Process Claim

“Substantive due process . . . serves the goal of preventing governmental power from being
used for purposes of oppression, regardless of the fairness of the procedures used.” Pittman v.
Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Howard
v. Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343, 1349 (6th Cir. 1996)). Specifically, “[s]ubstantive due process ‘prevents
the government from engaging in conduct that shocks the conscience or interferes with rights
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Prater v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 431 (6th Cir.
2002) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). “Conduct shocks the
conscience if it ‘violates the decencies of civilized conduct.’” Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573,
589 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998)).
Here, the Court does not minimize Plaintiff’s experience; however, the facts alleged in the
complaint fall short of demonstrating the sort of egregious conduct that would support a
substantive due process claim. Cf. Cale v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 943, 950 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding
that framing an inmate by planting evidence may violate substantive due process where a
defendant’s conduct shocks the conscience and constitutes an “egregious abuse of governmental
power”), overruled in other part by Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 388; Davis v. Gallagher, No. 1:16-

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cv-1405, 2016 WL 7403941, *4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2016). Therefore, any intended substantive
due process claim will be dismissed.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process
claims will be dismissed.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Defendants
Schulz and Hoult will be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, the
following claims against remaining Defendants Watson, Perry, Johnson, Lakanen, Zonza, Nichols,
Balini, Voeks, Kelly, and Schroeder: (i) First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants
Perry, Johnson, Lakanen, Zonza, Nichols, Balini, Voeks, Kelly, and Schroeder; (ii) any intended
Eighth Amendment claims premised on verbal harassment; (iii) Eighth Amendment medical care
claims against Defendants Watson, Johnson, Lakanen, Zonza, Nichols, Balini, and Voeks; and
(iv) any intended Fourteenth Amendment due process claims. The following claims remain in the
case: (i) First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Watson; (ii) Eighth Amendment
excessive force claims against Defendants Watson, Perry, Johnson, Lakanen, Zonza, Nichols,
Balini, and Voeks; and (iii) Eighth Amendment medical care claims against Defendants Perry,
Kelly, and Schroeder. Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 1, PageID.20) will
be denied without prejudice.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated:

September 24, 2024

/s/ Jane M. Beckering
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge

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