Jackson v. Metropolitan Council HRA Management Association et al
Filing
110
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting defendant's 83 Motion for Summary Judgment; adopting Magistrate Judge's 95 Report and Recommendation. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge John R. Tunheim on September 27, 2012. (DML) (cc: Nadia Jackson)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
NADIA JACKSON,
Civil No. 10-2370 (JRT/JJG)
Plaintiff,
v.
METROPOLITAN COUNCIL HRA
MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Defendant.
Nadia Jackson, 3224 Sixth Street North, Minneapolis, MN 55412, plaintiff
pro se.
Mary G. Dobbins, LANDRUM DOBBINS LLC, 7400 Metro Boulevard,
Suite 100, Edina, MN 55439, for defendant.
Plaintiff Nadia Jackson (“Jackson”) brings this action against defendant
Metropolitan Council HRA Management Association (“the Metro HRA”). Jackson was a
participant in the Housing Choice Voucher (“HCV”)1 Program administered by the Metro
HRA. This action arises from the Metro HRA’s decision to terminate Jackson’s HCV.
As a result of the termination of her voucher, Jackson brings twelve causes of action,
including discrimination (under the Fair Housing Act, Americans with Disabilities Act,
and other statutes) and defamation. The case is now before the Court on Jackson’s
1
Administrated locally by public housing agencies and funded by the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, the HCV program allows tenants to find their own housing
and use the voucher to pay a portion of their rent. 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(1)-(2).
23&AB
objections to the May 17, 2012 Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) issued by United
States Magistrate Judge Jeanne J. Graham which recommended that the Court grant the
Metro HRA’s motion for summary judgment. After careful de novo review of the
Magistrate Judge’s R&R, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); D. Minn. LR 72.2(b), the Court
will overrule Jackson’s objections, and adopt the R&R in its entirety for the reasons
stated below.
BACKGROUND2
Jackson was a participant in the HCV program administered by the Metro HRA.
Jackson used her HCV to rent an apartment from landlord Thomas Grant beginning on
July 1, 2005. (Aff. of Beth Reetz ¶ 3, Ex. B at 12, Jan. 13, 2012, Docket No. 86.)3 In
June 2007, the Metro HRA terminated Jackson’s HCV for her failure to give sixty days’
written notice4 to Grant and the Metro HRA before moving out of her apartment. (Id.
¶¶ 9-10, Ex. E at 22, Ex. F at 23.)
Jackson requested a hearing challenging the
termination, and the hearing officer upheld the Metro HRA’s decision; Jackson did not
2
The Court recites facts here only to the extent necessary to rule on Jackson’s objections.
A more thorough factual background is available in the Magistrate Judge’s R&R (see R&R,
May 17, 2012, Docket No. 95), this Court’s order affirming the Magistrate Judge’s order denying
Jackson punitive damages request, Jackson v. Metro. Council HRA Mgmt. Ass’n, Civil No. 102370, 2012 WL 2395187, at *1-3 (D. Minn. June 25, 2012), and in the prior state case, Jackson
v. Metro. Council Hous. Redev. Auth., 27-CV-09-7012 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 3, 2010).
3
Although the Court cites to the Beth Reetz affidavit throughout much of this Order for
the purposes of clarity, the Court notes that Jackson has submitted many of the same exhibits.
(See Jackson Decl., Exs. A-P, Nov. 14, 2011, Docket No. 72.)
4
As part of the HCV program, Jackson signed a “Statement of Responsibilities”
acknowledging her responsibility to give sixty days’ written notice to both the Metro HRA and
her landlord prior to moving from her unit. (Reetz Aff. ¶ 6.)
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appeal the decision. (Id. ¶¶ 11-13.) Jackson continued to contact the Metro HRA,
causing an employee of the Metro HRA to agree to meet with her in February 2008. (Id.
¶¶ 14-15.) At this meeting, the Metro HRA employee decided that Jackson’s 2007
termination was “in error,” causing the Metro HRA to reinstate Jackson to the program.
(Id. ¶ 15, Ex. K at 10.) It is unclear why the Metro HRA employee believed the
termination was in error, as it appears that Jackson did not provide the sixty days’ written
notice required prior to moving. In August 2008, the Metro HRA again terminated
Jackson’s HCV, this time for her failure to accurately and completely report her income
as required by the HCV program. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30, Ex. P at 16.)5 Jackson again challenged
the termination and requested an informal hearing; HRA consequently scheduled an
administrative hearing for October 24, 2008, which Jackson did not attend or reschedule.
(Id. ¶ 37.)
In March 2009, Jackson filed a pro se complaint against the Metro HRA in the
Minnesota state district court, raising claims based on the two terminations of her
voucher. Jackson v. Metro. Council Hous. Redev. Auth. (Jackson I), 27-CV-09-7012, at
3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 3, 2010).6 In her complaint, Jackson asserted claims that the
Metro HRA was negligent, deprived her of due process, and retaliated against her when it
5
Participants in the Section 8 Program are required to provide “true and complete”
information regarding household composition and income. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(b)(2), (4).
In August 2008, a potential landlord faxed to the Metro HRA a copy of the 2007 Schedule C to
Jackson’s Federal Income Tax Form 1040. (Reetz Aff. ¶ 28, Ex. O at 15.) This form showed
$19,926 of net income to Jackson for “Hairdressing” that Jackson had not reported to the Metro
HRA. (Reetz Aff. ¶ 28, Ex. O at 15.)
6
Jackson’s state court complaint, the state district court decision, and the state appellate
court decision dismissing Jackson’s appeal were submitted as exhibits to the Mary Dobbins
affidavit. (Aff. of Mary G. Dobbins, Ex. 1, Jan. 13, 2012, Docket No. 84.)
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decided to terminate her housing assistance.7 Id. at 4. It is unclear from Jackson’s
complaint under what statutes, if any, Jackson brought these claims. The Metro HRA
moved for summary judgment. Id. at 5.
In evaluating the summary judgment motion, the district court first found that
Jackson lacked standing to challenge her voucher terminations in state district court. Id.
at 5-6. The court determined that Jackson’s proper remedy to challenge the termination
of her voucher had been to file “a timely appeal [of the administrative decision to
terminate her voucher] with the Minnesota Court of Appeals, not [to] file a separate
complaint in district court.” Id. at 5.8
In spite of this finding, “[i]n the interests of judicial economy,” the court
addressed the merits of Jackson’s complaint and found that all of Jackson’s claims failed.
Id. at 6. The court noted as a preliminary matter that Jackson had provided a “litany of
allegations” but did not dispute any of the evidence submitted by the Metro HRA. Id. at
5. In regard to Jackson’s negligence claim, the court found that Jackson had not stated a
claim because she provided no affirmative evidence that the Metro HRA had failed to
comply with federal regulations or breached any legally recognized duty toward her. Id.
7
The state district court noted that the claims Jackson asserted in her complaint were
“difficult to decipher” but that negligence, deprivation of due process, and retaliation were the
three she “appeared to assert.” Jackson I, 27-CV-09-7012, at 4. The court found that neither the
2007 nor the 2008 termination of Jackson’s voucher formed a basis for these legal claims. Id. at
8.
8
By “taking evidence and hearing testimony,” the state district court found that the Metro
HRA had acted in a quasi-judicial capacity at the termination hearings and that “[j]udicial review
of quasi-judicial decisions of administrative bodies is in the Court of Appeals and invoked by
writ of certiorari.” Jackson I, 27-CV-09-7012, at 5-6 (citing Minn. Stat. § 480A.06; Ditz v.
Dodge Cnty., 487 N.W.2d 237 (Minn. 1992)).
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at 6. As to her due process claim, the district court found that for both terminations of
Jackson’s voucher, the Metro HRA gave Jackson an opportunity for an informal hearing,
and the fact that Jackson failed to appeal the 2007 termination or attend the 2008 hearing
did not support a claim that Metro HRA had deprived Jackson of due process. Id. at 7.
Finally, the court found that Jackson’s retaliation claim failed to establish either that she
was engaged in a “statutorily protected activity” or that there was a causal connection
between such activity and the adverse action that the Metro HRA allegedly took against
her. Id. at 7-8. The court thus dismissed each of Jackson’s claims with prejudice and
granted the Metro HRA’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 8. Jackson appealed that
order, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely. Jackson v.
Metro. Council Hous. Redev. Auth., A10-801 (Minn. Ct. App. June 1, 2010).
In June 2010, Jackson filed the complaint currently before this Court alleging
twelve causes of action against the Metro HRA; Jackson then amended this complaint in
October 2011. (Compl., June 15, 2010, Docket No. 1; Am. Compl., Oct. 3, 2011, Docket
No. 65.)
The Metro HRA moved for summary judgment. (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.,
Jan. 13, 2012, Docket No. 83.) In an R&R addressing this motion, the Magistrate Judge
determined that Jackson’s claims failed for two main reasons: first, they were barred by
the doctrine of res judicata, and second, substantively, Jackson was unable to establish a
prima facie case for any of her claims. (See R&R at 16, May 17, 2012, Docket No. 95.)
The Magistrate Judge thus recommended that this Court grant summary judgment for the
Metro HRA.
(Id. at 29.)
Jackson filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation for summary judgment, essentially asserting three main arguments for
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why the Court should not adopt the R&R: (1) res judicata does not apply, (2) summary
judgment is inappropriate because the Metro HRA submitted an affidavit without
notarization, and (3) summary judgment is not warranted on her negligence claim. (Pl.’s
Objections to R&R, May 30, 2012, Docket No. 96). The Court will consider each of the
objections in turn.
ANALYSIS
The fundamental problem with Jackson’s case, as described in more detail below,
is that Jackson neither directly disputes any of the Metro HRA’s facts nor asserts
alternative facts that could create a genuine issue of material fact. In addition, Jackson’s
arguments reiterate issues and claims that the state court previously adjudicated on the
merits. The Court will address Jackson’s objections below and explain why they are
insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material
fact and the moving party demonstrates that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit, and a
dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could lead a reasonable jury to return a
verdict for either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
court considering a motion for summary judgment must view the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable
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inferences that can be drawn from those facts. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
However, to survive summary judgment, Jackson – as the non-moving party –
must do more than rest on the allegations made in her pleadings or on general statements
of fact; she must show that specific facts exist which create a genuine issue for trial. See,
e.g., Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Without sufficient evidence to make out Jackson’s
claims, a trial is unnecessary and the Metro HRA, as the moving party, is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 249.
II.
RES JUDICATA
Jackson first objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that this Court
find her claims against the Metro HRA barred by res judicata. Res judicata operates to
bar subsequent litigation when “(1) the earlier claim involved the same set of factual
circumstances; (2) the earlier claim involved the same parties . . . (3) there was a final
judgment on the merits; [and] (4) the . . . party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the matter.” Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 840 (Minn. 2004). All four
elements must be satisfied for res judicata to apply. Id. In addition, the first suit must
have been based on proper jurisdiction. Lovell v. Mixon, 719 F.2d 1373, 1376 (8th Cir.
1983). “Res judicata applies equally to claims actually litigated and to claims that could
have been litigated in the earlier action.” Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co.,
P.L.L.P., 732 N.W.2d 209, 220 (Minn. 2007). When determining if res judicata applies,
federal courts “must give the same preclusive effect to a state-court judgment as another
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court of that State would give.” Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523
(1986) (citing the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976)).
Jackson seems to rest her argument that res judicata does not apply on two
theories. First, because Jackson’s claims raise federal questions, she argues that the state
court did not have jurisdiction to decide these issues; second, she argues that under the
Seventh Amendment, only facts tried by a jury are precluded from being reexamined.
(Pl.’s Objections to R&R at 6.)9
A.
Preclusion of Federal Claims
The Court must first decide if res judicata applies even though this action involves
federal claims.10 It was unclear to what extent, if any, Jackson’s state court claims were
based on federal law. Although Jackson’s federal complaint more clearly brings her
claims under federal law,11 Jackson’s present claims of negligence, retaliation, and denial
of due process are all based on the same factual circumstances and allegations as
Jackson’s state court claims of negligence, retaliation and denial of due process. Thus,
9
Jackson’s Seventh Amendment argument was not presented to the Magistrate Judge so
the Court is not bound to address it; however, because courts construe pro se filings liberally,
and because it is important to leave no doubts in Jackson’s mind that the Court carefully
reviewed her objections, the Court will address this argument.
10
Although the Magistrate Judge found Jackson’s claims barred by res judicata, because
“charges of discrimination based on race or disability, if true, are some of the gravest allegations
and must be uncovered and corrected when possible[,]” the Magistrate Judge evaluated the
merits of each of Jackson’s thirteen claims. (R&R at 16, n. 6.)
11
In her claims of negligence, denial of due process, and retaliation, Jackson alleges that,
through the 2007 and 2008 terminations of her voucher, the Metro HRA violated Jackson’s
rights under the Constitution and, among other statutes, the Fair Housing Act and the Civil
Rights Act.
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even if the claims in this action are not precisely the same as those raised in the state
court, because they involve the same facts, the same parties, and arise from the same
circumstances, Jackson should have raised them in her state court action. See Migra v.
Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 84-85 (1984) (holding that where a
federal claim could have been litigated with claims brought in a state court proceeding,
res judicata barred that party’s subsequent federal civil rights action arising from the
same circumstances which gave rise to the state court claims).
Jackson argues that she did not and could not have raised her current claims in the
state court. However, in general, “[s]tate courts have jurisdiction to enforce rights arising
under federal law.” Ademodi v. State, 616 N.W.2d 716, 717 n.2 (Minn. 2000); see also
Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981). Jackson has pointed
to no cause of action she now raises that she could not have raised in state court, and the
Court finds none. Moreover, Jackson brought the original state court action, and she
cannot now complain that it was the improper forum in which to raise her claims. The
Court thus concludes that all of the elements of res judicata are met in this case: the
action that Jackson filed in state court involved the same set of factual circumstances as
this action (the Metro HRA’s terminations of Jackson’s voucher), the same parties
(Jackson and the Metro HRA), a final judgment on the merits, and a full and fair
opportunity to litigate her state and federal claims. See Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 840.12
12
The Court also notes that because the Metro HRA’s 2007 and 2008 administrative
decisions, and Jackson’s subsequent challenges to those decisions, involved the same parties and
arose from the same factual circumstances as those which form the basis of Jackson’s federal
claims, the administrative decisions may also preclude at least some of Jackson’s claims. See
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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B.
Seventh Amendment
As to Jackson’s objection based on the Seventh Amendment, Jackson seems to
argue that because her state case was not tried before a jury, the state court’s decision
does not have preclusive effect. This legal theory is faulty and misapplies both the
doctrine of res judicata and the Seventh Amendment. While it is true that under the
Seventh Amendment, “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States,” Jackson’s Seventh Amendment rights are not at issue here.
See U.S. Const. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment does not provide for an automatic
right to have any fact examined by a jury, and, in this case, Jackson has no right to have
her claims heard before a jury because she fails to set forth facts sufficient to defeat
summary judgment. See, e.g., Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th
Cir. 1999) (finding that lack of a material fact question deprived the plaintiff of the right
to a jury or bench trial). Because a state court’s grant of summary judgment can serve as
a basis for res judicata, the Court overrules Jackson’s objection. See Rick v. Wyeth, Inc.,
662 F.3d 1067, 1069, 1072 (8th Cir. 2011).
____________________________________
(Footnote continued.)
Brinker v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 13, 15 (8th Cir. 1975). However, because the state court
reviewed the merits of Jackson’s challenge to the administrative decisions, this Court will only
focus on the state district court decision in evaluating the application of res judicata to Jackson’s
current claims.
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III
AFFIDAVITS
Jackson next objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation by alleging that
the Metro HRA’s summary judgment motion is not supported by admissible evidence.
Specifically, Jackson contends that the Metro HRA’s affidavits are inauthentic because
they were submitted electronically, without being properly signed or notarized. Jackson
also alleges that by submitting these documents to the Court without being properly
authenticated – thus making them inadmissible evidence – the Metro HRA has committed
acts of perjury and attorney misconduct.
The Court concludes that the Metro HRA’s affidavits are sufficiently
authenticated. The Electronic Case Filing Procedures in this District require parties
electronically filing a document, including all notarized documents, to sign the document
with “s/ Name” in lieu of an actual signature. See Elec. Case Filing Procedures Guide,
Civil Cases at 11-12, http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/cmecf/guides/Civil-ECF-ProceduresGuide.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2012). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(1), if
a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact as required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c), the court has discretion to give that party an opportunity to properly do
so. In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge found that the Metro HRA did not electronically
designate notarization on the affidavit of Beth Reetz and directed the Metro HRA to refile
the affidavit within thirty days of the order, which the Metro HRA did. (See R&R at 9;
Aff. of Beth Reetz, June 12, 2012, Docket No. 99.) In her objection, Jackson contends
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this directive was improper and violated Rule 56(c)(1),13 which states that a party who
asserts facts as undisputed must properly support those facts with admissible evidence,
such as an affidavit. The Court finds, however, that the Magistrate Judge merely – and
properly – exercised discretion, pursuant to Rule 56(e)(1), in allowing the Metro HRA to
refile the Reetz affidavit.14
Moreover, mindful of the standard for summary judgment, the Court notes that the
substance of Jackson’s objection was not to the facts asserted in the affidavit of Beth
Reetz, but merely to a technical defect in the procedure by which it was admitted.
Therefore, even if there were a continuing procedural defect with the affidavit, that flaw
would not affect the outcome of this motion because Jackson has not asserted facts
sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Indeed, Jackson does not specifically dispute any
of the facts set forth in the Reetz affidavit, and summary judgment is proper in the
absence of a genuine, material factual dispute.15
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Accordingly, the Court overrules Jackson’s objection regarding the Reetz affidavit.16
13
Jackson also alleges that the Magistrate Judge’s directive violated the Minnesota
Supreme Court Order ADM 10-8011 promulgating amendments to the e-filing rules of civil
procedure, see http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/Clerks_Office/ADM10801105242012.pdf, as well as Rule 5.06 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court finds
otherwise. This action is in federal court where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply,
making Minnesota procedural rules inapplicable. Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
Order ADM 10-8011 is not effective until September 1, 2012, and will only apply to all actions
or proceedings going forward from that date.
14
The Court additionally notes that, according to the Magistrate Judge, some of
Jackson’s own exhibits were “routinely accepted” despite their “apparent inauthenticity.” (R&R
at 3.)
15
Jackson asserts that she doubts the credibility of the witness Beth Reetz and that this
doubt creates a genuine issue of material fact. Jackson cites Sartor v. Ark. Natural Gas Corp.,
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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IV.
NEGLIGENCE
Finally, Jackson argues that because the Metro HRA’s evidence in support of
summary judgment is based on the improperly authenticated affidavits, summary
judgment on her negligence claim is improper. However, as discussed above, because
the Metro HRA’s affidavits are properly admissible evidence, this argument fails.
Jackson’s negligence claim additionally fails because, as discussed, it is barred by res
judicata. Furthermore, as outlined below, Jackson’s negligence claim fails because she
does not establish a prima facie case.
Under Minnesota law, a plaintiff must establish four essential elements to prevail
on a claim for negligence: “(1) the existence of a duty of care; (2) a breach of that duty;
(3) an injury was sustained; and (4) breach of the duty was the proximate cause of the
injury.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Aquila, Inc., 718 N .W.2d 879, 887 (Minn. 2006)
(quotation marks and citations omitted).
The problem with Jackson’s negligence claim is illustrative of the defect in this
entire action: in order to defeat summary judgment, Jackson must do more than make
____________________________________
(Footnote continued.)
321 U.S. 620 (1944) to support an argument that where there is such doubt, a jury is entitled to
observe the demeanor of the witness. This argument has no merit because (1) in making this
allegation, Jackson does not produce any facts that would create a genuine doubt as to Beth
Reetz’s credibility, and (2) Jackson seems to base her general allegation of “credibility” on her
argument that the unnotarized affidavit is inadmissible evidence, which the Court finds meritless.
16
Jackson also alleges in her objection that, by allowing the Metro HRA time to refile its
affidavit with proper authentication, the Magistrate Judge is “aiding and abetting” the Metro
HRA in an unlawful act. The Court finds no merit in this allegation because, as described above,
the Magistrate Judge properly exercised discretion.
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conclusory allegations. In asserting her negligence claim, Jackson “rests on the bare
assertions” that the Metro HRA was negligent in exercising administrative duties without
offering any supportive evidence or a clear definition of those duties. (See R&R at 17;
Am. Compl., ¶¶ 1-3.) Accordingly, Jackson has failed to establish the existence of a duty
of care or a breach of that duty. The Court finds that Jackson has neither pled nor
proffered evidence of a viable negligence claim and thus adopts the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation for summary judgment.17
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, the
Court OVERRULES the plaintiff’s objections [Docket No. 96] and ADOPTS the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation dated May 17, 2012 [Docket No. 95].
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket
No. 83] dated January 13, 2012 is GRANTED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED: September 27, 2012
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.
____s/
____
JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
17
As part of her negligence claim, Jackson alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437(f)(5)(a), but this subsection does not exist and Jackson does not define what duty the
Metro HRA breached. (Am. Compl. at 1.) Similarly, Jackson alleges a violation of 24 C.F.R.
§ 982.304 but has not asserted facts to show a violation of this regulation. (See id. ¶ 28.)
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