Brown v. Chiappetta et al
Filing
46
ORDER granting 31 defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 12 plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Written Opinion). Signed by Senior Judge David S. Doty on 8/23/2011. (PJM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 10-2629(DSD/TNL)
Esther Ruth Brown,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
Michael Chiappetta and
City of Minneapolis,
Defendants.
Joshua R. Williams, Esq., Law Office of Joshua R.
Williams, PLLC, 2701 University Avenue S.E., Suite 209,
Minneapolis, MN 55414, counsel for plaintiff.
C. Lynne Fundingsland, Esq., Amanda M. Trelstad, Esq. and
Minneapolis City Attorney’s Office, 350 South Fifth
Street, Room 210, Minneapolis, MN 55415, counsel for
defendants.
This matter is before the court upon the motion for partial
summary judgment by plaintiff Esther Ruth Brown and motion for
summary judgment by defendants Michael Chiappetta and City of
Minneapolis.
The court heard oral argument on May 27, 2011.
Based
on a review of the file, record and proceedings herein, and for the
following reasons, the court grants defendants’ motion.
BACKGROUND
This
civil rights
dispute
arises
out of
the
arrest
and
detention of Brown following an alleged drive-by shooting in
Minneapolis, Minnesota in August 2009.
I.
Initial Investigation and Reports
On August 27, 2009, at 4:46 p.m. Derrick Charleston called 911
and reported that Brown had fired three shots at him from the
passenger seat of a green Pontiac near the corner of 36th Avenue
North and Penn Avenue North.
Minutes later Minneapolis Police
Officer Anna Hedberg arrived and questioned Charleston. Charleston
stated that he knew Brown because he had lived with her and she
recently
kicked
him
out
after
girlfriend, Drucilla Pickens.
an
argument
concerning
his
Chiappetta Aff. Ex. 1, at 8; see
Brown Dep. 8:22–10:3. Charleston said that Brown fired three shots
at him from the passenger seat of a dark green car with twenty-inch
silver rims.
Chiappetta Aff. Ex. 1, at 8.
vehicle belonged to Brown.
Id.
He said that the
An independent witness, Patricia
Knapp, approached Hedberg and said that she heard three shots fired
from a dark green vehicle, but that she could not see the shooter
because the vehicle had tinted windows.
Id.
Hedberg searched the
area and found three spent 9-mm shell casings.
Id.
Hedberg recognized Charleston as a suspect in the burglary of
Brown’s home on August 26, 2009, during which a 9-mm Taurus handgun
was allegedly stolen.1
Id.
placed him in her squad car.
Hedberg handcuffed Charleston and
Id.
Charleston told Hedberg that he
had neither burglarized Brown’s house nor stolen a handgun.
1
Id.
On August 26, 2009, Brown reported that Charleston had
burglarized her home and had stolen jewelry and her 9-mm handgun.
2
Rather, Charleston said that he had returned only to recover his
property.
Id.
Hedberg released Charleston, and instructed him to
contact the precinct the next day.
Id.
Meanwhile, Officers Kasso and Griffin saw Brown and two of her
friends, Yenestra Shockency and Derrica Randle in a green GMC Jimmy
near Brown’s house.
arrested Brown.
Id.
Id. at 10–11. Griffin stopped the vehicle and
Kasso reported that she heard Shockency say,
“[t]his must be because of the shooting” and “[t]his must be
because of the gun.”
Id. at 11.
Chiappetta was assigned to investigate the incident. Officers
Hedberg, Griffin and Yasso each wrote supplemental reports on
August 27.
Chiappetta wrote a supplemental report on August 28.
Chiappetta’s report noted largely the same information as the
reports of Hedberg, Griffin and Yasso, but added that Shockency had
been contacted “but would not confirm that she was present during
the time of the shooting” and that Randle “also stated that she was
with Brown from 3 [p.m.] to the time of her arrest but denied a
shooting had taken place.”
Id. at 13.
Chiappetta stated that
“[b]oth known witnesses that had been contacted are believed to be
providing false information at this time.”
II.
Id.
Criminal Complaint
On August 28, 2009, an assistant county attorney filed a
complaint against Brown in Minnesota state court.
stated:
3
The complaint
Complainant, Sgt. Michael Chiappetta, of the
Minneapolis
Police
Department,
has
investigated the facts and circumstances of
this offense and believes that the following
establishes probable cause:
On August 27, 2009, at about 4:49 p.m.,
police spoke with [Derrick Charleston], a 19
year old male. He stated that he had been at
36th
Street
and
Penn
Ave.
North
in
Minneapolis, Hennepin County, when a green
Buick [sic] Grand Prix with 20” silver rim
tires approached.
A woman he recognized as
ESTHER RUTH BROWN, the Defendant herein,
reached out the right passenger window and
fired a handgun three times in his direction.
Officer
Hedberg,
who
spoke
with
[Charleston], was also approached by a woman,
[Knapp], who stated that she heard three shots
coming from a dark green vehicle which had
dark tinted windows. Officer Hedberg searched
the area where the car had reportedly been
when the shots were fired.
The officer
located three 9-mm shell casings on the north
side of 36th, just north of Penn Ave. These
were photographed and recovered.
Officer Griffin reports that on August
27, 2009, at about 5:48 p.m., he and Officer
Kasso
located
a
vehicle
matching
the
description given by the witnesses. Officer
Kasso reports that the driver appeared to
attempt to evade the squad.
The defendant
BROWN was seated in the front passenger seat.
The car contained two other women.
One of
them, [Shockency] stated “This must be because
of the shooting.” [Shockency] later stated,
“This must be because of the gun.”
Officer Hedberg reports that the day
before this drive-by shooting the defendant
BROWN had made a police report claiming that
her “godson,” [Charleston], had re-entered her
home without consent and had taken items,
including her 9-mm Taurus semi-automatic
handgun.
4
Williams Decl. Ex. C, at 1, ECF No. 30-1, at 27.
The judge found probable cause and set bail at $100,000.2
Id.
at 3. Brown remained in pretrial detention until Shockency and two
others posted a $3,000 bond on September 26, 2009.
Brown was
released.
A week or
The case proceeded to trial in April 2010.
two before trial, Brown’s defense attorney failed to show up for a
meeting with the prosecutor and Chiappetta to discuss disclosures.
Chiappetta Aff. Ex. 4, at 88:19–89:9, 95:4–96:16.
On the morning
of trial a discovery dispute arose, and Brown argued that the City
had failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. The judge held a pretrial hearing.
III.
Pretrial Hearing
Chiappetta was the only person who testified at the hearing.
Brown’s
defense
counsel
and
the
assistant
county
attorney
questioned Chiappetta.
A.
Shockency and Randle
Chiappetta said that he spoke to Shockency on August 28, and
that she “denied making the statement” about the gun at the time
Kasso and Griffin stopped the car.
11:5–8.
Chiappetta Aff. Ex. 4, at
Chiappetta said that he told the prosecutor about the
conversation, but could not recall the exact date or time.
16:14–18.
Id. at
Chiappetta also confirmed that he spoke to Randle on
August 28, and that Randle told him that she had been with Brown
2
According to Brown bail was $50,000.
5
Brown Dep. 27:22:23.
since 3:00 p.m. on August 27.
Id. at 27:25–28:4.
Randle also
confirmed several other facts, none of which were relevant. Id. at
38:21–25.
B.
Pickens and Charleston
Chiappetta talked to Pickens about her relationship with
Charleston and Brown, and confirmed Charleston’s story that there
was
no
burglary
on
August
26.
Id.
at
45:16–18,
46:2–11.
Chiappetta did not discuss the shooting with Pickens.
Id. at
45:22–46:1.
He talked to Charleston before taking his recorded
statement.
Chiappetta
also
talked
to
Charleston
after
the
statement to confirm some facts about the alleged burglary and
handgun.
C.
Id. at 62:11–25.
Kris Brown
Chiappetta also spoke with Kris Brown, who cares for Brown’s
adult son. Kris Brown told Chiappetta that she had been with Brown
when she bought the 9-mm handgun. Id. at 69:4–17. Detective Brian
McKague also spoke with Kris Brown in November 2009.
7, at 1.
Trelstad Ex.
Kris Brown told McKague that “she has seen Esther [Brown]
driving by the house and on one occasion Esther [Brown] parked in
front of the house and pointed a gun at Kris through the window.”
Id. at 2.
D.
Firearm Evidence
Chiappetta also said that the same gun was used in a separate
shooting in October 2009.
Id. at 75:10–18; Pl’s Mem. Supp. 6.
6
Chiappetta told the prosecutor about the second shooting a week
before trial.
Chiappetta Ex. 4, at 75:13–19.
Chiappetta stated
that he did not see bullet holes at the scene of the alleged
shooting.
At the end of the hearing Brown moved to dismiss the charges.
The state court dismissed the complaint as a sanction for the
City’s failure to disclose.
On June 25, 2010, Brown sued defendants under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, claiming that they deprived her of Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to liberty and due process.3
Brown also claims
numerous state statutory and common law violations, including
intentional
infliction
of
emotional
infliction of emotional distress.
distress
and
negligent
Brown moves for partial summary
judgment as to liability under § 1983 and defendants move for
summary judgment on all claims.4
DISCUSSION
I.
State Criminal Proceeding
Brown bases much of her argument on the order of the state
court judge
3
dismissing
the
criminal
case.
The
dismissal
is
Brown amended her complaint on February 4, 2011.
4
At oral argument, Brown abandoned her claims against the
City and her state claims against Chiappetta for malicious
prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment. Therefore, the
court dismisses those claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
7
significant to the instant action, however the issues in the
criminal
case
Chiappetta
had
proceeding.
are
distinct
from
no
interest
in
this
the
action.
outcome
of
For
example,
the
criminal
Moreover, the decision of the judge to dismiss the
criminal complaint bears only on the acts of the prosecutor, and
Chiappetta appeared as an uninterested witness, not an adversary.
Therefore, the outcome of the state criminal proceeding does not
establish § 1983 liability for Chiappetta, and the reasons for
sanctions are of little analytical value here.
II.
Qualified Immunity
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects [police] officers
from personal liability under § 1983 ‘insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a
reasonable
person
would
have
known.’”
Baribeau
v.
City
of
Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 473 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pearson v.
Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009)).
The court applies the
doctrine of qualified immunity in a manner that “gives ample room
for
mistaken
judgments
by
protecting
all
but
the
plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Walker v. City
of Pine Bluff, 414 F.3d 989, 992 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hunter v.
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)).
“The party asserting immunity
always has the burden to establish the relevant predicate facts,
and at the summary judgment stage, the nonmoving party is given the
8
benefit of all reasonable inferences.” White v. McKinley, 519 F.3d
806, 813 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
To determine whether an official is entitled to qualified
immunity the court views the facts in the light most favorable to
the
plaintiff
and
considers
(1)
whether
the
alleged
facts
demonstrate that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional
right and (2) whether the right claimed was clearly established at
the time of the alleged injury.
See id.
“If the answer to either
question is no, then [the official] is entitled to qualified
immunity.”
Doe v. Flaherty, 623 F.3d 577, 583 (8th Cir. 2010); see
Callahan, 129 S. Ct. at 818.
Fourth Amendment5
III.
“The standard for arrest is probable cause, defined in terms
of facts and circumstances ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the (suspect) had committed or was committing an
offense.’”
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975) (quoting
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).
Police officers may act on
“facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability.”
at 112.
“Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement.
Id.
To
allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of
the officers’ whim or caprice.”
Id. (citation omitted).
5
At oral argument, the court asked Brown’s counsel to clarify
whether she were abandoning her claim under the Fourth Amendment.
Counsel’s answer suggested that she was. The court addresses the
claim, however because it remained unclear whether Brown persisted
in this claim.
9
In the present case the City presented substantial evidence in
support of probable cause: a victim’s statement identifying Brown
as the shooter, an independent witness report corroborating the
victim’s statement and shell casings found at the scene consistent
with the statement.
omissions
would
not
A judge found probable cause.
change
that
outcome.
The
The alleged
inclusion
of
Shockency’s denial or Randle’s statement that she was with Brown
the day of the shooting at best would create a question of
credibility.
Given the totality of the evidence, these statements
do not seriously call into question the existence of probable
cause.
Therefore, Brown’s claim that her arrest and detention
violated the Fourth Amendment fails, and summary judgment is
warranted.
See Fisher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 619 F.3d 811, 818
(8th Cir. 2010) (“If the officers had probable cause, the arrests
did not violate the Fourth Amendment and the officers are not
liable.” (citation omitted)).6
IV.
Fourteenth Amendment
A.
Brady v. Maryland
Due
process
requires
prosecutors
that
material
to
evidence
defendant.
6
is
the
to
guilt
disclose
or
favorable
punishment
of
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
Moreover, Chiappetta was not an arresting officer.
10
a
“Brady’s
protections
also
extend
to
actions
of
enforcement officers such as investigating officers.”
other
law
White, 519
F.3d at 814.
The Eighth Circuit has never extended Brady beyond trial. See
United States v. Tyndall, 521 F.3d 877, 881 (8th Cir. 2008) (“The
evidence is not material and no prejudice can be shown unless there
is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been
different if the evidence had not been suppressed.” (emphasis
added)); White, 519 F.3d at 814 (“[T]he recovery of § 1983 damages
requires proof that a law enforcement officer other than the
prosecutor intended to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.”
(emphasis added) (quoting Villasana v. Wilhoit
368 F.3d 976, 980
(8th Cir. 2004)); Evans v. Janing, 489 F.2d 470, 474 (8th Cir.
1973) (“Unlike the exclusionary rule of Mapp and Miranda, the duty
of disclosure enunciated in Brady v. Maryland is designed to assure
the fundamental right to a fair trial rather than penalize law
enforcement officers for conduct encroaching upon an accused’s
constitutional rights.”) (emphasis added)).
Indeed, the Eighth
Circuit recently confirmed that “Brady does not require pretrial
disclosure, and due process is satisfied if the information is
furnished before it is too late for the defendant to use it at
trial.”
Jeanpierre, 636 F.3d at 422 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
11
Other
courts
of
appeals
agree.
See
United
States
v.
Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 285 (4th Cir. 2010) (“The Brady right,
however, is a trial right.”); Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656, 663
(4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“A Brady violation that resulted in the
overturning of the § 1983 plaintiff’s conviction is a necessary,
but not a sufficient, condition for § 1983 liability on the part of
the police.”); Morgan v. Gertz, 166 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir.
1999) (“Regardless of any misconduct by government agents before or
during trial, a defendant who is acquitted cannot be said to have
been deprived of the right to a fair trial.”); Flores v. Satz, 137
F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding no Brady violation due to
acquittal); McCune v. City of Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 907 (6th
Cir.
1988)
(finding
civil
plaintiff
in
month-long
pretrial
detention could not bring disclosure claim due to lack of criminal
trial).
Brown argues that the court should expand Brady into the
probable-cause and release-determination phase of an investigation.
A probable cause hearing and pretrial detention are not the same as
a trial and conviction.
Arrest probable cause requires only facts
and circumstances that support the reasonable belief that a suspect
committed an offense.
See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111.
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Conviction
“That difference,
together with uncertainties in what the evidence will show, implies
that some
innocent
persons
will
12
be
prosecuted.”
Buckley
v.
Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other
grounds, 502 U.S. 801 (1991).
As a result, “[p]ersons may be detained on evidence less than
necessary to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ‘(b)ecause many
situations which confront officers in the course of executing their
duties are more or less ambiguous’ and ‘room must be allowed for
some mistakes on their part.’” Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521,
529
n.14
(D.C.
Cir.
1978)
(alteration
in
original)
(quoting
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)); see Mays v.
City
of
Dayton,
134
F.3d
809,
816
(6th
Cir.
1998)
(finding
disclosure less compelling at probable cause stage than trial due
to less-severe consequences).
pretrial
detention,
further
The court does not suggest that
investigation
and
the
threat
of
prosecution are de minimis. The consequences are significant. But
they do not carry the same opprobrium and stigma of a criminal
conviction.
Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 872
(1997).
In the present case, there was no trial.
Brown were dismissed.
All charges against
This case presents no reason to expand the
trial rights of Brady into the early phases of an investigation.
Therefore, the facts fail to show that Chiappetta violated Brown’s
due process rights, and summary judgment is warranted.7
7
Although the court is not aware of a case in which the
Eighth Circuit expanded Brady beyond trial, it has never expressly
(continued...)
13
Even if the Brady disclosure right were unconnected to trial
and applied at the probable-cause stage, police officers have no
absolute duty to disclose.
“[T]he Constitution is not violated
every time the government fails or chooses not to disclose evidence
that might prove helpful to the defense.”
Kyles v. Whitley,
514
U.S. 419, 436–37 (1995) (citation omitted). The Due Process Clause
does not “demand[] an open file policy” and the government retains
a “degree of discretion.”
Id. at 437.
However, an investigating
officer violates the duty to disclose when he acts in bad faith.
White, 519 F.3d at 814; accord Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d
985, 990, 995 (7th Cir. 1988). The bad-faith requirement serves to
avoid “imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty
to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable
evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution.”
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988).
Arizona v.
Thus to show a due process
violation for failure to disclose, Brown would need to show that
(1) Chiappetta failed to disclose evidence favorable to Brown,
(2) the evidence was material and (3) Chiappetta acted in bad
faith.
Cf. Jeanpierre,
636 F.3d at 422; White, 519 F.3d at 814.
Evidence is material when it “might have affected the outcome of
the trial.”
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674–75 (1985)
(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
7
(...continued)
declined to expand Brady. As a result, the court also analyzes the
instant motion under Brady.
14
Chiappetta first argues that Brown has not shown that he
failed to disclose favorable evidence or that the evidence was
material.
The court agrees.
The evidence that the same gun used
in the August 27 incident was used again after Brown was released
from detention is, if anything, inculpatory.
There is no evidence
that any of Chiappetta’s discussions with Pickens or unrecorded
discussions with Charleston involved any exculpatory evidence.
If
anything, their statements could show that Brown filed the burglary
complaint out of anger towards Charleston. Chiappetta’s failure to
observe bullet holes is not evidence of anything, especially in
light of the witness statements and shell casings.
The only possibly exculpatory evidence is Shockency’s denial
of the spontaneous utterance and Randle’s denial of the shooting.
Chiappetta disclosed Randle’s denial and, at best, Shockency’s
denial created an issue of credibility between Shockency and the
arresting officers.
Even resolving such credibility dispute in
favor of Brown, the victim’s statement, his identification of
Brown, the corroborating statement by an independent witness and
the presence of shell casings are substantial evidence to support
probable cause.
Additional disclosure would not have changed the
probable-cause determination.
Therefore, Brown fails to show that
the undisclosed evidence was material at the probable cause stage.
Moreover, a determination that probable cause existed to
believe that Brown committed assault does not inform the custody
15
determination.
A judge setting terms of release “must consider”
numerous factors:
a) the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged; (b) the weight of the evidence;
(c) family ties; (d) employment; (e) financial
resources; (f) character and mental condition;
(g) length of residence in the community;
(h) criminal convictions; (i) prior history of
appearing in court; (j) prior flight to avoid
prosecution; (k) the victim’s safety; (l) any
other person’s safety; (m) the community’s
safety.
Minn. R. Cr. P. 6.02 subdiv. 2.
The weight of the evidence is only
one of many factors the judge must consider. Nothing in the record
supports
complaint
an
or
inference
that
different outcome.
the
that
the
judge
additional
set
facts
bail
would
based
have
on
led
the
to
a
Therefore, Brown also fails to show that the
undisclosed evidence was material to the judge’s determination of
the amount of bail.
Chiappetta next argues that his actions were not in bad faith.
Courts have found bad faith when investigating officers have an
interest in the investigation, lie or manufacture evidence.
See
White, 519 F.3d at 811, 814 (investigating officer lied about
ongoing romantic
relationship
with
accuser’s
mother,
violated
department rules regarding victim contact and failed to preserve
victim’s diary that called accused “a good father” who she “wanted
to spend more time bonding with at the family’s lake house”);
Livers v. Schenck, No. 08-107, 2011 WL 1197464, at *3, *7–8 (D.
Neb. Mar. 28, 2011) (investigating officers fabricated evidence,
16
prepared false reports, tampered with evidence, coerced confession
and suppressed recanted confession by developmentally disabled
plaintiff accused of capital murder); accord Jones, 856 F.2d at
990, 995 (investigating officers manufactured false identification,
falsified witness statements and victim identification of another
person as assailant, suppressed report by another investigator and
used
clandestine
files
of
“railroading” of accused).
exculpatory
information
leading
to
Chiappetta’s failure to record largely
immaterial, neutral facts stands in stark contrast to those cases
involving bad faith.
An investigating officer need not assiduously record every
word of every conversation in the early stages of an investigation.
See Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988); California v. Trombetta,
467 U.S. 479, 488–89 & 489 n.8 (1984); Jones, 856 F.2d at 995.
Instead, due process requires police to preserve and disclose
evidence that could exonerate a defendant.
U.S. at 58.
See Youngblood, 488
Chiappetta’s initial suspicion that Shockency was
lying to him was reasonable and formed the basis for further
investigation. His report noted that he had spoken with Shockency.
Her denial does not exonerate Brown.
Chiappetta disclosed the
statement of Randle that she had been with Brown and denied that
Brown was involved in the shooting. Therefore, Brown does not show
that Chiappetta
acted
in bad
faith,
warranted.
17
and
summary
judgment
is
In short, Brown fails to show that Chiappetta violated her due
process right
to
disclosure because
she
never
stood
trial.
Moreover, Chiappetta’s acts were not in bad faith and Brown does
not show that the disputed evidence is favorable or material under
Brady.
Therefore,
for
each
of these
reasons,
Chiappetta is
entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983.
Qualified immunity is also warranted because the right to
disclosure, as interpreted by Brown, was not clearly established at
the time.
A right is clearly established if “it would be clear to
a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation
he confronted.”
White, 519 F.3d at 813.
never extended Brady beyond trial.
The Eighth Circuit has
The parties do not present any
case in which a court of appeals extended Brady beyond trial.
A
reasonable officer could not have known that disclosing Shockency’s
inconsistent statement to the prosecutor before trial but not
during the initial investigation would violate Brown’s due process
rights.
For this additional reason, Chiappetta is entitled to
qualified immunity.
B.
Malicious Prosecution and Reckless Investigation
The Eighth Circuit has recognized a cause of action for
reckless investigation under the Due Process Clause.
Brooks, 522 F.3d 823, 833–34 (8th Cir. 2008).
Amarine v.
To prevail on a
claim for reckless investigation, a plaintiff must show that an
officer’s actions “shock the conscience.”
18
Id. at 833 (citation
omitted).
Gross negligence is not enough.
Id.
Brown also appears
to assert a general claim of malicious prosecution under either the
Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments.
The court applies the same
substantive due process standard to Brown’s § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim as her reckless investigation claim.8 Nothing in
the record approaches the standard of conscious shocking. The acts
alleged
occurred
Chiappetta
in
the
first
disclosed
his
potentially
Shockency and Randle.
that
the
evidence
hours
of
the
material
investigation.
interviews
with
Further, the court has already determined
supported
Shockency’s subsequent denial.
probable
cause,
with
or
without
See Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931,
938, 944 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Probable cause is an absolute defense to
[§ 1983 claim of] malicious prosecution.” (citation omitted).
In
short, the most that can be said about Chiappetta’s actions is that
his record keeping was sloppy.
His actions led to judicial
sanctions in the form of dismissal of the criminal case against
Brown.
Those same acts do not violate substantive due process.
Therefore, summary judgment is warranted.
8
The court notes that the Supreme Court has held that
“pretrial deprivations of liberty” are properly analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment.
See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274
(1994). The court has already determined that even if the disputed
evidence were included, the record supports the finding of probable
cause by the state-court judge. As a result Brown’s claims also
fail under the Fourth Amendment.
19
V.
State Law Claims
A.
Supplemental Jurisdiction
Having
determined
that
summary
judgment
is
warranted
on
Brown’s federal claims, the court must determine whether to dismiss
or
exercise
claims.
supplemental
jurisdiction
over
Brown’s
state-law
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); McLain v. Andersen Corp., 567
F.3d 956, 965 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[P]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
courts have the discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over remaining state-law claims even after the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Because Brown’s
federal and state claims derive from the same facts, deciding both
claims
in
one
proceeding
promotes
judicial
efficiency.
See
OnePoint Solutions, LLC v. Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 350 (8th Cir.
2007) (finding exercise of supplemental jurisdiction appropriate
when claims would ordinarily be expected to be tried in one
proceeding).
B.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To establish intentional infliction of emotional distress,
Brown must demonstrate four elements: “(1) the conduct must be
extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct must be intentional or
reckless;
(3) it
must cause
distress must be severe.”
emotional distress;
and
(4)
the
Langeslag v. KYMN Inc., 664 N.W.2d 860,
864 (Minn. 2003) (citation omitted).
20
Conduct that is extreme and
outrageous “must be so atrocious that it passes the boundaries of
decency and is utterly intolerable to the civilized community.”
Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 439 (Minn.
1983) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Brown does
not show that Chiappetta caused severe emotional distress.
The
record shows that Brown has a long history of depression and was
treated for depression before and after her arrest.
Aff. Exs. 2, 6.
elements.
See Trelstad
Further, she cannot establish the first two
No evidence before the court supports a finding that
Chiappetta’s actions were “extreme and outrageous.”
Therefore,
summary judgment is warranted on this claim.
C.
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
To prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional
distress Brown must prove that Chiappetta owed her a duty of care,
breached that duty, the breach caused her injury, she was within
the zone of danger of physical impact, she reasonably feared for
her safety and she consequently suffered severe emotional distress
with attendant physical manifestations. See Engler v. Ill. Farmers
Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Minn. 2005).
The “physical injury
or symptom requirement ... is a judicial obstacle designed to
insure
a
plaintiff's
claim
is
real.”
Quill
v.
Trans
World
Airlines, Inc., 361 N.W.2d 438, 443 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (citation
omitted).
Brown’s weight and hair loss, depression, sense of
betrayal and
stress
are
not
sufficiently severe
21
to
meet the
physical manifestation requirement. See Leaon v. Washington Cnty.,
397 N.W.2d
867,
875
(Minn.
1986)
(holding
that
lost
weight,
depression and feelings of anger, fear, and bitterness do not
satisfy physical manifestations test).
Moreover, Brown fails to
show that she was in a zone of danger that led her reasonably to
fear for her own safety. Contrary to Brown’s conclusory statement,
jail is not an “inherently unsafe place.”
Therefore, summary
judgment is warranted on this claim.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [ECF 31] is
granted; and
2.
Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment [ECF 12]
is denied.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated:
August 23, 2011
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court
22
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