Hanson v. Stefanson et al

Filing 95

ORDER. Plaintiff's request to file a motion for reconsideration (Doc. No. 91 ) is DENIED. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Donovan W. Frank on 11/30/2011. (BJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Mark Hanson,

Civil No. 09-1034 (DWF/LIB)
Plaintiff,

v.

ORDER

Randolph E. Stefanson, and
Stefanson, Plambeck, Foss & Fisher,
Defendants.
________________________________________________________________________
David J. Wymore, Esq., Christopher M. Daniels, Esq., and Jesse H. Kibort, Esq., Daniels
& Wymore, PLLC, counsel for Plaintiff.
Jan M. Gunderson, Esq., and Matthew J. Mahoney, Esq., Bassford Remele, PA; and
Bruce A. Schoenwald, Esq., Stefanson Law, counsel for Defendants.
________________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court upon a request for leave to file a motion to
reconsider the Court’s May 28, 2010 Memorandum Opinion and Order granting
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (the “May 28, 2010 Order”). In the May 28,
2010 Order, the Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s legal malpractice claims
against Defendants Randolph E. Stefanson, and Stefanson, Plambeck, Foss & Fisher for
failing to timely file Plaintiff’s claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) and Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) in state court.
The facts of this case are more fully set forth in the Court’s May 28, 2010 Order.
(Doc. No. 53.) The Court summarizes and updates the facts here. Plaintiff was
terminated from his position as the Chief of Police in Hawley, Minnesota, due to alleged

misconduct stemming from a minor traffic accident in 2005. At the scene of the accident,
Plaintiff registered a .024 blood alcohol content, which triggered an investigation and
eventually led to Plaintiff’s termination. Plaintiff retained Defendant Randolph
Stefanson to represent him in litigation against the City of Hawley.1 While represented
by Defendants, Plaintiff appealed his termination to the Minnesota Court of Appeals,
claiming that the City of Hawley violated the ADA, MHRA, and Minnesota Drug and
Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act (“MDATWA”). The Court of Appeals upheld
Plaintiff’s termination and explained that Plaintiff’s asserted claims under the ADA and
the MHRA were beyond the scope of its review.
Still represented by Defendants, Plaintiff filed a new action in Minnesota state
court. In the state action, Plaintiff asserted four counts, including claims under the ADA
and MHRA. The state district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of
Hawley on all counts, including Plaintiff’s ADA and MHRA claims, which the court
determined were time-barred.
Plaintiff then brought the current action against Defendants, alleging legal
malpractice with respect to the time-barred ADA and MHRA claims. Plaintiff alleges
that his termination was the result of disability discrimination in violation of the ADA
and MHRA and that he could have established a prima facie case of discrimination but
for Defendants’ failure to timely file his ADA and MHRA claims. Attorney Richard I.
Diamond originally represented Plaintiff in the present action. Defendants moved for
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While Plaintiff retained Randolph Stefanson, Plaintiff alleges that Stefanson
practiced law under the name of Stefanson, Plambeck, Foss & Fisher. (Doc. No. 1,
Compl. ¶ 1.2.) Therefore, the Court refers to the Defendants collectively.
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summary judgment and the Court concluded that Plaintiff’s malpractice claims failed as a
matter of law because Plaintiff’s discrimination claims could not have survived summary
judgment even if they were timely filed. (Doc. No. 53.) In particular, the Court ruled
that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case under the ADA or MHRA because
there was no evidence that Plaintiff was disabled or terminated because of a disability.
(Id. at 9.) The Court also found that even if Plaintiff had established a prima facie case,
his discrimination claims failed because his employer had proffered a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff, and Plaintiff had not submitted any
admissible evidence that Plaintiff’s termination was pretextual. (Id. at 11-12.) The Court
dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice. (Id. at 12.)
Judgment was entered on May 28, 2010. (Doc. No. 54.) Plaintiff appealed to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on June 25, 2010. (Doc. No. 55.) On July 20, 2010, the
Court issued an order explaining that the May 28, 2010 Order did not address or dismiss
Defendants’ Counterclaim against Plaintiff and reopened the case for the purpose of
adjudicating the counterclaim. (Doc. No. 64.) On August 6, 2010, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals issued an order granting a motion to remand the case to this Court “for
the limited purposed of allowing the district court to consider the pending counterclaim
and enter a final judgment.” (Doc. No. 66.)
Plaintiff filed a previous request to file a motion to reconsider the Court’s
May 28, 2010 Order (Doc. No. 80). The Court denied the request because the Court was
without authority to reconsider the merits of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants that
were, at that time, pending before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Doc. No. 89.)
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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has since dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal for lack of
jurisdiction due to the lack of a final decision resolving all claims. (Doc. No. 90.)
Plaintiff again requests leave to file a motion to reconsider the May 28, 2010
Order. In support, Plaintiff contends that Mr. Diamond, who was ill and passed away
less than a year after preparing and arguing the opposition to Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, failed to seek and submit to the Court certain evidence that would
have been sufficient to overcome summary judgment. Plaintiff submits that this evidence
includes a tape recording of a City Council meeting during which Plaintiff’s termination
was discussed, a letter sent to the City of Hawley by Defendants on behalf of Plaintiff
seeking an accommodation, and affidavit testimony of various members of the City of
Hawley’s Personnel Committee and City Council who voted on Plaintiff’s termination.
(Doc. No. 91 at 2.)
Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s request for leave to file a motion to reconsider.
Defendants contend that: (1) Plaintiff’s request is in violation of Local Rule 7.1(h)
because Plaintiff’s letter is more than two pages; (2) Plaintiff’s request is untimely;
(3) Plaintiff’s attempted supplementation of the record with additional affidavits is
inappropriate and, even if accepted, would not alter the Court’s analysis or conclusion;
and (4) there is no evidence that Mr. Diamond’s legal representation was inadequate.
(Doc. No. 92.)
Local Rule 7.1(h) states: “Motions to reconsider are prohibited except by express
permission of the Court, which will be granted only upon a showing of compelling
circumstances.” D. Minn. LR 7.1(h). Having fully considered the submissions of the
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parties, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate compelling
circumstances sufficient to justify a motion to reconsider this Court’s summary judgment
order. In particular, without deciding that Plaintiff’s request to file a motion to reconsider
is timely or that Plaintiff’s submission of additional evidence is appropriate, the Court
finds that even considering the additional evidence, the Court’s decision to dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants would remain the same. None of the newly
submitted evidence would alter the Court’s determination that Plaintiff’s discrimination
claims, and thus malpractice claims, fail as a matter of law.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request to file a motion
for reconsideration (Doc. No. [91]) is DENIED.
Dated: November 30, 2011

s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge

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