Senty-Haugen v. Ludeman
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Adopting 11 Report and Recommendation; Petitioners Objections 12 are OVERRULED. Petitioners Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis 2 is DENIED and the Petition 1 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Ann D. Montgomery on 06/08/2011. (TLU)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Arthur Dale Senty-Haugen,
Petitioner,
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Civil No. 10-3073 ADM/FLN
Cal Ludeman,1
Respondent.
______________________________________________________________________________
Arthur Dale Senty-Haugen, pro se.
Steven H. Alpert, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, on behalf of Respondent.
______________________________________________________________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the undersigned United States District Judge for a ruling on
Petitioner Arthur Dale Senty-Haugen’s (“Senty-Haugen”) Objections [Docket No. 12] to
Magistrate Judge Franklin L. Noel’s April 4, 2011 Report and Recommendation (“R&R”)
[Docket No. 11] which recommends dismissing Senty-Haugen’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus [Docket No. 1]. Senty-Haugen’s habeas petition raises three claims: (1) he was denied
due process of law when, upon his release from federal custody, the Minnesota Sex Offender
Program (“MSOP”) took custody of him without a second petition for commitment or an
additional hearing; (2) Minnesota’s civil commitment statutes are unconstitutional because they
“creat[e] a punitive confinement and impos[e] greater burdens on SPP/SDP [sexual psychopathic
personality and sexually dangerous person] commitments than on others committed under the
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At the time Senty-Haugen filed this petition, Cal Ludeman served as the Commissioner
of the Minnesota Department of Human Services (“DHS”) and was the named Respondent.
Lucinda E. Jesson is the current Commissioner of the Minnesota DHS.
Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act”; and (3) the “clear and convincing” standard of
commitment required by the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act is unconstitutional
because the United States Supreme Court requires proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” for civil
commitments. Judge Noel concluded that Senty-Haugen’s first claim was procedurally defaulted
and could not be excused, and that his second and third claims were barred as untimely. For
these reasons, Judge Noel recommended that Senty-Haugen’s petition be denied. The procedural
and factual background described in the R&R are incorporated by reference. Based on a de novo
review of the record, Senty-Haugen’s Objections are overruled and the R&R is adopted.
II. DISCUSSION
A district court must make an independent, de novo review of those portions of an R&R
to which a party objects and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also D. Minn.
LR 72.2(b).
A. Claim One
On March 29, 1996, Ramsey County District Judge Margaret M. Marrinan ordered
Senty-Haugen indefinitely committed to the custody of the MSOP as an SPP/SDP and issued a
warrant for commitment on April 1, 1996. In 2000, Senty-Haugen pled guilty to felony charges
and served a sentence in a state correctional facility. In 2002, Senty-Haugen went from the state
correctional facility back to the MSOP. In November, 2004, Senty-Haugen was indicted by a
grand jury on federal charges and eventually pled guilty to five counts of aiding and abetting
false claims and one count of conspiracy to defraud the government in connection with a tax
fraud scheme, and was sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment in a federal facility.
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Before Senty-Haugen’s federal sentence ended, Judge Marrinan issued a hold and
transport order which directed the MSOP to take custody of Senty-Haugen immediately upon his
release from federal custody. On January 6, 2009, Senty-Haugen returned to the MSOP in
Moose Lake where he currently resides.
In April 2009, Senty-Haugen filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Carlton
County District Court. The petition was denied. Senty-Haugen appealed raising several
arguments, including the claim at issue here, namely, that his return to the MSOP custody upon
his release from federal custody pursuant to Judge Marrinan’s hold and transport order violated
due process because there was no second petition for commitment or additional hearing. The
Minnesota Court of Appeals declined to reach the merits of the claim finding that Senty-Haugen
did not appeal the hold and transport order and that the habeas proceedings could not “substitute
for an appeal.” Senty-Haugen’s petition for review to the Minnesota Supreme Court was denied.
On July 21, 2010, Senty-Haugen filed this petition in federal court raising this same claim.
Judge Noel determined that because Senty-Haugen failed to exhaust his state court
remedies, the claim was procedurally defaulted and Senty-Haugen had not proffered any reason
to excuse the default in his initial petition to the Court. Judge Noel thus recommended
dismissing the claim. Now, however, Senty-Haugen argues in his Objections that cause exists to
excuse his procedural default because his counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal Judge
Marrinan’s hold and transport order.
Even assuming that cause exists to excuse Senty-Haugen’s procedural default, his claim
fails on the merits. Judge Marrinan’s March 29, 1996 order committed Senty-Haugen to the
custody of the MSOP indefinitely. When Senty-Haugen was transferred to federal custody
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pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, he was already in the custody of the
MSOP. “As between the state and federal sovereigns, primary jurisdiction over a person is
generally determined by which one first obtains custody of, or arrests, the person.” United States
v. Cole, 416 F.3d 894, 897 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). In this case, the MSOP first
obtained custody of Senty-Haugen and therefore, has primary jurisdiction over him indefinitely
pursuant to Judge Marrinan’s order. Senty-Haugen’s time spent in federal custody based on a
federal writ before being returned to the MSOP does not change primary jurisdiction from the
state to the federal government, and the MSOP did not relinquish its primary jurisdiction by
complying with the writ. Id. at 966-97 (“[W]hile under the primary jurisdiction of one
sovereign, a defendant is transferred to the other jurisdiction to face a charge, primary
jurisdiction is not lost but rather the defendant is considered to be ‘on loan’ to the other
sovereign.”) (citation omitted); see also Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d 795, 798 (8th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Sinito v. Kindt, 954 F.2d 467, 469 (7th Cir.)) (“‘[I]ssuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum d[oes] not alter [the defendant’s] custody status. It merely change[s] the location
of his custody for the sentence he was already serving.’”) (citation omitted). Senty-Haugen was,
in effect, temporarily removed or “on loan” from the primary jurisdiction of the MSOP pursuant
to the federal writ. Once his federal sentence was completed, he was properly returned to the
custody of the MSOP to carry out an indefinite sentence. For these reasons, Senty-Haugen’s
argument fails and claim one is dismissed with prejudice.
B. Claims Two and Three
Judge Noel concluded claims two and three were barred by the one-year limitations
period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) and should therefore be dismissed with prejudice.
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In his Objections, Senty-Haugen moves to dismiss “causes of action II and III without
prejudice.” Judge Noel determined that Senty-Haugen’s judgment of commitment became final
on December 16, 1998, at which time the federal habeas corpus statute of limitations began to
run. The one-year limitations period expired on December 16, 1999 but Senty-Haugen did not
file the petition in this matter until July 21, 2010, more than ten years after the limitations period
ended. Senty-Haugen does not dispute Judge Noel’s determination; the instant petition is clearly
time-barred and Senty-Haugen provides no reason that could save this action from being timebarred. Thus, claims two and three are also dismissed with prejudice.
III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
The Court may grant a certificate of appealability only where a defendant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Tiedeman v.
Benson, 122 F.3d 518, 523 (8th Cir. 1997). To make such a showing, “[t]he petitioner must
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The
Court finds it unlikely that another court would decide the issues raised in this habeas petition
differently, or that any of the issues raised in Senty-Haugen’s motion would be debatable among
reasonable jurists. Therefore, the Court declines to grant a certificate of appealability.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
Senty-Haugen’s Objections [Docket No. 12] are OVERRULED;
2.
Judge Noel’s R&R [Docket No. 11] is ADOPTED;
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3.
Senty-Haugen’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis [Docket No. 2]
is DENIED;
4.
Senty-Haugen’s Petition [Docket No. 1] is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
BY THE COURT:
s/Ann D. Montgomery
ANN D. MONTGOMERY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: June 8, 2011.
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