Yernatich v. St. Louis County et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc.#2) is GRANTED in part and Denied in part, and; 1. Plaintiff's federal conspiracy claim is DISMISSED with prejudice; and 2. Plaintiff's state-law claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Judge Paul A. Magnuson on July 29, 2011. (smr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Robert Yernatich,

Civ. No. 11-978 (PAM/LIB)
Plaintiff,

v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

St. Louis County, Deputy
Robert Tarr, individually and
in his official capacity, and
Deputy Jason Ackerson,
individually and in his official
capacity,
Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons
that follow, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
On the morning of April 4, 2005, in Virginia, Minnesota, two St. Louis County deputy
sheriffs pulled over a car driven by Plaintiff Robert Yernatich, who had a suspended drivers’
license. While the deputies were approaching the vehicle, they saw Yernatich put something
in his mouth. They suspected that he was ingesting a controlled substance and tried to get
him to spit it out. He refused. They then transported him to the hospital, where a mouth
swipe revealed the presence of a controlled substance.
Because of fears that Yernatich might overdose on whatever substance he ingested,
the deputies sought and obtained a search warrant for a blood test. According to Defendants,

the hospital required a urine test before it would release Yernatich to the custody of the
deputies, but Yernatich refused to participate. Thus, again according to Defendants, the
hospital catheterized Yernatich. Yernatich’s version of the story is different: he contends that
the deputies ordered him to urinate in a cup and, when he refused, ordered hospital staff to
insert a catheter into Yernatich’s penis and held him down as the nurse complied with their
order. Yernatich also contends that he requested an attorney multiple times but was never
allowed to contact an attorney, that the deputies sprayed him with pepper spray and otherwise
physically mistreated him, and that he suffered injuries as a result.
DISCUSSION
For purposes of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
the Court takes all facts alleged in the complaint as true. See Westcott v. Omaha, 901 F.2d
1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). The Court must construe the factual allegations in the complaint
and reasonable inferences arising from the complaint favorably to the plaintiff and will grant
a motion to dismiss only if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts which would entitle him to relief.” Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir.
1986) (citations omitted). The complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Yernatich objects to the Court considering the public record of the underlying criminal
case against Yernatich, contending the Twombly line of Supreme Court cases foreclosed the
consideration of matters outside the pleadings. But this fundamentally misapprehends both
the “public records and matters necessarily embraced by the complaint” exception to the
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usual rule that the Court considers only the Complaint in evaluating a motion to dismiss, see
Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999), and what the
Supreme Court decided in Twombly and its progeny. If necessary, the Court may consider
matters of public record when evaluating a motion to dismiss. Yernatich’s contentions to the
contrary are without merit.
Count I of Yernatich’s Complaint claims that Defendants, acting under color of state
law, violated Yernatich’s constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count II
alleges that St. Louis County violated § 1983 by failing to appropriately discipline, train, or
otherwise supervise its deputy sheriffs. Count III claims that there was a conspiracy among
Defendants to violate Yernatich’s civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Count IV
claims that the deputies were negligent in their treatment of Yernatich. Count V raises a
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and Count VI contends that the County
is liable for negligent supervision, training, and retention. Count VII alleges that the County
is responsible for the actions of the deputies under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Yernatich claims damages of more than $50,000, and seeks a declaration “mandating a
change in policy and procedures in St. Louis County which insures an appropriate system of
hiring, retention, supervision and discipline for acts of misconduct,” among other relief.
(Compl. at 12-13.)

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A.

Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue that Yernatich has failed to make out a claim for a violation of his

constitutional rights and that, even if such a claim can be construed from the allegations in
the Complaint, the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity.

But the Complaint

sufficiently alleges that the deputies violated Yernatich’s constitutional rights, and the rights
alleged were clearly established: the right to have an attorney, the right not to be subjected
to unreasonable searches and seizures, and so forth. At this early stage of the litigation, the
Court cannot and will not determine whether the facts alleged are actually true. This portion
of the Motion must be denied.
B.

Respondeat Superior and Conspiracy
Defendants contend that there is no evidence that St. Louis County had a custom or

policy that was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations. But Yernatich
does allege such a policy (Compl. ¶ 55), and for the purposes of this Motion, that allegation
is taken as true. Dismissal of this Count is not appropriate.
However, the allegations in the Complaint that the deputies and the County conspired
to violate Yernatich’s rights are not plausible on their face. To sustain a claim for a
conspiracy to violate constitutional rights under § 1985, Yernatich must allege some “classbased, invidiously discriminatory animus.” Bray v. Alexander Women’s Health Clinic, 506
U.S. 263, 268 (1993). He has failed to allege such an animus here, and the Court cannot
conceive of what that animus might be. Yernatich’s § 1985 conspiracy claim must be
dismissed.
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C.

State Claims
1.

Notice

Defendants first argue that Yernatich failed to comply with the notice requirement of
section 466.05, which provides that “every person . . . who claims damages from any
municipality or municipal employee acting within the scope of employment . . . shall cause
to be presented to the governing body of the municipality within 180 days after the alleged
loss or injury is discovered a notice stating the time, place and circumstances thereof . . . .”
Minn. Stat. § 466.05, subd. 1. As Yernatich points out, however, the statute goes on to
provide that “[a]ctual notice of sufficient facts to reasonably put the governing body on
notice of a possible claim shall be construed to comply with the notice requirements of this
section.” Id. The notice requirement of section 466.05 only applies to state-law torts, not
to federal claims or claims based on state statutes. Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709,
109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1101 (D. Minn. 2000) (Tunheim, J.).
Yernatich claims that the required notice was provided by the police reports filed in
the underlying criminal proceedings. At oral argument, Yernatich’s counsel offered no
further explanation or elucidation of how these reports ostensibly provided the County with
notice of the plethora of claims he raises in this litigation. It is difficult to imagine a situation
in which a police report regarding the arrest and search of a suspect would serve to put a
municipality on notice that the arrested person might, six years hence, file a civil-rights
lawsuit against the municipality.
Although the notice requirement must be liberally construed, here there is simply no
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indication that St. Louis County or either of the deputies had actual or constructive notice of
any of Yernatich’s claims. His state claims against the County and against the deputies in
their official capacities are therefore dismissed for failure to comply with section 466.05.
2.

Statute of limitations

Even if dismissal for failure to comply with the statutory notice requirements was not
warranted, however, Yernatich’s state claims would still fail because they are time-barred.
As Defendants contend, Yernatich’s state claims are in fact alleging intentional torts,
although they are couched as negligence claims. In Minnesota, intentional torts have a twoyear statute of limitations. Minn. Stat. § 541.07. Yernatich brought his claims nearly six
years after the events described in the Complaint, and thus his claims are time-barred.
Yernatich attempts to evade this conclusion by describing his negligence claims as
claims that the deputies had a duty to use reasonable force against him and breached that duty
by using excessive force, causing him injury. This, however, is an excessive force claim, not
a negligence claim.

Under Yernatich’s theory, every intentional tort could also be

transmuted into a negligence claim: for example, the assailant had a duty not to assault the
plaintiff and breached that duty by assaulting the plaintiff. This stretches negligence too far.

Yernatich’s state claims are intentional torts.1 He failed to raise those claims within

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Even the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, which has a six-year
statute of limitations, is here based on intentionally tortious conduct for which the statute of
limitations has run. Thus, the emotional distress claim likewise fails. Jones v. Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 720, No. C9-02-1205, 2003 WL 1702000, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2003).
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the statutory limitations period for intentional torts, and those claims must therefore be
dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights.
He failed to provide the required statutory notice of his state tort claims, and those claims are
time-barred in any event.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
(Docket No. 2) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and:
1.

Plaintiff’s federal conspiracy claim is DISMISSED with prejudice; and

2.

Plaintiff’s state-law claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.

Dated: July 29, 2011
s/Paul A. Magnuson
Paul A. Magnuson
United States District Court Judge

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