Wartley #462928 v. Hoffman et al

Filing 7

OPINION ; signed by District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Judge Paul L. Maloney, cmc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
JOHN WARTLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 2:24-cv-79
Honorable Paul L. Maloney

UNKNOWN HOFFMAN et al.,
Defendants.

____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. Under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required
to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must
read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and
accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at the Baraga Correctional Facility (AMF) in Baraga, Baraga County, Michigan. The events about

which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues Assistant Deputy Warden Unknown
Hoffman and Resident Unit Manager Marsha Nurkala.
Plaintiff alleges that he was transferred to AMF on January 11, 2023, “under the false
pretense of an STG II (Security Threat Group) prisoner due to falsified documents that have been
filed in his prisoner record since back in 2013.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Plaintiff contends
that since his arrival at AMF, he “managed to go 13 months ticket free and earned level 2
management points” during his annual classification screening, which was conducted on
December 28, 2023. (Id.)
Plaintiff has made numerous attempts to be placed on the list to be transferred to a Level 4
facility. (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff wants to be transferred to receive parole. (Id.) He contends that
it is “common knowledge that prisoners held in a supermax facility have a lesser chance of being
granted a parole even if they are not true level 5 prisoners per classification.” (Id.)
Plaintiff sent a kite to Defendant Hoffman on November 16, 2023, asking about
transferring to a Level 4 facility. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, the kite was intercepted by Defendant
Nurkala. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant Nurkala relied upon false documentation in
Plaintiff’s record and acted contrary to MDOC policy when she responded to the kite. (Id.)
Defendant Nurkala told Plaintiff that he could not transfer to a Level 4 facility “without CFA and
EMS approval” and noted that Plaintiff just became “1 year ticket free after multiple serious [and]
assaultive misconducts.” (Id.) Defendant Nurkala noted that she was not recommending that
Plaintiff be transferred to a Level 4 facility. (Id.)
Plaintiff followed up with multiple kites to Defendants in December of 2023, telling them
“that his parole hearing was nearing soon and that his eligibility to obtain a parole was in jeopardy
due to his capricious placement in a supermax facility.” (Id.) Defendant Hoffman responded to

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one kite, telling Plaintiff that he had “no right to any particular placement and that there is no
liberty interest in receiving a parole.” (Id.) Plaintiff filed a grievance about the issue in January of
2024, but claims that it was never processed. (Id., PageID.4.)
Plaintiff saw the Parole Board on March 18, 2024. (Id.) On March 21, 2024, the Parole
Board denied Plaintiff parole, in part “due to his placement in a maximum[-]security facility.” (Id.)
Plaintiff subsequently filed another grievance against Defendants on March 26, 2024. (Id.)
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights by refusing to transfer Plaintiff to a lower-level facility, thereby
causing Plaintiff to be denied parole. (Id., PageID.5.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory, punitive, and
nominal damages. (Id.)
Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
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misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
As set forth above, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights by refusing to transfer Plaintiff to a lower-level facility, thereby causing Plaintiff
to be denied parole. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) “The Fourteenth Amendment protects an
individual from deprivation of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.” Bazzetta v.
McGinnis, 430 F.3d 795, 801 (6th Cir. 2005). The elements of a procedural due process claim are
(1) a life, liberty, or property interest requiring protection under the Due Process Clause, and (2) a
deprivation of that interest (3) without adequate process. Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438
F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006). “Without a protected liberty or property interest, there can be no
federal procedural due process claim.” Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris, 503 F.3d 514, 519
(6th Cir. 2007) (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 579 (1972)).
The United States Supreme Court long has held that the Due Process Clause does not
protect every change in the conditions of confinement having an impact on a prisoner. See

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Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). In Sandin v. Conner, the Supreme Court set forth
the standard for determining when a state-created right creates a federally cognizable liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause. 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). According to that Court,
a prisoner is entitled to the protections of due process only when the sanction “will inevitably affect
the duration of his sentence” or when a deprivation imposes an “atypical and significant hardship
on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484, 486–87; see also Jones
v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998); Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790–91 (6th Cir.
1995).
As relevant to Plaintiff’s claim, the Supreme Court repeatedly has held that a prisoner has
no constitutional right to be incarcerated in a particular facility or to be held in a specific security
classification. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78,
88 n.9 (1976); Meachum, 427 U.S. at 228–29. Moreover, while it is clear that Plaintiff did not want
to be placed at AMF and believes that his placement there, in part, caused him to be denied parole,
Plaintiff has not suggested that his placement at AMF was an atypical and significant deprivation.
For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim
against Defendants regarding their refusal to transfer him to a lower-level facility.
Furthermore, there is no constitutional or inherent right to be conditionally released before
the expiration of a prison sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442
U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Although a state may establish a parole system, it has no duty to do so; thus, the
presence of a parole system by itself does not give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in parole release. Id. at 7, 11; Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). Rather,
a liberty interest is present only if state law entitles an inmate to release on parole. Inmates of
Orient Corr. Inst. v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1991).

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In Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1164–65 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, noting “the broad powers of the Michigan authorities to
deny parole,” held that the Michigan system does not create a liberty interest in parole. The Sixth
Circuit reiterated the continuing validity of Sweeton in Crump v. Lafler, 657 F.3d 393, 404 (6th
Cir. 2011). In Crump, the Sixth Circuit held that the adoption of specific parole guidelines since
Sweeton does not lead to the conclusion that parole release is mandated upon reaching a high
probability of parole. See id.; see also Carnes v. Engler, 76 F. App’x 79, 80 (6th Cir. 2003). In
addition, the Sixth Circuit has rejected the argument that the Due Process Clause is implicated
when changes to parole procedures and practices have resulted in incarcerations that exceed the
subjective expectation of the sentencing judge. See Foster v. Booker, 595 F.3d 353, 369 (6th Cir.
2010). Finally, the Michigan Supreme Court has recognized that there exists no liberty interest in
parole under the Michigan system. Glover v. Mich. Parole Bd., 596 N.W.2d 598, 603–04 (Mich.
1999).
Given this authority, Plaintiff has no reasonable expectation of liberty until he has served
his maximum sentence. The discretionary parole system in Michigan holds out “no more than a
mere hope that the benefit will be obtained.” Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11. Thus, any alleged
interference by Defendants with Plaintiff’s parole prospects does not implicate a federal right.
Accordingly, any Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims regarding Plaintiff’s
opportunity for parole will be dismissed.
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff intended to raise Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process claims against Defendants, as explained below, he fails to state such claims.
“Substantive due process . . . serves the goal of preventing governmental power from being used
for purposes of oppression, regardless of the fairness of the procedures used.” Pittman v. Cuyahoga

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Cnty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Howard v.
Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343, 1349 (6th Cir. 1996)). Specifically, “[s]ubstantive due process ‘prevents
the government from engaging in conduct that shocks the conscience or interferes with rights
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Prater v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 431 (6th Cir.
2002) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). “Conduct shocks the
conscience if it ‘violates the decencies of civilized conduct.’” Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573,
589 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998)). Here,
Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing the sort of egregious conduct that would support a
substantive due process claim. Accordingly, any intended Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process claims will also be dismissed.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.
1997). Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court does
not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not
be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $605.00
appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610–11, unless Plaintiff is

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barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is
barred, he will be required to pay the $605.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated:

June 4, 2024

/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge

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