Federal Insurance Company v. Steris Corporation et al
Filing
76
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Siemens Canada's Renewed Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. No. 42) is GRANTED (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Susan Richard Nelson on 10/19/12. (LPH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Federal Insurance Company,
as subrogee of HealthPartners, Inc.,
Case No. 11-cv-00078 (SRN/AJB)
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
v.
Steris Corporation and Siemens Canada
Ltd.,
Defendant.
Larry R. Eaton, Cozen O’Connor, 333 West Wacker Drive, Suite 1900, Chicago, IL
60606 and Patrick H. O’Neill, Jr. and Stephen M. Warner, O’Neill & Murphy, LLP, 332
Minnesota Street, Suite W2600, St. Paul, MN 55101, for Plaintiff.
Jessica A. Megorden, Nicholas H. Jakobe, and Patrick D. Reilly, Erstad & Riemer, PA,
8009 - 34th Avenue South, Suite 200, Minneapolis, MN 55425-4409, for Defendant
Steris Corporation.
Alana K. Bassin and Patrick L. Arneson, Bowman & Brooke LLP, 150 South 5th Street,
Suite 3000, Minneapolis, MN 55402 and John T. Richmond , Jr., Husch Blackwell LLP,
190 Carondelet Plaza, Suite 600, St. Louis, MO 63105, for Defendant Siemens Canada
Limited.
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge
I.
INTRODUCTION
This matter before the Court is Defendant Siemens Canada Limited’s Renewed
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 42.) The Court grants the
Motion for the reasons discussed below.
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II.
BACKGROUND
On February 10, 2009, property owned by HealthPartners, Inc. (“HealthPartners”),
and insured by Plaintiff Federal Insurance Company (“Federal Insurance”) was damaged in
a fire. (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def. Siemens Canada Ltd.’s Renewed Mot. to Dismiss for
Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Doc. No. 48 (“Pl.’s Opp’n Mem.”), at p. 1.) Plaintiff
investigated the fire and alleges that it was caused by a defective electrical component
manufactured by Defendant Siemens Canada Ltd. (“Siemens Canada”). (Def. Steris Corp.’s
Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Siemens Canada Ltd.’s Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction, Doc. No. 47 (“Def. Steris’ Opp’n Mem.”), at p. 1; Compl., Doc. No. 1, ¶ 8.).
The electrical component part had been incorporated into a sterilizing/disinfecting washer
manufactured by Defendant Steris Corporation (“Steris”). (Compl, Doc. No. 1, ¶ 9.)
Federal Insurance compensated HealthPartners for the property damage and then brought
this action against Siemens Canada and Steris to recover its losses. (Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. at p.
1.)
Siemens Canada was chartered in Canada in 1912 and “sells countless electrical
products” to distributors. (Mem. in Supp. of Def. Siemens Canada Ltd.’s Renewed Mot. to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Doc. No. 44 (“Def. Siemens Canada’s Mem.”), at
p. 2). The distributors make the products available to “a limitless number and variety of end
users.” (Id.) Siemens Canada hypothesizes, and the other parties do not dispute, that it sold
the electrical component at issue to Franklin Empire, Inc. (“Franklin”), a Canadian
company, which then sold it to Steris to incorporate in its sterilizing/disinfecting washer.
(Id.) HealthPartners then purchased the sterilizing/disinfecting washer from Steris. (Id.)
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Siemens Canada’s principal place of business is in Burlington, Ontario. (Claude
Lemieux Decl. in Supp. of Def. Siemens Canada Ltd.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 27
(“Lemieux Decl.”), at ¶ 3.) It only has the rights to sell products manufactured by other
Siemens entities within Canada. (Def. Siemens Canada’s Mem. at p. 3.) It is not
incorporated in Minnesota nor does it have an office, employees, property, or an ability to
manufacture products in this jurisdiction. (Lemieux Decl. ¶¶ 4–8.) The only product
Siemens Canada has shipped to locations in the United States comes from a single line of
products known as “Flender geared motors.” (Def. Siemens Canada’s Mem. at Ex. A,
Interrog. No. 8.) These products were sold in Minnesota 13 times in the first six months of
2011, out of a total of 63,487 transactions during that same time. (Id.) The total sales to
Minnesota companies accounted for $128,866.70 (Canadian) out of $2.3 billion (Canadian)
in the last fiscal year—or approximately 0.0056%. (Id.)
On March 29, 2011, Siemens Canada filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for
lack of personal jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 9.) The Court held a hearing on August 25, 2011
and then issued an Order dated August 26, 2011 denying Siemens Canada’s Motion without
prejudice and allowing Federal Insurance and Steris to conduct limited discovery related to
personal jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 28.)
Federal Insurance subsequently served interrogatories and document requests on
Siemens Canada, but Steris did not. (Def. Siemens Canada’s Mem. at p. 3.) The parties
discussed the scope of Federal Insurance’s discovery requests and Chief Magistrate Judge
Boylan conducted a telephone conference about them on October 14, 2011. (Doc. No. 30.)
On November 8, 2011, Siemens Canada responded to interrogatories and document requests
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served by Federal Insurance. (Def. Siemens Canada’s Mem. at p. 4, Exs. A–B.) On June
19, 2012, Siemens Canada renewed its Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
(Doc. No. 42.)
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Personal Jurisdiction
The plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. Johnson v. Woodcock, 444 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff
“must state sufficient facts in the complaint to support a reasonable inference that [the
defendants] can be subjected to jurisdiction within the state.” Dever v. Hentzen Coating,
Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quotations omitted). The
Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all factual disputes
must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. at 1076.
The test for deciding whether a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
a civil defendant is well settled. First, the court must determine whether the forum state’s
long-arm statute subjects the defendant to jurisdiction. Pangaea, Inc. v. The Flying Burrito,
LLC, 647 F.3d 741, 745 (8th Cir. 2011). Second, the exercise of jurisdiction must comport
with the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment. (Id.) Where the relevant state
long-arm statute extends as far as due process allows, as is the case in Minnesota, the two
inquiries are codeterminate. See Minn. Stat. § 543.19; accord Woodcock, 444 F.3d at 955.
To satisfy the due process clause, a defendant must have “minimum contacts [with
the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
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(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). The defendant’s contacts with the
forum state generally must not arise due to mere fortuity, but rather because the defendant
has “purposefully avail[ed]” itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the state.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); accord Digi-Tel Holdings, Inc. v. Proteq
Telecomm., Ltd., 89 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 1996).
“[T]hose who live or operate primarily outside a State have a due process right not to
be subjected to judgment in its courts as a general matter.” J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, __ U.S. __ , 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011) (plurality opinion). When a defendant
“purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within” a state, Hanson,
357 U.S. at 253, a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant is proper “‘in a suit
arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’” J. McIntyre, 131 S.
Ct. at 2788 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984)). “The question is whether a defendant has followed a course of conduct directed at
the society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given sovereign, so that the
sovereign has the power to subject the defendant to judgment concerning that conduct.” Id.
at 2789.
“The minimum contacts necessary for due process may be the basis for either
‘general’ or ‘specific’ jurisdiction.’” Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted). General jurisdiction “refers to the power of a state to adjudicate any
cause of action involving a particular defendant, regardless of where the cause of action
arose.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Maples Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 1996).
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General jurisdiction requires an examination of whether the defendant’s contacts with the
forum are “continuous and systematic.” See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414–15 & n.9.
Specific jurisdiction may be conferred when a defendant, through its contacts with
the forum, purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum “in
a suit arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” J. McIntyre, 131
S. Ct. at 2787–88 (plurality opinion) (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8); see also
Dever, 380 F.3d at 1073. The “‘purposeful availment’ requirement ensures that a defendant
will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or
‘attenuated’ contacts or of the ‘unilateral activity of another party or a third person.’”
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citation omitted). “Jurisdiction
is proper, however, where the contacts proximately result from action by the defendant
himself that create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum state.” Id. (emphasis in
original and citation omitted).
This case involves only a question of specific jurisdiction, as Federal Insurance and
Steris apparently concede that Siemens Canada’s alleged contacts with Minnesota were
neither continuous nor systematic. (Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. at p. 7.) Specific jurisdiction may be
established where the claim “aris[es] out of” or “relates to” a defendant’s contacts with the
forum. See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787–88 (plurality opinion). To evaluate the
sufficiency of a defendant’s contacts, the court considers five factors, affording the first
three primary importance: (1) the nature and quality of the defendant’s contacts with the
forum state; (2) the quantity of such contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the
contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) the
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convenience of the parties. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Maples Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 1100,
1102 (8th Cir. 1996).
B.
Stream of Commerce Theory
In cases involving products liability, courts often analyze whether the Plaintiff has
met its burden to show specific jurisdiction under a stream of commerce theory. In WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the Supreme Court recognized:
[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor . . . is not simply an
isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or
distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other
States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its
allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its
owner or to others.
444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). In other words, personal jurisdiction may be exercised “over a
corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that
they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.” Id. at 297–98.
The proper application of the stream of commerce theory is evolving in the Supreme
Court. See AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
24, 2012). The Court addressed this issue in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of
California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), and more recently in J. McIntyre, 131 S.
Ct. at 2785. In both cases, the Court considered whether placing a product into the stream
of commerce that results in harm in a specific state is sufficient to establish specific
jurisdiction over the defendant.
In Asahi, a defective motorcycle tire injured two Californians and they sued the
Taiwanese manufacturer. 480 U.S. at 105–06. The Taiwanese manufacturer filed a cross7
claim for indemnity against a Japanese company that had manufactured a part in the tire. Id.
The Japanese manufacturer knew that the Taiwanese manufacturer had used its part in tires
worldwide, including in California. Id. at 107. The Japanese manufacturer, however, did
not do business in California, had no agents, office, employees or property there, did not
advertise or solicit business in that state, and had no control over the distribution network
that brought its products to California. Id. at 112.
While the Court unanimously determined that California lack personal jurisdiction
over the Japanese manufacturer, the justices were divided on the application of the stream of
commerce theory. Justice Brennan, joined by three other Justices, relied on considerations
of foreseeability. Justice Brennan would have found purposeful availment whenever the
manufacturer “is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State,” because
the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise. Id. at 117 (opinion concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice O’Connor, joined by three other Justices, rejected Justice Brennan’s
approach. In their view, mere foreseeability that the “stream of commerce may or will
sweep the product into the forum State” is insufficient. Id. at 112. Justice O’Connor wrote:
The substantial connection between the defendant and the forum State
necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of
the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. The placement
of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum state.
Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted , emphasis in original). A plurality of the
Court found that the Japanese manufacturer’s mere placement of the tire part within the
stream of commerce did not constitute an act of purposeful availment towards the forum
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state. Id. at 108, 116; accord Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Work, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369,
375 (8th Cir. 1990). Since there was no majority opinion, however, neither Justice
Brennan’s nor Justice O’Connor’s test prevailed as the applicable precedent.
In J. McIntyre, the Court revisited questions left open in Asahi. J. McIntyre was a
products liability suit where the New Jersey plaintiff had injured himself while using a
machine manufactured by a British company. 131 S. Ct. at 2786. The British manufacturer
contested personal jurisdiction because it had no office in New Jersey, paid no taxes there,
and did not advertise or have any employees in the state. See id. However, the plaintiff
argued that jurisdiction existed because the British company’s distributor sold its machines
in the United States, its officials attended trade shows in the country, and at least four
machines had been sent to New Jersey. Id. at 2790.
The Court declined to resolve the Asahi split in J. McIntyre. In a plurality opinion,
Justice Kennedy acknowledged the imprecision of the metaphor “stream of commerce,”
stating that “[i]t refers to the movement of goods from manufacturers through distributors to
consumers, yet beyond that descriptive purpose its meaning is far from exact.” J. McIntyre,
131 S. Ct. at 2788. In “products-liability cases . . . it is the defendant’s purposeful availment
that makes jurisdiction consistent with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’” Id. at 2787. A “defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of
jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general
rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the
forum State.” Id. at 2788. The plurality concluded that the British manufacturer engaged in
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no “activities in New Jersey that reveal an intent to invoke or benefit from the protection of
its laws.” Id. at 2791.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, wrote a concurring opinion. The concurrence
rejected an approach that “would permit every State to assert jurisdiction in a productsliability suit against any domestic manufacturer who sells its products . . . to a national
distributor, no matter how large or small the manufacturer, no matter how distant the forum,
and no matter how few the number of items that end up in the particular forum at issue.” Id.
at 2793. Nevertheless, Justice Breyer declined to endorse revisiting the jurisdictional
standard at all, writing:
[O]n the record presented here, resolving this case requires no more than
adhering to our precedents . . . . I would not go further. Because the incident
at issue in this case does not implicate modern concerns, and because the
factual record leaves many open questions, this is an unsuitable vehicle for
making broad pronouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional rules.
Id. at 2792–93. According to Justice Breyer’s concurrence “the Supreme Court’s
framework applying the stream-of-commerce theory—including the conflicting
articulations of that theory in Asahi—had not changed, and . . . the defendant’s activities in
McIntyre failed to establish personal jurisdiction under any articulation of that theory.”
Nuvoton Tech., 689 F.3d at 1363.
Because J. McIntyre did not produce a majority opinion, the Court must follow the
narrowest holding among the plurality opinion in that case. Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188, 193 (1977). The “narrowest holding is that which can be distilled from Justice
Breyer’s concurrence—that the law remains the same after McIntyre.” Nuvoton Tech., 689
F.3d at 1363.
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C.
Eighth Circuit Precedent
The Court proceeds on the premise that J. McIntyre did not change the Supreme
Court’s jurisdictional framework and thus applies Eighth Circuit case law interpreting the
Supreme Court’s existing stream of commerce precedent. In Falkirk, a component
manufacturer sold a single part to another company that in turn sold its final product in the
forum state. 906 F.2d at 371–72.1 No evidence indicated that the defendant either knew or
should have known that its component part would end up in the forum state, nor was there
evidence that the defendant had availed itself of the benefits of the laws of the forum state.
Id. at 375. The court held, based on Asahi, that the manufacturer’s “placement of a product
into the stream of commerce, without more, does not constitute an act of the [manufacturer]
purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Id. at 376 (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112
(plurality)).
Additionally, in Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., a Nebraska
plaintiff was injured when setting up a firework display. 25 F.3d 610, 610–11 (8th Cir.
1994). The plaintiff and his employer sued the distributor and two firework manufacturers,
one of which was Japanese. Id. The Japanese manufacturer moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction because it had no office, agent, or distributor in Nebraska and did not
advertise or send any of its products there. Id. The Japanese manufacturer, however, had
utilized nine American distributors located in six states across the country, including South
1
The defendant had one other contact with the forum state, but it was unrelated to
the dispute and therefore irrelevant to the consideration of whether the forum state could
exercise specific jurisdiction. See Falkirk, 906 F.2d at 374.
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Dakota. Id. Sixteen percent of the fireworks purchased from its South Dakota distributor
were eventually resold into Nebraska. Id.
When analyzing the stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction, the Eighth
Circuit discussed Asahi and stated, “it appears that five justices agreed that continuous
placement of a significant number of products into the stream of commerce with knowledge
that the product would be distributed into the forum state represents sufficient minimum
contacts to satisfy due process.” Id. at 614. The court also said that Asahi appeared to
follow the Supreme Court’s decision in World-Wide Volkswagen that “when a
manufacturer or distributor attempts to serve a market ‘directly or indirectly . . . , it is not
unreasonable to subject it to suit in [that market] if its allegedly defective merchandise has
there been the source of the injury to its owner or to others.” Id. (citation omitted). The
court determined that personal jurisdiction existed over the Japanese manufacturer because
it chose its distributors in “an effort to reach much of the country” and it placed “its
products in the stream of commerce throughout the Midwest.” Id. at 613. The court held
that the Japanese manufacturer “reaped the benefits of its network of distributors, and it is
only reasonable and just that it should now be held accountable in [Nebraska].” Id. at 615.2
In Vandelune v. 4B Elevator Components Unlimited, an individual was injured in a
grain dust explosion while working in Iowa. 148 F.3d 943, 945 (8th Cir. 1998).
2
Justice Ginsburg dissented in J. McIntyre and included an appendix of
“[i]llustrative cases,” including Barone, that uphold the “exercise of personal jurisdiction
over an . . . out of state corporation, through a distributor, [which] targeted a national
market, including any and all States.” Id. at 2804. Whether Barone is still good law after
J. McIntyre is not clear, but is not of import here—this Court finds Barone
distinguishable from the case at bar.
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Contending that a faulty monitor caused the injury, the plaintiff filed a products liability suit
against the British manufacturer and its independent distributor located in Peoria, Illinois.
Id. The court stated that the Supreme Court’s decision in Asahi left as “an open question”
the issue of “whether introducing products into the ‘stream of commerce’ satisfies the due
process requirement of minimum contacts in a products liability case.” Id. Citing Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 475, the court concluded that because the British manufacturer “pour[ed]
its products” into a regional distributor with the expectation that the distribution would
penetrate a discrete, multi-state trade area, the British manufacturer “purposefully reaped the
benefits of the laws of each State in that trade area for due process purposes.” Id. at 948
(citation omitted). The British manufacturer created the monitor for the United States
market and the manufacturer attended technical support meetings at the independent
distributor’s location in Peoria, Illinois. Id. Further, the independent distributor sold
monitors to Iowa. Id. On this record, the court held that these sales were not “attenuated,
random, or fortuitous” contacts with Iowa and determined the court had personal
jurisdiction. Id.
D.
Siemens Canada’s Contacts With Minnesota
Siemens Canada contends that it maintained no contacts with Minnesota that would
justify the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. It asserts that no specific jurisdiction
can be established because this litigation did not result from injuries arising out of or related
to Siemens Canada’s operations. It only uses distributors in Canada to sell its products and
there is no evidence that it tailors any of its business in an effort to market products to the
United States. Since it is only licensed by other Siemens entities to sell products within
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Canada, Siemens Canada argues that it has no intent to sell products in the United States.
Moreover, there is no evidence that Siemens Canada has sold or marketed the electrical
component at issue in this case to any entity in Minnesota. Federal Insurance and Steris
respond that Siemens Canada is part of a worldwide organization that advertises its products
throughout the United States and Minnesota. According to Federal Insurance and Steris, it
is subject to personal jurisdiction under the stream of commerce theory.
As in Asahi, Falkirk, and J. McIntyre, the Court concludes that it lacks personal
jurisdiction over Siemens Canada. Siemens Canada is a foreign manufacturer with a
distribution system established in a foreign country. Siemens Canada is only licensed to sell
products within Canada. The record reveals only one of its electrical component parts at
issue in this case ended up in Minnesota. Federal Insurance and Steris have not alleged that
Siemens Canada has an office in Minnesota, paid taxes in the state, or owns property here.
There has been no allegation that Siemens Canada advertised in, sent employees to, entered
into any contracts within, or transacted business in Minnesota.3 Moreover, Federal
Insurance and Steris have not alleged that Siemens Canada committed a tortious act in
Minnesota. Federal Insurance and Steris do not even allege that Siemens Canada knew that
its electrical component product at issue in this case would be incorporated into another
3
Steris argues that the Court should find personal jurisdiction over Siemens Canada
because Siemens Canada advertises in Minnesota and holds promotional functions at
Target Field. (Def. Steris Opp’n Mem. at p. 7.) In support of this claim, Steris cites a
copy of an article that it attached to its brief as Exhibit A. (Doc. No. 22-1.) The first line
of the article states that it related to “Siemens Industry, Inc.’s” advertising efforts. (Id.)
Siemens Industry, Inc. is a separate legal entity from Siemens Canada and therefore its
advertising efforts are not relevant to this motion.
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product to be sold in Minnesota. The record demonstrates that Siemens Canada is a foreign
manufacturer with a distribution system established in Canada that had an electrical
component that ended up in Minnesota on an “attenuated, random, or fortuitous” basis.
Based on this record, the Court cannot find that Siemens Canada purposefully availed itself
of the benefits and protections of doing business in Minnesota.4
Unlike Barone and Vandelune, there is no allegation that Siemens Canada
purposefully chose to sell to distributors in Minnesota or poured its products into Minnesota
in an effort to penetrate this market. In Barone, the Japanese manufacturer utilized nine
American distributors located across the country to penetrate the market. Siemens Canada,
however, does not utilize American distributors and is only licensed to sell its products in
Canada. Siemens Canada does not market its products to Minnesota, only rarely sends
products to this state, and has never sent the electrical component part at issue in this case to
Minnesota. There is no evidence that Siemens Canada created the electrical component for
4
Federal Insurance and Steris argue that World-Wide Volkswagen and J. McIntyre are
distinguishable from this case because Canada is geographically close to Minnesota. (Pl.’s
Mem. at p. 10, 14; Steris Mem. at p. 9.) They contend that unlike World-Wide
Volkswagen, where a product was sold only on the east coast and unexpectedly ended up in
Oklahoma, it was foreseeable for Siemens Canada’s product to end up in Minnesota given
its proximity to Canada. (Pl.’s Mem. at p. 14.) They also argue that while the manufacturer
in J. McIntyre “shipped its products across an ocean and saw them disbursed, through a
distributor, across the United States,” Siemens Canada sold its products “through
distributors located within a few hundred miles of the site of the injury underlying this
action.” (Id. at p. 10–11.) Federal Insurance and Steris do not cite a single legal principal
that states that geographic proximity is a factor in determining whether personal jurisdiction
exists. Moreover, nothing in World-Wide Volkswagen, J. McIntyre, or any other decision
determines that personal jurisdiction exists based on how close a foreign manufacturer is to
a forum state—rather, the relevant inquiry is the extent of the defendant’s contacts with the
forum state.
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the sterilizing/disinfecting washer for the United States market. Moreover, Siemens Canada
only uses Canadian distributors, whereas the British manufacturer in Vandelune used an
independent distributor located in Peoria, Illinois. There is also no evidence that employees
of Siemens Canada attended support meetings in Minnesota to discuss the electrical
component at issue in this case. Therefore, unlike the facts of Vandelune and Barone, the
route taken by the electrical component manufactured by Siemens Canada to Minnesota was
“attenuated, random, or fortuitous.”
In sum, Siemens Canada’s actions do not reveal an intent to purposefully avail itself
of the protection of Minnesota’s laws or otherwise establish sufficient contacts with
Minnesota to justify personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court determines that it lacks
personal jurisdiction over Siemens Canada.5
IV.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that Siemens Canada’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. No. 42) is GRANTED.
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Federal Insurance and Steris request that if the Court determines that it does not
have personal jurisdiction over Siemens Canada, it should allow additional jurisdictional
discovery. (Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. at pp. 17–19; Steris Opp’n Mem.at pp. 9–10.) After a
hearing on Siemens Canada’s initial motion to dismiss, the Court granted ninety days for
jurisdictional discovery to occur. (Doc. No. 28.) Steris served no discovery requests
during that time. (Siemens Canada’s Reply Mem. at p. 14.) Siemens Canada served
responses to Federal Insurance’s discovery requests on November 8, 2011 and since then,
no party has raised any complaints regarding its responses. (Id.) Given the lapse of time
since Siemens Canada responded to Federal Insurance’s discovery requests, and the lack
of a record supporting the need for additional jurisdictional discovery, the Court denies
the request for additional discovery.
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Dated: October 19, 2012
s/Susan Richard Nelson
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON
United States District Judge
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