Wold v. United States of America
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting defendant's 9 Motion to Dismiss/General (Written Opinion). Signed by Judge John R. Tunheim on May 10, 2013. (DML)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
ANDREA S. WOLD,
Civil No. 11-1616 (JRT/LIB)
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO DISMISS
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
James W. Balmer, FALSANI, BALMER, PETERSON, QUINN &
BEYER, 306 West Superior Street, Suite 1200, Duluth, MN 55802, for
plaintiff.
Lonnie F. Bryan, Assistant United States Attorney, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 600 United States Courthouse, 300 South
Fourth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55415, for defendant.
Andrea S. Wold (“Wold”) brings this action for injuries she suffered due to falling
on the ice while attempting to mail a letter on or near the United States Postal Service
(“USPS”) facilities in the City of Grand Rapids, Minnesota (“the City”). The United
States brings a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56. The Court will grant the United States’s motions because there is
no evidence that the United States can be held liable for snow and ice removal in the area
where Wold fell.
23
BACKGROUND
On January 26, 2010, at about 1:45 P.M., Wold slipped and fell on a drive-through
placed next to a concrete island near the post office in the City. (See Compl. ¶ 1, June 20,
2011, Docket No. 1; Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. B (Dep. of Ken Johnson
9), Nov. 30, 2012, Docket No. 10; Id., Ex. C at 20.) The island contained two mailboxes
and a City payment deposit box. (Id., Ex. C at 3-4, 20-21.) The City built the island to
provide its citizens access to the mailboxes from their cars. (Id., Ex. A (Dep. of Jeff
Davies 8-9).)
The United States claims that the City owns the island, as well as the two to three
feet of land next to the island where Wold likely slipped. (See id., Ex. C at 4; Johnson
Dep. 18.)1 Wold’s counsel alleged at oral argument that this two to three feet of land
may in fact be owned by the USPS, but he offered no evidence to support this allegation
and stated that he was not sure who owned the land.
The parties agree that the portion of the drive-through more than two or three feet
away from the mailboxes (which is closer in proximity to the post office) is owned by the
USPS and subject to an easement owned by the City. When the City constructed the
drive-through, the USPS granted the City an easement to build the drive-through “for the
purpose of public ingress and egress and construction and maintenance of concrete curb
1
Ken Johnson, the postmaster for the City’s post office, heard from a customer that a
woman had fallen outside. (Johnson Dep. 5-6, 9.) He went to find out what had happened and
saw an ambulance leave. (Id. 6.) Wold’s truck was still present and parked in the drive-through
with the driver’s side door next to the concrete island. (Id. 8.) Based on the information he
received, he believed that Wold had fallen directly next to the island. (Id. 9-10; Mem. in Support
of Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. C at 20.)
-2-
and gutter, concrete pavement, sidewalk, and associated improvements . . . .” (Mem. in
Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. C at 1.)
Wold’s complaint does not clarify where she fell in relationship to the drivethrough, island, or easement. It merely alleges that Wold suffered injury “while using
United States Postal Service facilities,” referring to the mailboxes, with no allegation
about who owned the land where she fell. (See Compl. ¶ 1 (emphasis added).) Wold has
also provided no evidence regarding the exact location where she fell.2 At oral argument,
Wold’s counsel stated that it was not clear from the record exactly where Wold fell and
that Wold does not recall, but that it was near the mailboxes. It is thus unclear if Wold
fell on property owned by the USPS or the City.
The City regularly removed snow and ice from the entire drive-through. (Davies
Dep. 16.) On January 24 through 26, 2010, the City plowed, removed snow, and deiced
the drive-through. It also brushed and cleared the adjacent sidewalk. (Id. 32-40, 61-65.)
The USPS has never removed snow or ice from the drive-through. (Johnson Dep.
15-16.) The USPS also never asked the City to plow or remove snow from the drivethrough on any specific occasion. (Id. 15.) However, the City’s agreement with the
USPS regarding the easement portion of the drive-through provides:
That any construction, maintenance or repair of the mail drop box drive
through, sidewalk and collection box island during normal business hours
of the Post Office shall be made on such terms and conditions as the
Postmaster of Grand Rapids, Minnesota shall approve . . . .
2
Wold has not been deposed and submitted no affidavit in response to the United States’s
motion.
-3-
Furthermore, it is understood between the parties to this agreement that the
United States Postal Service shall reserve the right to maintain and/or alter
the improvements described herein.
(Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. C at 1). It appears that the City never sought
or obtained approval from the USPS regarding the details of its snow and ice removal.
(Johnson Dep. 15; Davies Dep. 17.) Also, the United States claims that most of the snow
and ice removal that the City conducted was completed before business hours.
ANALYSIS
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.
Sovereign Immunity
The United States claims that it is entitled to sovereign immunity and brings a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). It is the
plaintiff’s burden to establish that jurisdiction exists. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d
724, 730 (8th Cir. 1990). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court is “free to weigh
the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). If the Court finds that jurisdiction is not present, it
must dismiss the matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526
U.S. 574, 583-84 (1999).
The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim against the United States
only if the United States has waived its sovereign immunity. United States v. Orleans,
425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976). The United States has waived immunity for some actions in
tort, under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2674; see United States
-4-
v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117–18 (1979) (“[T]he [FTCA] waives the immunity of the
United States and [courts] should not take it upon [them]selves to extend the waiver
beyond that which Congress intended.”). Specifically, the United States has waived
immunity for cases requesting money damages for injury caused by “the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). To establish the United
States’s liability, Wold must show that this waiver applies.
B.
Summary Judgment
The United States also brings a motion for summary judgment.
Summary
judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the
moving party can demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit, and a dispute is
genuine if the evidence is such that it could lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for
either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A court
considering a motion for summary judgment must view the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from those facts. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
-5-
II.
USE OF POST OFFICE BOX
To determine if the United States is entitled to prevail on either motion, the Court
must first consider the basis on which Wold attempts to hold the United States liable. In
her complaint and at oral argument, Wold did not hinge the United States’s alleged
liability on the fact that she fell on United States property. Instead, Wold claims that the
United States is liable because she fell while using a post office box.
Wold has cited no cases supporting her argument that the United States is liable
under the FTCA for her injuries merely because she was using a USPS mailbox, and the
Court finds that this fact alone is insufficient to establish the United States’s liability.
Generally, a business owner is required to exercise reasonable care to warn a business
invitee of dangers that the owner knows exist or which the owner could discover with
reasonable care. Dempsey v. Jaroscak, 188 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Minn. 1971); Behrendt v.
Ahlstrand, 118 N.W.2d 27, 30 (Minn. 1962). However, “[e]ach mailbox is not a branch
post office.” Dix v. United States, 296 F.2d 20, 23 (2d Cir. 1961). If the United States
did not own or control the land where Wold fell and did not contribute to the hazard near
the mailbox, it cannot be held responsible for Wold’s injuries even if she was using a
USPS mailbox. See Strong v. Richfield State Agency, Inc., 460 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1990) (holding that business owner was not responsible for plaintiff’s fall
because it did not own the property where the fall occurred and had not contributed to the
-6-
hazard).3 Accordingly, the Court finds that the United States is not liable simply because
Wold was using a post office box when she fell.4
II.
OWNERSHIP OF AND CONTROL OVER LAND
The Court will next consider whether the United States could be held liable
because it had ownership of or control over the land where Wold fell. Despite Wold’s
speculations to the contrary, there is no evidence in the record that the United States
owned the land two or three feet in front of the island, where she may have fell; instead, it
appears that this land was owned by the City. Thus, it appears that Wold fell either on
land owned by the City or on land owned by the United States but subject to an easement
by the City. The Court will first consider the United States’s potential liability if Wold
fell on land owned by the City and will then consider its liability if Wold fell on the
easement.
A.
Land Owned by City
If Wold fell on land owned by the City, there is no evidence to support the United
States’s liability. As stated above, the placement of a USPS mailbox on City property
does not create liability on behalf of the United States. Furthermore, there is no evidence
3
The Court further finds that the result is not different because this particular post office
box was located in front of a postal facility. See Dix, 296 F.2d at 24 (“There is no sound legal
reason why the fact that this particular box was placed . . . in front of the Post Office building
should put it in a different category from other similarly located and exposed mailboxes.”).
4
This holding alone is likely grounds to dismiss Wold’s complaint because she did not
allege who owned the land where she fell, and instead simply asserted that the United States is
liable because of she fell while using postal facilities. Nonetheless, the Court will consider
whether the ownership of or control over the land where Wold fell might subject the United
States to liability.
-7-
that the United States agreed to clear the area around the mailboxes from ice and snow or
otherwise acted in a way that might bring about its liability for Wold’s injuries.
Accordingly, if the City owned the land where Wold fell, the United States is not liable
for her injuries.5
B.
Easement
The Court will next consider if the United States can be held liable if Wold fell on
the easement. There are two potential arguments for why the United States could be
liable for a fall on the easement: first, because of its ownership of the land underlying the
easement, or second, because of its control over the City’s actions on the easement. The
Court will consider these arguments in turn.
1.
Ownership of Land
First, the Court will consider whether the United States is responsible because it is
the owner of the land upon which the easement is located. See Larson v. State, 790
N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. 2010) (“An easement is an interest in land owned by another
person, consisting in the right to use or control the land . . . for a specific limited
purpose.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court finds that this fact alone is not
enough to impute liability to the United States for occurrences on the land.
5
The United States is also not responsible, as an adjacent landowner, for maintaining
property owned by the City. See, e.g., Sternitzke v. Donahue’s Jewelers, 83 N.W.2d 96, 100
(Minn. 1957); Jones v. Evenstar Book Store, Inc., No. A05-863, 2006 WL 52263, at *6 (Minn.
Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2006).
-8-
Under the common law of easements, the party with the easement – here, the City
– and not the landowner is responsible for any damage resulting from a failure to
maintain or repair an easement, absent a separate agreement. See Matter v. Nelson, 478
N.W.2d 211, 214 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). There is no allegation of an agreement that
the United States would remove the ice and snow in this case. Thus, the Court finds that
the United States is not liable solely because it is the owner of the land underlying the
easement.
2.
Relationship with City
The Court will next consider if the United States can be held liable for Wold’s fall
on the easement because the City acted as an agent for the United States when it
conducted the snow and ice removal.6 To decide this issue, the Court must look to the
FTCA. As stated above, the FTCA allows the United States to be liable for the negligent
conduct of “any employee of the Government.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). An “[e]mployee of
the government” includes “officers or employees of any federal agency” and “persons
acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity.” 28 U.S.C. § 2671. When a
federal employee has caused damage by being negligent in the performance of his or her
6
Wold’s counsel stated at oral argument that Wold was not alleging that the City acted as
an agent for the USPS and was instead alleging that USPS employees were responsible for
maintaining the area around the mailbox. Wold has offered no evidence, however, that USPS
employees were responsible for removing the ice and snow around the island or that USPS
employees were prohibited from contracting with others to perform this task. Accordingly, the
Court will consider the issue of agency.
-9-
job, the United States is held liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
The FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for the actions of entities, such as
independent contractors, whose performance is not subject to the United States’s
supervision. Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 525-27, 531-32 (1973). This is so
even if the contractor would perform a task that would otherwise be performed by
salaried employees of the United States, id. at 532, and even where the contractor must
comply with federal standards and regulations, Orleans, 425 U.S. at 815. However, the
United States can be held liable for the actions of an agent over whom the United States
controls the day-to-day operations or the detailed physical performance. Id. at 814-15.
Applying these guidelines, the Court finds that the City was not an agent of the
United States when it conducted the snow and ice removal. First, there is no evidence
that the United States actually supervised or retained control over the City’s removal of
ice and snow from the easement. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the United States
had the contractual right to supervise this removal.7 As stated above, the contract
between the City and the United States allowed that the City’s maintenance of the
mailbox drive-through “shall be made on such terms and conditions as the Postmaster of
Grand Rapids, Minnesota shall approve.” The Court finds that this language did not
7
B & A Marine Co. v. Am. Foreign Shipping Co., 23 F.3d 709, 713 (2d Cir. 1994)
(“Courts have found it indicative of an agency relationship if the Government enjoys the power
to control the detailed physical performance of the contractor or if the Government in fact
supervises the day-to-day operations.” (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted));
see also Kirchmann v. United States, 8 F.3d 1273, 1275 (8th Cir. 1993) (“The critical question is
whether the government has asserted the power to control the detailed physical performance of
the contractor.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
- 10 -
provide the United States with authority to oversee the day-to-day operations or details of
the City’s snow removal; rather, it was more akin to setting general standards and
regulations (or, as stated in the contract, the “terms and conditions”) for the City’s
behavior. See Orleans, 425 U.S. at 815-16. Thus, the United States did not retain
sufficient authority over the City’s removal of ice and snow for the City to be considered
an agent of the United States under the FTCA. The United States therefore possesses
sovereign immunity for the City’s alleged negligence in its snow and ice removal, and the
Court will dismiss Wold’s complaint.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss and for summary judgment
[Docket No. 9] is GRANTED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED: May 10, 2013
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.
____s/
____
JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
- 11 -
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?