Estate of John Stoick v. McCorvey et al
Filing
43
ORDER denying 17 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; granting 26 Motion for Summary Judgment (Written Opinion). Signed by Senior Judge David S. Doty on 7/29/2011. (PJM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 10-1030(DSD/AJB)
Estate of John Stoick,
by Special Administrators
Lisa Spry and Anthony Perra,
Plaintiffs,
ORDER
v.
Cora McCorvey, in her official
capacity as Executive Director
of the Minneapolis Public Housing
Authority (MPHA), and Minneapolis
Public Housing Authority (MPHA),
in and for the City of Minneapolis,
a public body corporate and politic,
Defendants.
Dorinda L. Wilder, Lael E. Robertson and Legal Aid
Society of Minneapolis, 125 West Broadway Avenue, Suite
105, Minneapolis, MN 55411 and Michael R. Fargione and
Mid-Minnesota Legal Assistance, 430 First Avenue North,
Suite 300, Minneapolis, MN 55401, counsel for plaintiff.
Carol A. Kubic, Minneapolis Housing Authority, 1001
Washington Avenue North, Room 210, Minneapolis, MN 55401,
counsel for defendants.
This matter is before the court upon cross-motions for summary
judgment by plaintiff, the estate of John Stoick, by and through
Special Administrators Lisa Spry and Anthony Perra1 (the Estate)
1
Stoick died in April 2011, while the instant motions were
under advisement.
See Fargione Aff. ¶ 2.
On July 5, 2011, a
Minnesota state-court judge appointed Lisa Spry and Anthony Perra,
Stoick’s half-siblings, as special administrators of Stoick’s
estate. See ECF No. 37-2.
On July 12, 2011, Stoick’s counsel
moved to substitute plaintiff and amend the caption pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25. The court granted the motion.
and defendants Minneapolis Public Housing Authority (MPHA) and Cora
McCorvey in her official capacity as Executive Director of MPHA.
Based on a review of the file, record and proceedings herein, and
for the following reasons, the court grants defendants’ motion.
BACKGROUND
This public housing dispute arises out of Stoick’s December
26, 2008, application to live in a high-rise unit owned by MPHA.
See
Wider
Decl.
Ex.
2.
On
July
8,
2009,
MPHA
denied
the
application because (1) Stoick indicated that he had been arrested
for, found guilty of, or pleaded guilty to certain offenses;
(2) MPHA identified “twenty incidents” of arrest, criminal charges,
guilty pleas, or convictions that Stoick failed to disclose on his
application;
(3)
Stoick
was
“on
probation
for
Indecent
Exposure/Lewdness or Procure Another to Expose in Presence of Minor
Under 16 (offense date 6/25/2005) until 9/12/2009”; (4) Stoick has
“a pattern of criminal behavior”; (5) Stoick did not identify the
use of three alias names; and (6) Stoick did not provide accurate
information about his criminal history.2
Id. Ex. AA.
The letter
informed Stoick of his “right to request an Informal Hearing”
within 10 days, and stated “[i]f you have a disability, you may
request a reasonable accommodation to assist you in the admission
2
Stoick did not contest the accuracy of the criminal records,
see Boler Aff. ¶ 20, and the Estate does not argue that the
criminal records are inaccurate.
2
process or to meet the eligibility requirements for admission ....
With or without reasonable accommodation, you are required to meet
the essential eligibility requirements for admission.”
Id.
On September 1, 2009, Stoick requested that MPHA waive his
criminal history.
Id. Ex. A.
Stoick claimed that his criminal
history was a “direct result of many years of untreated depression,
manifesting
itself
difficulties.”
Id.
in
substance
dependence
and
related
Stoick claimed that he “cannot enjoy the
benefits of public housing because of MPHA’s policy of rejecting
applicants based on criminal history” and that his “criminal
history is predicated on his disabilities and does not even suggest
that [he] presents a threat or danger to the public housing
community.”
Id.
Stoick submitted a report from Dr. James Bunde,
Ph.D., in support of his request for an accommodation.
On September 24, 2009, MPHA again denied admission for the
same reasons cited in the July 8, 2009, letter, including that
Stoick (1) indicated that he was arrested for, convicted of, or
pleaded guilty to 22 crimes from 1985 to 2007, including FifthDegree Assault, Indecent Exposure and Disorderly Conduct, and
(2) failed to disclose nine criminal incidents from 1985 to 2009,
including Fifth-Degree Assault, Possession of Burglary Tools, and
Felony Burglary.
See id. Ex. 1.
MPHA agreed that Stoick’s depression was a disability but did
“not agree that alcoholism is a disability.”
3
Id. at 6.
Even if it
did agree that alcoholism was a disability, MPHA stated that it
“would deny [the] request because [Stoick had] not demonstrated any
connection between the crimes ... [and] alcoholism or depression.”
Id. at 5.
MPHA denied the reasonable accommodation request for
several additional reasons, including: (1) “the accommodation would
pose a direct threat to others’ health and safety” due to Stoick’s
“history of arrests for indecent exposure, assault, burglary,
trespassing and disorderly conduct”; (2) Stoick “cannot meet the
essential eligibility requirements” including “no criminal history
and honesty in providing information”; (3) the request was not a
request for reasonable accommodation and was based upon Stoick’s
“personal preference”; and (4) lack of documentation that Stoick
was experiencing depression and alcohol dependence on the dates of
his criminal incidents.
See id. at 6.
Stoick appealed, and a three-member panel held a hearing on
February 4, 2010.
been through
At the hearing, Stoick testified that he had
unsuccessful
substance-abuse
treatment
twenty times since 1975, but that he was then sober.
Ex. 2, at 28, 49.
more
than
Kubic Aff.
Stoick admitted that he was arrested in February
2009 for loitering with an open bottle, but believed that he could
maintain his sobriety.
Id. at 52-53.
Stoick stated that when he
“is under the influence of drugs [his] brain tends to cross
circuit” and his “whole personality changes.”
Id. at 19.
Stoick
further stated that “it’s unreasonable to expect anyone who has
4
used ... as much as [he has] to maintain perfect sobriety.”
Id. at
42. The panel upheld the denial of admission and the accommodation
request because “Stoick has relapsed under doctors [sic] care
showing
that
his
history
does
not
demonstrate
compliance with the terms of the lease.
capability
of
Does not pass screening –
Gross misdemeanor – 2 years after sentencing is complete, will be
eligible Aug. 26, 2010.”
Wider Decl. Ex. X.
Stoick had 60 days to
appeal the panel decision, but did not do so.
On March 30, 2010, Stoick filed the instant action, alleging
that MPHA discriminated against him on the basis of disability and
failed to provide reasonable accommodation in violation of the Fair
Housing Amendments Act (FHAA), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f); the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132; the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and the Minnesota Human Rights Act
(MHRA), Minn. Stat. § 363A.09 subdiv. 1(1).
Thereafter, MPHA
reconsidered Stoick’s eligibility and Stoick executed a lease for
MPHA housing effective October 1, 2010.3
parties moved for summary judgment.4
In December 2010, both
The court heard oral argument
3
On December 3, 2010, the Estate voluntarily dismissed all
claims except those stated in paragraphs 114, 120-27, 130-38, and
142(g) and all relief except that sought in paragraphs 2(b)-(e) and
6-10. See Pl.’s Reply Mem. 2; ECF No. 15.
4
The Estate’s motion is styled as a motion for partial
summary judgment.
The Estate states that it moves for summary
judgment “on the issue of the treatment of alcoholism as a
disability for the purposes of reasonable accommodation in public
housing”; that the parties “can resolve voluntarily or through
(continued...)
5
and took the matter under advisement on January 21, 2011.
The
court now considers the motions.
I.
Survival of Claims
The court first considers whether Stoick’s causes of action
and requests for relief survive his death. Stoick asserted federal
and state-law claims and seeks money damages and declaratory
relief.
A.
Money Damages
1.
Federal Claims
“[W]hether a cause of action based on federal law survives the
plaintiff’s death is a question of federal law.”
Kettner v.
Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126 (D. Minn. 2008)
(citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980)).
“There is no
general survival statute for federal-question cases.”
7C Charles
Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1954 (3d ed.
2007).
“With respect to civil rights actions, ‘the question
whether a civil rights action survives the death of the plaintiff
or
defendant
‘virtually
seldom
none
of
is
the
resolved
civil
explicitly
rights
4
acts
by
Congress,’
makes
any
as
express
(...continued)
mediation any remaining issues related to the practical
administration of the correct policy”; and that “damages and
attorneys’ fees will remain.” Pl.’s Mem. Supp. 3. This statement
fails to adequately “identif[y] each claim or defense – or the part
of each claim or defense – on which summary judgment is sought,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The court construes this statement to
indicate that the Estate moves for summary judgment on liability
for all claims not voluntarily dismissed.
6
provision for survival.’”
Kettner, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1126
(quoting 2 Joseph G. Cook & John L. Sobieski, Jr. Civil Rights
Actions ¶ 4.05, at 4-80).
In the absence of a survival statute “the court must look to
federal common law.” Id. (citing 7C Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1954).
Under federal common law, “only actions for penalties or
forfeitures do not survive.”
ADA
and
Rehabilitation
Id. at 1133 (citation omitted).
Act
are
“remedial
in
nature”
The
and,
accordingly, a plaintiff is entitled to “all available remedies
under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act except for liquidated or
punitive damages.”
Id. at 1134.
A claim for compensatory damages
under the FHAA also survives the death of the plaintiff.
See,
e.g., United States v. Matusoff Rental Co., 494 F. Supp. 2d 740,
747 (S.D. Ohio 2007); Ambruster v. Monument 3: Realty Fund VIII
Ltd.,
963
F.
Supp.
862,
864-65
(N.D.
Cal.
Discrimination Law & Litigation § 12:1 (2011).
1997);
Housing
Therefore the
claims for money damages under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act and
the FHAA survive.
2.
State Law Claim
Under Minnesota law, “[a] cause of action arising out of an
injury to the person dies with the person of the party in whose
favor it exists, except as provided in section 573.02.”
Stat. § 573.01.
When injury is caused to a person by the
wrongful act or omission of any person or
7
Minn.
corporation and the person thereafter dies
from a cause unrelated to those injuries, the
trustee ... may maintain an action for special
damages arising out of such injury if the
decedent might have maintained an action
therefore had the decedent lived.
Minn. Stat. § 573.02 subdiv. 2. “Special damages are those damages
to which an exact dollar amount can be assigned, such as medical
expenses or lost wages to date of death.”
Kettner, 570 F. Supp. 2d
at 1125 (citing Deal v. Northwood Children’s Home Soc’y, 608 N.W.2d
922, 925 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)).
Damages to compensate the
Estate for rent paid as a result of denial of public housing can be
assigned an exact dollar amount and, therefore, constitute special
damages.
As a result, the claim for money damages under the MHRA
survives.
B.
Declaratory Relief
A federal court has no power to render advisory opinions or to
decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the
case before them.
(1975).
See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401
Instead the court’s “judgments must resolve a real and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a
decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.”
Id. “The question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under
all
the
circumstances,
show
that
there
is
a
substantial
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
8
declaratory judgment.”
Id. at 402 (citation omitted); see also
Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661, 673 (8th Cir. 1992) (declaratory
judgment requires “actual ... [and] substantial controversy between
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and
reality”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The instant case does not meet this standard.
A declaratory
judgment, if rendered, would have no direct or indirect effect on
the Estate, and the Estate can obtain no immediate or future relief
based on the declaratory judgment.
As a result, a declaratory
judgment would necessarily be based upon a hypothetical set of
facts, speculating about future plaintiffs or others similarlysituated.
Stoick filed this action as an individual plaintiff.
Cf. Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 605 F.2d 1033,
1036 (8th Cir. 1979) (in class action under FHAA, court has power
“to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the
discriminatory
effects
of
the
past
as
well
as
bar
like
discrimination in the future”). Where, as here, declaratory relief
will not “clarify any legal relationship” between the parties, the
“issue [is] moot.”
Butler, 979 F.2d at 673.
As a result, the
claim for declaratory relief is moot and summary judgment is
warranted on this claim.
II.
Summary Judgment
Summary
judgment
is
appropriate
“if
the
pleadings,
the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show
9
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of
the case.
(1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could
cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party.
See
id. at 252.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court views all evidence
and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See id. at 255.
The nonmoving party, however, may not rest upon
mere denials or allegations in the pleadings but must set forth
specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
See
Moreover, if a plaintiff cannot support
each essential element of his claim, the court must grant summary
judgment because a complete failure of proof regarding an essential
element necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
Id. at
322-23.
III.
Discrimination Claims
The
FHAA,
the
Rehabilitation
Act,
the
ADA
prohibit disability discrimination in housing.
and
the MHRA
See 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(f)(1) (unlawful to discriminate in rental of units “or to
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling,” to renter because
of renter’s “handicap”); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (prohibiting disability
10
discrimination in program receiving federal financial assistance,
including housing programs); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12133 (prohibiting
discrimination in all public housing, even if no federal financial
assistance);
Minn.
Stat.
§
363A.09
subdiv.
1(1)
(prohibiting
disability discrimination in rent or lease of real property).
parties agree that Stoick was disabled.
6
(MPHA
agrees
that
Stoick’s
The
See Wider Decl. Ex. 1, at
“diagnosis
of
depression
is
a
disability”).5 The parties dispute whether Stoick was eligible for
public housing when he applied in December 2008 and whether he was
entitled to the accommodation that he requested.6
A.
Eligibility
In order for a public housing authority (PHA) to make an offer
of housing, an applicant must meet mandatory eligibility criteria
and applicant-selection criteria for admission.
See 24 C.F.R.
§§ 960.201 (a), 960.203 (a)(b)(c)(d);7 see also U.S. Dep’t of
Housing & Urban Dev. et al., Public Housing Occupancy Guidebook 47
5
The FHAA, Rehabilitation Act, the ADA and their implementing
regulations “define an individual or person with disability in
virtually the same language.” U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev. et
al., Public Housing Occupancy Guidebook 15 (June 2003). Moreover,
“the ADA and the MHRA are construed the same.” Loye v. Cnty. of
Dakota, 625 F.3d 494, 497 n.2 (8th Cir. 2010).
6
The parties also dispute whether alcoholism is a disability
for purposes of admission to public housing. The court declines to
consider this issue, however, because its resolution is immaterial
to resolving the instant dispute.
7
Both parties cite federal regulations in support of their
respective motions, and neither party challenges the validity of
the regulations or that they apply to the instant dispute.
11
(June 2003) [hereinafter Guidebook].8
mandatory
eligibility
criteria,
If an applicant meets the
the
PHA
then
considers
discretionary factors to determine the applicant’s probable lease
compliance.
See 24 C.F.R. § 960.203 (a)(b)(c)(d); see also Wider
Decl. Ex. U (“Being eligible ... is not entitlement to housing.
addition,
every
applicant
must
meet
MPHA’s
Tenant
In
Selection
Criteria.”).
1.
Eligibility Review
“An applicant must meet all eligibility requirements in order
to receive housing assistance.”
24 C.F.R. § 960.201.
The Estate
claims that Stoick satisfied all mandatory eligibility criteria.
MPHA’s denial letter stated that Stoick “cannot meet the essential
eligibility requirements of the program which include no criminal
activity and honesty in providing information.” Wider Decl. Ex. 1,
at 6.
MPHA “can reject [an] application if, during the course of
processing, it is proven that an applicant has ... misrepresented
any facts about his/her current situation, history, or behavior in
a manner that would affect eligibility, preferences [or] applicant
selection criteria qualification.”
Guidebook 55.
Under its
“requirements for admission,” however, the MPHA requires only that
an applicant: (1) qualify as a “family,” (2) not exceed a maximum
8
The Estate submitted excerpts of the Guidebook as an exhibit
in support of its motion. See Wider Decl. Ex. MM. “Th[e] Guide is
designed to assist public housing authority staff and HUD with a
range of issues related to public housing occupancy.” Guidebook 1.
12
annual
income,
(3)
provide
a
social
security
card
for
each
applicant over six years old, and (4) be a United States citizen or
eligible noncitizen.
See Wider Decl. Ex. U.
Therefore, for the
purposes of this motion, the court determines that Stoick satisfied
the minimum eligibility requirements.
2.
Applicant Selection Criteria
“The second stage of processing is applying the screening
criteria.”
Guidebook 59.
The federal regulations give PHAs broad
authority to deny admission and terminate tenancy for criminal
activity or alcohol abuse.
See 24 C.F.R. § 5.851.
In Part 5
(General HUD Program Requirements; Waivers), Subpart I (Preventing
Crime
in
Federally
Assisted
Housing
–
Denying
Admission
and
Terminating Tenancy for Criminal Activity or Alcohol Abuse), the
regulations
direct
PHAs:
“You
must
establish
standards
that
prohibit admission to federally assisted housing if you determine
you have reasonable cause to believe that a household member’s
abuse or pattern of abuse of alcohol interferes with the health,
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other
residents.”
24 C.F.R. § 5.857 (emphasis added).
This directive is repeated throughout the regulations.
In selection of families for admission to its
public housing program ... the PHA is
responsible for screening family behavior and
suitability for tenancy. The PHA may consider
all relevant information, which may include,
but is not limited to ...
13
A history of criminal activity involving
crimes of physical violence to persons or
property and other criminal acts which would
adversely affect the health, safety or welfare
of other tenants.
Id. § 960.203.
The PHA must establish standards that prohibit
admission to the PHA’s public housing program
if the PHA determines that it has reasonable
cause to believe that a household member’s
abuse or pattern of abuse of alcohol may
threaten the health, safety, or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other
residents.”
Id. § 960.204(b) (emphasis added).
MPHA’s criteria for excluding Stoick fell well within federal
regulations.
Stoick’s substantial and prolonged criminal history
included fifth-degree assault and burglary, and a 2005 arrest for
Indecent Exposure/Lewdness or Procure Another to Expose in Presence
of Minor Under 16.
As a result, MPHA had reasonable cause to
believe that Stoick’s “history of criminal activity involving
crimes of physical violence to persons or property and other
criminal acts which would adversely affect the health, safety or
welfare of other tenants.” Id. § 960.203. Therefore, Stoick could
not meet the applicant-selection criteria.
If an applicant with a disability cannot meet one or more of
the screening criteria, the applicant may request a reasonable
accommodation. See Guidebook 59. Stoick requested that MPHA waive
his criminal history, and argues that MPHA’s refusal was unlawful.
14
B.
Reasonable Accommodation
The court considers claims for failure to accommodate using “a
modified burden-shifting analysis, because discriminatory intent is
not at issue.”
Mershon v. St. Louis Univ., 442 F.3d 1069, 1074
(8th Cir. 2006).
To prevail on its claims under the FHAA,
Rehabilitation Act, ADA and MHRA, the Estate must show “that the
accommodation [Stoick] requested ... was reasonable.”
Huberty v.
Wash. Cnty. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 374 F. Supp. 2d 768, 773
(D. Minn. 2005) (citing Peebles v. Potter, 354 F.3d 761, 766 n.4,
767-78 (8th Cir. 2004) (ADA and Rehabilitation Act); Burchett v.
Target
Corp.,
340
F.3d
510,
517
(8th
Cir.
2003)
(MHRA);
Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Scotch Plains,
284 F.3d 442, 457 (3d Cir. 2002) (FHAA)).
If the Estate makes a
prima face showing, the burden shifts to MPHA to demonstrate that
the requested accommodation creates an undue hardship under the
particular circumstances.
See Peebles, 354 F.3d at 768 (citing
U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 402 (2002)).
Whether
an
fact-specific,
accommodation
requiring
a
is
reasonable
case-by-case
is
“‘highly
determination.’”
Lapid-Laurel, 284 F.3d at 462 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
“The court should first examine the accommodation
request to determine precisely what plaintiff was asking for under
all the circumstances.”
Huberty, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 774.
A
requested accommodation that fundamentally alters the nature of the
15
program is not reasonable. See Mershon, 442 F.3d at 1076; see also
Peebles, 354 F.3d at 769; Lapid-Laurel, 284 F.3d at 462.
In the present action, Stoick requested that MPHA “disregard
his criminal history” because he had “undergone and continues to
undergo successful and effective treatment for his disabilities”
and his criminal history “does not even suggest that [he] presents
a threat or danger to the public housing community.”
Ex. A, at 2.9
Wider Decl.
The record contradicts these conclusory statements.
At his appeal hearing Stoick admitted that he had been arrested for
loitering with an open bottle despite ongoing treatment.
Aff. Ex. 2, at 53.
Kubic
He also admitted that he had relapsed “many
times,” even with treatment and asserted that it was unreasonable
to expect that he would not relapse.
Id. at 52.
Stoick further
stated: “the only treatment I’m getting right now is from myself.”
Id. at 53. By Stoick’s own admission, his personality changes when
he is under the influence of alcohol, id. at 19, and is therefore
more likely to commit crimes while using.
Stoick’s criminal
history includes assault, burglary and other violent crimes.
As a
result Stoick’s accommodation request fundamentally alters the
9
The Estate now claims that Stoick requested only that MPHA
waive two offenses committed in 2005 and 2009. See Pl.’s Reply
Mem. 27. This assertion is belied by the Estate’s own exhibits,
which indicate that Stoick asked MPHA for a blanket exclusion of
his criminal history.
See, e.g., Wider Decl. Ex. A, at 1.
Moreover, within the context of his long criminal history, the
recent offenses are relevant to determine whether Stoick’s pattern
of crime and alcohol abuse presented a threat to the health and
safety of other residents. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 960.203-.204.
16
nature of the program by requiring MPHA to disregard federal
regulations requiring that it protect the health and safety of its
tenants and screen out applicants who pose a threat.
In short, no
reasonable juror could find that Stoick’s accommodation request was
reasonable.
requested
As a result, the Estate fails to show that the
accommodation
was
facially
reasonable,
and
summary
judgment is warranted.10
Moreover, even if the requested accommodation were reasonable,
the Estate fails to show that the accommodation would have enabled
Stoick to meet the requirements of the lease.
See Guidebook 58
(“If,
applicants
even
disabilities
with
cannot
reasonable
meet
accommodation,
essential
permissible to reject them.”).
lease
requirements,
with
it
is
The record shows that Stoick
continued to commit crimes even while receiving treatment for
alcoholism.
See Wider Aff. Ex. X, at 3.
10
As a result, even if MPHA
The Estate cites several inapposite cases in support of its
argument that waiver of criminal history is reasonable. None of
these cases involved an applicant with a long criminal history
seeking admission to housing, and none stand for the proposition
that waiving criminal history is a reasonable accommodation. See
Boston Housing Auth. v. Bridgewaters, 898 N.E.2d 848, 850 (D. Mass.
2009) (before evicting mentally disabled public housing tenant for
assaulting another, PHA must consider whether requested reasonable
accommodation related to disability); Roe v. Sugar River Mills
Assocs., 820 F. Supp. 636, 640 (D.N.H. 1993) (denying landlord’s
motion for summary judgment where landlord evicted tenant after
tenant’s disability-related outburst); Cornwell & Taylor LLP v.
Moore, No. C8-00-1000, 2000 WL 1887528, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec.
22, 2000) (remand to determine whether evicted tenant’s reasonable
accommodation
request
imposed
undue
hardship
or
required
fundamental change).
17
waived Stoick’s criminal history, Stoick failed to demonstrate that
he could comply with the lease requirement that he refrain from
future criminal activity that threatens the health and safety of
other tenants.
Therefore, for this additional reason, the claims
fail.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
The motion for summary judgment by defendants MPHA and
Cora McCorvey [ECF No. 26] is granted; and
2.
The motion for partial summary judgment by the estate of
John Stoick, by and through Special Administrators Lisa Spry and
Anthony Perra, [ECF No. 17] is denied.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY
Dated:
July 29, 2011
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court
18
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