Pruitt v. Anderson et al
Filing
16
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 4 Motion to Dismiss. (Written Opinion). Signed by Senior Judge David S. Doty on 12/9/2011. (PJM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 11-2143(DSD/JJK)
Quera Pruitt, on behalf of
herself and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
Karsten Anderson, in his
individual and official
capacity; Dr. Beth Borgen,
in her individual and official
capacity; Red Wing Public
Schools, ISD #256; John and
Jane Does, in their individual
and official capacity,
Defendants.
A.L. Brown, Esq., Law Offices of A.L. Brown, 2515 White
Bear Avenue, Suite A-8103, Maplewood, MN 55109 and Joshua
R. Williams, Esq. and Law Office of Joshua R. Williams,
PLLC,
2701
University Avenue,
S.E.,
Suite
209,
Minneapolis, MN 55414, counsel for plaintiff.
Morgan A. Godfrey, Esq. and Johnson & Condon, PA, 7401
Metro Boulevard, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55439,
counsel for defendants.
This matter is before the court upon the motion to dismiss by
defendants Red Wing Public Schools, ISD #256 (ISD #256); Karsten
Anderson; Dr. Beth Borgen and John and Jane Does.
Based on a
review of the file, record and proceedings herein, and for the
following reasons, the court grants the motion in part.
BACKGROUND
This race-discrimination dispute arises out of student actions
during the Red Wing High School (RWHS) homecoming celebration in
2008 and 2009.
The RWHS student council encouraged students to
dress according to different themes during homecoming week. Compl.
¶ 9.
The student council designated the theme for Wednesday,
September 30, 2009, as “Tropical Day.”
Id. ¶ 10.
A group of RWHS
students instead decided the Wednesday theme would be “Wigger Day”
or “Wangsta Day.”1
Id. ¶ 11.
As a result, on Wednesday, September
30, 2009, sixty to seventy students wore “oversized sports jerseys,
low-slung pants, baseball caps cocked to the side and ‘doo rags.’”
Id. ¶¶ 11, 18.
Plaintiff Quera Pruitt is black and attended RWHS from 2008
until her graduation in 2010.
complained
to
school
Id. ¶¶ 1, 7.
officials
that
Pruitt and her mother
Wigger
Day
was
racially
offensive. Id. ¶ 25. Defendants “did not take school-wide action”
to address Wigger Day before “intervention by state and federal
government officials.”
Id. ¶ 30.
As a result, Pruitt chose not to
celebrate Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Day at RWHS.
1
Id. ¶¶ 31-34.
“Wigger” refers to “a white youth who affects the speech
patterns, fashion and other manifestations of black youth.” The
Routledge Dictionary of Modern American Slang and Unconventional
English, 1056 (Tom Dulzel ed., 2009).
“Wangsta” refers to
“someone, especially a white person, who poses as a gangsta
rapper.” Id. at 1038.
2
On July 29, 2011, Pruitt filed the present action, claiming a
hostile environment in violation of the Title VI of the Civil
Rights
Act
of
discrimination
1964
in
(Title
violation
VI),
of
42
42
U.S.C.
§
2000d;
race
U.S.C.
§
1983;
race
discrimination and aiding and abetting race discrimination in
violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) and common-law
negligence.
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim.2
DISCUSSION
I.
Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)).
“A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff [has pleaded]
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
Although a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, it must raise a right to relief above
2
Defendants also move to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5).
Following proper service of
process upon ISD #256, those motions are moot.
3
the speculative level.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
“[L]abels
and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action are not sufficient to state a claim.”
Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In general, the court does not consider matters outside the
pleadings in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); Brooks v. Midwest Heart Group, 655 F.3d 796,
800 (8th Cir. 2011).
In this action, the charge of discrimination
filed with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, Brown Decl.
Ex. E, ECF No. 11-1, is outside the pleadings: it is not attached
to the complaint or referenced in the complaint.
II.
Title VI
Section 601 of Title VI provides that “no person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Individuals may
sue under Title VI for intentional discrimination.
Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001).
As an initial matter, the Eighth Circuit has not addressed
school liability for student harassment under Title VI, but has
found such harassment actionable under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (Title IX).
See Wolfe v. Fayetteville, Ark.
Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2011); Shrum ex rel. Kelly v.
4
Kluck, 249 F.3d 773, 782 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Davis ex rel.
LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
Congress modeled Title IX after Title VI, and courts look to both
statutes for guidance.
See Grandson v. Univ. of Minn., 272 F.3d
568, 571 (8th Cir. 2001).
Moreover, several other courts of appeals have held that a
plaintiff may sue a school district under Title VI for intentional
failure to address a racially hostile environment.
See Whitfield
v. Notre Dame Middle Sch., 412 F. App’x 517, 521 (3d Cir. 2011);
DT v. Somers Cent. Sch. Dist., 348 F. App’x 697, 699 (2d Cir.
2009); Bryant v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. I-38, 334 F.3d 928, 934 (10th
Cir. 2003).
As a result, the court determines that Title VI
supports an individual suit against a school for intentional
discrimination in the form of a racially hostile environment.
To
state
a
claim
for
a
racially
hostile
environment,
a
plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to support a reasonable
inference that a defendant was “(1) deliberately indifferent (2) to
known acts of discrimination (3) which occurred under its control.”
Shrum, 249 F.3d at 782 (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 664).
A school
is deliberately indifferent when it ignores a “strong likelihood
that pursuit of its questioned policies will likely result in a
violation of federally protected rights.” Meagley v. City of Little
Rock, 639 F.3d 384, 389 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Barber ex rel.
Barber v. Colo. Dept. of Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222, 1228-29 (10th Cir.
5
2009).
To constitute discrimination under Title VI, student
harassment must be motivated by a plaintiff’s race and be “so
severe,
pervasive,
and
objectively
offensive,
and
that
so
undermines and detracts from the victims’ educational experience,
that the victim-students are effectively denied equal access to an
institution’s resources and opportunities.”
Davis, 526 U.S. at
651; see Wolfe v. Fayetteville, Ark. Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 860, 864,
867 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Acts of name-calling do not amount to sexbased harassment [under Title IX], unless the underlying motivation
for the harassment is hostility toward the person’s gender.”).3
In the present action, the complaint contains few factual
assertions.
Pruitt alleges that students participated in Wigger
Day in 2008 and that on September 30, 2009, sixty to seventy
students dressed in a manner stereotypically associated with black
youth.
She further alleges that RWHS was aware of Wigger Day in
2009 but took inadequate action to prevent its reoccurrence.
Upon
a motion to dismiss, the court must view the plausibility of the
claim as a whole, drawing on “judicial experience and common
sense.”
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
Common sense suggests that
even these meager facts are sufficient to “raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of a Title VI
violation.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
3
As a result, dismissal of
The language of Title IX, “on the basis of sex,” is
materially the same as Title VI, “on the ground of race.”
Compare
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
6
the Title VI claim against ISD #256 is not warranted, and the
motion is denied as to ISD #256.
Dismissal is warranted, however, as to the Title VI claim
against Anderson. Title VI does not support individual liability.
See Whitfield, 412 F. App’x at 521; Schotz v. City of Plantation,
Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1170 n.12 (11th Cir. 2003); Buchanon v. City
of Bolivar, Tenn., 99 F.3d 1352, 1356 (6th Cir. 1997).
Therefore,
the Title VI claim is dismissed with prejudice as to Anderson.4
III.
Section 1983
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides in
relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any
State...subjects,
or
causes
to
be
subjected,
any
citizens
of
the
United
States...to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 is not an independent source of
rights, and a complaint must allege a deprivation of a specific
right, privilege, or immunity. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187
(8th Cir. 1986).
The
present
complaint
alleges
that
“[p]laintiff
had
a
constitutional and statutory right to have equal access to public
education, without regard for her race.”
4
Compl. ¶ 47.
Defendants
Pruitt conceded her Title VI claim against Anderson.
7
argue that the complaint fails to identify a violation of a
constitutional right.
Even
reading
an
The court agrees.
Equal
Protection
Clause
claim
into
the
complaint, the complaint is too vague to provide sufficient notice.
Defendants cannot know whether Pruitt claims failure to train RWHS
employees, failure to act upon complaints of unconstitutional
conduct or some other basis.
See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); Plamp v. Mitchell Sch. Dist. No. 17-2,
565 F.3d 450, 459 (8th Cir. 2009).
Therefore, the § 1983 claim is
dismissed without prejudice, with leave to amend as to ISD #256.5
IV.
MHRA Claims against ISD #2566
A claim of an unfair discriminatory practice under the MHRA
must be brought within one year after the occurrence of the
practice.
See Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subdiv. 3.
Pruitt alleges
that the discrimination occurred on September 30, 2009.
She filed
this action on July 29, 2011, well past the one-year limit. Pruitt
did not plead or attach a timely charge of discrimination. As a
result the MHRA claims appear barred by the statute of limitations.
5
Pruitt conceded her § 1983 claim against Anderson, and that
claim is dismissed.
6
Pruitt conceded her MHRA claims against the individual
defendants, and those claims are dismissed.
8
The charge of discrimination7 that Pruitt filed with her
memorandum in opposition suggests that she did file within one year
of September 30, 2009, and thus her MHRA race discrimination claim
may be timely.
See Brown Decl. Ex. E., ECF No. 11-1.
But the
charge of discrimination is not properly before the court, and
therefore, the MHRA claims are dismissed without prejudice, with
leave to amend as to ISD #256.
V.
Negligence
The MHRA states, “[A]s to acts declared unfair by sections
363A.08 to 363A.19, and 363A.28, subdivision 10, the procedure
herein provided shall, while pending, be exclusive.”
§ 363A.04.
Minn. Stat.
The negligence claim arises out of the same facts and
the same duty created by the MHRA.
If Pruitt timely asserted a
§ 363A.13 claim of race discrimination, that claim would be the
exclusive state-law remedy.
Because the court dismisses the MHRA
claims with leave to amend, it does not address the negligence
claim.
Should Pruitt amend her complaint to state a claim under
the MHRA, dismissal of the negligence claim would be warranted
under § 363A.04.
7
The court notes that the charge of discrimination only
addresses race discrimination, not aiding and abetting, and it
appears that dismissal with prejudice of the aiding and abetting
claim may be proper. The charge, however, is not properly before
the court, and the court withholds judgment.
9
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
The motion to dismiss [ECF No. 4] is granted in part;
2.
The motion is denied as to the Title VI claim against ISD
# 256 and granted as to Anderson;
3.
The motion is granted as to the § 1983 claim against all
individual defendants and granted without prejudice, with leave to
amend, as to ISD #256;
4.
The motion is granted as to the MHRA claims against all
individual defendants, and granted without prejudice, with leave to
amend, as to ISD #256;
5.
The motion is denied as to the negligence claim, with
leave to renew should Pruitt state an MHRA claim; and
6.
Pruitt is granted leave to file an amended complaint in
accordance with this order no later than January 10, 2012.
Dated:
December 9, 2011
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court
10
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