American Dairy Queen Corporation v. Blume et al

Filing 106

ORDER denying 104 Motion to Disqualify District Judge. (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Richard H. Kyle on 03/26/12. (kll)cc: Guy A. Blume Modified on 3/26/2012 (jam).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

American Dairy Queen Corporation,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 11-358 (RHK/TNL)
ORDER
v.
Guy A. Blume, et al.,
Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Guy A. Blume’s Motion to
Disqualify District Judge (Doc. No. 104). The Motion is not entirely comprehensible and
is filled with wholly inappropriate (and offensive) allegations regarding the members of
the Minnesota federal bench. (See, e.g., Mem. in Supp. at 3 (suggesting judges of this
Court were involved in a conspiracy “to cover up illegal collection of fees”); id. at 4
(“The Judges and other Court officers in Minnesota may have been involved in the
massive Fraud against franchisees.”).) Regardless, it appears that the thrust of the Motion
is that the undersigned must recuse himself from this matter because of his “association”
with John W. Mooty, an attorney with the Gray Plant Mooty law firm, which represents
Plaintiff American Dairy Queen Corporation in this action. The Motion alleges, for
example, that Mooty and the undersigned are both “alumni of the Minnesota Law
Review” (id. at 3, 5-6); that I have had dinner with Mooty in the past (id. at 2); and that I
once attended an event regarding the “turnaround” and “purchase” of “IDQ” (presumably

meaning International Dairy Queen) at which Mooty was a speaker (id. at 3-4). Even
assuming the truth of these allegations regarding my “associations” with attorney Mooty,
Blume has failed to demonstrate that recusal is warranted.
Blume’s Motion invokes 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which requires a judge to disqualify
himself whenever his “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a). 1 Judges are presumed to be impartial and, accordingly, parties seeking recusal
bear “the substantial burden of proving otherwise.” United States v. Dehghani, 550 F.3d
716, 721 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A judge is as
much obliged not to recuse himself when it is not called for as he is obliged to when it
is.” In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 1988). Were it
otherwise, parties could easily engage in judge shopping and “deal a serious blow to the
integrity of the court system.” ADC Telecomms., Inc. v. Thomas & Betts Corp., Civ. No.
98-2055, 2001 WL 848559, at *1 n.1 (D. Minn. July 25, 2001) (Frank, J.).
Blume’s Motion overlooks that “the practice of law is a profession, and the
judicial office is one specialized manifestation of that profession.” United States v.
Kehlbeck, 766 F. Supp. 707, 713 (S.D. Ind. 1990). As a result, judges frequently serve
on committees, attend functions, and socialize with members of the bar, but the recusal
rules do not require judges to check those relationships at the courthouse door. Indeed, if
such relationships “were to require recusal . . . , I daresay recusal would be required in so
1

Blume also makes passing reference to 28 U.S.C. § 455(b), which contains several subsections
concerning recusal. He appears to be relying only on subsection (2), which mandates recusal
when a judge “has been a material witness concerning” the matter in controversy. Suffice it to
say, despite Blume’s wild and fantastic allegations, the undersigned has no factual knowledge
regarding any of the claims or defenses in this case.

many . . . cases because of my acquaintance with an attorney that I – and probably most
other judges – would be unable to function in our jobs.” Bailey v. Broder, No. 94 Civ.
2394, 1997 WL 73717, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1997); accord, e.g., United States v.
Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1537 (7th Cir. 1985) (“In today’s legal culture friendships
among judges and lawyers are common. They are more than common; they are
desirable.”).
Simply put, a “judge must have neighbors, friends, and acquaintances, business
and social relations, and be a part of his day and generation,” but such associations do not
require recusal. Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, 388 F. Supp. 155, 157 (E.D. Pa.
1974); accord, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Masset Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2268 (2009)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“In any given case, there are a number of factors that could
give rise to a ‘probability’ or ‘appearance’ of bias: friendship with a party or lawyer,
prior employment experience, membership in clubs or associations, prior speeches and
writings, religious affiliation, and countless other considerations. We have never . . .
require[d] recusal for any of these reasons, even though they could be viewed as
presenting a ‘probability of bias.’”). Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records,
and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED that Blume’s Motion to Disqualify District
Judge (Doc. No. 104) is DENIED.

Dated: March 26, 2012

s/Richard H. Kyle
RICHARD H. KYLE
United States District Judge