Gilbert v. MetLife, Inc. et al
Filing
61
ORDER GRANTING Gilbert's Motion to Substitute Party 35 . MetLife's Motion to dismiss 44 is DENIED. Toni Gilbert, in her capacity at representative of Joan Gilbert's estate, is hereby substituted as the plaintiff in this action. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge John R. Tunheim on October 7, 2011. (HAM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
JOAN GILBERT,
Civil No. 09-1990 (JRT/JSM)
Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
(MetLife Auto and Home),
Defendant.
Frances E. Baillon, Christopher D. Jozwiak, and Phillip M. Kitzer,
HALUNEN & ASSOCIATES, 1650 IDS Center, 80 South Eighth Street,
Minneapolis, MN 55402, for plaintiff.
Marko J. Mrkonich and Rhiannon C. Beckendorf, LITTLER
MENDELSON, PC, 80 South Eighth Street, Suite 1300, Minneapolis, MN
55402, for defendant.
Plaintiff Joan Gilbert sued her former employer, defendant Metropolitan Property
and Casualty Insurance Company (“MetLife”), for disability discrimination in violation
of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) after she was the only supervisor not
retained following MetLife’s closure of its Bloomington, Minnesota office.
On
March 14, 2011, the Court denied MetLife’s motion for summary judgment, concluding
that a question of fact exists as to whether MetLife discriminated against Gilbert because
of her disability and whether MetLife failed to provide her a reasonable accommodation.
Gilbert v. MetLife, Inc., No. 09-1990, 2011 WL 1843441, at *11, *13 (D. Minn. Mar. 14,
22
2011). On December 19, 2010, while the motion was pending, Gilbert died of carcinoma
of the larynx. On March 31, 2011, Gilbert’s daughter Toni Gilbert was appointed as
personal representative of Gilbert’s estate.
There are two motions before the Court arising out of Gilbert’s death. Gilbert
moves the Court to substitute Toni Gilbert, her estate’s representative, as the plaintiff in
this action. MetLife moves the Court to dismiss the action in its entirety on the ground
that Gilbert’s claim does not survive her death. Although only “special damages” survive
a plaintiff’s death in this type of action under Minnesota law, the Court concludes that
Gilbert’s complaint encompasses a demand for such damages. Accordingly, the Court
grants Gilbert’s motion to substitute plaintiff and denies MetLife’s motion to dismiss.
ANALYSIS
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Both of the instant motions hinge on whether any part of Gilbert’s claim survives
her death. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1), “[i]f a party dies and the
claim is not extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper party” upon
motion of the decedent’s successor or representative.
(Emphasis added.)
A Rule
12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of the non-moving party’s complaint. “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
The Court appropriately addresses “challenges regarding issues such as survival of
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claims” through Rule 12(b)(6). Kettner v. Compass Group USA, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 2d
1121, 1124 n.1 (D. Minn. 2008).
II.
WHETHER ANY PART OF GILBERT’S CLAIM SURVIVES HER DEATH
While the parties raise the instant motions under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Minnesota substantive law governs the dispositive question of whether any
part of Gilbert’s MHRA claim survives her death.
See id. at 1125-26 (applying
Minnesota law to address whether a decedent’s MHRA claim survives his death in the
context of a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion). “A cause of action arising out of an
injury to the person dies with the person of the party in whose favor it exists, except as
provided by section 573.02.” Minn. Stat. § 573.01. Pursuant to section 573.02, subd. 2,
[w]hen injury is caused to a person by the wrongful act or omission of any
person or corporation and the person thereafter dies from a cause unrelated
to those injuries, the [decedent’s representative or successor] . . . may
maintain an action for special damages arising out of such injury if the
decedent might have maintained an action therefor[e] had the decedent
lived.
(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, assuming that Gilbert’s MHRA claim is a personal
injury claim encompassed by Minn. Stat. § 573.01,1 only her demands for special
1
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not determined whether an MHRA claim is a
personal injury claim, and the statute’s definition of “person” explicitly includes trustees and
legal representatives. Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 30. Nonetheless, the Court will adopt the
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ holding in this regard and assume that section 573.01 applies to
Gilbert’s claim. See Lipka v. Minn. Sch. Employees Ass’n, Local 1980, 537 N.W.2d 624, 630
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995), aff’d, 550 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. 1996) (relying on federal courts’
interpretation of analogous anti-discrimination law to conclude that MHRA claims are “injury to
the person” claims under section 573.01); Kettner, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1125 (reaching the same
conclusion by reference to Lipka).
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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damages survive her death. Gilbert’s complaint seeks “restitution in the form of back
pay, with interest of an appropriate inflation factor[,]” as well as front pay, the monetary
value of any employment benefits, damages for emotional harm, and attorney fees and
costs. (Compl. ¶ 29, Docket No. 1, Ex. 1.) The complaint also contains a separate
demand for compensatory damages. (Id.)
Under Minnesota law, “special damages” are “those damages to which an exact
dollar amount can be assigned, such as medical expenses or lost wages to date of
death.” Deal v. Northwood Children’s Home Soc’y, Inc., 608 N.W.2d 922, 925 n.1
(Minn. App. 2000) (emphasis added). See also Beaudry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 518 N.W.2d 11, 12 n.1 (Minn. 1994) (“Special damages would include medical
expenses, lost wages to date of death, and the like.”) (emphasis added), abrogated on
other grounds, Oanes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401 (Minn. 2000); but see Jenson
v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1304, n.21 (8th Cir. 1997) (summarily concluding
that a decedent had not sought special damages).2
_____________________________________________
(Footnote continued.)
2
MetLife relies heavily on Jenson to argue that no part of Gilbert’s MHRA claim
survives her death. However, in Jenson the Eighth Circuit did not articulate any consideration of
whether the decedent’s claim for back pay constituted special damages under Minnesota
substantive law. Moreover, “[i]n resolving any substantive issues of state law, [the Court is]
bound by the decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court.” Integrity Floorcovering, Inc. v.
Broan–Nutone, LLC, 521 F.3d 914, 917 (8th Cir. 2008). “If the Minnesota Supreme Court has
not spoken on a particular issue, [the Court] must attempt to predict how the Minnesota Supreme
Court would decide an issue and may consider relevant state precedent, analogous decisions,
considered dicta . . . and any other reliable data.” Id. (omission original, quotation marks
omitted). As the citations in this Order make clear, Minnesota courts – including but not limited
to the Minnesota Supreme Court – consistently characterize lost wages and medical expenses as
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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Damages to compensate a plaintiff for emotional harm, by contrast, are not
considered readily quantifiable special damages. See, e.g., Estate of Benson by Benson v.
Minn. Bd. of Med. Practice, 526 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (“Because . . .
[emotional harm] injuries are so personal, a jury would have to guess on the extent and
nature of the decedent’s emotional devastation, humiliation and ostracism without his
presence and testimony at trial.”); Taylor v. Hennepin Cnty., No. C1-93-2369, 1994 WL
175010, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. May 10, 1994) (“[Plaintiff] sought damages in excess of
$50,000 for ‘pain and suffering.’
But his complaint did not seek any damages to
compensate for any medical expenses or lost wages resulting from pain and suffering.
Therefore, his claim for ‘pain and suffering’ is best viewed as one for general, rather than
special, damages . . . [under] section 573.02 . . . .”) (emphasis added).
Gilbert’s
complaint includes a demand for back pay, or lost wages, as well as employment
benefits, an amount to which an exact dollar amount can presumably be assigned. Under
clear, consistent Minnesota precedent, these claims survive her death, although her
demands for compensatory and emotional harm damages unrelated to lost wages or
benefits do not.
MetLife first argues that no dollar amount can be assigned to Gilbert’s damages
allegations, noting the absence of any specific quantity in her complaint other than “an
_____________________________________________
(Footnote continued.)
special damages under Minnesota law. See Beaudry, 518 N.W.2d at 12 n.1. Indeed, MetLife has
cited no Minnesota caselaw in which a court explicitly concluded that lost wages and
employment benefits are not “special damages.”
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amount in excess of $50,000 . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 29.) That Gilbert did not quantify lost
wages to the date of her death (an amount impossible to calculate when she filed the
complaint, while alive) does not remove her demand for such wages from the ambit of
section 573.02. The notice pleading standard of Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure does not necessitate such specificity. See Kettner, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1125
(“[W]hile only ‘special damages’ survive [the decedent], the Court cannot require
Plaintiff, [on a motion to dismiss,] . . . to establish with greater specificity what precise
types or amounts are claimed as special damages. Such specificity is needed only at the
time of trial.”) (emphasis added). As Gilbert’s counsel affirmed at oral argument, Toni
Gilbert can quantify Gilbert’s lost wages and benefits as trial approaches. MetLife
asserts that Gilbert’s claim for special damages is limited by periods during which she
was unable to obtain employment due to her cancer treatments and related disability
issues, and that, without her testimony, MetLife will be unable to establish appropriate
reductions in her claim for back pay and employment benefits. Yet Gilbert’s complaint
has always encompassed claims for back pay and employment benefits, and she died after
her deposition and the close of discovery. Accordingly, any insufficiencies in
information regarding amounts by which Gilbert’s claim for back pay and employment
benefits should be reduced is the result of MetLife’s deficiencies in discovery, not
Gilbert’s death.
MetLife also objects that Gilbert’s complaint did not include a general prayer for
“special damages” as did the complaint under review in Kettner. See id. at 1124. The
alleged discrimination victim in Kettner, however, was already deceased when his next-6-
of-kind filed a complaint on his behalf. Id. The Court will not fault Gilbert for failing to
include the phrase “special damages” in her complaint, given that she died well over a
year after filing her complaint and that she has always alleged lost wages and
employment benefits, which constitute special damages under Minnesota law. MetLife
cites interpretations of federal and state procedural requirements construing special
damages as “the natural but not the necessary consequence of the act or omission that
renders the defendant liable.” Id. at 1125 (citing construction of federal Rule 9 and the
analogous Minnesota counterpart requiring plaintiffs to specifically state items of special
damage) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Kettner court, however, rejected the
argument that this definition applies in the context of sections 573.01-02. Id. at 1125; see
also id. at 1126 (“Th[ese] procedural restriction[s] on seeking ‘special damages’ [are] not
what Minnesota law refers to when it provides that only ‘special damages’ survive
the death of a plaintiff.”) (emphasis added).3 The Court agrees. Under well-established
Minnesota precedent, lost wages and employment benefits are “special damages” that
survive Gilbert’s death.
3
The Kettner court also concluded that the difference between the definition of special
damages under procedural provisions and under section 537.02 was inconsequential because the
plaintiff’s demand for lost wages satisfied both standards. See id. The Court agrees that under
Minnesota law, lost wages and employment benefits are a natural, but not a necessary,
consequence of discriminatory discharge. See Olson v. Midwest Bus. Sys., Inc., No. C2-92-1561,
1993 WL 205176, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 15, 1993) (noting that “[s]pecial damages are the
natural, but not necessary, result of a wrongful act[,]” but accepting the characterization of lost
wages as special damages).
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and the records, files, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
Gilbert’s Motion to Substitute Party [Docket No. 35] is GRANTED.
2.
MetLife’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 44] is DENIED.
3.
Toni Gilbert, in her capacity as the representative of Joan Gilbert’s estate, is
hereby substituted as the plaintiff in this action.
DATED: October 7, 2011
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.
__________s/ John R. Tunheim_________
JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
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