The City of Farmington Hills Employees Retirement System v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

Filing 284

ORDER re 260 Objection To Discovery Ruling, filed by The City of Farmington Hills Employees Retirement System. 1. Plaintiff's Objection to Magistrate Judge Jeanne J. Graham's September 24, 2012 Order (Doc. No. 260 ) is OVERRULED. 2. Magistrate Judge Jeanne J. Graham's September 24, 2012 Order (Doc. No. 235 ) is AFFIRMED. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Donovan W. Frank on 11/19/2012. (BJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

The City of Farmington Hills
Employees Retirement System,
individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,

Civil No. 10-4372 (DWF/JJG)

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
Defendant.

This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff The City of Farmington Hills
Employees Retirement System’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal (Doc. No. 260) of Magistrate Judge
Jeanne J. Graham’s September 24, 2012 Order (Doc. No. 235). Defendant Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. (“Defendant”) opposes Plaintiff’s appeal. (Doc. No. 269.)
The Court must modify or set aside any portion of the Magistrate Judge’s order
found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(a); D. Minn. LR 72.2(a). This is an “extremely deferential standard.” Reko v.
Creative Promotions, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1007 (D. Minn. 1999). “A finding is
‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on
the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” Chakales v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 79 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 1996)
(quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). Having

reviewed the record and the submissions of counsel, the Court finds that Magistrate Judge
Graham’s Order is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law.
Plaintiff objects to the Order to the extent the Magistrate Judge authorized
Defendant to conduct ten depositions of absent class members. Plaintiff argues that
depositions of absent class members would be unduly burdensome, irrelevant, and would
elicit no probative evidence. (Doc. No. 260.) Defendant contends, however, that the
Magistrate Judge applied the proper standard in permitting the depositions to go forward
and appropriately limited the scope, number, and length of the depositions in order to
mitigate any potential burden. (Doc. No. 269.)
On November 13, 2012, the first of such absent class member depositions took
place. In a letter to the Court, Plaintiff reported that Defendant’s deposition of the
Adventist Health System designee on that date “reflected the substantial burdens
associated with such depositions, went beyond the permissible scope and illustrated the
lack of probative value of such depositions.” (Doc. No. 280 at 1.) On the contrary,
Defendant maintains that the questions asked “explored Adventist’s ‘consideration of and
decision to engage in securities lending at Wells Fargo’ . . . as well as the Confidential
Memoranda that Adventist reviewed before choosing to invest its cash collateral in the
Wells Fargo Trust for Securities Lending.” (Doc. No. 281 at 1.)
In light of the foregoing, and the record and proceedings herein, the Court
concludes that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the discovery ruling is either clearly

2

erroneous or contrary to law. Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiff’s appeal and affirms
Magistrate Judge Graham’s September 24, 2012 Order in all respects. 1
ORDER
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s Objection to Magistrate Judge Jeanne J. Graham’s

September 24, 2012 Order (Doc. No. [260]) is OVERRULED.
2.

Magistrate Judge Jeanne J. Graham’s September 24, 2012 Order (Doc.

No. [235]) is AFFIRMED.

Dated: November 19, 2012

s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge

1

The Court reserves the right to award attorney fees and costs upon completion of
the absent class member depositions in the event Plaintiff can establish that the
deposition questioning improperly exceeded the scope of Magistrate Judge Graham’s
Order, was unnecessarily cumulative or duplicative, or was otherwise not relevant to any
claim or defense.
3