Doe 134 v. Derstine et al

Filing 103

ORDER granting 84 Motion to Dismiss/General. This action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Patrick J. Schiltz on 06/01/11. (bjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
JANE DOE 134, by and through her
guardian, Mother Doe 134,

Case No. 10-CV-3143 (PJS/AJB)

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER

GERALD DERSTINE; GOSPEL
CRUSADES, INC.; and GOSPEL
CRUSADE MINISTERIAL FELLOWSHIP,
Defendants.
Jeffrey R. Anderson, Patrick W. Noaker, Sarah G. Odegaard, JEFF ANDERSON
& ASSOCIATES, PA, for plaintiff.
Britton D. Weimer, Eric D. Satre, JONES SATRE & WEIMER PLLC, for defendants
Gerald Derstine and Gospel Crusades, Inc.
Deborah C. Eckland, Alan P. King, GOETZ & ECKLAND P.A., for defendant
Gospel Crusade Ministerial Fellowship.
This matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Jane Doe 134 (“Doe”) for
voluntary dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Defendants oppose the motion because,
they argue, Doe has not presented a proper explanation for her desire to dismiss, dismissal would
result in a waste of judicial time and effort, and dismissal would prejudice defendants. See
Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 187 F.3d 941, 950 (8th Cir. 1999) (identifying
factors relevant in resolving Rule 41(a)(2) motions to dismiss). The Court disagrees.
Doe seeks to dismiss this lawsuit without prejudice because she wants to join a nondiverse defendant. Defendants contend that Doe’s mother knew of the existence of this nondiverse defendant before this lawsuit was filed, and that therefore Doe should be forced to live
with the consequences of her decision to file in federal court. The Court doubts that Doe’s

mother — who, as far as the record reflects, has no legal training — appreciated the legal
consequences of the existence of a separate, non-diverse corporate defendant. Moreover, there
appears to be no strategic reason for Doe to have omitted that defendant from her initial
complaint. Instead, the omission appears to be a good-faith mistake. Doe’s desire to litigate
against all defendants in a single forum is thus a valid reason for her to seek dismissal without
prejudice. The Court also rejects defendants’ suggestion that Doe is attempting to seek a more
favorable forum. Doe has done fairly well in this forum thus far, and there is no reason to
believe that she will do better in state court.
Defendants next argue that dismissal would be a waste of judicial resources because the
parties have already engaged in discovery, and there has been extensive motion practice. But the
parties will be able to use in state court all of the discovery that they have taken so far in federal
court. As for the “extensive motion practice,” that has consisted of (1) a motion for summary
judgment that was so obviously premature that the Court took the unusual step of denying it
without a hearing and (2) the parties’ motion practice concerning the addition of the non-diverse
defendant. It is true that the motion practice concerning the addition of the non-diverse
defendant was essentially a waste of time. But at this point the only question is whether the
parties will litigate all of Doe’s claims together in state court or, instead, will litigate some of
Doe’s claims in this Court and some in state court. Under either option, the motion practice
concerning the addition of the non-diverse defendant will remain a waste of time.
Finally, defendants claim that they would suffer significant financial prejudice if this
action were dismissed so that Doe can re-file in state court. While the Court does not doubt that
this litigation is proving to be a financial hardship for defendants, that hardship is almost entirely

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attributable to the existence of this lawsuit, and not to the forum in which this lawsuit will be
litigated. Indeed, forcing Doe to litigate her claims in both federal and state court would force
defendants to litigate those same claims in both federal and state court.1 Defendants fail to
explain how litigating one action in two courts would cost them less than litigating one action in
one court.
Of course, defendants understandably want this case resolved as quickly as possible, but
the Court does not believe that permitting Doe to re-file in state court will cause any significant
delay. Despite defendants’ protestations to the contrary, this case is still in its relatively early
stages. Discovery is ongoing, dispositive motions are not due until next year, and the motion
practice that has taken place thus far has done little to substantively advance the lawsuit or the
Court’s understanding of its merits. In short, this case is nowhere near ready for trial, and
requiring Doe to litigate simultaneously in two courts will do nothing to hasten the conclusion of
this legal dispute. The Court will therefore grant Doe’s motion to dismiss.
Finally, defendants ask that, if the Court is inclined to grant Doe’s motion, the Court also
award defendants the fees and costs that they have incurred in defending the lawsuit thus far.
The Court declines to do so. As noted, this case is still in its early stages, and much of the work
that the parties have done is work that the parties would have done even if Doe had originally
filed suit in state court. It is true that the parties’ motion practice concerning the addition of the

1

Defendants also claim that, if Doe re-files this action in Florida state court (as she has
indicated she intends to do), the action will almost certainly be transferred to Minnesota under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. That may be a reason for Doe to reconsider her choice of
forum (an issue about which the Court expresses no opinion), but it does not change the fact that
Doe is unable to litigate all of her claims in this Court and that denial of her motion will
therefore inevitably create the need for two parallel actions, with all the extra expense and
duplication of effort that that would entail.
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non-diverse defendant was largely a waste of time, but this was in part because all parties failed
to recognize, much less to brief, “the critical question of whether [the non-diverse party] is both
a necessary and indispensable party.” Docket No. 83 at 2. Moreover, defendants’ overly
aggressive litigation strategy — for example, their bringing a summary-judgment motion that
had no chance of succeeding — leads the Court to believe that both sides bear some fault for
unnecessary motion practice. The Court therefore will not award fees or costs to defendants.
See Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1984) (“The time and effort invested
by the parties, and the stage to which the case had progressed, are among the most important
factors to be considered in deciding whether to allow a dismissal without prejudice, and, if so, on
what conditions.” (emphasis added)).
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss [Docket No. 84] is GRANTED.

2.

This action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: June 1 , 2011

s/Patrick J. Schiltz
Patrick J. Schiltz
United States District Judge

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