Francis v. Dosal et al

Filing 67

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 65 . The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 56 is DENIED; The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 37 is GRANTED; and the Amended Complaint in this action is DISMISSED with prejudice and judgment is entered for the Defendants. (Written Opinion) Signed by Judge Susan Richard Nelson on 01/24/2013. (jmf) CC: Francis. (kt)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Deborah Ann Francis,

Civil No. 11-CV-1536 (SRN/AJB)

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Sue Dosal, Mark Thompson, Leah
Wermerskirchen,
Defendants.

Deborah Ann Francis, 3945 Lancaster Lane N. Apt #223, Plymouth, MN 55441-1717,
pro se Plaintiff
John S. Garry, Assistant Attorney General, Atty. Reg. No. 208899, 445 Minnesota Street,
Suite 1100, St. Paul, MN 55101-2128, Counsel for Defendants

SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge
This matter is before the undersigned United States District Court Judge on the
Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) of Chief Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan dated
December 26, 2012. (R & R [Doc. No. 65].) Plaintiff Deborah Ann Francis subsequently
filed a “Notice of Motion Objection” to the R & R. (Doc. No. 66). For the reasons set forth
below, Plaintiff’s objections are overruled and the Court adopts the R & R.
I. BACKGROUND
The factual and procedural background of Plaintiff’s case is thoroughly detailed in
the Chief Magistrate Judge’s R & R and is incorporated herein by reference. (R & R [Doc.
No. 65].) Plaintiff, an African-American female, brought this civil rights action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Minnesota state court administrators defendants Sue Dosal, Mark Thompson, and Leah Wermerskirchen. In her complaint,
Plaintiff alleges that the jury selection procedure in Hennepin County violates the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by asking prospective grand jurors a
voluntary question regarding race. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 89-90 [Doc. No. 23].) Plaintiff further
alleges that asking questions regarding race allows court administrators to personally
exclude potential jurors on the basis of race. (Id. ¶¶ 57, 89-90.)
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants contend that there are no
genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that Plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law.
(Def’s. Mem. Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. at 3 [Doc. No. 39].) Specifically, Defendants argue
that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim fails because she cannot establish the prima facie elements of
an equal protection violation in the grand juror selection process. (Id.) In her cross motion
for summary judgment, Plaintiff asserts that she has established the elements of a
constitutional violation. (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. No. 57].) In the R & R
addressing these motions, Chief Magistrate Judge Boylan recommended that Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment be denied and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
be granted. (R & R at 15 [Doc. No. 65].) Accordingly, he further recommended that the
Amended Complaint in this action be dismissed with prejudice and judgment be entered for
the Defendants. (Id.)
II. DISCUSSION
According to statute, the Court must conduct a de novo review of any portion of the
Magistrate Judge’s opinion to which specific objections are made. 28 U.S.C. §
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636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); D. Minn. L.R. 72.2(b). Summary judgment must be
granted, entitling the movant to judgment as a matter of law, if the movant shows that no
genuine disputes of material fact exist. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
In her Objection, Plaintiff does not challenge any specific ruling in the R & R.
Rather, she objects to it “in its entirety for the reasons set forth in [her] complaint.”
(Objection at 1 [Doc. No. 66].) As stated above, this Court’s review of the R & R is limited
to those portions to which specific objections have been made.
Liberally construing Plaintiff’s arguments in light of her pro se status, see Horsey v.
Asher, even if she had made specific objections, the conclusions of the R & R must stand.
741 F.2d 209, 211 n. 3 (8th Cir. 1984). Chief Magistrate Judge Boylan correctly analyzed
the merits of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim under Floyd v. Garrison and examined the three
requirements Plaintiff must meet to establish a prima facie equal protection violation. 996
F.2d 947, 949 (8th Cir. 1993). As set forth in the R & R, Plaintiff must show that:
(1) blacks are “a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment;”
(2) blacks were substantially underrepresented in jury pools over a significant period
of time; and
(3) the jury-selection process is “susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral.”
(R & R at 10 [Doc. No. 65]) (citing Floyd v. Garrison, 996 F.2d 947, 949 (8th Cir.
1993).)
The Chief Magistrate Judge correctly determined that the first element of the test
was met because it is undisputed that African-Americans “are members of a group
recognizable as a distinct class capable of being singled out for different treatment under
the law.” (Id.) (citing Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 565 (1979)).
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Chief Magistrate Judge Boylan properly determined that the second element was
not met because Plaintiff based her claims on the lack of African-Americans on a single
grand jury, and a single discrepancy “cannot demonstrate systematic exclusion.” (Id. at
11) (citing United States v. Horne, 4 F.3d 579, 588 (8th Cir. 1993).) Furthermore,
Plaintiff failed “to provide any evidence comparing the proportion of African-Americans
in the total population to the proportion called to serve as grand jurors.” (Id. at 12.)
Chief Magistrate Judge Boylan also correctly found that even if Plaintiff had attempted to
provide this evidence, she would not have been successful because the data show a slight
overrepresentation of African Americans on grand juries in the Fourth Judicial District as
compared to the census percentage of African Americans eligible to serve on grand juries
in the Fourth Judicial District. (Id.)
Finally, the Magistrate Judge properly determined that even if the second Floyd v.
Garrison requirement had been met, the third requirement had not been. (Id. at 13.)
Plaintiff provided no support for her claim that the presence of the race identification
question on the jury qualification form allowed for discrimination. (Id.) Moreover,
Defendants provided evidence that the jury selection process is performed randomly by
computer, not personally by administrators. (Id. at 14.) This process does not use race
information voluntarily provided by potential jurors. (Id.)
In conclusion, the Court finds that Chief Magistrate Judge Boylan properly
analyzed the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. The Court therefore adopts
his recommendations granting Defendants’ motion and denying Plaintiff’s motion.

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THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

The Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 56) is DENIED;

2.

The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 37) is
GRANTED; and

3.

The Amended Complaint in this action is DISMISSED with prejudice and
judgment is entered for the Defendants.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

Dated: January 24, 2013
Nelson

s/Susan Richard Nelson
s/Susan Richard
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON
United States District Judge

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