Song v. Regents of the University of Minnesota
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 17 Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge Ann D. Montgomery on 11/21/2011. (TLU)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Yahui Song, Ph.D.,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Civil No. 11-427 ADM/TNL
v.
Regents of the University of Minnesota,
L. James Nixon, M.D., Barbara K. Patrick, M.D.,
Sheila M. Specker, M.D., Theodore R.
Thompson, M.D., Kathleen V. Watson, M.D.,
and John Does 1-15,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
Richard T. Wylie, Esq., Minneapolis, MN, on behalf of Plaintiff.
Jennifer L. Frisch, Esq., Associate General Counsel, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN,
on behalf of Defendants
______________________________________________________________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 9, 2011, the undersigned United States District Judge heard oral argument
on Plaintiff Yahui Song, Ph.D.’s (“Song”) Motion [Docket No. 17].1 The Regents of the
University of Minnesota (“University”) and the other parties (collectively “Defendants”) oppose
the Preliminary Injunction Motion. Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. For Inj. Relief [Docket No. 29]. For
the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Preliminary Injunction Motion is denied.
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Song’s Motion requested leave to file a second amended complaint and for a preliminary
injunction. Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung granted the motion to amend on October 4, 2011,
so the remaining matter before this Court is the Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
II. BACKGROUND
Song, a United States citizen and California resident, attended the University of
Minnesota Medical School (“Medical School”) between August 2005 and the fall semester of
2009. Second Am. Compl. [Docket No. 3] ¶¶ 1(c), 4, 7. The University operated the Medical
School, and the individually named defendants were faculty and administrators at that school.
Id. ¶ 5–6. In May 2007, Song took a one-year leave of absence. Id. ¶ 15. In February 2008,
Song was reinstated at the Medical School on the condition that she take the United States
Medical License Exam Step 1 (“USMLE Step 1") prior to August 2009. Id. ¶¶ 16–17. Song
experienced anxiety problems in July 2008 and requested an extension of her USMLE Step 1
date. Id. ¶ 20. In response, she was required to attend a meeting with the Medical School’s
Committee on Student Scholastic Standing (“COSSS”) scheduled for August 14, 2008. Id. ¶ 24.
Song passed USMLE Step 1 on August 6, 2008. Id. ¶ 26. Song requested permission to
not attend the August 14, 2008 meeting. Dr. Kathleen Watson denied her request. Id. ¶¶ 29–30.
The day after the meeting Song’s class registration was cancelled, she was prohibited from
registering for third-year courses, and she was required to “shadow a hospitalist” for six weeks.
Id. ¶¶ 31–32. During these six weeks, Song was not a registered student and therefore did not
receive student aid. Id. ¶ 33. She resumed classes in November 2008. Id. ¶ 37. Song was
notified in April 2009 that she had failed a medical course, and on May 27, 2009, Song was
placed on mandatory “immediate medical leave” for her to undergo “thorough physical and
psychiatric evaluations.” Id. ¶¶ 52, 76. On July 6, 2009, Song’s six-week medical leave ended
and she returned to her medical school duties, but she failed another class and was placed on
indefinite suspension on August 13, 2009. Id. ¶¶ 98, 100. Song was prohibited “access to any
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clinical site” as of September 3, 2009, and on September 6, she was informed that her health
insurance had been terminated. Id. ¶¶ 107, 109. After a hearing with COSSS in February 2010,
the Medical School notified Song in March 2010 that she was dismissed from the Medical
School due to failing grades. Id. ¶¶ 114–15, 118.
In July 2009, Song obtained a Ford Unsubsidized Direct Loan (“Direct Loan”) for her
fall semester tuition and living expenses. Song Decl. [Docket No. 20] (“First Song Decl.”) ¶ 3.
The Direct Loan was applied to Song’s tuition and costs, and the remaining $7,514.96 was
deposited in Song’s personal bank account for living expenses. Id. ¶ 4. After Song was
suspended, the University returned the entire amount of Song’s loan to the government,
including the amount deposited in Song’s bank account. Id. ¶¶ 6, 12. The University now seeks
to have Song repay the funds2 originally disbursed to Song’s bank account, since those Direct
Loan funds were contingent on Song’s attendance at the University. Id. ¶ 13. University policy
is to not issue transcripts to students, such as Song, with a financial hold on their records. First
Song Decl., Ex. D (“Song’s Record Hold”). Song received a medical degree from Hebei
Medical University in China after her dismissal from the University of Minnesota Medical
School. She now seeks her transcript from the University in order to apply to medical programs
in the United States. First Song Decl. ¶ 18; Second Song Decl. [Docket No. 34] ¶ 4. On
September 9, 2011, Song filed a Preliminary Injunction Motion seeking an Order to the
University to issue her official transcripts and restrain from attempting to collect the debt at
issue.
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The University is seeking $7,514.96 plus accumulated interest and late charges, totaling
$8,425.96. First Song Decl. ¶ 13.
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III. DISCUSSION3
A.
Standards of Review
In considering a preliminary injunction, courts apply the factors set forth in Dataphase
Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981): (1) threat of irreparable harm to the
movant; (2) harm to other parties if the relief is granted; (3) probability of movant’s success on
the merits; and (4) effect on public interest. Id. at 113. The movant “bears the burden of
establishing the necessity of this equitable remedy.” Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown’s, LLC,
563 F.3d 312, 316 (8th Cir. 2009).
B.
Application of the Dataphase Factors to Song’s Preliminary Injunction
In support of her Preliminary Injunction Motion, Song argues that she is likely to succeed
on the merits because the University had no obligation to return the loan funds to the Department
of Education, and internal and external policies prohibit them from withholding her transcript.
Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. [Docket No. 19] 6–8. Song also contends that as a result
of the University’s refusal to issue her transcript, she will face irreparable harm by being
precluded from applying to other medical schools and residency programs in the United States.
Id. 6. Song further urges that the University will not be harmed by releasing her transcripts, and
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On November 9, 2011, Song improperly emailed this Court an ex parte communication
attempting to answer several questions raised at the hearing on that same day. See Letter to
District Judge [Docket No. 40]. The communication was made outside of the presence of
counsel. This Court subsequently posted Song’s communication on the CM/ECF system and
responded to Song’s email with a November 14, 2011 Letter [Docket No. 41]. Regardless, the
information in Song’s email does not affect the analysis.
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that public interest will be affected by allowing the University to withhold Song’s transcript
when she has invested substantial amounts of money in her education. Id. 6, 8.
1. Irreparable Harm
Irreparable harm is established if the movant shows the harm is certain, great, and
imminent. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. F.C.C., 109 F.3d 418, 425 (8th Cir. 1996). Further, a showing of
irreparable harm requires the movant have no adequate remedy at law. Gen. Motors Corp., 563
F.3d at 319. Failure to show irreparable harm is sufficient to deny a preliminary injunction
motion. Id. at 320.
Song has failed to show irreparable harm that is either certain or imminent. Song’s harm
is not certain because she has not demonstrated an inability to continue her medical education
resulting from the University’s withholding of her transcript. On the contrary, Song enrolled and
graduated from Hebei Medical University in China after the University’s hold was placed on her
records. First Song Decl. ¶ 18; Second Song Decl. ¶ 4. Although Song argues that she will be
unable to recover the value of her lost time in the medical profession, there is no showing of the
likelihood of harm beyond mere speculation.
Song has failed to establish the imminent nature of her alleged harm. The hold was
placed on Song’s account in October 2009, more than two years ago. Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate how the alleged harm is now imminent after this passage of time. No evidence has
been provided showing that the University’s continued withholding of her transcript is creating
an imminent harm; in fact, the harm appears to be less imminent now in that Song successfully
graduated from medical school in China. First Song Decl. ¶ 18; Second Song Decl. ¶ 4.
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Moreover, a sufficient remedy at law exists for Song. Should Song prevail in her claims,
the monetary damages of wage loss and tuition increase are quantifiable and sufficient to
compensate her for the alleged harm in this case. Song has not provided any evidence
supporting her assertion that she is unable to repay the loan funds to the University. Counsel for
the University stated at the hearing that repayment of the loan will release her transcript. Since
the irreparability of Song’s harm has not been established, her preliminary injunction motion is
denied.
2. Relative Harm to Either Party and Public Interest
Song argues “[t]here is clearly no harm to the University” in “[l]osing the leverage of
withholding Plaintiff’s official transcript hostage.” Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 6.
However, the hold on Song’s transcript is the University’s only means, short of a lawsuit, for
encouraging loan repayment. Public interest also weighs in favor of repayment of school loans.
The University is a state institution receiving state and federal funds, therefore heightening the
public interest in the repayment of its student loans. Song’s argument that public interest would
be served by lifting the hold on a transcript of a student “who has invest (sic) hundreds of
thousands of dollars to obtain a medical education, ” Id. 8, only identifies a private, rather than
public, interest. Because of the potential harm to the University and because public interest
favors repayment of school loans, Song’s preliminary injunction motion is denied.
3. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Song is also unlikely to succeed on the merits. Song’s Higher Education Act (the
“HEA”) claims are unlikely to succeed because no implied private right of action under HEA
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exists for student borrowers. Labickas v. Ark. State Univ., 78 F.3d 333, 334 (8th Cir. 1996).
Additionally, while the HEA states that “the institution is not responsible for returning the
funds,” 34 C.F.R. § 668.21(a)(2)(ii), it does not prohibit institutions such as the University from
returning the funds. Song’s argument that the University’s repayment of the loan to the federal
government was illegal is unavailing given the plain language of the statute, and she is unlikely
to succeed on her HEA claims.
Song’s federal claims - Title VI; First Amendment; and Fifth Amendment - all result
from the University’s policy of placing a hold on records of students owing more than $100.
Song’s evidence does not appear to establish that she was singled out on the basis of race, color,
or national origin in contravention of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d). Her evidence also fails to
demonstrate that her right to free speech was violated contrary to the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution, or that she was denied substantive or procedural due process contrary
to the Fifth Amendment.
Finally, Song’s state law claims - the Minnesota Human Rights Act; Minn. Stat. §§
144.291–144.298, 13.05; a breach of contract claim; a negligence claim; and a defamation claim
- stem from a contractual dispute and are all before this Court premised on supplemental
jurisdiction. Since the federal and HEA claims over which this court has original jurisdiction are
likely to be unsuccessful, this federal court would likely decline to exercise jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine. “[I]n the usual case in which
all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under
the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will
point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Dodson v.
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Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis., 601 F.3d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ.
V. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). Moreover, the aforementioned state law claims, as
well as Song’s claim of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 violations, are also likely precluded under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits federal
jurisdiction over claims brought against public entities or public employees acting in their
official capacity. See Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 946 (8th Cir. 2009); Sallis v. Univ. of
Minn., 322 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1004 n.1 (D. Minn. 2004) (applying sovereign immunity to claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981). Because her federal, state, and HEA claims are unlikely to succeed on
the merits, Song’s preliminary injunction motion is denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that Plaintiff Song’s Preliminary Injunction Motion [Docket No. 17] is DENIED.
BY THE COURT:
s/Ann D. Montgomery
ANN D. MONTGOMERY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: November 21, 2011.
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