Meeks v. Dolan et al
Filing
36
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 19 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Donovan W. Frank on 10/12/2011. (rlb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Recardo D. Meeks,
Civil No. 10-2008 (DWF/LIB)
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
The City of Minneapolis; Officer David
O’Connor ( individually and in his official
Capacity), and Officer Daniel Anderson
(individually and in his official capacity),
Defendants.
_______________________________________________________________________
Andrew P. Muller, Esq., Muller & Muller, PLLC; John A. Klassen, Esq., John A.
Klassen, PA; and Joshua W. Carlson, Esq., Cottrell Law Firm, counsel for Plaintiff.
Darla J. Boggs and James Anthony Moore, Assistant City Attorneys, Minneapolis City
Attorney’s Office, counsel for Defendant City of Minneapolis.
Ann E. Walther, Esq., and Karin E. Peterson, Esq., Rice Michels & Walther LLP, counsel
for Defendant Officers David O’Connor and Daniel Anderson.
_______________________________________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Against Defendant Officers (Doc. No. [19]). For the reasons set forth below,
the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s claims arise from a search of his person conducted pursuant to a traffic
stop on March 25, 2009. (See Doc. No. 1, Compl.; Doc. No. 22, Muller Aff., ¶ 3, Ex. 1
(“O’Connor Depo.”) at 39.) On that date, Defendant Minneapolis Police Officers David
O’Connor and Daniel Anderson (together “Defendant Officers”) were working for the
Little Earth Housing Complex in an off-duty, uniformed capacity. (See O’Connor Depo.
at 25, 39.) Defendant Officers were patrolling the area in a marked Minneapolis Police
squad car, driven by Officer O’Connor. (See id. at 39–40.) At approximately 2:30 a.m.,
the officers conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle driven by Plaintiff for a purported speed
limit violation. (See id. at 39; Muller Aff., ¶ 9, Ex. 7 (“Anderson Depo.”) at 31; Muller
Aff. ¶ 4, Ex. 2 (“Video”)1.) Defendant Officers approached the vehicle, with Officer
O’Connor on the driver’s side and Officer Anderson on the passenger side. (O’Connor
Depo. at 42; Anderson Depo. at 31–32.) The officers claim that they could smell
marijuana coming from the vehicle. (O’Connor Depo. at 44; Anderson Depo. at 62.)
Officer O’Connor asked the driver, later identified as Plaintiff, for his identification and
insurance information. (O’Connor Depo. at 42.) Plaintiff provided a clipped Minnesota
ID card. (Id. at 43.) The officers then returned to their squad to run a driver’s license
check. (Id. at 45–46.) When Officer O’Connor returned to Plaintiff’s vehicle, he asked
Plaintiff to step out of the car in order to search Plaintiff and the vehicle for marijuana.
1
The traffic stop and subsequent search were recorded by a security camera.
(Video.) The recording contains no audio. (Id.)
2
(Id. at 47.) Officer O’Connor then conducted a pat-down search of Plaintiff, next to
Plaintiff’s vehicle, while Plaintiff’s hands remained behind his head. (Video; O’Connor
Depo. at 48–49.) Plaintiff remained fully clothed while Officer O’Connor thoroughly
patted down Plaintiff’s outer clothing and buttock area2 and emptied Plaintiff’s pockets.
(Video.) While pat searching Plaintiff’s buttocks, Officer O’Connor claims to have “felt
a large bulge between [Plaintiff’s] buttocks cheeks.” (O’Connor Depo. at 48–49.) The
bulge was “blunt” and without a “specific shape.” (Id. at 50.) Officer O’Connor testified
that, upon feeling the “bulge,” he “started becoming concerned” and proceeded to
handcuff Plaintiff “for [his] safety.” (Id. at 51.)
Officer O’Connor then escorted Plaintiff, in handcuffs, to the police car. (Video.)
Officer Anderson waited with Plaintiff outside the squad briefly while Officer O’Connor
returned to the car driven by Plaintiff. (Id.) Upon his return to the squad car, Officer
O’Connor pushed Plaintiff down onto the trunk of the vehicle, then pulled down
Plaintiff’s pants, exposing Plaintiff’s buttocks. (Id.) While Plaintiff leaned forward on
the trunk of the police car, held in place by Officer Anderson, Officer O’Connor
inspected Plaintiff’s buttock area with a flashlight. (Id.) Plaintiff’s body was further
illuminated by the squad car’s flashing lights. (Id.)
The video reveals that a piece of tissue paper protruded from Plaintiff’s anus. (Id.)
Plaintiff’s pants remained around his knees, with his buttocks fully exposed, while
2
At his deposition, Officer O’Connor testified that “we always check the buttocks
region to make sure there’s not a weapon or narcotics there.” (O’Connor Depo. at 49.)
3
Officer O’Connor opened the trunk of the squad to retrieve rubber gloves. (Id.; see
O’Connor Depo. at 68–69.) Officer O’Connor then removed the tissue from Plaintiff’s
anus while Officer Anderson looked on.3 (Video; O’Connor Depo. at 69.) Officer
O’Connor claims to have believed that “there was a distinct possibility” that Plaintiff was
concealing a gun between the cheeks of his buttocks. (O’Connor Depo. at 67–72.)
Ultimately, several “nuggets” of marijuana were retrieved by Defendant Officers
pursuant to the search. (Id. at 67–70.)
In this action, Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his
Fourth Amendment rights against Defendant Officers and a battery claim against
Defendant Officers and the City of Minneapolis.4 Plaintiff has moved for partial
summary judgment on his Fourth Amendment claim against Defendant Officers.
DISCUSSION
I.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank
3
Because of Officer O’Connor’s position behind Plaintiff at the time of the strip
search, the extent to which Officer O’Connor may have conducted a body cavity search is
unclear from the video. (Video.)
4
Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the Court dismissed Counts 2 and 3 of
Plaintiff’s complaint, as well as Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims in Count 1.
(Footnote Continued on Next Page)
4
of Mo., 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). However, as the Supreme Court has stated,
“[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed
‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enter. Bank, 92 F.3d at
747. The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record
that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th
Cir. 1995). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment “may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 256 (1986).
II.
Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendant Officers
Plaintiff has moved for partial summary judgment as to liability against Defendant
Officers with respect to his claim that Defendant Officers violated Plaintiff’s right to be
free from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment. Viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to Defendant Officers, the Court finds, as a matter of law, that the
officers violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.
(Footnote Continued From Previous Page)
(Doc. No. 35.)
5
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979). The test of reasonableness “requires
a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights
that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the
manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it
is conducted.” Id. at 559. The Court concludes that the strip search of Plaintiff in this
case was objectively unreasonable.
Defendant Officers assert that, because they believed that Plaintiff was concealing
a gun, exigent circumstances existed to strip search Plaintiff on a public street. Plaintiff,
however, relies on Starks v. City of Minneapolis, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1089 (D. Minn.
1998), for the proposition that police officers are not entitled to conduct a strip search
simply because they have probable cause to believe a suspect may be hiding something.
In that case, Starks claimed that officers violated her constitutional rights by
ordering her to lower her pants and underwear in a public place when the officers
suspected that she possessed marijuana. Id. at 1086–87. The district court concluded
that, at the time the officers conducted the strip search, “the officers knew conclusively
that [the] plaintiff did not have a firearm or a weapon because she had already been
searched and patted down twice—once before being placed into the squad car, and again
by Officer Ireland prior to the claimed strip search.” Id. at 1089. The court further
emphasized that the officers had detected the odor of burnt marijuana and noted that
whatever the officers suspected her of hiding “was small enough in amount that it had not
6
been perceived by feel” pursuant to the pat-down searches. Id. In light of these facts, the
court concluded that the plaintiff’s claims survived summary judgment.
The Court finds Starks to be persuasive here. Even assuming Defendant Officers
actually believed Plaintiff was in possession of a weapon at the time of the stop, after
conducting the pat-down search, no reasonable officer could have maintained the belief
that Plaintiff concealed a gun on his person. (See Video.) The video makes clear that,
prior to the strip search, Officer O’Connor conducted a very thorough, and rather
aggressive, pat-down search of Plaintiff’s outer clothing, which included, and appeared to
focus on, Plaintiff’s buttock area. (Video.) Officer O’Connor claims that he felt “a hard
bulge” in the area of Plaintiff’s buttocks during the pat-down search. The Court finds
that whatever Officer O’Connor suspected Plaintiff of concealing was small enough that
no reasonable officer would have perceived it to be a weapon pursuant to the pat-down
search, as evidenced by the video. Still, after conducting the pat-down, Officer
O’Connor handcuffed Plaintiff. (Id.) Rather than conduct a less intrusive “reach-in”
search at that point to determine what, if anything, Plaintiff concealed in his
undergarments, Defendant Officers, instead, opted to pull down Plaintiff’s pants and fully
expose Plaintiff’s buttocks on a public street.5 (Id.)
5
In light of Defendant Officers’ failure to avail themselves of the less invasive
alternative of a reach-in search, the Court need not reach Plaintiff’s argument that
Defendant Officers should have transported Plaintiff to the nearby police station to
conduct the search. See Starks, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1089 (determining that “the very short
drive time to the Downtown police station obviates any claim of exigent circumstances”
requiring a strip search in that case).
7
A public strip search of a suspect is more invasive than a “reach-in” search
performed when an officer reaches into a suspect’s pants without disrobing him to
retrieve a hidden item from the area surrounding the suspect’s buttocks or genitals. See
United States v. Williams, 477 F.3d 974, 976, 977 (8th Cir. 2007). Although “the
availability of a less intrusive alternative does not necessarily prove unreasonableness,”
case law suggests that police officers “should take precautions to insure that a detainee’s
privacy is protected from exposure to others unconnected to the search.” Id. at 977.
Unlike a strip search, “during which a suspect must expose fully his or her private areas,”
a reach-in search of a clothed suspect “may be permissible if police take steps
commensurate with the circumstances to diminish the potential invasion of the suspect’s
privacy.” Id. Here, Defendant Officers disrobed Plaintiff unnecessarily where a less
intrusive “reach-in” search could have accomplished their stated objective of attempting
to retrieve a hidden weapon.6 Defendant Officers failed to avail themselves of any less
intrusive alternatives to strip searching Plaintiff on a public road.
6
Given the Court’s conclusion that, after conducting the pat-down search, no
reasonable officer could have maintained the belief that Plaintiff concealed a gun on his
person, the Court need not reach the issue of whether a strip search would be
constitutionally permissible on the following facts: where reasonable officers actually
believe that a suspect is concealing a weapon in his undergarments, but fail to avail
themselves of the less intrusive alternative of a reach-in search. The Court notes,
however, that even if a reasonable officer would have believed that Plaintiff was in
possession of a gun at the time of the strip search here, a less intrusive reach-in search
would have been a constitutionally permissible alternative to the strip search conducted
and would have allowed the officer to determine whether Plaintiff concealed a weapon in
the area surrounding his buttocks.
8
Moreover, the video makes clear that Defendant Officers made no effort to protect
Plaintiff’s privacy. Contra id. (concluding that the officers conducting a reach-in search
of a clothed suspect in a private, fenced precinct parking lot “took adequate precautions
to protect [the suspect’s] privacy, and the search in the parking lot caused no
unreasonable ‘invasion of personal rights’ in violation of the Fourth Amendment”).
Defendant Officers conducted the search on a public street while Plaintiff was
handcuffed. (Video.) Rather than allowing Plaintiff to remain fully clothed, as would
have been the case with a “reach-in” search, Officer O’Connor dropped Plaintiff’s pants
to his knees, fully exposing Plaintiff’s buttocks. Plaintiff’s pants remained around his
knees, with his buttocks exposed, for approximately three minutes while the officers
prepared for, and then conducted, their search.7 (Id.) The officers made no effort of any
kind to shield Defendant’s body from public view, and his buttocks remained fully visible
throughout the duration of the search.
On the facts of the instant case, there is nothing before the Court to suggest any
conceivable exigency that could only be met by strip searching Plaintiff in public, on the
spot. See Campbell v. Miller, 499 F.3d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding a public strip
search constitutionally invalid, as a matter of law, because “there was nothing before the
jury that suggested any conceivable exigency that could only be met by strip-searching
7
The Court need not reach the issue of whether a body cavity search occurred in
addition to the strip search, given the Court’s conclusion that the strip search in and of
itself was unreasonable and constitutionally impermissible.
9
[the plaintiff] in public, on the spot”). Although the video contains no recorded audio,
Plaintiff appears to have been compliant at all times. (Video.) The officers moved
slowly and with no apparent sense of urgency or fear. (See id.) Nothing about their
conduct indicates that the situation presented any imminent threat to their safety. (See
id.) In fact, Officer Anderson can be seen smiling on the video. (See id.) Plaintiff was
handcuffed immediately after the pat-down and remained handcuffed throughout the
duration of the strip search. (See id.) In light of the objective facts as captured on video,
the Court concludes that no exigency existed so as to reasonably warrant a strip search of
Plaintiff.
The Court finds that Defendant Officers committed a per se constitutional
violation by conducting an intrusive public search in light of the facts in this case. See
Campbell, 499 F.3d at 719 (“Courts across the country are uniform in their condemnation
of intrusive searches performed in public.”). Defendant Officers have not met their
burden of demonstrating that exigent circumstances required conducting a strip search of
Plaintiff on a public thoroughfare. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455
(1971) (explaining that there must be “a showing by those who seek exemption [from the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement] . . . that the exigencies of the situation made
that course imperative.”). The video makes clear that no compelling exigent
circumstances existed to justify the invasive search on a public street. See Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007) (concluding that the lower court “should have
viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape”). Not only was the strip search
10
unsupported by exigent circumstances, but Defendant Officers did not attempt to protect
Plaintiff’s privacy in any way, whether by shielding his body or by relying on the less
intrusive alternative of a “reach-in” search.
The Court holds that a reasonable police officer would not be justified in assuming
that an on-street strip search in this case was within the boundaries defined by the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court thus finds that the strip search
conducted by Defendant Officers was unconstitutional as a matter of law.8
Because the Court concludes that Defendant Officers unlawfully subjected
Plaintiff to an unreasonable search in violation of the rights afforded him under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, he is entitled to partial summary
judgment with respect to his Fourth Amendment claim.
ORDER
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, and the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendant
Officers (Doc. No. [19]) is GRANTED with respect to Count I, paragraph 29(i), of the
Complaint.
2.
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as to his claim that Defendant Officers
8
The Court rules narrowly on the record before it. Because the Court concludes
that Defendant Officers committed a constitutional violation based on the facts, the Court
need not reach Plaintiff’s argument that the CRA report proves that the officers’ conduct
was unreasonable.
11
violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.
(Compl. ¶ 29(i).)
Dated: October 12, 2011
s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
12
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