Addison #982065 v. Corrigan

Filing 6

OPINION; signed by District Judge Jane M. Beckering (lep)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
CURTIS EUGENE ADDISON, JR.,
Petitioner,

Case No. 2:24-cv-118

v.

Honorable Jane M. Beckering

JAMES CORRIGAN,
Respondent.

____________________________/
OPINION
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Promptly
after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of
the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits
annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules
Governing § 2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed.
Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (discussing that a district court has
the duty to “screen out” petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes
those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations
that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436–37 (6th Cir. 1999). The
Court may sua sponte dismiss a habeas action as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). See Day
v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the
Court concludes that the petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Nonetheless, the
Court will permit Petitioner, by way of an order to show cause, an opportunity to demonstrate why
his petition should not be dismissed as untimely.

Discussion
I.

Factual Allegations
Petitioner Curtis Eugene Addison, Jr., is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of

Corrections at the Chippewa Correctional Facility in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan.
Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere in the Saginaw County Circuit Court to armed robbery causing
serious injury and use of firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm). On
September 1, 2016, the Saginaw County Circuit Court sentenced Petitioner to consecutive prison
terms of 10 to 20 years’ incarceration for the armed robbery causing serious injury conviction and
two years’ incarceration for the felony-firearm conviction. (See Petition, ECF No. 1, PageID.1);
see also Offender Tracking Information System, https://mdocweb.state.mi.us/otis2/otis2profile.
aspx?mdocNumber=982065 (last visited Sept. 20, 2024).
The Court received Petitioner’s present habeas petition on July 19, 2024. (See Petition,
ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) However, under Sixth Circuit precedent, the application is deemed filed
when handed to prison authorities for mailing to the federal court. Cook v. Stegall, 295 F.3d 517,
521 (6th Cir. 2002). Petitioner signed his application on July 16, 2024. (See Petition, ECF No. 1,
PageID.15.) Giving Petitioner the benefit of the earliest possible filing date, the Court will deem
July 16, 2024, as the date Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition. See Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d
921, 925 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Goins v. Saunders, 206 F. App’x 497, 498 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006))
(holding that the date the prisoner signs the document is deemed under Sixth Circuit law to be the
date of handing to officials).
II.

Statute of Limitations
Petitioner’s application appears to be barred by the one-year statute of limitations provided

in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), which became effective on April 24, 1996, as part of the Antiterrorism
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and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA). Section
2244(d)(1) provides:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of
(A)
the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of
direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B)
the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by
State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is
removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C)
the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized
by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review; or
(D)
the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
A.

Timeliness Under § 2244(d)(1)(A)

In most cases, § 2244(d)(1)(A) provides the operative date from which the one-year
limitations period is measured. Under that provision, the one-year limitations period runs from
“the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration
of the time for seeking such review.” Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). On February 27, 2017, Petitioner filed
a delayed application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Court
of Appeals denied Petitioner’s delayed application for leave to appeal on April 13, 2017, “for lack
of merit in the grounds presented.” See Order, People v. Addison, No. 337185 (Mich. Ct. App.
Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.courts.michigan.gov/c/courts/coa/case/337185 (last visited Sept. 20,
2024). Petitioner did not seek leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.
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Where a petitioner has failed to pursue an avenue of appellate review available to him, the
time for seeking review at that level is counted under § 2244(d)(1)(A). See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(A) (stating that the time for filing a petition pursuant to § 2254 runs from “the date
on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time
for seeking such review” (emphasis added)). However, such a petitioner is not entitled to also count
the 90-day period during which he could have filed a petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 152–53 (2012) (holding that, because the
Supreme Court can review only judgments of a state’s highest court, where a petitioner fails to
seek review in the state’s highest court, the judgment becomes final when the petitioner’s time for
seeking that review expires).
Under Michigan law, a party has 56 days in which to apply for leave to appeal to the
Michigan Supreme Court. See Mich. Ct. R. 7.305(C)(2). Accordingly, Petitioner’s conviction
became final on Thursday, June 8, 2017. Petitioner had one year from that date, 1 until June 8,
2018, to file his habeas application. Petitioner filed the present petition on July 16, 2024. Thus,
absent tolling, his application is time-barred.
B.

Statutory Tolling

The running of the statute of limitations is tolled when “a properly filed application for
State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is
pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181–82 (2001)
(limiting the tolling provision to only State, and not Federal, processes); Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S.
4, 8 (2000) (defining “properly filed”).

1

The Sixth Circuit recently confirmed that the one-year period of limitation runs to and includes
the anniversary of the finality date. See Moss v. Miniard, 62 F.4th 1002, 1009–10 (6th Cir. 2023).
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Petitioner reports that he filed a motion for relief from judgment in the Saginaw County
Circuit Court; however, Petitioner does not indicate the date on which he filed the motion. (See
Petition, ECF No. 1, PageID.3 (writing “N/A” when prompted to provide the “Date you filed” a
motion for relief from judgment).) Petitioner provides the Michigan Court of Appeals case number
for the appeal of the Saginaw County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion for relief from
judgment—case number 364702. (See id.) In that case, the Michigan Court of Appeals denied
Petitioner’s delayed application for leave to appeal on May 17, 2023, “because [Petitioner] failed
to establish that the trial court erred in denying the successive motion for relief from judgment.” 2
See Order, People v. Addison, No. 364702 (Mich. Ct. App. May 17, 2023), https://www.courts.
michigan.gov/c/courts/coa/case/364702 (last visited Sept. 20, 2024). Although not reported by
Petitioner in his present petition, it appears that Petitioner first filed a motion for relief from
judgment in the Saginaw County Circuit Court in June of 2021. See Saginaw County Circuit Court
Case Information, https://odysseycourtinformation.saginawcounty.com/Portal/Home/Dashboard/
29 (enter “16-042175-fc” in the Record Number search bar) (last visited Sept. 20, 2024).
However, Petitioner’s June 2021 motion could not toll the period of limitations because
the limitations period had already expired. The tolling provision does not “revive” the limitations
period; it does not “restart the clock . . . it can only serve to pause a clock that has not yet fully
run.” Vroman v. Brigano, 346 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2

Petitioner filed a motion in the Saginaw County Circuit Court, which he styled as a motion to
withdraw guilty plea, in September of 2022, and the court denied the motion in October of 2022.
See Saginaw County Circuit Court Case Information, https://odysseycourtinformation.
saginawcounty.com/Portal/Home/Dashboard/29 (enter “16-042175-fc” in the Record Number
search bar) (last visited Sept. 20, 2024). The denial of this motion appears to have been the subject
of Petitioner’s appeal in Michigan Court of Appeals case number 364702. See Case Information,
People v. Addison, No. 364702, https://www.courts.michigan.gov/c/courts/coa/case/364702 (last
visited Sept. 20, 2024) (indicating that the Saginaw County Circuit Court’s October 27, 2022,
opinion was the “Order Appealed From”).
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When the limitations period has expired, “collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid a statute
of limitations.” Id. Even where the post-conviction motion raises a claim of ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel, the filing of the motion for relief from judgment does not revive the statute
of limitations. See McClendon v. Sherman, 329 F.3d 490, 493–94 (6th Cir. 2003). Because
Petitioner’s one-year period expired in June of 2018, a collateral motion filed in June of 2021
would not serve to revive the limitations period.
C.

Equitable Tolling

The one-year limitations period applicable to § 2254 is also subject to equitable tolling.
See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). A petitioner bears the burden of showing that
he is entitled to equitable tolling. Allen v. Yukins, 366 F.3d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 2004). The Sixth
Circuit has repeatedly cautioned that equitable tolling relief should be granted “sparingly.” See,
e.g., Ata v. Scutt, 662 F.3d 736, 741 (6th Cir. 2011); Solomon v. United States, 467 F.3d 928, 933
(6th Cir. 2006); Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 588 (6th Cir. 2005); Cook v. Stegall, 295 F.3d 517,
521 (6th Cir. 2002). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must show: “‘(1) that he has been
pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and
prevented timely filing.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418
(2005)).
Petitioner has failed to raise equitable tolling or allege any facts or circumstances that
would warrant its application in this case. The fact that Petitioner is untrained in the law, was
proceeding without a lawyer, or may have been unaware of the statute of limitations does not
warrant tolling. See Keeling v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst., 673 F.3d 452, 464 (6th Cir. 2012)
(“Keeling’s pro se status and lack of knowledge of the law are not sufficient to constitute an
extraordinary circumstance and excuse his late filing.”); Allen, 366 F.3d at 403 (“[I]gnorance of
the law alone is not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling.” (quoting Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331,
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1335 (6th Cir. 1991))). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of
limitations.
D.

Actual Innocence

In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013), the Supreme Court held that a habeas
petitioner who can show actual innocence under the rigorous standard of Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298 (1995), is excused from the procedural bar of the statute of limitations under the miscarriageof-justice exception. In order to make a showing of actual innocence under Schlup, a Petitioner
must present new evidence showing that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would
have convicted [the petitioner.]” McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 399 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327)
(addressing actual innocence as an exception to procedural default). Because actual innocence
provides an exception to the statute of limitations rather than a basis for equitable tolling, a
petitioner who can make a showing of actual innocence need not demonstrate reasonable diligence
in bringing his claim, though a court may consider the timing of the claim in determining the
credibility of the evidence of actual innocence. Id. at 399–400.
In the instant case, although Petitioner may baldly claim that he is actually innocent (see,
e.g., Br., ECF No. 2, PageID.43), he proffers no new evidence of his innocence, much less evidence
that makes it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. Schlup, 513
U.S. at 327, 329. Because Petitioner has wholly failed to provide evidence of his actual innocence,
he would not be excused from the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). His petition
therefore appears to be time-barred.
Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court has directed the District Court to give fair notice and an
adequate opportunity to be heard before dismissal of a petition on statute of limitations grounds.

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See Day, 547 U.S. at 210; see also Nassiri v. Mackie, 967 F.3d 544, 548 (6th Cir. 2020). The Court
will allow Petitioner 28 days to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed as untimely.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated:

September 24, 2024

/s/ Jane M. Beckering
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge

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