Child Evangelism Fellowship of Minnesota v. Minneapolis Special School District #1

Filing 54

ORDER 1. VACATING 52 Order for Entry of Permanent Injunction and Dismissal and the accompanying 53 Judgment. 2. DENYING 51 the parties' Stipul ation for Entry of Permanent Injunction and Dismissal with Prejudice to the extent it requests the entry of a permanent injunction and the Court's retention of jurisdiction over this matter. 3. Thirty days from the entry of this Order, the Court will dismiss CEF's claims with prejudice and direct that judgment be entered, unless any party has filed an objection to such an order.(Written Opinion). Signed by Judge John R. Tunheim on March 12, 2013. (DML)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
CHILD EVANGELISM FELLOWSHIP
OF MINNESOTA,

Civil No. 10-2687 (JRT/JJK)

Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
MINNEAPOLIS SPECIAL SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 1,
Defendant.

G. Craig Howse, HOWSE & THOMPSON, PA, 3189 Fernbrook Lane
North, Plymouth, MN 55447; Matthew H. Krause and Stephen M.
Crampton, LIBERTY COUNSEL, 100 Mountain View Drive, #2150,
Lynchburg, VA 24502, for plaintiff.
Michael J. Vanselow and Marie L. Van Uitert, OPPENHEIMER WOLFF
& DONNELLY LLP, 222 South Ninth Street, Suite 2000, Minneapolis,
MN 55402, for defendant.
The above-captioned matter came before the Court upon the parties’ Stipulation
for Entry of Permanent Injunction and Dismissal with Prejudice, (“the Stipulation”) filed
on October 10, 2012. On January 25, 2013, the Court issued an Order for Entry of
Permanent Injunction and Dismissal with Prejudice. Upon further review, the Court finds
that the Stipulation indicates only that the parties have agreed to settle this matter.
Because the Stipulation does not indicate that the parties have satisfied the requirements
for the entry of a permanent injunction, and the Court’s retention of jurisdiction is
unnecessary, the Court will vacate its previous order.

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BACKGROUND
Child Evangelism Fellowship of Minnesota (“CEF”) brought this action against
Minneapolis Special School District No. 1 (“the District”) seeking injunctive relief
preventing the District from engaging in conduct that allegedly violated CEF’s freedom
of speech, free exercise of religion, and other constitutional rights. (Compl., June 28,
2010, Docket No. 1; Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Jan. 3, 2011, Docket No. 9.)
CEF sponsors a Good News Club at the District’s Jenny Lind Elementary School.
The District operated an after school enrichment program pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 124D.19, subd. 12, which allows districts operating community education programs to
offer youth after school programs “that support development of social, mental, physical,
and creative abilities of school-age youth.” CEF became a member of the after school
program. However, during the 2008-2009 school year the District informed CEF that it
would be removed from the after school program, and as a result would not be listed in
the District’s after school program registration form, and would no longer have access to
transportation and food services from the District. CEF alleged that the District revoked
its right to participate in the after school program upon a complaint that CEF was
engaging in religious activities with students.
The Court denied CEF’s motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that CEF
was unlikely to succeed on the merits. (Order, Sept. 30, 2011, Docket No. 36.) The
Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that CEF was likely to succeed on the merits of its First
Amendment claim. Child Evangelism Fellowship of Minn. v. Minneapolis Special Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 690 F.3d 996 (8th Cir. 2012).
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On October 10, 2012, the parties filed the Stipulation indicating that they wish to
resolve the case and “avoid the time and expense of further litigation.” (Stipulation ¶ 3,
Oct. 10, 2012, Docket No. 51.) Pursuant to the Stipulation the District will pay CEF
$100,621 in attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. ¶ 5.) The Stipulation also prohibits the
District from denying CEF’s Good News Club full reinstatement as an after school
program at Jenny Lind, including equal access to the facilities and benefits enjoyed by
other after school programs. (Id. ¶ 4.) Finally, the Stipulation requests that the Court
enter a permanent injunction and “retain jurisdiction over this matter for the purpose of
enforcing its permanent injunction.” (Id. ¶¶ 3, 7.)

ANALYSIS
I.

PERMANENT INJUNCTION
Whether to issue a permanent injunction is a decision committed to the discretion

of the district court. Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 382 F.3d 807, 812 (8th Cir.
2004).

“According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a

permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief.”
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).

When considering

whether to issue a permanent injunction, one of the four factors that the Court must
consider is “the threat of irreparable harm to the movant.” Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336
F.3d 724, 731 (8th Cir. 2003). In determining whether a party faces a threat of irreparable
harm, the Court considers the likelihood of future violations and whether an “injunction
is necessary to prevent future violations.” United States v. Articles of Drug, 825 F.2d

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1238, 1248 (8th Cir. 1987).1 Where there is no threat of future harm, injunctive relief is
not warranted. See LensCrafters, Inc. v. Vision World, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1481, 1497
(D. Minn. 1996). Consequently, “a defendant’s voluntary cessation ‘is an important
factor bearing on the question of whether a court should exercise its power to enjoin
defendant.’” Surdyk’s Liquor, Inc. v. MGM Liquor Stores, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1016,
1020 (D. Minn. 2000) (quoting City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283,
283 (1982)).
Here, the Court finds that the parties have not demonstrated that permanent
injunctive relief is necessary or warranted. Instead, the Stipulation reveals the parties’
agreement to settle the action. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Kurnizki, No. 2:06-cv-2702,
2007 WL 214564, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2007) (“[T]he Stipulation does not indicate
that Defendant will not abide by the parties’ agreed upon settlement, such that a
permanent injunction and retention of jurisdiction to enforce the settlement is required.”).
The Stipulation does not reveal that a permanent injunction is necessary to prevent future
violations by the District. Instead, because the District has voluntarily agreed to cease the
challenged conduct, the Court finds that there is no threat of future irreparable harm to
CEF and therefore an injunction should not issue.

1

See also United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) (“[T]he moving
party must satisfy the court that [injunctive] relief is needed. The necessary determination is that
there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation, something more than the mere
possibility which serves to keep the case alive.”).
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II.

PERPETUAL EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
Additionally, the Court is not bound by the parties’ stipulation regarding its

continuing exercise of jurisdiction, because retaining jurisdiction over enforcement of a
settlement involves a court’s ancillary subject matter jurisdiction.

See Gilbert v.

Monsanto Co., 216 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2000).2 “Parties cannot by agreement confer
jurisdiction upon a federal court.” Potter v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 329 F.3d 608, 611
(8th Cir. 2003). Therefore, it is irrelevant “whether both parties wish for the federal court
to retain indefinite jurisdiction to enforce their settlement agreement,” Brass Smith, LLC,
v. RPI Indus., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 377, 380 (D.N.J. 2011), because “parties may not
confer subject matter jurisdiction by consent.” Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc.,
357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2004).3 Instead, “[w]hether or not a court decides to retain
ancillary jurisdiction over the settlement agreement is discretionary,” and a district court
“is under no obligation to retain jurisdiction over a settlement agreement.” Brass Smith,
827 F. Supp. 2d at 381; see also Martin v. Moorhead Metro. Area Transit, 971 F. Supp.
414, 415 (D. Minn. 1997).

2

Federal courts do not automatically have jurisdiction over the enforcement of settlement
agreements. A district court retains ancillary enforcement jurisdiction over a settlement
agreement only if “the dismissal order states that the district court is retaining jurisdiction over
the agreement or the court incorporates the terms of the agreement into an order.” Jenkins v.
Kan. City Mo. Sch. Dist., 516 F.3d 1074, 1081 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994)).
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See also Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380 (“If the parties wish to provide for the court’s
enforcement of a dismissal-producing settlement agreement, they can seek to do so.” (emphasis
in original)); Arata v. Nu Skin Int’l, 96 F.3d 1265, 1269 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he mere fact that the
parties agree that the court should exercise continuing jurisdiction is not binding on the court.”).
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“Ancillary enforcement jurisdiction is, at its core, a creature of necessity.”
Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 359 (1996). Here, the Court finds that the parties’
Stipulation does not demonstrate any necessity for the perpetual exercise of the Court’s
jurisdiction. Instead, it appears from the Stipulation that the parties have reached an
agreement whereby the District has agreed not to deny CEF any of the rights accorded
the District’s other, non-religious after school programs. The Court sees no indication
that the District will violate this agreement, but if the agreement is violated, nothing will
prevent the parties from pursuing a remedy. See Martin, 971 F. Supp. at 416 (declining
to exercise continuing jurisdiction over a consent decree where “[t]he Court [wa]s fully
confident that the parties can and will pursue their remedies in regular course”).4
Additionally, the Court declines to exercise continuing jurisdiction consistent with the
Stipulation, because the Stipulation requests the Court to retain jurisdiction indefinitely
over all disputes arising out of CEF’s access to the facilities and benefits provided by the
District to its programs. Where the parties’ proposed retention of ancillary jurisdiction
would subject the Court to perpetual jurisdiction over a broad range of disputes, declining
to exercise jurisdiction is appropriate. See Brass Smith, LLC, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 383
(declining to exercise jurisdiction proposed in a settlement where “there are no temporal
or other limits to the Court’s jurisdiction over the settlement agreement . . . and . . . the

4

The Stipulation in the present case – indicating that the District has agreed to cease its
complained of conduct – does not reveal the need for the type of immediate and continuous
federal enforcement of its terms that would be provided by a permanent injunction accompanied
by the Court’s continued jurisdiction. Instead, the Stipulation contains simple contractual
settlement terms that can appropriately be enforced, in the event of a breach of those terms, by
state courts. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 382 (explaining that absent the explicit retention of
federal jurisdiction “enforcement of the settlement agreement is for the state courts, unless there
is some independent basis for federal jurisdiction”).
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parties appear to contemplate that the Court will be available for this limitless period to
resolve ‘any disputes pertaining’ to the agreement”).
Because the Court will decline to enter a permanent injunction and exercise
continuing jurisdiction over this matter, the Court’s approval of the parties’ Stipulation is
no longer necessary, and the document is now simply a private settlement. The parties
appear to have agreed to bind each other to the Stipulations’ terms – including that the
District will pay CEF’s attorneys’ fees and costs and also allow CEF to enjoy equal
access to the facilities and benefits enjoyed by non-religious groups – and request
dismissal with prejudice of CEF’s actions. The Court notes, however, that it is “without
authority to require parties to comply with a ‘settlement’ different from their own
agreement.” Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1., 921 F.2d
1371, 1389 (8th Cir. 1990). Although “a term mandating a court’s continuing jurisdiction
over a matter is not properly considered a term of settlement,” Martin, 971 F. Supp. at
415, it is possible that the Court’s refusal to enter a permanent injunction could materially
affect the parties’ decision to settle this case and dismiss CEF’s claims with prejudice.
Should the parties no longer agree to the entry of judgment in light of the Court’s refusal
to issue a permanent injunction, they may file a motion objecting to the Court’s dismissal
of this matter within thirty days of the entry of this Order.

ORDER
After further review, and based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and
proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1.

The Order for Entry of Permanent Injunction and Dismissal [Docket

No. 52] and the accompanying judgment [Docket No. 53] are hereby VACATED.
2.

The parties’ Stipulation for Entry of Permanent Injunction and Dismissal

with Prejudice [Docket No. 51] is DENIED to the extent it requests the entry of a
permanent injunction and the Court’s retention of jurisdiction over this matter.
3.

Thirty (30) days from the entry of this Order, the Court will dismiss CEF’s

claims with prejudice and direct that judgment be entered, unless any party has filed an
objection to such an order.

DATED: March 12, 2013
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.

____s/
____
JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge

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